INTRODUCTION

Through the kindness of George E. Ganss, S. J., of the Institute of Jesuit Sources, WOODSTOCK LETTERS presents a translation of *La Ley Ignaciana de la Oración*, a study by Ignatian specialist and Congregation *peritus*, Miguel A. Fiorito, S. J.

With a translation of Michael Petty’s article on the nativity narratives and the *Exercises*, WOODSTOCK LETTERS carries on the dialog it began a few years ago between modern Scripture studies and the Christ-life contemplations in the *Exercises*.

A recent issue printed William W. Meissner’s study of the psychological dimension of authority. Fr. Meissner, S. J., who recently received his M. D. from Harvard, in this issue further develops the less traditional significances of authority.

The backgrounds of our reviewers in this issue are as diverse as the books treated: James J. DiGiacomo, S. J., Catechetics Department Chairman at Brooklyn Preparatory and Lecturer in Religious Anthropology at Fordham University; Patrick J. Ryan, S. J., ordinandus at Woodstock and former resident of Nigeria, Senegal, and The Gambia; Robert R. Boyle, S. J., Professor of English at Regis College, Denver; and Sr. Sharon Feyen, S. D. S., Editor of *World Wide*. 
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WOODSTOCK LETTERS solicits manuscripts from all Jesuits on all topics of particular interest to fellow Jesuits: Ignatian spirituality, the activities of our various apostolates, problems facing the modern Society, and the history of the Society, particularly in the United States and its missions. In general it is our policy to publish major obituary articles on men whose work would be of interest to the whole assistancy.

Letters of comment and criticism will be welcomed for the Readers' Forum.

Manuscripts, preferably the original copy, should be double-spaced with ample margins. Whenever possible, contributors of articles on Ignatian spirituality and Jesuit history should follow the stylistic norms of the Institute of Jesuit Sources. These are most conveniently found in Supplementary Notes B and C and in the list of abbreviations in Joseph de Guibert, S.J., The Jesuits: Their Spiritual Doctrine and Practice, trans. W. J. Young (Chicago, 1964), pp. 609–16.

STAFF
IGNATIUS' OWN LEGISLATION ON PRAYER

Ignatian and post-Ignatian concepts

MIGUEL A. FIORITO, S.J.

Evolution in law and custom can imply either creative adaptation and development, or loss of the original clarity of vision, or, as is generally the case, a combination of both. Such is the case with the concept of Ignatian prayer. In recommending change in our traditional methods of prayer, Jesuit scholars have had to return to the original Ignatian sources and, from an understanding of the mind of Ignatius, evaluate subsequent modifications in Jesuit practice.

Following the spirit of the 31st General Congregation, Fr. Miguel A. Fiorito, S.J., published an exhaustive study on the development of Ignatian prayer, “La ley Ignaciana de la oración en la Compañía de Jesús,” Stromata 22 (1967), pp. 3-89. The text and notes were translated and edited in their entirety by Fr. Aloysius A. Jacobsmeyer, S.J., with the assistance of Fr. George E. Ganss, S.J., who had worked with Fr. Fiorito in the preparation of the original monograph, and Fr. John R. Kelly, S.J. While retaining all the references to the sources used by the author, due to limitations of space, the editors have omitted the lengthy textual citations contained in the notes of the original version.

In the recent 31st General Congregation, the Society of Jesus has questioned herself, thus imitating in her own small measure the Church of Vatican Council II.¹ The Congregation devoted time to

many studies concerning the origins of the order, and also to serious reflection upon the realities of its place in modern circumstances.

One of the subjects of study and reflection which the General Congregation undertook was the topic of prayer, especially in its legislative expression in the Society. In this matter also, the Society of Jesus has in its own way followed the example of the Church of our time. In two Constitutions, the conciliar Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy and the post-conciliar one on penance, the Church has sought a new legislative expression which might foster the spirit of prayer and penance in men of our time. In both Constitutions, that of Vatican Council II and that of Paul VI, the service which the "new law" has aimed to offer to the permanent spirit of renewal of the Church has been the diminution of external prescriptions on rites or a clear opening of the door to personal adaptations in regard to fasts and abstinence. Such search for new legislative expression must obviously and necessarily be accompanied by the necessary study of the sources and by reflection on the realities of the present situation.

The study which we now offer, on the Ignatian legislation on prayer in the Society of Jesus, was composed in early 1966 amid those special circumstances of the Church and of the Society in which the latter, in the spirit of Vatican Council II, was preparing her renewal and her current legislative updating. Those circumstances are still present to some extent, and hence we believe it fitting to publish the study with minor corrections of detail. One of the characteristics of the recent General Congregation, is the fact of its being only a point of departure, an inspiration for post-congregational work. In this effort, the study of the sources and reflection on their exact present value continue to be as necessary as they were for the editorial drafting of the new legislative documents. As Father General Peter Arrupe told all the Jesuits in a letter touching on the acceptance of the decrees of the General Congregation, the Society of Jesus will live in "a time of intense

2 Pope Paul VI in his discourse at the end of the 31st General Congregation spoke to us of "all those things which you have so carefully done during this most important period . . . as though concluding four centuries of [the Society's] history just after the close of the Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, and beginning a new era of your militant religious life with a fresh mentality and with new proposals."
expectation, not of mere waiting but of hard work without prospect of immediate results; for it is only by effort and feeling our way that our essential and enduring values can be expressed, as they should be, in an idiom that has undergone some change. Our expectation should be serene and optimistic. Patient persevering effort will gradually develop new expressions better adapted to our times. We are certainly preparing for a new period of history in which there will be a fuller understanding of the personal, Christian and religious vocation. For this new phase of our history, a phase characterized by waiting for the new and more adequate expressions of our essential and perennial values, there must be many historical studies and simultaneously much reflection on the present. As Father General indicates in the same letter, this waiting ought to take place as something shared by all.

We believe that it was necessary to give the above introduction on the present plan of our study and reflection concerning the law of prayer in the Society of Jesus. With regard to the same study, we mention this in advance: both in the title of this study as well as in its development, whenever we speak of the law or legislation on prayer, we do not mean only the law which with mathematical precision, so to speak, prescribes the time to be employed by rule in prayer or the method of prayer. We also mean the legislation which exhorts us to prayer, or rather, which offers directives to improve prayer—by indicating, for example, its external conditions of silence, mortification, or control of the senses. Finally, we mean the law which lays down principles of a life of prayer based on revelation and on a sane psychology and sociology, in the measure that these sciences contribute to the grasping of revelation as the word which is directed by God to each man.

From all this rich content of the law concerning prayer in a religious order such as the Society of Jesus, it is of special interest for us to call the attention of our readers to the principles, by means of which the legislator—in our case, St. Ignatius—puts the spirit of prayer before our eyes. That spirit is the end of his legislative expression, while all the rest—prescriptions, directives, exhortations—are only means to attain that spirit more securely.

Moreover, we believe that it is those principles which in an

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original manner make the law on prayer developed by St. Ignatius for the Society of Jesus genuinely Ignatian, while many of the other elements of the same law may be common with other forms of spirituality, and may be copied verbatim from the legislation of other religious institutes. This has happened, for example, in respect to the "hour of prayer" or to its method being "mental," or to the performing of the prayer "in the morning." Within the Society, too, these elements may perhaps, through being incarnated in diverse social and cultural environments, change the spirit of the Ignatian law without their being by this fact changed themselves.

Consequently our study, although it assumes the ambitious title of "Ignatius' Own Legislation on Prayer" looks especially to the vital, intrinsic element which is the spirit of prayer. It pays attention to the other elements only in the measure which is necessary for the attainment of that primary goal. This is all the more necessary because the historians who have preceded us in the study of the law on prayer in the Society of Jesus have allowed themselves to be absorbed too much, in our opinion, in one or other circumstantial element of prayer, as appears, for example, from the very titles of their works. Fr. Leturia's own title serves as instance: "The Morning Hour of Meditation in the Society of Jesus." His study is a prototype of an historical orientation which has given attention almost exclusively to the element of the duration of prayer—a continuous duration, too. Moreover, with that observation made, we wish to keep free from a controversy which was begun at the beginning of the present century, or even earlier. For it has dragged along from the very beginning of the Society and was continued during the recent 31st General Congregation. History is the master of life. But whoever lives as one engaged in controversy is not a good master of history.

Nevertheless, we hope that by focusing our attention on the spirit of the Ignatian legislation on prayer in the Society of Jesus, certain elements of the law, such as the prescribed duration and method of prayer, may occupy their true place. On the other hand,
we also hope that other elements which have been practically for-
gotten may come into prominence in our study. Examples in point
are the intervention of the local superior in adapting the law to
each of his subjects and the responsibility and initiative of the
subject in his personal prayer-life and its time schedule. To
facilitate this new perspective, which holds great importance in
regard to the practical consequences of our study, we shall en-
deavor to present the spirit of St. Ignatius’ legislation on prayer,
not in the abstract, but as something incarnated in concrete
elements. That spirit is what imparts life to the elements.

Bibliography of Ignatian prayer

The controversy about the Ignatian law on prayer, with one
side favoring it and the other favoring the present law introduced
into the Society since the generalate of Borgia, has been going on
for almost a century, if not for four centuries. For that reason we
believe it useful to embody in the text itself of this article, rather
than in footnotes or an appendix, the bibliographical antecedents
of our historical study. The history of the Ignatian law concerning
prayer in the Society of Jesus, begun at the beginning of the
century, is still developing; we think that the recent legislative
expression which was worked out painstakingly during the two
sessions of the General Congregation of the Society of Jesus, May 7
to July 15, 1965 and September 8 to November 17, 1966, can give
a new impetus to the innate curiosity of historians.

We limit ourselves here to the authors who devoted themselves
defined universal norm for the manner and length of prayer” (no. 11).
Consequently, other elements of the universal rule have been able to occupy
the principal place in this decree. Ibid., no. 11.

"Our rule of an hour’s prayer is therefore to be adapted so that each Jesuit,
guided by his superior, takes into account his particular circumstances and
needs...” But to each Jesuit the same decree states: “The charity of Christ
urges us to personal prayer and no human person can dispense us from that
urgency” (no. 7). In regard to the forgetting in practice which befell those
elements of the legislation (intervention of the local superior and responsibility
of each subject), it is symptomatic that the best and most complete study
on the subject of prayer in the Society, that of Leturia in AHSJ, III (1934),
47-108, scarcely and only in passing refers to those elements; and only in reply
to a later criticism does he speak about them a little more, but always without
expressly to the Ignatian law, and pass over those who studied other laws on prayer in other religious orders and congregations, in which work they are still engaged. This latter fact implies that a "spiritual evolution" is going on in our day, as the recent General Congregation mentioned, and also that this evolution, spiritual in its origin and aim, finds a vehicle of expression in historical study. This is all the more reason for insisting on our purpose indicated above, of attending primarily to the spirit which found expression in the more original elements of the Ignatian law on prayer in the Society of Jesus, and of leaving to other historians the detailed study of its other secondary elements, or the study of the legislation on prayer in other religious institutes in the Church.

Each one of the authors whom we cite in succession as explicit bibliographical antecedents of our study has his own peculiar value, and has made his own contribution to the clarification of the subject, no matter how much they may contradict and even try to displace one another. We shall not state precisely what we take or reject from each author, because that would provoke among our own selves and among our readers the same controversial spirit which till now has considerably impaired the history of the Ignatian law concerning prayer in the Society. On the other hand, to keep our bibliographical list from being a mere citation, we shall say something positive about almost all these authors, or at least about those who are better known:

P. Bouvier. "Les origines de l'oraison mentale en usage dans la Compagnie," Lettres de Jersey, 1922, pp. 594-613. This author, who published his work twenty years after having written and distributed it in mimeograph, is the first and almost the only one who presents St. Ignatius within the tradition of the great lawgivers of religious orders who have been rather parsimonious in their legislation on prayer.


J. M. Aicardo. Comentario a las Constituciones de la Compañía de Jesús (Madrid, 1920), Libro VIII, cap. 3, pp. 386-409. He presents the

7 See the text cited in footnote 4.
continuous duration of prayer as a method or manner of prayer, and not as a mere prescribed duration of prayer.

O. Karrer. *Der Heilige Franz von Borja* (Freiburg, 1921), pp. 249-274. He carries to the extreme the pejorative interpretation of Borgia’s intervention in the change of legislation about prayer in the Society after the time of St. Ignatius, by isolating his interpretation a little from the subsequent historical context. This called forth the complementary and corrective study of Leturia.

A. Astrain. *De oratione matutina in Societate Jesu* (1923), 84 pages.

P. de Leturia. “La hora matutina de meditación en la Compañía naciente,” *AHSJ*, III (1934), pp. 47-86; “Documentos,” *ibid.*, pp. 87-108 (Cf. *Estudios Ignacianos* [Rome. 1957], II, pp. 189-268). This author’s treatise is and continues to be the best on the post-Ignatian period of the legislation on prayer (Borgia, Mercurian, Aquaviva) in the Society. In regard to what pertains to the Ignatian period properly so called, Leturia’s treatise can only be supplemented, improved, and corrected in the sense to be explained below.

P. Dudon. “S. Ignace et l’oraison dans la Compagnie de Jésus,” *RAM*, XV (1934), pp. 254-257. He proposes certain subtle objections, not always felicitious, to the previous work of Leturia. The latter answers him in the following article.

P. de Leturia. “De ‘Constitutionibus collegiorum’ P. Ioannis de Polanco ac de earum influxu in Constitutiones S.I.,” *AHSJ*, VII (1936), pp. 1-30. (Cf. *Estudios Ignacianos*, I, pp. 355-387). Here Leturia includes, at least in passing, important elements of the Ignatian law (for example, the personal intervention of the local superior) which he had neglected in his former work, and which the criticism of Dudon obliged him to take into account at least in passing and in a few words.

I. Iparraguirre. “Para la historia de la oración en el Colegio Romano durante la segunda mitad del siglo XVII,” *AHSJ*, XV (1946), pp. 77-126. He brings in personal documents of early Jesuits, whereas the earlier writers confine themselves to the study of the public and official documents. In this sense Iparraguirre supplements our knowledge of the post-Ignatian period of the legislation on the hour of prayer in the Society of Jesus.

P. de Leturia. “Lecturas ascéticas y lecturas místicas entre los Jesuitas del siglo XVI,” *Archivo italiano per la storia della pietà*, II (1953), pp. 8-34 (Cf. *Estudios Ignacianos*, II, pp. 269-331. What he says of the refectory reading, on pages 282-283, is partly on the law of prayer in the Society and is of interest to us. Our citations are from the
text which is reproduced in Estudios Ignacianos. On the same topic, see Aicardo, Comentario, II, pp. 222-228, 536-537, and V, pp. 466-472); on private reading, pp. 283-286; on Nadal, Mercurian, and Aquaviva, pp. 295-311.

J. de Guibert. La Spiritualité de la Compagnie de Jésus (Rome, 1953). In the English translation by W. J. Young, The Jesuits: Their Spiritual Doctrine and Practice (Chicago, 1964), see the index, s.v. "prayer, the time to be given to it," on page 673, and especially ch. 2, pages 85-96, on the means of formation, and ch. 14, pages 544-565, on mental prayer.


I. Iparraguirre. Estilo espiritual Jesuitico (Bilbao, 1964), 279 pages. In chapters VI-VIII he treats of the same theme, but more fully than in the previous study.

B. Schneider. "Der Konflikt zwischen Claudius Aquaviva und Paulus Hoffaeus," AHSJ, XXVI (1957). See pp. 11-12, where he produces a new document of that period which takes on significance for the present day.

H. Bacht. "Zur Frage nach den Anfängen der täglichen Betrachtungstunden in der Gesellschaft Jesu." This study, still in a manuscript of 29 pages, bears no date. In the light of Leturia's treatises of 1934-1953, Bacht best brought up to date Bouvier, who had written in about 1902.

Anonymous. "De iis quae S. Ignatius de formali orationis exercitio sensit atque statuit." Documentum praevium 26 for the 31st General Congregation. This study of early 1965 synthesizes in 11 tightly typed pages the principal studies issued up to that time. It takes the same line of interpretation as Leturia.


S. Egusquiza, "El tiempo de oración en la primitiva Compañía." A study still in manuscript, 73 pages. 1966.

The hour of prayer

As one might observe in reading these authors, the historical sources on the law of prayer in the Society of Jesus, especially in the post-Ignatian period, that is, from the generalate of Borgia to
our own time, do not limit their consideration to the so-called "hour of mental prayer in the morning." Instead, they also treat of the other "hours," moments, or methods of prayer: visits to the Blessed Sacrament and examens, litanies and rosary, spiritual reading and domestic exhortations, and also the annual Spiritual Exercises, the days of weekly or monthly recollection, the renovation of vows, and so on and so forth. But, for the sake of brevity, we restrict ourselves to the study of the aforementioned hour of prayer. On the one hand, it is something so characteristic of the modern Society that the 31st General Congregation devotes to it the two most discussed paragraphs of the recent decree concerning prayer in the Society. On the other hand, that celebrated hour of prayer appears as the origin of the other hours which are its natural consequences. Thus, if we study more exactly the history of the hour of prayer, we shall, as it were by rebound, have a better knowledge of this history of the hours of prayer in the Society of Jesus, and that without distracting ourselves greatly about details. By this we do not mean that we do not take these into account; on the contrary, they have been an indispensable clue for us to distinguish the Ignatian law from the law which was working itself out little by little after the death of St. Ignatius, and especially after the generalate of St. Francis Borgia. Although for practical reasons we center our attention on that daily hour of prayer, yet we never lose sight of the context of the other hours; they are more characteristic of the whole post-Ignatian period than the hour itself.

Having established this first comparison, we shall divide the whole history of the law on prayer into two large periods: the first, in which the only preoccupation appears to be a daily time of prayer; the other in which there is a discussion about the various

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8 Decree on Prayer, nos. 11 and 12. No. 11 is for Jesuits in general, but especially for those already formed, and no. 12 is more particularly about Jesuits in formation. The 31st General Congregation speaks then of the rule of the hour of prayer (no. 11), and of the Society's custom or usage which prescribes an hour and a half for prayer, Mass, and thanksgiving (no. 12, 2°). Meanwhile it does not speak of the other "hours," although it does treat of the different traditional manners of prayer, such as the so-called examens of conscience (no. 13), the "lectio divina" (no. 14 and parallel passages), the prayer in common, in addition to liturgical prayer (no. 15), the annual Spiritual Exercises (no. 16); but practically and without a precise determination of time.
times and methods of prayer, with each method having its own measure, which is almost always delimiting. In this period, too, the legislation endeavors at all costs to maintain the method as something different and distinctive. These two periods are also found in the life of the Church; the Society of Jesus, as a faithful daughter, reflects them in her own interior life. Let us think, for example, on the history of the breviary or the directive and prescriptive rubrics of the Mass, and we shall understand what we mean when we speak of periods in the law on prayer in the Society of Jesus.

With a little simplification, these two periods are the following:

1) The first period extends from 1539, the origin of the Society, to 1564, the death of Laynez. We call this the Ignatian period because in it the legislative conception of the founder prevails, in law although not always in execution.

2) The post-Ignatian period extends from 1565 to 1965. Thus it embraces all the time after the generalates of Borgia, Mercurian, and Aquaviva. Within this post-Ignatian period these three generals form, as Leturia indicates, a decisive bloc for implanting the morning hour of mental prayer in the Society of Jesus, as well as the other hours and delimiting methods of prayer.⁹

Concerning the second period, and especially its nucleus established by the three fathers general mentioned, we rely on the magnificent study of Leturia, based on first hand documents. The only objection that can be made to this work is, as we said, that it restricts itself to the "hour" of prayer, and does not pay sufficient attention to the other hours, such as litanies and the like, which by reason of the same post-Ignatian legislative spirit were being gradually introduced. So we shall not directly expound this historical period of the present law or rule on prayer in the Society, but give our chief attention to Leturia’s conclusions and data.

In regard to the first or Ignatian period, however, we shall permit ourselves not to accept Leturia’s conclusions, for they appear to us to be influenced by a partial view of the data, and by a point of

⁹ This is the period which was brought within the scope of the decree where the 31st General Congregation states that it, "recognizing the value of current developments in the spiritual life, does not intend to impose upon all indiscriminately a precisely defined universal norm for the manner and length of prayer" (Decree on Prayer, no. 11).
view too favorable to these three fathers general. Perhaps Leturia’s viewpoint is a reaction to the viewpoint of other historians who are too adverse to those same three generals. Be that as it may, in our opinion it is risky to devote so much attention to the duration of prayer imposed by law or rule, or to fail to distinguish between the time imposed which is mere time, and the time which is itself a method of praying (for example, when there is an order that the prayer be made for an hour without interruption, or in the morning), or to fail to see other elements equally or more important in the Constitutions of St. Ignatius, and in his correspondence on the topic of prayer (such as the personal initiative and responsibility of the subject, and the authoritative direction of the local superior). Such procedure is, in our judgment, to read the documents of the past with partiality and, unconsciously, to interpret them in the light of a later personal experience which has almost completely forgotten those elements of the life of prayer in the Society of Jesus.

For these and other reasons we shall limit our study to the first period, the period we have called Ignatian even though it includes the generalate of Laynez. Passing over all except the highlights of the post-Ignatian period, we shall take account of what the 31st General Congregation called “the contemporary spiritual evolution,” or, if you wish, the present climate in the Society and the Church. This climate appears above all in the two great ecclesiastical “laws” on prayer and interior life: the conciliar Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy, and the apostolic constitution of Paul VI on penance. After discovering—or rediscovering—the spirit of the Ignatian legislation on prayer, we propose to treat its contemporary relevance for Jesuits, who are men and Christians, in the post-conciliar world. If the objection should be raised that we are preoccupied by the present circumstances, and that we too run the risk of distorting history and of falling thus into the same fault of partiality or favoritism which we imputed to Leturia, we would at once answer briefly: first, the history of the past can be constructed only from the present viewpoint of the observer, and to claim a history entirely “objective” is the worst of all subjectivisms. Second, the

present time resembles much more the time in which St. Ignatius lived than that immediately after him during the generalates of Borgia, Mercurian and Aquaviva. Therefore, still looking at St. Ignatius from the present and not from the years of his successors, as Leturia did, we are able to be more accurate in our historical interpretation. For the interpretation proceeds more from a sympathetic understanding and personal experience than from the cold observation of historical documents.\textsuperscript{11}

A chronology of Ignatian prayer

Nevertheless, we do not wish to make this leap from the time of St. Ignatius to our time without offering at least a panoramic view of the combined whole. We present this immediately by pointing out the more important dates and outstanding facts:

1539. \textit{Deliberatio Primorum Patrum}. This is, as it were, a first “Summa” or Conspectus of the Society of Jesus, which sketches its first characteristic features as a new religious order.

1540. The first \textit{Formula of the Institute}, the Bull of Paul III, \textit{Regimini militantis Ecclesiae}, which is the juridical expression and confirmation of Ignatius’ spiritual intuition concerning his new religious order. From the \textit{Formula} as a basis, St. Ignatius begins on his own account the editing of the Rules or Constitutions of the Colleges (that is to say, the colleges of formation), to which are soon added the first Rules of some colleges for externs.

1547. Polanco’s work as secretary begins, and from that time on the previous legislative work is accelerated, and the work of the correspondence involved in government and spiritual direction of the growing order increases in parallel manner. This task of legislation is directed not only to the colleges or to Jesuits in formation, but to the whole Society.

1548. St. Ignatius’ correspondence about the prayer of Jesuits, written in a manner characteristic of him, is intensified. This correspondence becomes antecedent material for the respective parts of the \textit{Constitutions} which treat prayer. As in the first rules, the time and method of Jesuit prayer were entrusted to the superior, the

superiors consulted Ignatius, and he served as the “living rule” on prayer (and also penance) in the infant Society.

1549. Text a of the Constitutions is drawn up. It was written by Polanco, but may correspond more closely than others to St. Ignatius’ original views.12

1550. Second Formula of the Institute, that of Julius III, Exposcit debitum, which came to be the definitive one. Text A of the Constitutions also belongs to this period, where the hand of St. Ignatius is frequently observed correcting Polanco, and where what refers to prayer is entirely from the hand of St. Ignatius. There does not seem to be the slightest indication here of any interpretation whatever by his secretary.

1553. The promulgation of the Constitutions, entrusted to Nadal, begins. They are in Text B, and this is the text which continues to be the object of minor retouchings by the hand of St. Ignatius himself until his death in 1556.

1556. Death of St. Ignatius, which as a matter of fact establishes the definitive stability of the present text of the Constitutions.

1558. The 1st General Congregation elects Laynez as general, and promulgates the Constitutions just as St. Ignatius left them at his death. We add that from the time shortly before the death of St. Ignatius to the death of Nadal, the latter is the principal interpreter of the Ignatian spirit in the Constitutions. It is Nadal, thanks to his continuous journeys, who introduces his interpretation in the whole Society by means of his theological writings on spirituality and his instructions. Nevertheless, as we shall see later on in a concrete case, it appears that Nadal allows himself to be influenced in his interpretations by his new superiors, or rather, by Borgia, as General; also, that he corrects his earlier writings to bring them into line with the legislative changes introduced after the 2nd General Congregation.

1565. The 2nd General Congregation elects Borgia as general of the Society, and entrusts to him the framing of a new decree concerning the time of prayer in the Society. The Congregation first

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12 F. Roustang, “Sur le rôle de Polanco dans la rédaction des Constitutiones S. I.,” RAM, 54 (1966), 193-202. This Text a could have been copied by Polanco from an earlier Ignatian text.
discussed the subject, and when the assembled fathers failed to reach agreement, requested the new general to decide what was best in respect to the matter, while keeping in mind places, persons, and the like. Thus the new law or rule on prayer in the Society, that of the post-Ignatian period, began in an atmosphere of compromise. We shall point out only the most important dates of this post-Ignatian law, as follows:

1573. The 3rd General Congregation elects Mercurian general. In spite of the fact that he came from the northern provinces, in which the resistance to the Borgian decree was stronger and the desire to return to St. Ignatius’ Constitutions was more frequently reiterated, Mercurian continues in the line of Borgia and prepares the intervention of Aquaviva.

1581. The 4th General Congregation elects Aquaviva as general.

1615. Aquaviva dies. His generalate, the longest of this whole post-Ignatian epoch, succeeds in establishing definitively the legislation of the integral hour of mental prayer in the morning, although not as yet in these express terms.

1923. 27th General Congregation gives this law its definitive legislative expression.

1946. First mitigation of that iron law, in the letter of Father General Janssens. It gives a more benign interpretation of the “mental” method of performing the prayer which the rule enjoined.

1957. Second mitigation, in the 30th General Congregation. It gives permission to distribute the hour during the day. (This is also a mitigation of the method, since prayer through a continuous hour is a method of praying.)

1965. The problem of the return to the Constitutions in what refers to prayer in the Society arose again, after it had lain dormant since the time of Aquaviva except for one or two instances of discussion. In the first session of the 31st General Congregation three solutions were presented. In the time between the sessions data of every kind were studied and put together. In the second session discussion took place and the voting established the present decree on prayer, in which the return to the Ignatian Constitutions has been tempered with respect for the post-Ignatian tradition of the “hour” of prayer. We shall see later on in what manner or measure
the two tendencies, which some considered opposed and even contradictory, were able to be reconciled. In reality, an intelligent agreement between them is possible only if the characteristic elements of the trends in the two traditions are very clearly distinguished. That is precisely what we are endeavoring to do in our study concerning the Ignatian period of the law on prayer in the Society of Jesus.

The Ignatian Period of the Legislation on Prayer

Before we enter upon the genuinely historical study of our subject, it serves our purpose to give the precise meaning of certain terms. In the first place, the distinction between formal prayer and virtual prayer has already been made by different authors. We shall not discuss the advantages or disadvantages in this distinction, but we point out in advance that we always refer to formal prayer. It seems to us to be the only object of the law on prayer which we are studying, for that distinction does not appear to have been in St. Ignatius' mind when he was legislating. Yet by this remark we do not wish to reduce formal prayer to the prayer which is made in one's room or in the chapel, at an hour determined beforehand and made known by a bell, and so forth. Such conditions are not formalities of prayer, but mere circumstances of formal prayer; and even though we are accustomed to consider them as monastic customs, they do not pertain to the origin of monasticism. Cassian, for example, does not so materially interpret the words of Matthew 6:6 ("When you pray, go into your room, and shut the door and pray to your Father . . .") but purposely observes: "We pray within our room when, with our heart separated from the din of thoughts and cares, we disclose our desires to God in a certain manner secretly and familiarly. We pray 'with the door shut' when without opening our lips and in silence we supplicate him who understands hearts no less than words. We pray by ourselves when with intent heart and mind we simply manifest our petitions to God, so that the very devils cannot know what we are asking."13

13 Collatio IX, c. 35 (édit. Sources chrétiennes, Cassien, Conférences, II, 71-72), PL 49, col. 816-817, where the commentator Alardo refers to a Pauline text, "I wish that man pray in every place . . ." (1 Tim 2:8) in order to insist that the words of the Gospel ought not to be understood in a material
We know, moreover, that St. Ignatius used to practice, in the midst of his occupations, this formal and not merely virtual manner of praying, especially under the form of the examen; we shall see further on that, because it is a more formal method of prayer which can be made frequently during the day, he would prefer it for his own men, without failing to praise, for others, a more material manner of making formal prayer. We shall also see that Blessed Peter Faber preferred this manner of formal prayer which springs, so to speak, from action, and returns to the action anew, in a circle of action and prayer a little distinct from that which others propose. But we shall return to all these matters later, and for that reason let it suffice for the moment to have stated precisely the meaning which we give to formal prayer as the object of the Ignatian law, since this object will become a little different in the post-Ignatian period of the law on prayer in the Society. That is, this formal prayer will become more material.

Another point of precision which should be made refers to the distinction between public prayer (or prayer in common) and private prayer (which we are reluctant to call personal, because the prayer that is made in common is also personal). For the sake of brevity, we shall center our attention more expressly on private prayer, although we think that there is not much difference in regard to what refers to the spirit of the Ignatian law—and that spirit is our concern, as we said in the beginning. Furthermore, this rivalry or opposition between public and private prayer which has been going on, particularly in our own time, is something entirely outside the perspective of St. Ignatius. As we shall see shortly, he imposed upon those who were in formation the recitation of the Little Office or the Office of the Virgin because it was the private prayer which more resembled the breviary which they would later have to recite as ordained priests.

Sufficiently bound up with the distinction just made from which we wish to prescind is another distinction from which we shall completely prescind: the distinction between mental and vocal prayer. In our opinion, St. Ignatius does not allow himself to be

influenced by the "Devotio Moderna" in such a way as to fall into an exaggerated spiritualization of mental prayer, as did some of his successors in the application of the legislation for the Society. Just as in the Exercises he distributes the prayer, by means of his preludes, into deeds and words, so also as legislator he embodies it into some external text or context. And without being in this respect as explicit as St. Teresa, who directly states that if vocal prayer is not mental, it is not prayer, St. Ignatius, as a director of souls and as a founder, pays no attention to that difference between mental and vocal prayer, a difference which is merely extrinsic and of little practical importance. Consequently, in the future we shall always refer to prayer without further concern about its form, whether more or less mental, more or less vocal.

**Formed and formation**

Hitherto we have noted one series of distinctions (between formal and virtual prayer, public and private prayer, mental and vocal prayer) which have been introduced and accentuated within the Society after Ignatius, and which therefore do not interest us in the study of the legislation on prayer in its Ignatian period. One last distinction remains, which St. Ignatius did take into account, but which we will make: the distinction between formed Jesuits and Jesuits in formation.

The following is the brief legislative history of this distinction. We should attend to it now, because later on we shall dwell on it at greater length in our historical study of the law of prayer for those who are in formation.

1) Text a of the Constitutions, of 1549, is written in the hand of Polanco, but is perhaps a mere copy of an earlier draft of St. Ignatius himself. It says nothing about the formed Jesuits in the matter of prayer. Nor does Text A, of 1550. In both texts the delimiting law or prayer looks solely to those who are in formation.

2) Text B already says that, in reference to prayer, the formed Jesuits are only under the law or rule of discreet charity. Or, perhaps this consequence is explicitly derived from the earlier

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16 Cf. the recent study of Roustang, cited in footnote 12.
silence and is explained by the long formation or probation. But at times the personal providence of the local superior is extended to those formed Jesuits. This providence, as we shall see later, is the most characteristic note of the law on prayer for those who are in formation.

3) The distinction between the formed and those in formation is maintained purposely in the 1st General Congregation, which elected Laynez general in 1558; and the same reason is given and the same providence is assumed.

Up to this point the Society's law in the Ignation period remains the same. But did that distinction perdure in fact? Leturia wishes to prove, perhaps to minimize the distance between the Ignatian and post-Ignatian periods, that in fact, in the houses of the early Society, such difference between the formed and those who were in formation was not made. As evidence for his view he uses a testimony of Nadal in his Scholia. At first sight the text appears definitive, because Nadal says expressly that "up to the moment, the professed have been subject to rules, not only in the colleges but also in their houses, and in the same matters about which we are treating here," that is, about prayer and penance.

But Leturia failed to take notice that the text he cites is a later correction which Nadal himself made in his earlier text during the generalates of Borgia and Mercurian, after the juridical situation had changed. Nadal's earlier text, on the contrary, read as follows: "And so the professed, we understand, ought not in their private exercises to be either urged on or restrained by rules, in those things of which there is question here." But later he added, at the end of the paragraph, the text cited by Leturia. This kind of correction, made by Nadal in his writings, is wont to be found after the generalate of Borgia; it is very likely that this correction may be one of them, since it favors the change introduced in the law or rule on prayer in the Society after the 2nd General Congregation.

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17 Cons, (583), Text B, p. 6, c. 3, lines 21-27 in ConsMHSJ, II, 546.
18 Decree 97 of Congregation I, in InstSJ, II, 177.
21 ArchRSJ, Inst. 207, f. 70.
22 Ibid., f. 71.
Consequently, and contrary to what Leturia claimed, no proof has yet come in support of the opinion that the difference between the formed and those being formed, which is so clearly present juridically in the Ignatian legislation, was non-existent in fact. The mere change made in Nadal's own hand in his earlier testimony seems to be a sufficient proof that the earlier testimony was correct. For it had been written when he was not yet influenced by the change in the legislation concerning prayer in the Society of Jesus.

For the future, then, we ought to consider that difference as intrinsic to the law on prayer in its Ignatian period. Consequently, we should perhaps study separately the law properly so called (which for those in formation establishes a time and to some extent a method of praying) and the "rule of discreet charity" which, properly speaking, is something intrinsic in the law, not external to it.

Nevertheless, it will not be necessary to study both these aspects of the Ignatian law or, if we may call them such, these watersheds which gave rise to two currents of opinion later on. For on the one hand, the "discreet charity" is rather well known, thanks to the study of the Spiritual Exercises as a "school of discernment" or election; and on the other hand, as we shall see at the proper time, the law of prayer for those in formation is a kind of incarnation of the "discreet charity" and gives this law a pedagogical orientation, as the 31st General Congregation expressly acknowledged in its recent decree on prayer.

Therefore, in spite of our ambitious title, which announces a historical study of the Ignatian legislation concerning prayer in the Society of Jesus, we shall limit ourselves to the direct study of the one part of it which expressly has reference to those who are in formation, the scholastics and brothers. We shall allow the "rule of discreet charity," which pertains to those already formed, to remain on the horizon as an ideal to which the Ignatian law for those who are in formation leads, in the manner which we shall explain later.

Furthermore, we shall try to place in clear light the elements of the Ignatian law for those who are in formation. Sometimes these elements are easily recognized, as, for example, the responsibility and initiative of the subject himself, and the personal direction of the local superior. At other times they appear, at least often, as
elements proper to the Ignatian law for those already formed. An example is the option it permits among different manners or methods of fulfilling the duration which is prescribed. But we must never forget the elements which are obviously diverse for those formed and those being formed, for example, the daily duration or time of prayer quantitatively imposed by law.

In other words, the more our historical study will be limited to the law on prayer which St. Ignatius elaborated for those who were in formation, the better will it serve, to some extent, to improve our understanding of the "rule of discreet charity" proper to those already formed. Thus too, in turn, a deeper understanding of this interior law helps to the comprehension of the external law proper to those who are in formation.

Finally, the recent decree of the 31st General Congregation can make this approximation of the one law to the other more intelligible. This Congregation, maintaining to some extent the difference between formed Jesuits and Jesuits in formation, has made these two groups similar in various important aspects.  

Ignatian elements

With the object of our study thus determined upon, we can begin our presentation of this study, issued to all the delegates of the recent General Congregation between the two sessions as a preparatory document for the second session. In that document we had a complete list of letters, early drafts of legislative texts, and definitive texts which had a bearing on this study, and which we used in working out our historical interpretation. These documents were numbered for easy reference. For practical reasons of space we must omit that list here and in ordinary footnotes refer merely to the most expressive texts.

With this introduction now completed, we enter upon our study proper. We have personally read all these documents, and this led us to detect in St. Ignatius' mind, when he legislates on the subject of prayer in the Society of Jesus, the following three elements which we consider fundamental. In these elements his spirit as

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23 Decree on Prayer of the 31st General Congregation, nos. 11-12.
24 We mean all the texts which are found published in the series of the MHSJ.
legislator is embodied, and also his spirit as spiritual director of his sons of all times:

1) The relation between the superior and subject in regard to prayer; or rather, the superior as the “living rule” on prayer for each subject in particular;

2) The method or manner of praying, which the superior suggests or recommends or prescribes to the subject;

3) The time or duration which the subject should devote each day, as a general rule, to prayer.

Not only is the order in which these three elements are placed important in the mind of St. Ignatius, but it is also the chronological order in which they are presented in the legislative texts of the Ignatian period which we are studying. By contrast, in the post-Ignatian period the first element will gradually disappear; the second will be reduced to the manner of praying, namely mental, morning, and continuous; the third element will come to occupy the first place of importance and will be turned into the crucial point of all the discussions.

Therefore as we proceed we shall look for these three elements, separately and in the order indicated above, in the mind of St. Ignatius and in the Ignatian documents.

Superior and subject

It is with full deliberation that we place the superior and subject together as a primary element of the law on prayer in its Ignatian period. They are inseparable. They are found in a direct relation, and no one should think that the one has more right to intervene than the other. The greater the responsibility of the superior as father and master, the greater to the same degree is the co-responsibility of the subject as spiritual son and disciple. That which is a general truth in the government of religious is equally or more true in regard to the prayer-life of the subject: prayer as such is an interior act which can be practiced by obedience, but which before all is a personal response to the call of God, and a fidelity to the law of charity which the Holy Spirit writes in our hearts.

26 These are words of the text of the 31st General Congregation’s Decree on Prayer, no. 7.
This accounts for the fact that the first legislative texts on the prayer of a Jesuit mention, as the only rule of prayer, the person of the local superior: “No one, in addition to the obligation which he has and to which holy Mother Church obliges him, ought to perform more meditations or contemplation or prayer or abstinence than that which the superior will order him.”

Let us mention, for now and further on, that whenever we speak of the superior, we mean that what the superior does in virtue of his office, the director or confessor may do or ought to do by delegation.

This also explains the fact that in the early Society, before any fixed law or rule concerning the time and manner of prayer was imposed, the correspondence of the generals, St. Ignatius and Laynez, with the local superiors concerning the prayer of the subjects was so abundant. While St. Ignatius was still living, the letters which treat of prayer are more numerous than the legislative texts! By contrast, the later fixed law or rule brought as its immediate consequence the steadily diminishing importance of this primordial element in the Ignatian legislation.

But here there is more than a mere consideration of quantity. We mean that, because of the large number of letters of the superior general concerning the law on prayer, St. Ignatius’ correspondence with each superior is a source of legislative interpretation. Further still, it is a more important source than other documents which, though legislative in character, were simply preliminary drafts and never gained the force of law in the Society. We are referring to the preliminary drafts of Polanco as secretary of the holy founder in the preparation of the Constitutions. Other historians consider them a decisive argument. To us, however, they do not appear to be such, both because of what we suggested above about the different mentality of Ignatius and Polanco, and also

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27 “Constitutions of the Scholastics of the Society,” in ConsMHSJ, I, 175.
29 An example of this diverse mentality is found in the objection which Polanco makes, after Ignatius’ death, in a still unpublished text beginning with the words “Quaedam quae aliter videntur dicenda ex Exam., Const., et Decl.,” to words in the text of Constitutions, (340), that study can be “immo magis Deo . . . gratum”: “Vel addendum de prolixis orationibus . . . vel simpliciter moderandum. Videtur tollendum to magis quia nimis haec verba favel studiis
because St. Ignatius is clearly responsible for the letters which he sends although he may not have written them, while he does not consider to be his those documents which Polanco prepared but which were never promulgated.\(^{30}\)

For that reason we have given so much importance in our work to the correspondence of St. Ignatius; and we admit the documents called antecedent and not promulgated, of the time of Polanco, only insofar as they coincide with that correspondence. In both cases St. Ignatius made use of the hand of Polanco, and perhaps more generously in his letters than in his laws. But he sent the letters while he held back the antecedent legislative documents, sometimes indefinitely.

We think of Nadal in a somewhat similar way. He was as it were the voice of St. Ignatius for the promulgation of the Constitutions; but not all that he said at that time was in keeping with Ignatius’ mind, as we know from the severe judgment which St. Ignatius made of his visit to Spain in what referred precisely to prayer.\(^{31}\)

Leturia presents Polanco as one of those who represent “a bond of spiritual continuity that . . . unites . . . both periods” (the Ignatian and the post-Ignatian).\(^{32}\) But to us it seems rather a bond which does not exist, because, in the first place, it is concerned with Polanco, and in the second place, because Leturia trusts too much in the antecedent documents not promulgated by St. Ignatius, although written by his secretary. We would say the same of Nadal and his explanations of the Institute, especially those which he obviously corrected after the death of St. Ignatius. For we have already seen the influence which the founder’s successors in the legislation and government of the whole Society seem to have exerted upon Nadal.

\[^{30}\text{EppIgn}, I, 19-23.\]

\[^{31}\text{MonNad, II, 32; Memoriale P. Da Câmara, no. 256, in SdeSl, I, 278, and FN, I, 676-677; also no. 196 in SdeSl, I, 250-251 and FN, I, 644-645.}\]

\[^{32}\text{Estudios Ignacianos, II, 242. Leturia presents that opinion as a conclusion of his whole study.}\]
The local superior

After this clarification on the value of the Ignatian correspondence as a source of interpretation more secure than the preliminary legislative sketches which were not promulgated, we shall return to our subject, that of the primary role which the superior has by reason of office, and the spiritual director or confessor by delegation, in the Ignatian legislation on prayer. And it is of interest to call attention especially to the complementary role, merely indicated above, which the subject himself has in that Ignatian legislation. Or better, there is not merely an understanding of the subject's psychological, cultural, and social temperament, but, as St. Ignatius said, of his devotion, grace, and any special need he might have at the moment. In the earliest documents, and also in some of the subsequent ones, the superior's intervention appears to be as absolute and entire as it is in the question of dress and diet. But gradually the part of the subject himself becomes more explicit—his initiative, his devotion and graces, of his spiritual necessity.

It is in the Constitutions that we more clearly see this interest of St. Ignatius for the part which touches the subject in his own prayer. In Text A of 1550 he makes additions in his own hand to the preliminary draft of Polanco, such as the following phrases: according to each one's devotion, for the true devotion of those (scholastics), that the scholastic might be helped more by means of divine grace, with greater attention and devotion.

We insist upon this aspect of the Ignatian legislation, namely the intervention of the subject, because it is historically related with the intervening of the local superior; and also because in the post-Ignatian law both the superior's part and the subject's part were replaced by the universal and excessively delimiting prescrip-

\[33\] ConsMHSJ, I, 58-59.
\[34\] EppIgn, II, 236, letter to Borgia: that prayer "is better for each individual in which God our Lord communicates Himself more by showing forth His most holy gifts and spiritual graces, because He sees and knows what is more suitable to the individual, and as He knows all, He shows him the way; and to find that way it helps us much, with the aid of His divine grace, to seek and experiment by many ways in order to travel along that one which is more manifest. . . ."

\[35\] Ibid., III, 502.
\[36\] Cf. ConsMHSJ, II, 410-414.
tion of the duration and manner of praying. In other words, it seems that every excessively delimiting prescription seeks to take the place of the will, not only of the weak subject but also of any local superior whatsoever. For St. Ignatius too supposed that the subject could be weak in regard to prayer and penance and vacillating in spirit. But the solution he hoped for was the solution from the will of the local superior, and not one from a universal law.

The Ignatian law on prayer does not suppose, as some historians favorable to the post-Ignatian law do, that the Jesuits will be indiscreet only by excess and never by defect. In no place does St. Ignatius say that he believes the excesses of fervor will be more frequent than the deficiencies in it. On the other hand, he points out expressly that in any case whatever, whether one of excess or of defect, the local superior who is nearby ought to supply the remedy, and not a legislator from afar who gives one prescription for all without distinguishing between fervor or relaxation. For that reason, in the Constitutions, before stating the legislation about those in their studies, St. Ignatius asserts that this double danger exists equally for either direction: “Just as care must be taken that through fervor in stud’ they do not grow cool in the love of true virtues and of religious life, so also during that time mortifications, prayers, and long meditations will not have much place.”37 A little further on he points out that in both dangers the local superior ought to apply the remedy, by so intervening that “in the case of some the period of prayer could be lengthened or shortened.”38

Without prejudging which may be more frequent, he points out the same double danger for those already formed, when he tells them, also at the beginning of the section which he devotes to their interior life: “On the one hand, the members should keep themselves alert that the excessive use of these (spiritual) practices may not weaken the bodily energies and consume time to such an extent that these energies are insufficient for the spiritual help of the neighbors according to the Institute; and on the other hand they should be vigilant that these practices may not be relaxed

37 Cons, (340), P. 4, c. 4, n. 2.
38 Ibid., (343), Decl. B, P. 4, c. 4.
to such an extent that the spirit grows cold and the human and lower passions grow warm." 39 Here too it is the local superior who ought to exercise personal care "to keep them from being either excessive or deficient in their spiritual exercises." 40

Nadal, underlining in almost the same words the importance of the role which the superior plays in the spiritual life of his subjects, says that "the superiors and prefects of spiritual things ought to use the same moderation which we know to have been familiar to Father Ignatius and which we say is proper to our Institute. Hence, if they judge that someone is making progress in the Lord with a good spirit in his prayer they should not prescribe for him nor interrupt this progress. . . . But if there is one who is not advancing or progressing well, or is carried along by some illusion, let them try to lead him back to the true path of prayer and to true progress in Christ Jesus." 41

Arguments

Therefore the hypothesis that Ignatius' law on prayer is parsimonious in prescribing duration because he supposes Jesuits who fail only through excess and not through defect has no support in the text itself of the Constitutions. There remains only a recourse which is elaborated later and outside the text in search of a means to justify the change of this Ignatian legislation into another which universally imposes more time of prayer. This hypothesis is defended only among those who wish to defend the change of the Ignatian law into the post-Ignatian one. By what arguments? It is worth the trouble to look at them one by one, for they aid much toward our understanding of the Ignatian law itself on prayer.

1) The first argument does not originate from the text itself of the Ignatian law concerning the prayer of the formed, which, as we saw, is impartial to excess or deficiency in the spirit of prayer. Instead, it springs from the context or beginning of the chapter: "Since those who are incorporated into the Society wait through a period of time and approval of their lives before admission to the profession, and also before admission among the formed co-

39 Ibid., (582), P. 6, c. 3, n. 1.
40 Ibid., (583), Decl. A.
41 Nadal, "In Examen Adnotationes," in MonNad, V, 163.
adjutors, it is presupposed that they will be spiritual men sufficiently advanced to run in the path of Christ our Lord.”

Our first reply is that according to the official Latin translation, made by Polanco, the text does not say “on the hypothesis of their being spiritual men,” but rather is a way of showing confidence in all the Jesuits, present and future. Polanco translated the Spanish phrase se presupone into Latin by “tanquam certum ducitur.”

Secondly, we deny that from that “hypothesis” there follows, in the mind of the legislator, a mitigated or delimiting law in regard to the duration of prayer. Or rather, we would not deny the mere hypothesis, as we did before, but the consequence which the defenders wish to derive from it. What should follow in the mind of St. Ignatius from such a hypothesis is that the local superior ought to intervene quickly and according to the need of each case, without awaiting or necessitating universal laws!

The fact that this is St. Ignatius’ intention in his legislation is proved by some thought of Laynez. For Laynez gives the following answer on two different and successive occasions:

a) “If someone in a particular case should have need of increasing his penance, the door is not closed to the superior to ordain what discreet charity should dictate. But to give a general rule, it is not expedient that those matters should be increased much.”

b) “The reason which your Reverence touches on, which also moved the consultors, about the special need of some, leads to no conclusion greater than this, that a dispensation should be granted to some individuals so that they may devote an hour and a half (or even more) to prayer because of the special need perceived in their cases to increase its duration. This need will not be the same in all others.”

42 Cons, (582), P. 6, c. 3, n. 1.
43 Nadal, commenting on this Latin phrase of the Constitutions, says “si aliquo casu, vel negligentia vel aliquo mentis vitio, aliter eveniret, esset tunc alia disciplina utendum . . .” (Scholia (Prati, 1883), p. 130. Italics supplied.) The term disciplina turns out a little ambiguous for us; but perhaps it is applied more to the local order than to a universal law.
44 Letter to Bustamante, MonLain, IV, 579-590.
45 Letter to Quadros, MonLain, V, 357. It is a commentary for “the understanding of the Constitutions on the hour of prayer . . .” The “dispensation” spoken of in the cited text is the superior’s “power” of giving more time for
Therefore it is not necessary for us to deny that a hypothesis may exist in the Ignatian law, because we can always deny that anything follows from it except the need of the local superior's personal intervention. Or rather, we deny that according to the mind of St. Ignatius (and of Laynez) recourse to a universal law is necessary if that hypothesis of great fervor is not verified. For the intervention of the local superior is enough to solve such a problem.

Furthermore, it is clear to us that St. Ignatius preferred not to resort to a universal law to solve these problems of prayer. Laynez expressly mentions this in the letter cited above: "But to give a general rule, it is not expedient that those matters should be increased much." The letter in which this occurs is treating expressly about penance.46

Da Câmara, in his Memoriale, considers this Ignatian preference as "the reason why our Father Ignatius so often refers in the Constitutions to the opinion of the superior; because he saw that it was impossible to give a general order in things that are moral."47 Da Câmara also points out that St. Ignatius did not wish, as universal legislator, to limit the power of the individual superiors, because then these superiors omitted to do what belonged to them, and did what did not belong to them. Now, this is precisely what happened little by little in regard to the prayer of the subjects, once the post-Ignatian law was established. Through the transformation of this universal law, excessively delimiting time and manner of prayer, into the role which the Constitutions entrusted to the superiors in regard to subjects less fervent, the local superior gradually ceased to act as father, and turned insensibly into an administrator, into one who merely executes the laws in the eyes of his immediate subjects. In large measure, although not solely, through this law, the government, especially the local government, ceased to be predominantly spiritual and became too "bureaucratic" in the sense of a mere fulfilling of laws and prescriptions. The 31st General Congregation, on the contrary, in trying to return not only in this decree on prayer but also in other decrees, such as those on prayer to one who may need it, without the necessity of relying on a universal law which prescribes it for all.

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46 Cf. Letter of Suarez to Father General Laynez, MonLain, V, 64-66.
47 FN, I, 687.
the office of the general, on the provincials, and on other matters, to the moderation of the Constitutions and rules, has at the same time insisted that the government of the Society is above all spiritual.

2) There is a second argument which defenders give to support their hypothesis, that hypothesis which holds the following: the Ignatian legislation is so minimal in prescribing the duration of prayer because it presupposes fervent Jesuits somewhat prone to go to excess in prayer! Hence, when these Jesuits ceased to be fervent in this manner, the Society had to change the Ignatian law into another. This hypothesis is based entirely on the same Da Câmara whom we just used in our favor. There is question of the comment he made on Nadal’s visit to Spain to promulgate the Constitutions, and on the displeasure which St. Ignatius showed to him for having increased the time of prayer for the Spaniards.

A question of texts

Let us note that we do not wish to enter upon a discussion as to whether or not the hypothesis of fervor explains the parsimony of the Ignatian law in prescribing the time of prayer. Rather, our interest is to prove that even if this whole hypothesis of excessive fervor or deficiency should be right, St. Ignatius gives truly great importance to the local superior in the solution of these personal problems. Nevertheless, now that we have already entered on the subject, let us pursue it to the end.

Our first reply is one “ad hominem.” When Leturia depends on Da Câmara, he uses in turn now the Spanish and now the Portuguese text of the Memoriale in order to make the argument in favor of the hypothesis stronger. But this is not permissible in this case. There is a great difference of time between the one text and the other, and the Portuguese text was written under the influence of a controversy in which Da Câmara represented the severe opinion asking for more austerity in the formation of Jesuits. In these

48 Cons., (822), P. 10, n. 10.
49 31st General Congregation, Decree on Obedience, no. 8.
51 Estudios Ignacianos, II, 212-213.
52 Memoriale, no. 257, in SdeSI, I, 279, FN, I, 678.
circumstances, it is Da Câmara’s advantage to attribute to St. Ignatius the hypothesis of his imparting a good formation; and for that purpose he attributes to that hypothesis the Ignatian restraint in legislating on prayer in the Society. Therefore it is not licit to argue, as Leturia does, by using indiscriminately now the primitive Spanish text and now the later Portuguese text of the Memoriale.

There is a second reply. If we give more attention to the Spanish text which is contemporaneous with the occurrences recounted, we see that Da Câmara gives here, in addition to the well known hypothesis of fervor, other reasons:

a) “The other day, when the Father was talking to me, he told me that in his opinion, there could be no greater error in spiritual matters than to try to guide others as oneself. He was speaking to me about the long periods of prayer he had practiced.” To the words “to guide others” we would add “or to legislate for them.”

b) “He then added that out of a hundred men who give themselves to prolonged prayers and severe penances,” Da Câmara continues, “the majority expose themselves to great harm. The Father was referring especially to stubbornness of judgment.”

c) “And thus he (the Father) was placing the whole foundation in mortification and abnegation of the will. When he told Father Nadal that one hour of prayer was enough for the scholastics, he was placing the chief stress upon this mortification and abnegation. Thus it is clear that the Father constructs a strong foundation from all the things of the Society, such as the indifference which is presupposed, and the examination after a candidate has passed through his probations and obtained the necessary favorable testimony, and not from prayer, except for the prayer which springs from these things. Thereupon the Father praised prayer highly, as I already mentioned many times, especially that prayer which is made by keeping God always before one’s eyes.”

We have quoted almost the entire Spanish text, because it treats directly of the Ignatian legislation on prayer, while the later Portuguese text is a commentary on the esteem which St. Ignatius had of prayer. And we see in this Spanish text that in addition to the hypothesis of previous mortification with which the text begins

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53 No. 256, in SdeSI, I, 278 and FN, I, 678.
in which he narrates the visit of Nadal to Spain, Da Câmarã gives two other reasons.  

A resume

We have no interest in delaying longer in this argument advanced by those who wish to defend the change in the legislation on prayer in the Society, because it has no direct bearing on our purpose. For our study is not to discuss whether good or harm was done by abandoning the Ignatian law and passing into the post-Ignatian legislation. We suppose that good was achieved, and that the Society of that time gained something by it. But our aim is to penetrate into the spirit of the Ignatian legislation. Toward this purpose, we can now say in resume:

1) In what refers to the personal prayer of the subject, it is more important for St. Ignatius that the subject rely on the spiritual and discreet personal intervention of the local superior, rather than on a general law which, precisely because it is a universal law, can become indiscreet or too "legalistic" at times of change in the subject's mentality or environment.

2) In regard to spiritual matters such as prayer, for St. Ignatius in his capacity either as a director or as a legislator, there is no greater error than to try to guide others along the same path as some one person, in what pertains to the duration and manner of praying.

3) In what refers concretely to prayer, St. Ignatius judges it more important to legislate concerning the presuppositions or conditions for good prayer than upon the length of continuous time devoted to it.

This is, point by point, what the 31st General Congregation has just been doing in regard to the hour of prayer, without depreciating thereby the value of the tradition introduced by the post-Ignatian law. The Congregation has restored to the local superior his place of privilege as a "living rule" of this discipline of prayer and of all external discipline. But rather than guiding all along

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54 FN, I, 676.
55 Referring in general to all that constitutes external discipline, such as daily schedules and the like, the 31st General Congregation states in its Decree on Community Life and Discipline, no. 10: "These rules pertain to the whole
one same path by imposing “upon all indiscriminately a precisely defined universal norm for the manner and length of prayer,” it has abounded in declarations which motivate and stimulate the search of one's own personal path of prayer. Finally, with its decrees on the religious life, on each one of the vows, one the common life, and the like, it has created the ideal conditions for a renovation of both personal and community prayer in the Society of Jesus.

With this we finish our exposition of the first element of the Ignatian legislation, the correlation or co-responsibility of subject and superior in what refers to the subject's life of prayer, and we pass on to the other characteristic elements of that legislation. Here too we observe something original in the Ignatian spirit and which, just like the previous element, is intimately related with the Spiritual Exercises of the founder and legislator of the Society of Jesus. Therefore it should be interesting to advance the following observation. Although it is true that the entire preoccupation of the legislators of the post-Ignatian period, especially since Aquaviva, is to find the inspiration for their laws in the Exercises, they saw in these Exercises the external rules which refer to the “continuous hour” or to the “mental manner” of praying, rather than the interior presuppositions of personal direction and spiritual discretion. And for that reason—that is, not through fault of these legislators but because of circumstances in their environment—the balance between some elements and others, which is characteristic of the Exercises, has not been preserved in the religious life of the Society; the preponderance of the continuous time of prayer or of the mental manner of praying issued into a diminution of direction and spiritual government in the society, above all in what referred to the formed members. But we shall observe this better by treating directly and separately both elements of the Ignatian legislation, the duration and the method of prayer.

The Manner of Praying in the Ignatian Law

St. Ignatius, who speaks so copiously about different methods of prayer in the Exercises, is, on the contrary, very sparing on this subject in the Constitutions. Moreover, the different methods of vital range of religious obedience, and their application to individuals is subject to the living rule of a superior.”

56 Decree on Prayer, no. 11.
prayer which are in Text a disappear in Text A, and in their place appear, in the hand of St. Ignatius, words less expressive.\textsuperscript{58} To corroborate the difference, let us note that the words of Text a are highly similar to the words which Polanco uses in the “Constitutions of the Colleges,”\textsuperscript{59} while those of Text A are more like the words that St. Ignatius used in the “Regulæ Collegii Romani,”\textsuperscript{60} and in his letter to Fr. Brandao,\textsuperscript{61} so that the parsimony in legislating on the method of prayer is really proper to St. Ignatius.

The definitive text of the Constitutions maintained the same restraint in what referred to the method of prayer of the scholastics and brothers in formation: “Consequently, in addition to confession and Communion . . . and Mass . . . they will have one hour. During it they will recite the hours of our Lady, and examine their consciences twice each day, and add other prayers according to each one’s devotion until the aforementioned hour is completed, in case it has not yet run its course. Furthermore, they are to do all this according to the arrangements and judgments of their superiors, whom they oblige themselves to obey in place of Christ our Lord.”\textsuperscript{62} Further, this prescription of the Office of the Virgin is understood in such a way that “in the case of the scholastics who are not obliged to recite the Divine Office, that hour can more easily be changed at times to meditations and other spiritual exercises by which the hour is filled out. This holds true especially with some who do not advance spiritually by the one method, that with the grace of God they may be helped more by the other, with the permission or through the order of their superiors . . .”\textsuperscript{63} Still further, “Others (for example, some of the temporal coadjutors who do not know how to read) will have in addition to the Mass their hour, during which they will recite the rosary or crown of our Lady, and they will likewise examine their consciences twice a day, or engage in some other prayers according to their devotion, as was said about the scholastics.”\textsuperscript{64}

\textsuperscript{57} ConsMHSJ, II, 178. \textsuperscript{58} Ibid., 410-412. \textsuperscript{59} Ibid., IV, 219-222. \textsuperscript{60} Ibid., 251-253. \textsuperscript{61} EppIgn, III, 508-509. This letter is almost contemporaneous with the text of the Constitutions indicative above, corrected by the hand of St. Ignatius. \textsuperscript{62} Cons, (342), P. 4, c. 4, n. 3. \textsuperscript{63} Ibid., (343), Decl. B. \textsuperscript{64} Ibid., (344), n. 4.

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In reality, the only point that is determined is the length of time, and even that is subject in the last analysis to the local superior, on whose discretion it depends that "in the case of some the period of prayer could be lengthened or shortened."65 With regard to the method, although the Office of the Virgin is proposed as a point of departure, the liberty is greater. Even the Office of the Virgin remains subject to the local superior, who can change it "at times into meditations and other spiritual exercises, by which the hour is filled out."

Methods of prayer

It may be interesting to reflect upon the different methods of prayer which are expressly found in the Ignatian legislation for those who are in formation, without our losing sight of the fact that these methods are prescribed with less precision. We shall pursue these methods briefly, referring to them one by one.

First of all, let us pay attention to the place which the Ignatian law gives in general to vocal prayer. It is, or appears to be, paradoxical that the saint who is regarded by many as the principal promoter in the whole Church of mental prayer, legislates for his men only about vocal prayer.66 This paradox will appear greater to one who, contrary to the tradition of the great spiritual masters, makes too great a distinction between mental and vocal prayer, and especially to one who depreciates vocal prayer. But the paradox will turn out much less striking if it is kept in mind that the great founders of religious orders, in legislating on prayer, never imposed pure mental prayer but at most vocal prayer or spiritual reading.67 Thus St. Ignatius in legislating directly on vocal prayer, the Office of the Virgin, and in leaving the superior free to change it into mental "meditations and other spiritual exercises by which the hour

65 Ibid., (343), Decl. B.
67 Cf. P. Bouvier, "Les origines de l’oraison mentale un usage dans la Compagnie," Lettres de Jersey, 1922, pp. 594-595. He cites, as an example of religious Founders who did not legislate directly on mental prayer, St. Benedict, of whom Dom Martene has affirmed: "He has not prescribed meditation which consists in the contemplation of divine things, which we generally understand by the name of mental prayer . . . because in the ancient rules of monks we read that no hour for mental prayer was ordered . . . ." cf. PL, 66, col. 414.
is filled out,” is found in the category of the great founders and of the subsequent reformers. He is also in line with the Church, which has legislated on the Mass, the sacraments, and the Divine Office, but not on prayer purely mental at a fixed time.

Another original detail of the Ignatian legislation is that in it, from the first drafts to the last, vocal prayer is found joined to the grateful remembrance of the founders or benefactors of the colleges. The first time that the Office of the Virgin is mentioned as specifically prescribed, it is stated that “it should be recited by all ... with continual subordination and commemoration” of the founder of the house and of other benefactors. In the definitive text of the Constitutions, in the same manner as in its earlier texts, the change of the Office of the Virgin into another method of prayer is permitted by the superior while “keeping in view the genuine devotion of the subjects [i.e., scholastics] or of the founder and also the circumstances of persons, times, and places.” This explains the fact that neither Ignatius nor his first companions ever depreciated vocal prayer, nor did they consider it inferior to purely mental prayer. The Office of the Virgin is an essential part of his experience in Manresa, and it appears that then he recited it at “its canonical hours,” or according to the proper time of each hour, as Vatican II recently recommended in regard to the breviary or prayer of the hours. Furthermore, it seems that the Office of the Virgin was the starting point of the seven daily canonical hours which then obtained, a practice which appears to have engendered a high regard for this so-called “breviary of the laity,” and which still further justifies the place given to the Office of the Virgin, from the time of the first legislative texts to the definitive text of the Constitutions, in their legislation on prayer for those who are in formation.


69 “De collegiis ... fundandis,” in ConsMHSJ, I, 58-59.

70 “Constitutiones scholasticorum, 1546,” ibid., p. 175.

71 Cons, (343), P. 4, c. 4, Decl. B.


73 Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy, no. 94. 31st General Congregation has done the same, Decree on Prayer, no. 10.

74 Cf. Leturia, “Libros de horas, Anima Christi y Ejercicios Espirituales de
It seems then that the Office of the Virgin was for St. Ignatius a very special vocal prayer. It truly consisted in reading which was in a certain way not only liturgical but also biblical. It was the only biblical reading widespread at that time in which the Bible was not in the hands of all. Moreover if the Office was recited at its canonical hours, as Ignatius had done in Manresa, it was introducing a prayer that was frequent and distributed during the day, a practice which St. Ignatius preferred, as we shall see later, to the protracted prayer made at one sole period of the day. Further still, the same book of the "Hours of the Virgin," which was perhaps in the hands of all the scholastics of the Society, generally contained other liturgical prayers and even readings of a more doctrinal nature. Finally, as this reading, if it was recited prayerfully and well, could take an hour of time, the mere performance of the prayer by reciting it at different periods of the day gave to the one praying an assurance, without the need of ringing a bell or looking at a watch, that he had fulfilled the daily measure of prayer which the Constitutions imposed in addition to Mass. This was especially the case since the two examens could be made at the time when Sext or Compline, the hour corresponding to the time of the day was being recited. Or they could be joined to other more personal prayers.

The use of the Office of the Virgin was a help toward the easy fulfillment of the prescribed hour. But it is of interest to us to underline the profound reason for the preference which St. Ignatius as legislator manifests for it. We think that this reason is, in addition to his personal experience, the liturgical and biblical character of this small and precious book. We already mentioned that it was regarded as "the breviary of the laity." We today rely on other books which are more biblical and more liturgical. We have the whole Bible and not merely one somewhat arbitrary selection of passages

75 Constitutiones Collegiorum, in ConsMHSJ, IV, 223.
76 Ibid., p. 221, note 10; and Leturia, op. cit., in note 74, pp. 121-123.
77 The Constitutions, in saying: "with the definite hour or a little more or less for the recitation of the Hours of our Lady" (343) seem to indicate that with the sole recitation of the Hours at their canonical times, the hour prescribed for those in formation was satisfied.
from it. But if we do not give much importance to the traditional Office of the Virgin, we ought not for that reason fail to understand the importance which men of the 16th century gave it. Nor in this respect is St. Ignatius the only one who thought and legislated about this Office. St. Peter Canisius, among his last private resolutions shortly before his death, lists "the recitation in the course of the day of the Hours of the Virgin."\(^{78}\) As superior he never ceased to urge its recitation.\(^ {79}\)

**Law of the Church and Society**

In pursuing our rapid review of the methods of prayer which St. Ignatius proposes in his legislation on prayer, it is fitting that we mention the Divine Office or breviary. It is well for us to treat it after the Office of the Virgin, because as we said it was the "breviary of the laity"— and because the Ignatian law supposes and includes a fortiori the law of the Church for all priests.\(^{80}\) Already from the year 1546 St. Ignatius asked for his men the express permission to use, in place of the common breviary, the new breviary of Cardinal Quinones, which was shorter and simpler, and therefore more adapted for the active life and for the Jesuits who did not sing the office in choir.\(^ {81}\) The first documents concerning prayer in the Society place its recitation of the breviary entirely or partially within the prescribed hour,\(^{82}\) while other later documents, all from Nadal, always add something to the obligation

\(^{78}\) *P. Canisii Epistulae et Acta*, (ed. Braunsberger), VII, 850.

\(^{79}\) *Ibid.*, V, 294-295; VIII, 733. The attitude which Aquaviva, for example, takes in regard to the Office of the Virgin is noticeably different (cf. Leturia, *Estudios Ignacianos*, II, pp. 262-263). Our study has already carried us into the post-Ignatian era when, we think, the exaggerated spiritualization of personal prayer was already beginning, and when the way was being prepared for the disturbing opposition between private and personal prayer, and also between community and liturgical prayer. Only now is that opposition beginning to dissolve.

\(^{80}\) *Cons.*, (343) P, 4, c. 4, Decl. B, where mention is made indirectly of those who are obliged to the Divine Office. Nadal, in his *Scholia* (Prati, 1883), p. 78, remarks that its recitation could not last less than one hour.


of the Divine Office. Finally, the Constitutions seem to consider the Divine Office, for students who were obliged to it, as a way of fulfilling the obligation of the Society. A contemporary letter of St. Ignatius makes the same supposition where he says that "for a priest in studies the obligatory hours and the Mass and examens suffice; and he may take a half hour more, should his devotion be great."

Thanks to Nadal, we also have a proof that this was the mind of St. Ignatius: to add nothing to the obligation of the Church for his priests, whether they be formed or still scholastics. In the first draft of his Scholia, written when the Ignatian legislation was still in force, Nadal permits the priests who are still students to retain their hour over and above the Divine Office, but he does not impose that hour upon them; however, under the post-Ignatian law, which proceeds from a different mentality, he corrected the text and left it as we read it today, enjoining that the priests in studies, just as those who are not priests, should have their hour of private prayer in addition to the Divine Office.

It has seemed proper to us to dwell on this preoccupation of St. Ignatius, as legislator, of not separating too much the obligations of the prayer of the Church and those of the Society, because the 31st General Congregation appears to us to manifest the same preoccupation. Its decree on prayer is a true effort to integrate the tradition of the hour of prayer of the Society with the liturgical and biblical prayer-life of the post-conciliar Church.

Another method of prayer much akin to those just indicated, namely the Office of the Virgin and the Divine Office, is spiritual reading, that is, the reading of spiritual authors. In the documents preliminary to the Constitutions, all except one by Polanco and

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83 “Orationis Ordo” (for Spain, 1553-1554), found in ConsMHSJ, IV, 488, adds a half hour to the ecclesiastical obligation (cf. Leturia, Estudios Ignacianos, II, 254-255); but in an Instructio for France, there is already prescribed an hour in addition to the Divine Office (MonNad, IV, 574); and the same is deduced from a more particular Instructio (ibid., 358-359) which mentions a custom of Italy.

84 Cons, (343), P. 4, c. 4, Decl. B.

85 Letter to Brandão, EpplIgn, III, 508-509.

86 ArchRSJ, Inst., 207, f. 43.

87 Nadal, Scholia (Prati, 1883), p. 79.

88 31st General Congregation, Decree on Prayer, nos. 5, 6, 10, 14.
one by Nadal, such reading has a place among the methods of prayer.99 This reading also figures in Text a of the Constitutions, which as yet is in the hand of Polanco.90 But, by successive corrections in the hand of St. Ignatius, only one mention of it remains, and this rather through distraction,91 so that, when Polanco adverts to this distraction, the mention of spiritual reading disappears from Text B of the Constitutions, and from its definitive text.92

Until now we have been speaking about spiritual reading as a method of prayer, or rather, of that reading which the Ignatian legislation would list within the other methods of prayer which can be used during the hour of prayer enjoined on the scholastics. For, if we consider spiritual reading as a preliminary aid to prayer, we find it mentioned in the Examen for candidates93 and in the Constitutions for novices;94 and, moreover, for novitiates as reading during meals.95 It should not cause surprise that we mention the reading in the refectory here. For, like Benediction, it was a spiritual exercise. In that reading, the reading of the Bible occupied a principal place, and all were expected to listen to it with attention.96 At times some reading proper to the liturgical season was added.97 Furthermore, if the reader felt inspired, he could express proper spiritual sentiments which came to him as he went along reading for the others.98

90 ConsMHSJ, II, 178.
91 Ibid., II, 410, line 67.
92 Cons, (342-343), P. 4, c. 4, n. 3 and B.
93 Exam, (46), c. 3, n. 10.
94 Cons, (277), P. 3, c. 1, n. 20: Here the hand of Polanco is observed proposing the idea to St. Ignatius. Cf. ConsMHSJ, I, 188, n. 8.
95 Ibid., (251), P. 3, c. 1, n. 5: This Part III of the Constitutions refers to the houses of “probation,” i.e., novitiates, and not to houses of formation in studies, about which Part IV speaks. Therefore, it seems that reading in the refectory was not a rule in all the houses of the Society, as it was later, but only in the houses of probation or novitiates.
96 SdeSI, I, 485: “Scriptura legebatur aperto capite et stando; alii libri sedendo et capite tecto legebantur.”
98 “Regulae conimbricenses,” ibid., p. 839; “Regulae communes Romanæ,” ConsMHSJ, IV, 162, and note 5.
Here we should add some data which we possess about a type of spiritual reading of St. Ignatius which was more private and personal. Although this kind of reading does not figure expressly in his legislation for those who are in formation, it may help toward understanding the method of prayer which he recommended the most, that is, as we shall see immediately, the prayer which is frequent and distributed during the different hours of the day. We mean the reading of the *Imitation of Christ*, and perhaps that of the New Testament. His esteem for this type of reading, necessarily brief but for that very reason more frequent, did not carry him to the point where he legislated on it expressly. But we must keep it in mind in order to interpret better his spirit as a legislator who preferred to recommend rather than prescribe. And it is obvious that he recommended it to others, although he would not impose it on anyone, according to that golden principle of his as legislator and superior, not to seek to lead all the others along the same path which he was travelling or had travelled.

**Daily examen**

Let us pass now to the other method of prayer, the one called the examen of conscience. It is perhaps the spiritual exercise of which the Ignatian documents speak more, although not always in the same manner with regard to the daily frequency or the duration ascribed to it. At times it seems prescribed once a day, at other times twice; and at times neither one prescription nor the other.


100 *EppIgn*, II, 705, no. 5; “Chronicon,” *MonNad*, I, 19, no. 57.

101 The documents are so numerous that we shall cite only the first and the last which we have in view: “Constitutions which are observed in the colleges of the Society,” *MonPaed*, p. 78; in the margin, we find “in those of Bologna and Padua there is one examen a day, no more;” “Regulae Collegii Romani,” *ConsMHSJ*, IV, 220, no. 12: “without the examination which is made in the sacramental confession, let each one examine his conscience once a day before retiring to sleep, after the manner that is taught in the *Exercises* . . . If the Rector thinks that someone ought to make two exams a day, one after dinner, the other after supper, he will make them.”

102 Let it suffice to cite one document, perhaps the oldest, from “Regulae conimbricenses,” *MonBroet*, p. 74: “before dinner for a quarter of an hour, and before supper for half an hour, on hearing the bell, let all gather to make their exams.”
is clearly seen. One time it is hinted that the examen before noon does not ordinarily last a quarter of an hour, and more than one time Nadal, interpreting St. Ignatius, affirms with entire certainty that the examen is joined to other prayers with which it shares its time.

On their part, the Constitutions never speak expressly of a quarter of an hour of examen of conscience, but they only state, about the scholastics and brothers in formation, that “they will have one hour. During it they will recite the Hours of our Lady, and examine their consciences twice each day, and add other prayers according to the devotion of each one until the aforementioned hour is completed, in case it has not run its course.” This is the definitive text; while Text a, which is the first draft, says nothing of the examens of conscience, but in general points out that they will divide up the prescribed hour in the best way, with the advice of the superior or confessor. Only in Text A does it appear expressly, and from the hand of Ignatius, that “they will examine their consciences twice each day, and add other prayers according to the

103 There are documents which speak of “examen” in the singular, e.g., “Estatutos para Bolonia” (1548?), in ConsMHSJ, p. 259: “che ogni di si faccia l'examen . . .”

104 “General Order for the Colleges,” by Nadal, cited by Leturia, Estudios Ignacianos, II, 254-255: “an examen before dinner, and because this examen is not ordinarily a full quarter of an hour . . .”

105 Nadal, Orationis ordo, ConsMHSJ, IV, 487-488: “And thus ordinarily the time of prayer will be an hour beyond the hearing of Mass; and in that divided hour two examens are to be made briefly, and in the rest of the hour they can occupy themselves in their meditation or vocal prayer as best they can.” We find the same in the visitation which Nadal makes at Venice and Padua, MonNad, IV, 316; and in his comments on the Constitutions in his Scholia (Prati, 1883), p. 79; and in his “Instruction” to Father Manareo, Commissary of France, MonNad, IV, 573 (cf. Leturia, Estudios Ignacianos, II, 254). Hence, the response of Father General Janssens was ill advised, when he indicated that it was not according to the spiritual tradition of the Society that the examen should be made during the recitation of Compline of the Divine Office, as the conciliar Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy recently recommended. (Cf. ActRSJ, XIII, 877).

106 Cons, (342), P. 4, n. 3.

107 ConsMHSJ, II, 178. This Text a treats of one examen daily (Ibid., p. 163, n. 21); but in Part III, reference is made to those who are in probation, or to the novices (Ibid., p. 150).
devotion of each one,” but without any reference to the exact duration of each time.\textsuperscript{108}

From the above we can, anticipating a little what we shall say later in treating the third element of the Ignatian legislation, draw a conclusion. Although St. Ignatius has in view different methods of prayer as being possible when he is legislating, at no moment is he preoccupied with a prayer-timetable to determine the duration for each method, but he leaves that entirely to the subjects. The method and timetable are covered when he states that those in formation “are to do all this according to the arrangement and judgment of their superiors, whom they oblige themselves to obey in place of Christ our Lord.”\textsuperscript{109} In other words we should say that St. Ignatius legislates for the life of prayer, and leaves to each one, in touch with his superior, to propose his own prayer-schedule. If this procedure had always been followed in the Society and in the Church, the present conflict between the life of prayer and its time-schedule would never have arisen.

In treating the method of praying, other historians have devoted attention almost exclusively to that method as being mental, as even the titles of their works indicate. But we have set this topic of the method as mental aside till last. The truth is that we are doing nothing more than keeping close to St. Ignatius’ own practice. In his legislation on prayer, as we saw, he speaks sparingly of the method which has been termed mental. He mentions it as an option always free for the scholastics. In his correspondence, on the contrary, he speaks of it more frequently and at length, yet always, if there is question of giving to it much uninterrupted time, with caution and even suspicion. St. Theresa used to say that vocal prayer was either mental or it was not prayer. A somewhat similar point should here be noted well: St. Ignatius shows himself cautious, not in regard to the mental method of prayer, but in respect to the duration of all mental prayer, and to continuous duration through a long period. We are speaking here of prayer in the ordinary life of a Jesuit, and not of prayer during the time of the \textit{Spiritual Exercises} or of prayer in other religious institutes. Let us examine this in greater detail.

\textsuperscript{108} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 410.

\textsuperscript{109} \textit{Cons.}, (342), P. 4, c. 4, n. 3.
In regard to the method of vocal prayer as contrasted with mental, the first thing to which we call attention is that St. Ignatius, differently than others such as Miró,\textsuperscript{110} does not manifest the pejorative idea of "vocalization" of prayer which arose later and which will be found in the Society, and that above all in the same measure as the Ignatian laws is replaced by the post-Ignatian.\textsuperscript{111}

Nadal goes farther in this direction than St. Ignatius. Not only does he manifest no preference for mental prayer and no disdain for vocal prayer, but he also defends the possible superiority of vocal prayer over prayer purely mental.\textsuperscript{112} Perhaps the reason for this is that after St. Ignatius’ death Nadal saw himself obliged to defend the text of the \textit{Constitutions} which prescribed a daily vocal prayer delimited to about an hour, the Hours of the Virgin, and the principal argument which he uses is that the prayer imposed by the Church is also vocal.\textsuperscript{113} Furthermore, Nadal comes to say that vocal prayer is more proper to the Society and that the spirit of prayer in the Society ought to incline just as much to vocal prayer as to apostolic action.\textsuperscript{114}

In respect to the method of mental prayer taken in itself and not merely in comparison with vocal prayer, St. Ignatius refers at times to an easy method of meditating which he distinguishes from another difficult method which is not made without labor and fatigue.\textsuperscript{115} He also speaks of a mental prayer which does not last a long time but which is made in a short time;\textsuperscript{116} and of a method which is not so abstract,\textsuperscript{117} and which can be united with daily activities themselves.

It is worth the trouble to fix our attention well on that difference of ease and difficulty in St. Ignatius’ manner of speaking when he treats of mental prayer in his correspondence with superiors and subjects, while he is almost entirely silent on the subject in the

\begin{footnotes}
\item EppMixt, I, 415.
\item Cf. Bacht’s study, already mentioned in note 15, on the exaggerated spiritualization of mental prayer (\textit{GeistLeb}, 28 [1955], 360-373).
\item MonNad, V, 478.
\item Ibid., V, 478-579.
\item Ibid., IV, 673.
\item Letter to Theresa Rejadella, EppIgn, I, 108; cf. \textit{Industriæ} (prima series), PolCompl, II, 740, no. 7.
\item EppIgn, XII, 651-652.
\item Letter to Brandão, EppIgn, III, 510.
\end{footnotes}
Constitutions. St. Ignatius' highly intensified facility in one certain method of mental prayer is, in our opinion, intrinsically related with its relative brevity of duration and, consequently, with the possibility of making that prayer as something mingled with apostolic action, and that at any moment of the day whatever. For that reason we believe that when the post-Ignatian law of a full hour of morning mental prayer was imposed, it entailed the loss in the Society of that Ignatian tradition, namely, that method of praying mentally which is proper to the Jesuit in action, although the tradition of prayer in solitude for an hour a day was acquired. But about this we shall speak more to the purpose when we treat the third and last element of the legislation on prayer in the Society, that is, the duration prescribed for prayer.

Nevertheless, we wished to anticipate, by giving a preliminary hint, in order to make this point clear: although we treat separately what we call the three elements of the Ignatian law (the co-responsibility of the subject and the superior, the method or manner of praying, and the duration of prayer), in St. Ignatius' original legislation they compenetrate one another. A consequence is that the concept of each element colors or influences that of the others.

Time in the Ignatian Legislation on Prayer

The discussion on the subject of the time of prayer by rule or constitution is as old as the Society itself. A large number of persons have entered into the discussion. Persons of undeniably good will have taken opposite positions. None of them debated or called into doubt the importance of prayer, but only a distinct method of making it or of imposing it on others.

We wish to say that, at root, perhaps the discussion centered more on time which was considered qualitatively, as a method or manner of praying, than as mere time considered quantitatively. Perhaps this may have been the case because, when one takes into account those four centuries, and the quality of the persons who were discussing during that whole time, one can imagine that there was an ambiguity in some of the terms used in the discussion. That ambiguity can be the one indicated in the central term or "time of prayer."

We shall take as a working hypothesis, then, that distinction
between the time which is mere time, and the time which is method of prayer. We are moved to this procedure by the desire of seeing that very old discussion come to an end, and of not taking sides in favor of some or others. For, first, the discussion has no meaning, since the 31st General Congregation has given us a decree on prayer which merits our complete respect; secondly, the taking of sides in the old discussion has no major interest for us, short of reflecting that that was the psychological motive which some of the historians had who have preceded us in the study of the subject.

Before we study the Ignatian documents, let us explain our working hypothesis. We call time, quantitatively considered, the mere imposing of a daily time of prayer which can be fulfilled at whatever moment of the day and by any method whatever: (mental or vocal; by separating it from other obligations of prayer or by employing it in fulfilling those other obligations better, for example, more slowly, and so on). We call time, qualitatively considered, when a continuous time is imposed (such as a full hour), or a determined moment of the day (such as prayer in the morning), or in one exclusive manner (such as mental and not vocal or reading; examen of conscience and not other prayers at the time, and so on). In other words, we distinguish between time that is open to different manners of fulfilling it, and time imposed exclusively for one certain manner of employing it in prayer.

With this hypothesis made, for a while let us not think about it but rather examine the Ignatian documents themselves.

Examining the texts

St. Ignatius praises the entire and continuous hour of prayer in the Exercises, but he does not impose it expressly in any legislative text of the Society. As we already saw earlier in treating the different methods of prayer in the Ignatian legislation, although it assigns an hour to those who are in formation, it only prescribes that in that hour they say the Hours of our Lady, and examine their consciences twice daily “and add other prayers according to the devotion of each one until the aforementioned hour is completed, in case it has not run its course.”

118 Annotations 12, 13, and others. SpEx, (12, 13).
119 Cons, (342), P. 4, c. 4, n. 3.
saw before, the two methods of prayer which are mentioned here, the Hours and the examen of conscience, are understood precisely without any determination of continuous time. For the Hours are by their nature, so to speak, for recitation “at their canonical times” and not all together or at a time fixed beforehand for each one; and the examen, in the mind of St. Ignatius, and also according to the repeated interpretation of Nadal even in the time of the post-Ignatian law, did not have a fixed duration assigned. And the final phrase of the Ignatian text, in his own hand, (“and add other prayers... until the aforementioned hour is completed, in case it has not run its course”), says very clearly that St. Ignatius imposed a daily quantity, so to speak, of time of prayer for those who were in formation, but at no time does he specify its quality as being a continuous manner of praying.

And nevertheless, St. Ignatius praises what we now call formal prayer, and esteems “familiarity with God our Lord in spiritual exercises of devotion”¹²⁰ no less than in all actions.¹²¹ But it is one thing to give time to prayer, and another to give to it a continuous or “integral” hour. The first is necessary for man who is temporal and historical; the second is not necessary nor is it always possible.

Hence there is no contradiction between these two positions of St. Ignatius. On the one hand “he praises prayer highly;”¹²² on the other hand, he is sparing in legislation concerning the time of prayer, and when he does legislate, for those in formation, he limits himself to pointing out a daily time, and not a continuous or integral duration.

A prayerful hour

The full hour of prayer is for St. Ignatius a very good means, and in fact he imposes it in his Spiritual Exercises, during which he considers complete solitude during several days as a means exceptionally fruitful.¹²³ He also imposes it as an extraordinary means to which one must have recourse in certain necessities.¹²⁴ For, as legislators, even when he saw the necessity of fixing a daily

¹²³ Cf. Annotation 20, in SpEx, (20).
¹²⁴ *ConsMHSJ*, I, 4-5.
time of prayer for those in formation, he did not consider an integral hour of prayer or a continuous time of prayer to be, in general, an ordinary means.

In other words, the continuous time of prayer, and above all the approach toward making it an integral hour, is a path. It is, moreover, a path which St. Ignatius had taken at the very beginning of his spiritual life, when he prayed seven times a day—perhaps, as we saw before, at every hour of the Office of the Virgin, and at its canonical times. But as legislator he did not wish to enjoin that path on all his sons because in his opinion, as Da Câmara observed in his Memoriale, “there was no greater error in spiritual things than to seek to guide others as oneself. He was speaking about the long prayer he had made.”

What he says about directing others holds true also of legislating for them. For legislation is a more permanent and universal method of directing.

The other Jesuits of the infant Society who began as local superiors and provincials to impose a daily time of prayer on their subjects, distributed it partly in the morning and partly in the afternoon. And when in the generalate of Borgia the new daily hour of prayer began to be practiced, permission was granted in some places for the hour to be carried out at different separated periods of the day. But outside the Society there existed from earlier decades a current of opinion which was willing to give the name of prayer, oración, only to that which lasted a long and continuous time. That concept, moreover, was winning adherents within the Society, and ultimately, although under a much more moderate form, the idea was imposed in the post-Ignatian legislation

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126 “Constituciones que se guardan en los Colegios,” MonPaed, 78 (cf. ConsMHSJ, IV, 140, which presents this as a resume of what was done in the colleges at the time).
127 Nadal to Borgia, MonNad, III, 328 and 471; and Borgia to Nadal, ibid., 461 and 478.
128 Indications of that environmental opinion are found in the works of Fray Luís de Granada and St. Peter of Alcantara. Both books were published during the years we are treating (cf. Dudon, “Saint Ignace et l’oraison dans la Compagnie de Jésus,” RAM, XV (1934) 248), but are a result of an earlier atmosphere contemporary to St. Ignatius (cf. Leturia, Estudios Ignacianos, II, 204-205).
129 Epplgn, XII, 651-652.
enjoining the integral hour of prayer in the morning.

If we remember what we said before, when we treated the manner or method of prayer in the Ignatian legislation, about the great founders of religious orders who do not appear to have legislated about the mental methods of prayer, we can perhaps observe that the beginning of the legislation on mental prayer is simultaneous with that of the religious legislation on the continuous duration of prayer, and legislation on both these matters together begins at the time of the reform of the religious orders.\textsuperscript{130} Or rather, we can remark that the mentality of the founder who legislated concerning the prayer in a nascent order would be one thing, and the mentality of the reformer who endeavors to recapture the spirit of the founder and establish it anew in an old religious order would be something different; also, that this difference of mentality would be manifested especially in two conceptions of the time of prayer, the one concept being merely quantitative and open to being used in prayer according to any method, and the other concept more qualitative and being itself a method of praying. But let this be said in passing, and without an intent to enter deeply into a comparative study of the spirituality of the foundation and the spirituality of the reform of a religious order—even though we believe this to be of great interest in these times when the Society, like the Church, is returning to the sources and lives, not a "counter-reformation," but a renewal and present realization of the spirit of its founders. Even a superficial reading of the conciliar Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy or the Decree on Prayer of the 31st General Congregation would show which concept of time has found expression in the documents of our time.

In order to confirm the existence of a concept of a time of prayer which, as integral or continuous, contains in itself a method of prayer, we shall not turn our attention now to its extreme defenders who say with Onfroy even that "prayer of one or two hours is not prayer and more hours are necessary." Instead, we shall attend to those who more moderately limit themselves to stating that a direct proportion exists between the continuous time and the fruit of prayer.\textsuperscript{131} It is evident that these last consider continuous dura-

\textsuperscript{130} Consult the studies cited in footnotes 67 and 68.
\textsuperscript{131} Letter of Oviedo to St. Ignatius (EppMixt, I, 437). See also De Guibert,
tion as a method of prayer. As such a method, they recommend it more than another method, such as the short but frequent prayer during the day could be. In such a case the difference between those who recommend one method or the other, prayer all at one stretch or prayer at its different canonical times, would not consist in the mere total quantity of daily time of prayer, for the total duration could be the same in either case. Rather, the difference would be in the quality of the duration as being all within one period of the day, or as being brief but frequent prayer distributed throughout the whole day.

With this, we believe that we have put the state of the question to be discussed into clear light without any ambiguity. This has been done through the hypothesis about time as mere time and time which is also a method or manner of praying, that hypothesis which we made just above when we began to treat the topic of time in the Ignatian legislation on prayer. We now wish to resume the treatment itself and to corroborate the hypothesis by the Ignatian documents.

Discretion and adaptation

First of all, we should make this observation. In the atmosphere of the reform of the religious orders and of the Counter-Reformation which encompassed St. Ignatius as founder, the idea was taking shape that there is a direct proportion between the continuous duration of prayer and the fruit derived from prayer. Nevertheless St. Ignatius, as legislator of the infant order, manifested his ideas clearly:

1) Concerning the ordinary law for the Jesuits, including those who are in formation, in regard to the fruit of formal prayer, a certain equivalent compensation may be granted among the different methods (continuous or interrupted) of employing the time of daily prayer. Without going so far as to say, as he does once, that a lesser time of prayer can be compensated with a greater fervor, St. Ignatius frequently hints that in short periods during the day it is

The Jesuits: Their Spiritual Doctrine and Practice, pp. 86-89, and Index, p. 673.

132 "Constitutiones Collegiorum," in ConsMHSJ, IV, 222: "If on some occasion the time is not fulfilled, let it be made up, if not in time, at least in devotion." Cf. EpplIgn, I, 509.
possible to accomplish much time of prayer.\textsuperscript{133} The name traditionally given to the Divine Office in the Church, the "prayer of the canonical hours," signifies nothing different than this.\textsuperscript{134}

2) A continuous duration of prayer cannot be imposed equally on all, because there are natural temperaments which do not stand this.\textsuperscript{135} In this direction, the better universal law is one which, like the Ignatian, does not prescribe or prohibit a continuous time, but leaves it free to the discretion of the subject himself under the direction of his superior or spiritual director.

3) While the time open to different ways of fulfilling it has advantages, such as, for example, that of facilitating the adaptation to each subject, and that of giving a feeling of satisfaction from praying throughout the whole day and not only at one period of it,\textsuperscript{136} the continuous time, especially if exaggerated concern is given to its measurement, has various inconveniences. To limit ourselves to those which St. Ignatius mentions expressly, such would be the loss of health, the neglect of the obligations of study or action, and even serious spiritual defects which would be encouraged in that exaggerated manner of performing prayer.

In regard to the loss of health, the information is interesting which Manareo gives us, in one of his exhortations, concerning a medical consultation which St. Ignatius had when he observed that many became sick and even died shortly after entering the Society. The result of that consultation appeared immediately in the measure of time of prayer which he set for those who were in formation, namely, the daily hour.\textsuperscript{137} He enjoined even this without ordering that it should be made at one continuous time.

With regard to the neglect of the other obligations such as the obligations of study or of the apostolate, it is evident that this was one of the great preoccupations of St. Ignatius, who was so

\textsuperscript{133} "Industriae" (prima series), \textit{PolCompl}, II, 741, no. 11: "Also short prayers ought occasionally to be mingled with the study . . ." Cf. ConsMHSJ IV, 222, 16\textdegree; \textit{Epplgn}, III, 75.

\textsuperscript{134} \textit{Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy}, nos. 88 and 94.

\textsuperscript{135} \textit{Epplgn}, IV, 90-91.

\textsuperscript{136} \textit{Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy}, no. 84; cf. nos. 88, 94.

\textsuperscript{137} Manaree's "Exhortationes super instituto et regulis S.J.," (conferences which he gave during Aquaviva's generalate), pp. 613-614.
sensitive to the spiritual indiscretion which was at the bottom of that rivalry between prayer and action. Together with this, there were other spiritual defects joined to the indiscreet augmentation of the time of continuous prayer, apart from the cases of special personal necessity. These cases formed one of the strongest ad hominem arguments against those who were pressing for an increase, by law, of the time of prayer in the Society.\(^\text{138}\) This also explains the firmness with which Ignatius opposed even persons who had the reputation of being virtuous, and whom he as superior would not have hesitated to expel from the Society if they had not yielded on this point.\(^\text{139}\)

It is of interest to us to delay on the first idea, especially on its second part which refers to that method of employing the daily time of prayer in brief but frequent prayer, because it throws light on our hypothesis to the effect that St. Ignatius was not opposed to a prayer-time taken merely quantitatively, but to that prayer-time which was simultaneously a particular manner or method of prayer, that is, the prayer of continuous duration. That first idea interests us also because St. Ignatius too, in his correspondence, has delayed more than once in order to recommend it as a method of prayer which can be united easily with the activity of a Jesuit, especially of a formed Jesuit. In order to recommend it he has used different expressions. He calls it, for example, prayer of desires,\(^\text{140}\) prayer in the action itself,\(^\text{141}\) elevations of the mind to God,\(^\text{142}\) exercise of

\(^\text{138}\) Besides the particular case of Oviedo and Onfroy (cf. *EppMixt*, II, 115; De Guibert, *The Jesuits*, pp. 87-88), we have here St. Ignatius’ general opinion, communicated by Da Cámara in two versions in his *Memoriale*. One version is in no. 256 (in *SdeSI*, p. 278 and *FN*, I, 676-677); the other is in no. 196 (*FN*, I, 644).

\(^\text{139}\) *EppIgn*, II, 494-495.

\(^\text{140}\) Letter on Perfection, *EppIgn*, I, 509: “... and although study does not give us time to spend in very long prayers, the time can be compensated for through desires by one who makes a continuous prayer of all his activities, by undertaking them solely for the service of God.”

\(^\text{141}\) “*Constitutiones Collegiorum,*” *ConsMHSJ*, IV, p. 222, 16: “In all things let them find God. Let them regard all their study and works as a prayer, by directing them to the sole service of God our Lord by trying to find Him in all their activities; and to renew this intention and obligation as well as to beg of God Grace to do in everything what is pleasing to His divine Majesty, they should employ the holy practice of making short prayers or elevations
the presence of God, the search for and finding of God in all things, the explicit offering to God of what is done for Him, and so forth. The mere variety of these expressions is a sign of the importance which he gave to this method, of praying briefly but frequently every day.

Still further, this is a method of prayer in which he has preceded us by his example. (Of course, he has preceded us also by his own example of praying through long periods, but he has not endeavored as legislator or superior to make us follow this practice.) Let us recall, for example, his practice of examining his interior disposition, something he did every time the hour struck. Let us also recall his custom, which we mentioned before, of opening a Kempis at any part whatever and reading one of its chapters.

Essentially apostolic

This is also a way of giving time to prayer which does not lessen appreciably the time destined to action; and this prayer is in one sense a fruit derived from the same action. For that reason, we should say that it is a method of prayer more proper to the Society, a religious order primarily apostolic and one in which, therefore, everything is "essentially apostolic" and nothing ought to be understood as "directed exclusively to our personal sanctification." Therefore the relations between prayer and action can be

of the mind to God, mingling these prayers with their actions at home and abroad, and in all manners of occupations, now uttering some chosen words, according to the pleasure of each one, now speaking only with desires and pious aspirations." Cf. Industriae (prima series), PolCompl, II, 741, no. 11.

142 EpplIgn, VI, 90-91: "Amid the occupations and studies, we can lift our mind to God; and through our directing everything to the divine service, all is prayer . . . ."

143 Ibid., III, 309: "... in prayer or meditation and the examens he [Oviedo] should not go beyond an hour . . . that there may be more time and attention to other things pertaining to the service of God, whose presence he can bring about in the midst of all occupations; and he can make his prayer continuous by directing all things to His greater service and glory." Cf. Da Câmara, Memoriale, no. 256, in SdeSI, I, 278 and FN, I, p. 677.

144 EpplIgn, III, 502.

145 Ibid., III, 510.

146 Da Câmara, Memoriale, no. 24, in FN, I, 542 (cf. Ridadaneyra, "De actis P. Ignatii," no. 42, in FN, II, 345). See also SdeSI, II, 561, no. 34.

147 See the texts cited in footnote 99 above.

148 31st General Congregation, Decree on Chastity, no. 4.
understood, as Blessed Peter Faber said, in two ways which are at least different if not opposed: by seeking God in spirit through good works, in order to find Him later in prayer; or by seeking Him principally in prayer, in order to find Him later in action; but Faber, and without doubt St. Ignatius with him when treating of Jesuits, preferred the first way, which goes from action to prayer and from prayer goes back afresh to action. This practice can be used precisely with those brief but frequent prayers about which St. Ignatius speaks so much, and not only with ejaculatory prayers.

Furthermore, this way of prayer, without failing to be proper to the Society, is traditional in the Church. For other spiritual masters have led their disciples along the path of short but frequent prayers, in order to bring them to fulfill more easily the evangelical precept that one "ought always to pray and not lose heart" (Lk 18:1). St. Ignatius too, in his well-known response to Oviedo and Onfroy, shows himself as a skilled expert of this tradition and conscientiously follows it: "This is perceived through the example of the holy hermit fathers who commonly performed prayers which did not take up an hour, as is seen in Cassian, who recited three psalms at one time, and so forth, as is practiced in the public office and the canonical hours." At the end of this paragraph St. Ignatius again quotes this tradition which binds this manner of brief but frequent prayer with the evangelical precept that one "ought always to pray and not lose heart."

Let us touch here a point which appears to us substantial in order to understand the manner of prayer which St. Ignatius hoped for from the Jesuit, whether in formation or not, although there can be a pedagogical difference between the one and the other. Here we are referring to the manner of prayer in regard, not to theory, but to practice. In theory, we should be able to admit the expression of Nadal, "a contemplative in action," as an expression of the Ignatian ideal of "prayer in action," but in practice, it appears to us that that expression can divert us from our objective—unless we avoid giving too theoretical a meaning to contemplation and restore to it its practical and vital meaning."
The distinction between the theory and practice of contemplation which we just pointed out could merit a separate study, but we are not in a position to make it at present. But as we said at the beginning of this study, at the same time that we were studying the Ignatian legislation on prayer in the Society of Jesus, other authors were making their own study on the laws of prayer of their respective religious orders. One of these studies investigates, in the concrete, the meaning of the Divine Office in the Benedictine Rule. We mean the study of A. de Vogüé, entitled “Le sens de l'office divin d’après la Règle de S. Benoît.” It endeavors to express, better than has been done hitherto, the contemplative ideal not only in theory, but also and especially in practice. We shall, then, take advantage of some of this author’s conclusions, now that we cannot make the separate study which would be so worth while in regard to St. Ignatius.

To resume while keeping in mind our immediate objective at this moment, De Vogüé would say that the place of the Divine Office has been accentuated too much as an ideal of the Benedictine monk, by separating it from life and concealing the true ideal of the monastic life, which should be the “prayer without ceasing” of the Gospel. This accentuation of the Divine Office, which changes the means into an end, has been going on for a long time. It was scarcely hinted at in the Rule of the Master but received some stress in the Rule of St. Benedict and was finally consecrated by the classical commentators up to the present.

If we turn back toward the origins of the Divine Office, the farther back we move, the greater is the prominence which we see (always according to De Vogüé) attributed to the gospel precept that one “ought always to pray.” In regard to this evangelical ideal, the Divine Office is only one means among other equally or more important ones. Moreover, it is a means such that its true meaning is understood only if it is placed back into its context: the continuous effort the monk makes at every hour to reach the ideal of “praying without ceasing.” “With respect to this ideal, the prayer of the hours offers the monk a first approach and is at the same time a help toward realizing it more perfectly. It is not, therefore, a particular occupation, singular in its kind and without a common

153 See footnote 6.
denominator with the others, but rather the momentary actualization of a constant effort. The Divine Office is incorporated into life."}\(^{154}\)

It would be of interest to follow De Vogüé in detail in his study of the parallel historical development of that primitive monastic ideal of "prayer without ceasing" and of the Divine Office, in order to see how this Office, which was initially one means among others, was finally transformed into the principal and only means and, consequently, into the characteristic end of the monastic life.\(^{155}\)

But much more interesting still, and more directly connected with our Ignatian theme of brief but frequent prayers during work as a practical means for "contemplation in action" is, it seems to us, De Vogüé's explanation of that historical development. To understand it, we should remind ourselves in advance that in early monastic writings the word "meditate" meant "to mutter" or "to mumble," and not what the word usually connotes to us today.

In primitive times there was a certain structural homogeneity between the Divine Office and the other daily activities of the monk. Over and above the common scriptural basis, which consisted especially of the Psalter meditated (that is, muttered) during his manual work and of the Psalter recited in public, there was a series of brief but frequent prayers which interrupted or intercalated the Office and the activities alike. These brief prayers constituted the more intense moments, stimulated by the word of God which had been heard, in the life of the man perpetually consecrated to God. Through this basis of structural homogeneity, the word of God to man and the response of man to God, the Office was woven into life and both the Office and the life of the monk were under the gospel law of "prayer without ceasing."\(^{156}\)

Two streams

Soon, however, two streams of evolution began, one in the Divine Office and the other in the monk's life of work. A common feature was injected into each stream: on the one hand, the abbreviation and even the gradual disappearance of the brief and


\(^{155}\) Ibid., 390-398.

\(^{156}\) Ibid., 398-400.
frequent prayers hitherto intercalated between psalm and psalm; and on the other hand, the practical forgetting of the tradition of the brief and frequent prayers uttered in the midst of the daily tasks.\textsuperscript{157} These two streams of evolution converged to produce a common result. There was the ever increasing heterogeneity between the Divine Office and the ordinary life of the monk and, consequently, the transformation of the Divine Office into the only "work of God" of the monastery. Further still, the Divine Office was elevated in importance so that its proper fulfillment became the ideal of the monk, instead of fulfillment of the gospel precept of "prayer without ceasing." But when the special moments of prayer disappeared from the Divine Office, and when the similar moments of prayer also ceased to be interwoven into the tasks of the day, something even more striking was introduced. It was something outside both the Office and the work alike and enjoined for a precisely determined hour of the day: the "half hour of prayer" of the moderns as a necessary compensation for all those short but frequent prayers which in the beginning had characterized both the Divine Office and the life of the monks. It was from these short and frequent prayers that the homogeneity of the Office and the monks' daily life had once sprung. From these short prayers had also once sprung the fundamental orientation of both the Office and the daily work toward the true ideal unifying the whole life of the monk, the gospel precept of prayer without ceasing.\textsuperscript{158}

Up to here we have been presenting that which is apropos to our purpose from what De Vogüé tells us about the simultaneous legislative and spiritual streams of evolution of the ideal of prayer for the monk and about its causes or historical manifestations in the Benedictine Rule of the \textit{opus Dei}. Returning now to our subject of the Ignatian rule of prayer in the Society, we would say that something similar has happened in the case of the Jesuit ideal of "a contemplative in action." We would say further that its causes or the signs which manifest it in history are also similar. In one stream of evolution there was a forgetting, in practice, of the short but frequent prayers throughout the day, in all their possible forms such as desires, prayers intercalated into the apostolic work, eleva-

\textsuperscript{157} Ibid., 400-403.
\textsuperscript{158} Ibid., 33.
tions of the mind to God, examens of conscience, and the discern-
ment of spirits. In another stream, there was the legislative
insistence on the hour or hours of prayer, each one of which had
its own prescribed method of prayer, continuous and uninterrupted,
mental or vocal, and litanies. To use the terms of the Benedictine
historian, in the Society of Jesus, too, a kind of substitution occurred
through which a schedule replaced life as an ideal. That ideal,
prayer-life with vitality, can be concretized and facilitated in highly
diverse forms, while the time-schedule imposed by a rule up to its
last details implies as the only alternatives, its fulfillment or non-
fulfillment. For in such a schedule there is question not merely of
the time quantitatively taken but also of time in which the very
method of praying is prescribed by the rule.

A further similarity might still be given. When the Divine Office
is converted into the highest ideal of the written rule of the Bene-
dictine monk and is separated too much from life; when the
homogeneity of structure which the spontaneity and variety of the
short but frequent prayers had formerly given to both "offices" of
the monk, his liturgy and his work, is lost, the path is open to the
grave danger of ritualism, and simultaneously of objective piety. 159

In similar manner within the Society of Jesus, when the time
schedule of prayer by rule is separated too much from the life of
apostolic action, the path is opened to the danger of legalism and
also to another risk no less serious, that of conflict between the
external law of prayer and the internal law of discreet charity,
followed by an oversimplifying solution whereby a Jesuit abandons
all scheduled formal prayer and becomes content with apostolic
action as virtual prayer.

With these remarks finished, we have by now indicated a
practical and contemporary solution which history, the master of
life, offers us for all those false—or better, falsified—problems of
conflict between prayer and apostolate or, to consider the matter
more generically still, between contemplation and action. The solu-
tion is, not to sacrifice all legally prescribed prayer nor all formal
prayer, but rather to bring about the greatest possible homogeneity
between prayer and life, according to one's schedule. This can be

159 Or rather, the way was opened for the conflict between liturgical piety,
called "objective," and "private" piety (cf. ibid., 403-404).
done through the practice of the short but frequent prayers, as lengthy as grace inspires, intercalated into the action itself. That solution further requires, when there is question of enunciating a rule or law on prayer or of commenting on one, a clear distinction between time taken quantitatively merely as duration and time taken qualitatively insofar as it is identified with a determined method or manner of praying, such as continuous, mental, matutinal, or the like. As is evident, every rule about prayer properly so called necessarily entails some time.

The Contemporary Relevance

We stated in our introduction that after making the historical study of the Ignatian period of the legislation on prayer, we would make a leap over the post-Ignatian legislation from Borgia to our own day, in order to pass directly to the post-conciliar climate in the Church, the atmosphere which the Decree on Prayer of the 31st General Congregation has characterized as one of peculiar “spiritual evolution.” We also said that by passing over four centuries which separate us historically from St. Ignatius and by making that leap from the remote past to the present, we were endeavoring to ascertain the contemporaneous importance which the spirit of the Ignatian legislation (although not its mere letter) still has for us as men, Christians, and post-conciliar Jesuits. And this is what we shall now try to do in this part of our historical study. For, as we also stated in our introduction, one’s contemporary point of view can never, in our opinion, be absent from the study or writing of history.

But this objective can be attained by two paths: either by comparing directly the spirit of the Ignatian legislation just studied with the present spiritual environment or climate, or by making this same comparison indirectly, that is, through the new Decree on Prayer. This Decree surely has contemporary relevance. In the first draft of this historical study, completed before Session II of the General Congregation, we followed the first path, direct study. Therefore it seems much better at present to take the second path, and use the Decree as a means. For the General Congregation is not something to be put aside by our regarding it as already a thing of the past, but instead it is a fact here in plain sight before our eyes, although
it is a fact not closed in itself but open to the future.\textsuperscript{160}

But before making this comparison, we wish to point out briefly what is most original and fundamental in this recent \textit{Decree on Prayer}. Above all we observe that in our contemporaneous historical circumstances the recent Congregation has not wished merely to cite what St. Ignatius had legislated about prayer for a Jesuit whether formed or in formation. In other words, it has not returned literally, in regard to the formed, “to that [rule] which discreet charity dictates to them,”\textsuperscript{161} nor has it, in regard to those in formation, repeated verbally that text of the \textit{Constitutions} which tells them that “in addition to confession and Communion, which they will frequent every eight days, and Mass which they will hear every day, they will have one hour. During it they will recite the Hours of our Lady, and will examine their consciences twice each day, and add other prayers according to the devotion of each one until the aforementioned hour is completed . . . ”\textsuperscript{162} But neither did this General Congregation merely cite the text of the post-Ignatian law, repeated and elaborated by virtually all earlier General Congregations since the 2nd General Congregation, with its different hours and methods of prayer strictly determined by a universal rule, whether for the formed or for those in formation.\textsuperscript{163}

We would say that this General Congregation has done something in our opinion more important than to return to the letter of the \textit{Constitutions}. For it worked out a new letter or contemporaneous expression of the Ignatian spirit, that spirit which is embodied in the \textit{Constitutions} and is manifested above all in the three characteristic elements which we have just studied in the first part of this article: co-responsibility of subject and superior in the prayer of the subject; and a method and time of the subject’s prayer which are left open to personal adaptations under the personal direction of the superior. We would also observe, in regard to the discreet charity, that this is not only present expressly in this decree on prayer\textsuperscript{164} and in many other decrees,\textsuperscript{165} but it is also a

\begin{footnotes}
\item[160] Cf. Father General Arrupe’s letter, cited in footnote 2 above.
\item[161] \textit{Cons}, (582), P. 6, c. 3, n. 1.
\item[162] \textit{Ibid.}, (348), P. 4, c. 4, n. 3.
\item[163] Cf. \textit{Collectio decreitorum}, 52, 55, 81.
\item[164] 31st General Congregation, \textit{Decree on Prayer}, no. 11.
\item[165] Especially the \textit{Decree on Spiritual Formation}.
\end{footnotes}
background which inspires the whole Decree on Prayer upon which we are briefly commenting.

Highly original rule

We cannot extend our comparison of the Ignatian law on prayer with the present Decree on Prayer in all its aspects, such as its Christocentrism, its compenetration with the biblical and liturgical spirit, and its community dimension. We must limit ourselves, as we did in the first part of our historical study of the Ignatian law, to the three elements of it which we consider original in St. Ignatius, and which we wish to show to be contemporaneously relevant: the co-responsibility of the subject and superior in the personal prayer of the subject, the method of prayer left open to the most diverse personal adaptations, and the duration without any connotation of the method or manner of prayer and equally open to those adaptations. Only we would add, to facilitate the comparison with this recent decree, that those three elements have their unity and their way of complementing one another, since each of them requires and conditions the others. Thus the three compenetrating elements constitute one single and highly original rule or law on prayer. Since both the superior and the subject participate, each in his own manner, in a shared responsibility, room is left for some universal rule in regard to the duration or daily measure of formal prayer. This measure, however, should not entail a determined method of prayer, but should be a simple quantitative time, a time taken as a point of departure or universal reference for the personal dialogue involving the initiative of the subject and the responsible direction of the superior. But this rule about prayer, if it is made, ought to be a rule left entirely open to personal adaptation in regard to the method of prayer and the employment of the time designated for it.

As we begin to compare the Ignatian legislation on prayer with the 31st General Congregation’s Decree on Prayer, the first thing that stands out, already in the introduction of the Decree, is the first Ignatian element, the co-responsibility of the subject and superior in the subject’s prayer. For there we are told that amid the present post-conciliar circumstances of renewal in the Church, “the General Congregation considers that it must recall the importance of prayer and propose specific orientations on the forms and conditions of prayer in the Society, in order that both the superiors and individual
members may be able to ponder better their personal responsibilities in God's presence."⁹⁶ There it is seen that that co-responsibility of subjects and superiors stands out above everything else which in the Decree is referred to the forms and conditions of prayer, since that co-responsibility is their ultimate object. Moreover, the two following paragraphs of the Decree, the one on our religious and apostolic vocation (no. 2) and the other on the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius as a spiritual patrimony of that same vocation (no. 3), have no other aim than to awaken that responsibility in all Jesuits.⁹⁷

An important paragraph

The next paragraph of the Decree is very important for our purpose because it treats of the unity and necessary interlocking of prayer and action. That is, it deals with what we called the homogeneity between the life of prayer and that of action, characteristic of the ancient and Ignatian tradition of "contemplation in action." And although here a "continuous" prayer is spoken of as distinct from formal prayer,⁹⁸ there are also mentioned "praise, petition, thanksgiving, self-offering, spiritual joy, and peace which ought to penetrate simultaneously prayer and action, and confer on our life its definite unity."⁹⁹ We believe, then, that in this last phrase—and in the example of Christ who "was praying always to the Father, often alone through the night or in the desert" (no. 4), we find sufficient hints about the method of praying briefly but frequently during the action which St. Ignatius as founder and spiritual father of his men kept always before his eyes and in his letters, and which he described with a variety of expressions similar to those which the Decree uses here.

Moreover, this is corroborated, if we remember that that method is the more practical means characteristic of a spiritual tradition which is very ancient and also very contemporaneous. This tradition hopes to find both a renewal in the rules of religious on prayer and an understanding of the historical sources of these rules, precisely by starting from this vital unity or homogeneity of prayer and action. That is, it seeks the renewal according to the light of the gospel ideal of "praying always" and in every place, and not

⁹⁶ Decree on Prayer, no. 1.
⁹⁷ Ibid., nos. 2-3.
⁹⁸ Ibid., no. 4.
⁹⁹ Ibid.
merely according to a clock or through mere obedience to a rule about prayer. For in the light of this highest ideal, everything, even a universal law about prayer, is a means which should be used precisely to the extent in which it is conducive, for each person and each community, to that ideal. From this an important conclusion follows in regard to the parsimony shown by the Constitutions and by the Decree on Prayer of the 31st General Congregation in prescribing any rule which is universal and which rather rigidly determines the method and duration of prayer. That parsimony does not sacrifice prayer to action or fall into the heresy of activism. Neither does it sacrifice apostolic action to a strict time-schedule which sets the time and method of prayer and which could become a kind of taboo. Rather, that parsimony endeavors, as the decree states, that we may be "strengthened and guided towards action in our prayer while our action in turn urges us to pray."  

The next two paragraphs of the Decree refer to the liturgy (no. 5) and to Holy Scripture and tradition in our life of prayer (no. 6). This is an evident repercussion in the Decree of the contemporary liturgical and biblical movements in the Church, and it brings up to date and enriches the spiritual tradition of the Society of Jesus. The Society could not do otherwise if she wished to "think with the Church" of today. In what interests us now, it is fitting to note that one effect of those movements in the Church in this Decree, has been the amplitude and variety of methods of prayer which characterize it. This variety of methods was a characteristic feature of the Ignatian legislation, but it had almost been forgotten after such a long time of speaking almost exclusively about the hour of mental, morning, and continuous prayer. There is another effect on which we shall comment later when we treat the prescriptive paragraphs of the Decree. There we shall speak about the breviary as "a prayer of the hours" and its continuity with the Eucharistic prayer.

It is interesting to observe that the justification of this renewed interest of the present Society in the liturgy and the Scriptures is also apostolic. The spirit of this Decree is, therefore, like the

170 Ibid.
172 Decree on Prayer, no. 6.
spirit of St. Ignatius' Constitutions, a spirit primarily apostolic. It facilitates, as St. Ignatius also sought to do with his legislation on prayer, the homogeneity or vital unity of prayer and of apostolic action, by bringing us to see how apostolic action requires prayer and leads to it.

Paragraph 7 treats the responsibility of each Jesuit in his own life of prayer. It is, from our point of view, central and capital in the whole decree, because it attributes the primacy of importance not to any human law, but to "the law of charity towards God and men which the Holy Spirit has written in our hearts. The charity of Christ urges us to personal prayer and no human person can dispense us from that urgency" (no. 7)—although dispensation can be given from a human rule of prayer. To this first expression about the responsibility of each one in his life of prayer another is added here in respect to the method of prayer. St. Ignatius pointed out "how vital it is for each of his men to seek that manner and kind of prayer which will better aid him progressively to find God and to treat intimately with Him." Then, in treating of time, the third element of legislation on prayer, the Decree adds in a third place and as a new emphasis on personal responsibility, its esteem of everyone's keeping "some time sacred in which, leaving all else aside, he strives to find God" (no. 7). If account is taken of what was said above concerning the personal search for one's own manner and kind of prayer, the passage must be interpreted to mean a time of prayer without any other connotation imposed by rule. That is, no rule requires that the time should be either continuous and at a single period of the day or several briefer periods distributed through the day. Therefore, the reasons are now clear which lead us to consider this paragraph of the Decree on Prayer as central and essential. In it are found incarnated and brought up to date the three elements of the Ignatian legislation on prayer—the co-responsibility of the subject and superior, the method or manner of praying left open to highly diverse personal adaptations, and the time left similarly open. Both contemporaneous relevance and Ignatian originality are clearly evident in this paragraph.

173 Cf. footnote 149.

174 Decree on Prayer, no. 7.
Conditions of prayer

Paragraph 8 treats of the conditions of prayer: abnegation, peace and interior silence, and spiritual discernment in exterior activities. This paragraph insists anew on the unity and vital homogeneity between the life of prayer and apostolic action in the Society, by indicating that the conditions for prayer are also those for action.\footnote{175}{Ibid., no. 8.}

Let us mark here a relation between abnegation and the practice of brief but frequent prayers during the day which we scarcely hinted at in the first part of our study when St. Ignatius is presented to us in the Memoriale of Da Câmara as saying that abnegation and mortification bring it about that one mortified man “would easily accomplish more prayer in a quarter of an hour than another who is not mortified would do in two hours.”\footnote{176}{FN, I, 677.} He does not recommend mortification for itself, but as a condition of a brief but genuine prayer, a prayer which moreover may be frequent. That is why Da Câmara concludes by saying that “with this the Father praised prayer highly, as I have mentioned many times, especially that prayer which is made by bringing God before our eyes.”\footnote{177}{Ibid.}

But, turning to what the Decree tells us about the conditions of prayer as conditions of life, it is evident that at least two of those conditions, “peace and interior silence” and “the spiritual discernment by which a man is willing to listen to God” (no. 8), suggest to us rather the practice of a formal prayer which is frequent during the day and not merely concentrated in a single period of it. Without denying the value and necessity of “intense” times of prayer, the Decree insists on a life of prayer which coextends with the life of apostolic action. Thus, it suggests to us that other method of formal prayer which is equally esteemed and necessary for the lasting practice of the “intense” time of prayer, and also for a life of action which is more homogeneous with the life of prayer.

Paragraph 9, which closes this introductory part of the Decree, more expressly takes up the responsibility of the superior in the prayer of his subjects—a responsibility which is shared by superior and subjects alike. The Decree affirms that “superiors must actually lead the way in this matter of growth in prayer, inspiring by their
example, helping their men, encouraging them, and aiding their progress” (no. 9). Further, “it is the superior’s function to promote the prayer life of the entire community as well as the individual’s, and to promote those conditions which favor prayer” (Ibid.). It should be noticed, too, that by delegation the spiritual fathers share in this responsibility. For the Decree states: “Spiritual fathers, as well as superiors, show the true charity of Christ towards those placed in their charge when they guide them and aid them in this art of prayer, at once most difficult and divine” (Ibid.).

Here the introductory or declarative part of the decree ends. We have limited ourselves to pointing out in it the explicit presence of the three elements of the Ignatian law which we studied above: the co-responsibility of the subject and superior in the prayer of the former, and the method and time of prayer open to any personal adaptation whatever. In passing we have allowed ourselves to point out places in which the Decree can be interpreted in the line of brief but frequent prayers distributed throughout the day. But we have not done this in an exclusive manner, since that method of praying, so proper to our vocation, does not exclude the method which is more extended and concentrated in one period. Rather, in our opinion that method of short reiterated prayers both prepares the way for the lengthier prayer and supplements it.

A common prayer

The second part of the Decree is the preceptive section. It begins with the statement: “Liturgical celebrations, especially those in which the community worships in a group, and above all the celebration of the Eucharist, should mean much to us” (no. 10). It is recommended that this celebration be daily, “even if the faithful are unable to be present. . . .” Concelebration may be had “in our houses when allowed by the proper authorities, while each priest shall always retain his right to celebrate Mass individually” (Ibid.). Here it appears that even in liturgical prayer the Society does not wish to demand more of each one than the Church in regard to his manner of prayer. As is evident here, however, the Society has manifested the same preference as the Church of today for certain forms of liturgical prayer.

At this point and in the light of the study of the Ignatian legislation and in order to show its contemporary relevance, we cite
the next sentences of the Decree: “Priests themselves extend to the different hours of the day the praise and thanksgiving of the Eucharistic celebration by reciting the Divine Office (Presbyterorum Ordinis, no. 5). Hence our priests should try to pray attentively (Sacrosanctum Concilium, no. 90) and at a suitable time (Ibid., no. 94) that wonderful song of praise (Ibid., no. 84) which is truly the prayer of Christ and that of His Body to the Father (Ibid.). In one of the first drafts of the Decree, previous to those which were discussed and voted on in the hall of the General Congregation, it was stated that the different hours of the Divine Office could be integrated with the personal prayer and the examens imposed by rule. In the final text, nothing is stated about this procedure, but it is evident that it is one of the possible adaptations of the schedule of personal prayer which fits in perfectly with the explicit recommendation of the breviary as “a prayer of the hours” by which priests “extend to the different hours of the day the praises and thanksgivings which take place in the Eucharistic celebration” (no. 10). For this liturgical principle has an obvious application to personal prayer: it too ought to be extended to the different hours of the day. If we take the liturgy seriously in our life, it must be for us a school of continuous prayer. The liturgical principle just indicated ought likewise to be applied to our personal prayer and prevent us from considering it finished at the end of the period assigned to concentrated daily prayer by rule. If not even the monks, who are spoken of as consecrated to the liturgical opus Dei, can identify their prayer-life with their schools of liturgical life, much less can we, “contemplatives in action,” identify our prayer-life with a schedule of prayer by rule. The monks ought to consider the schedule of liturgical services which the rule imposes, not as an end, but as a means; nor may they forget the other means of short but frequent prayers during the Divine Office as well as during their personal activity. Neither, then, ought we to forget this last means, so Ignatian, as we saw, of “contemplation in action.” In other words, either liturgical prayer or personal prayer, when they are concentrated in one solitary period of the day, are still a means. And if either liturgical prayer or personal prayer are distributed into opportune periods throughout the whole day of personal activity, they still remain a means. The true end is the Gospel precept to “pray always” and in every place. This end is
so elevated that no one ought to neglect the means which tradition offers us to attain it. Much less ought anyone neglect that means of short but frequent prayers throughout the day which is precisely the more practical means, the means which approaches more closely to that ideal.

Necessity of prayer

Paragraphs 11 and 12, the next two in the definitive Decree, were the most discussed in the Congregation, even down to their last details, undoubtedly because they deal expressly with the rule or traditional usage which was introduced after St. Ignatius and from the time of Borgia: the prescribed hour of daily prayer. Because of this discussion, which began even before the first session of the General Congregation and lasted until the last moments of the second session, it will be best to begin by pointing out what is not said in these two paragraphs. We readily notice these omissions when we compare this Decree with the earlier post-Ignatian legislation. The first thing we observe in this negative line is the principal affirmation, one which characterizes the whole Decree: "The General Congregation, recognizing the value of current developments in the spiritual life, does not intend to impose upon all indiscriminately a precisely defined universal norm for the manner and length of prayer," although the Congregation expressly "wishes to remind every Jesuit that personal daily prayer is an absolute necessity" (no. 11). That is the reason why "our rule of an hour's prayer is . . . to be adapted so that each Jesuit, guided by his superior, takes into account his particular circumstances and needs, in the light of that discerning love which St. Ignatius clearly presupposed in the Constitutions" (Ibid.). Something equivalent is expressed in the following paragraph 12, which treats explicitly of the scholastics and brothers in formation. In order that "they will know how to apply the rule of discerning love which St. Ignatius prescribed for his sons after the period of their formation . . . the Society retains the practice of an hour and a half as the time for prayer, Mass, and thanksgiving. Each man should be guided by his spiritual father as he seeks that form of prayer in which he can best advance in the Lord."

Later on we shall treat of the difference of expression which the decree employs about the formed and those still in formation. For
the present, we continue our observations in the same "negative line" of pointing out what is not mentioned in the Decree, although it had been contained in the post-Ignatian law. This new Decree speaks of the examens of conscience (no. 13), spiritual reading (no. 14), community prayer (no. 15), and the remote preparation of prayer (nos. 9 and 12). But it always does this without precise determination of time or concrete manner. It does not give any determination such that it cannot be adapted to each one in the manner which has been indicated in regard to the rule about the hour of prayer or to the usage of the hour and a half. Consequently, General Congregation has been faithful to its own principle that it, "recognizing the value of current developments in the spiritual life, does not intend to impose upon all indiscriminately a precisely defined universal norm for the manner and length of prayer" (no. 11). For that reason, whenever it speaks of a time or manner of prayer, it avoids doing so in a manner that would impose "a precisely defined universal norm," as had been done in the post-Ignatian law which was in force until now. Instead, it speaks of a rule or traditional usage which is "to be adapted so that each Jesuit, guided by his superior, takes into account his particular circumstances and needs, in the light of that discerning love which St. Ignatius clearly presupposed in the Constitutions," so that each man may "be guided by his spiritual father as he seeks that form of prayer in which he can best advance in the Lord" (no. 12). There it clearly appears that the General Congregation has always in view the responsibility of the subject who seeks constantly his method and way of prayer and the responsibility of the superior who constantly discerns the results of that personal search and adapts any rule or universal usage of prayer to those results.

Given the importance of this principle of adaptation, which is not the long-known dispensation proper to every human rule but rather something peculiar to this Decree on Prayer, the General Congregation, "recognizing the value of current developments in the spiritual life," repeats the principle several times.

After stating that "The Society counts on her men after their formation to be truly 'spiritual men who have advanced in the way of Christ our Lord so as to run along this way,' men who in this matter of prayer are led chiefly by that 'rule . . . which discerning love gives to each one' (Constitutions, 582), guided by
the advice of his spiritual father and the approval of his superior,” the Decree expressly reminds all that they “should recall that the prayer in which God communicates himself more intimately is the better prayer, whether vocal or mental, meditative reading, affective prayer or contemplation” (no. 11). We have seen that the Congregation also repeats the same principle of adaptation for the scholastics and brothers in formation.

Two reasons for adaptation

There are two reasons for this principle of adaptation. The first is the contemporary spiritual evolution in which the Society is involved just like the whole Church. The second reason, more proper to the Society, is that rule of discreet charity which, in its way, continues to be the spirit of all the rules and universal usages of the Society. The same Decree says that about those already formed, as we just saw; and in its own manner it repeats it about those in formation, when it says of them that “During the entire time of their formation they should be carefully helped to grow in prayer and a sense of spiritual responsibility towards a mature interior life, in which they will know how to apply the rule of discerning love which St. Ignatius prescribed for his sons after the period of their formation” (no. 12, 1°).

In this reason of discreet charity, there is a slight difference of expression, though it is of fundamental significance, between the adaptation of the rule of the hour of prayer in the case of the formed and the usage devoting an hour and a half to prayer, Mass, and thanksgiving in the case of those in formation, whether scholastics or brothers. For those already formed, there is a division supposing that the rule of the hour must be adapted to each one (no. 11), while for those in formation the rightful supposition is that the usage of the hour and a half must be preserved (no. 12, 2°), although without denying for that reason the more universal principle that “our rule of an hour’s prayer is to be adapted so that each Jesuit . . . takes into account his particular circumstances and needs,” without distinction of class or grade. The Decree gives the reason for this slight but fundamentally significant difference of expression about the formed and not yet formed members. It states that in this matter of prayer, the formed should be men “led chiefly by that rule . . . which discerning love gives to each one” (no. 11),

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while it says of those in formation that "to foster this growth" toward mastery of that rule of discreet charity "the practice of an hour and a half as the time for prayer, Mass, and thanksgiving" should be retained (no. 12, 2°).

By expressing the Ignatian rule of discreet charity in its own way amid the present historical circumstances, the 31st General Congregation has worked out a genuine aggiornamento of it for the formed as well as for those in formation, although not in the same manner for both.

Personal responsibility

In what refers to the daily time of prayer, a certain difference is maintained, as St. Ignatius already did, in favor of those already formed; but this difference has been expressed in another way more in agreement with the present-day circumstances of renewal. Whether or not to retain the difference was a point discussed at great length, but in the end a way was sought to retain the same tradition of the hour of prayer, by eliminating from it that which answered the needs of past epochs but was no longer timely now, and by making capital of all the good which it had given to the Society and to the Church. That tradition of almost four centuries had great weight in the Society, and in addition it had been followed by many other religious institutes and even by the Church. But it was not so important that the 31st General Congregation should retain its obligation "as a precisely defined universal norm for the manner and length of prayer" (no. 11). Instead, from now on the rule of the hour of prayer for the formed or the practice of the hour and a half, including Mass and thanksgiving for those in formation can and should be adapted to each one and applied. The true aim is to favor among all the development of the life of prayer, and in particular among those in formation, to foster the sense of responsibility as something growing ever more personal.

The Congregation desired to facilitate in the best way this adaptation of that daily time "so that each Jesuit . . . takes into account his particular circumstances and needs, in the light of that discerner ing love which St. Ignatius clearly presupposed in the

178 Code of Canon Law, canons 125 (for clerics), 595 (for religious) and 1367 (for seminarians).
"Constitutions" (no. 11). Therefore it does not treat of time which is also qualitatively specified in regard to the method of prayer, such as mental, continuous, and in the morning. Instead of this procedure, which was used in the post-Ignatian law, the Congregation treats of time purely as time for prayer, without any connotation of a manner of prayer, not even that of its being continuous or integral. In this respect the Congregation has returned to what St. Ignatius’ text allows. It even goes beyond him, since for those in formation he had specified the Hours of our Lady as a point of departure. This was, of course, easily dispensable or adaptable to each one. The Decree observes that the communities where those in formation live “are ordinarily more tightly structured and larger in number,” and therefore it prescribes that “the daily order should always indicate clearly a portion of the day fixed by superiors within which prayer and preparation for it may have their time securely established” (no. 12, 3°). This statement means, not an imposition of a continuous and integral time within a determined period of the day, as the post-Ignatian law sought, but a mere margin of security for the whole, or a help for those who, in the large communities, need that external circumstance of silence and solitude.

In what refers to the manner of prayer, we have returned in fact and in law to the plentitude of the Ignatian concept. For the present Decree does not impose on anyone any determined manner of prayer. It expressly says that “the prayer in which God communicates Himself more intimately is the better prayer, whether vocal or mental, meditative reading, affective prayer or contemplation” (no. 11). Moreover, the Decree has gone a little farther than St. Ignatius, since for those in formation he did use a determined manner of prayer as a starting point, while the present Decree tells them that “each man should be guided by his spiritual father as he seeks that form of prayer in which he can best advance in the Lord” (no. 12, 2°). It should be observed, too, that if the 31st General Congregation has precinded from mention of the Office of the Virgin, the reason was not one of lower esteem for vocal prayer or for the “prayer of the hours,” as had been the case in the post-Ignatian legislation. For the Congregation has mentioned both these forms of prayer together and with esteem equal to that which
until now was shown for the prayer termed mental. Rather, the reason was that in this matter it has shown itself as especially "recognizing the value of current developments in the spiritual life" (no. 11). Thus those in formation have in this point been assimilated, in regard to personal prayer, entirely with those already formed. The only difference retained is that which the Church places between priests and those who are not priests.\(^{179}\)

Finally, in what refers to St. Ignatius' fundamental principle, the co-responsibility of the subject and superior in the subject's life of prayer, the 31st General Congregation has returned to it several times—not only in the decree on prayer, but also in many others, as for example, those on obedience, common life, and the selection of ministries.

We are able then to conclude our comparison between the Ignatian legislation on prayer in the Society of Jesus and the recent Decree on Prayer by affirming that the three typical elements of that Ignatian law, the co-responsibility of subjects and superiors, the manner or method of prayer left open to the most diverse personal adaptations (always under the spiritual authority and direction of the superior or of his ordinary delegate), and the time of prayer left similarly open, are seen as prevailing in the Decree on Prayer of this General Congregation. They also appear as contemporaneously relevant.

**Conclusion**

We think that we have been sufficiently clear in the course of our work, both in its first or historical part, which investigated the genesis and essence of the Ignatian legislation on prayer in the Society, and in the second part, when we treated the contemporary relevance of that Ignatian law in the light of the Decree on Prayer of the recent General Congregation. Hence we feel ourselves dispensed from making a resume of our conclusions.

But since we have prescinded, in general, from the post-Ignatian legislation which prevailed up to the promulgation of the recent Decree, we believe it opportune to refer to it at the end of our study on the Ignatian law, in order to see its place in the Decree.

\(^{179}\) *Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy*, no. 97.
Until a short while before the 31st General Congregation began, and also during its course almost until the voting on this theme of prayer which occurred on the very last days, many regarded the two laws, the Ignatian and the post-Ignatian, as irreconcilable—if not in their spirit, at least in their letter and in the mentalities they represented. Without reaching, like some of the historians whom we quoted at the beginning of this study, an extreme position of putting St. Ignatius and St. Francis Borgia in opposition, many delegates found themselves unable to see any way in which the two laws could be reconciled. Hence they thought it necessary to opt for one law or the other, to impose or not to impose a period of time.

In our opinion, the less insight there is into the substance of the one law or the other, the easier does it become to advance justifying support for an option so radical, if not an opposition. If instead of considering the spirit and original characteristic elements of St. Ignatius' legislation on prayer, attention is paid merely to its letter, it appears impossible to integrate his statement about the formed Jesuits, “it does not seem expedient to give them any rule other than that which discreet charity dictates to them” (Constitutions, no. 582) with a rule which does impose on them at least one hour of daily prayer. This impossibility sharply increases if attention is paid only to a rule imposing “upon all indiscriminately a precisely defined universal norm for the manner and length of prayer”—a rule accompanied, moreover, by so many other “rules” about other “hours” and other methods of prayer, such as litanies, spiritual reading, the rosary, and the like.

With the discussion based on terms of the duration of prayer, and a duration in which the method is prescribed as being continuous, integral, mental, and made in the morning, it becomes difficult indeed to escape from a radical option between one law, the Ignatian, which does not determine any time for the formed, and another law, the post-Ignatian, which determines that time to the last detail. In this form the tension is carried to the extreme because the option seems to be between “nothing” and “all.” To this difficulty still another is added: he who chooses for no rule in prayer for the formed appears to choose for nothing of formal prayer. And he who chooses for a rule on formal prayer so determined and
luxuriant, appears to choose for another manner of living, one more contemplative and less active.

The General Congregation brought the first occasion when the proponents of these two extreme tendencies found themselves forced to carry on a dialogue about this problem in an exhaustive way and for a period of time relatively long—the two lengthy sessions and the period of over a year between them. As a result, the delegates came not only to a better understanding of the Ignatian law in its fundamental elements, but also to a true understanding of a post-Ignatian tradition of the daily hour of prayer, a tradition as worthy of being taken into account and respected as is the Ignatian law itself, and as presently relevant, too.

We should say that, in order to arrive at a positive result for both sides, it was necessary to overcome the over-simplification of characterizing the Ignatian legislation as being a mere negation of all time of prayer imposed by rule on the formed. It was also necessary to overcome reluctance to see, beneath the post-Ignatian legislation, a tradition which rose above the defects of expression in that later legislation and was another expression, historically different from the Ignatian, of the same discreet charity of St. Ignatius.

In our opinion, the rediscovery of the positive element of the Ignatian legislation has been what made possible the revaluation of the tradition of the hour of prayer. For this rediscovery has enabled us to make prominent in the interpretation of the Ignatian legislation, not a merely negative element, the non-imposition of a fixed duration of prayer for the formed, but the three positive elements: 1) the co-responsibility of the subject and superior in the subject's prayer-life, 2) the method of praying left open and adaptable to each subject, directed and governed by his immediate superior, and 3) the length of prayer left similarly open. From all this has also emerged the possibility of integrating the Ignatian legislation on prayer with the tradition of an hour of prayer, when that tradition is purified of everything which makes the aforementioned co-responsibility difficult or indiscreetly lessens it. For the fundamental Ignatian principle of the co-responsibility of the subject and superior does not exclude all law or rule of prayer, but only that rule which makes the persons of subject and superiors
infantile and irresponsible, or makes the subjects rebel at a prayer-structure which is merely juridical and little flexible to personal adaptations.

Toward a synthesis

The experience immediately before the General Congregation, with its multiple and varied defections, personal calamities, irresponsibilities, and rebellions against all structure, not only within the Society of Jesus, but in the Church itself and in human society, was an awakening; it demanded that we look at what was fundamental and not bog down in discussing what is merely accessory. The result has been our discovery, in the Ignatian legislation as well as in the post-Ignatian tradition of prayer, of the values both of which are contemporaneously relevant and can be integrated.

In this integration, the Ignatian legislation with its fundamental elements, co-responsibility of subject and superior, method of prayer open to the most diverse adaptations, and time of prayer similarly open, has displayed a very important role. For that reason we have made those elements the object of a special study. But also very important has been the working presence of that post-Ignatian tradition of the hour of prayer, once it was freed, in the light of the Ignatian legislation, from all that pertained to the past and made it outdated and unacceptable.

We believe that that is the positive judgment which the Decree on Prayer of the 31st General Congregation merits: after more than four centuries of discussion among many men of good will, it has integrated an Ignatian legislation opened to the future of the Society of Jesus with a tradition which was begun after the death of St. Ignatius and has only now reached its perfect expression.

We believe when all juridical preference for one manner of prayer (such as mental, continuous, matutinal, and the like) over any other manner disappears, a new era of prayer-life opens up for the Society, just as it did for the Church after the promulgation of the Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy of Vatican Council II. It can well be an era "as though concluding four centuries of the Society's history just after the close of the Ecumenical Vatican Council II, and beginning a new era of your militant religious life with a fresh mentality and with new proposals"—if we may

180 Paul VI, Discourse at the close of the 31st General Congregation.
thus apply to this most important aspect of the Society’s prayer-life those words which Pope Paul VI spoke about the work of the General Congregation. Wherefore, as Father General Arrupe said to the whole Society, we should not think “that the 31st General Congregation broke with our past history and our living tradition, so that everything must be discovered afresh,”¹⁸¹ but neither should we look “for simple ready-made conclusions from the Congregation and a complete definitive solution to the serious problems put before it.”¹⁸²

The work which awaits us all, and which the decree on prayer of the Society demands of us, is “the searching and testing by many manners” of praying,¹⁸³ whether privately or in the community, to the end of enriching and updating our already abundant tradition of prayer. For that reason we say that, in our opinion, a new era of a life of prayer has been opened for the Society of Jesus.

In this new era, thanks to the Decree on Prayer of the recent General Congregation, the Ignatian spirit will be present and operative in us, and also the post-Ignatian tradition. We have characterized it with this epithet, not in order to oppose it to the Ignatian spirit, but to indicate a real difference of time which nevertheless does not involve a spiritual discontinuity. We presuppose here, as we said above, that what is original and contemporaneously relevant in the Ignatian legislation on prayer in the Society is better recognized, and that the post-Ignatian tradition will be freed from whatever would “impose on all indiscriminately a precisely defined universal norm for the manner and length of prayer,”¹⁸⁴ a norm or rule in which that post-Ignatian tradition was embodied for many centuries.

¹⁸¹ Father General Arrupe, in the letter to the whole Society, cited above in footnote 3.
¹⁸² Ibid.
¹⁸³ Letter of St. Ignatius to the Duke of Gandia, Epplgn, II, 236.
¹⁸⁴ 31st General Congregation, Decree on Prayer, no. 11.
"if ever there was a body of men who merited damnation on earth and in Hell it is the society of Loyola's." So wrote John Adams in 1816 to his friend Thomas Jefferson. Adams reflected a tradition of anti-Jesuitism which went back to the very foundations of the American nation. Fearing the subversive influence of the Jesuits, the Massachusetts General Court passed a law in 1647, a mere twenty-seven years after the establishment of the colony, which was designed to prevent the "secret underminings and solicitations of the Jesuitical order." Entry of the Jesuits into the colony was strictly prohibited, with violators receiving severe punishment. Feeling against the sons of Loyola ran high throughout the Revolutionary and post-Revolutionary periods, reaching a climax in the years 1830 to 1860, an era sometimes called "The Age of No Popery."

The sectional and social conflicts which arose during the administration of Andrew Jackson (1828-1836) spawned a thirty-year period of religious antagonism unparalleled in American history. Anti-Catholic societies and publications flourished, as nativist and Protestant groups organized to break the power of Rome. At least nine anti-Jesuit tracts received wide publicity during this time. One

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of the first to appear was an anonymous volume entitled Helen Mulgrave; or, Jesuit Executorship: being Passages in the Life of a Seceder from Romanism, published in New York in 1834. The tale of the “ex-Jesuit” and “ex-Catholic” was a frequently repeated one which seldom failed to find a believing audience. In the following year there appeared a work of equal interest by Richard Baxter entitled Jesuit Juggling: Forty Popish Frauds Detected and Disclosed. Who were these Jesuits, Baxter asked? Answering his own question, he asserted that they were “Men who know no authority but the supreme pontifical mandate; who are united to mankind by none of the natural bonds of relationship; who have no motive of action but personal indulgence.” In short, they were “... the enemies of all that portion of the human family who will not submit to their personal despotism.”

One of the most effective of the anti-Jesuit books was one written by a true ex-Jesuit, an articulate writer named Andrew Steinmetz. Steinmetz’ rather melancholy (and evidently accurate) recollections of his Jesuit days appeared in a popular volume entitled, The Novitiate, or a Year Among the English Jesuits. Replete with detailed drawings of the Jesuits’ instruments of mortification and a surprisingly accurate account of the Jesuit’s daily life, the publication gave the reader the “inside story” of the life of the Jesuits. “The Jesuit is a picked man,” Steinmetz concluded, and not one to be taken lightly. Steinmetz’ work offered correct information about the daily order of the houses of formation, the recreational activities, the Novitiate readings, etc., but was marred by a tendency to find a sinister motivation behind every event, even the most commonplace.

At the end of the 1830’s Isaac Taylor, the noted philologist, scientist, and philosopher, published a more restrained indictment of the Society entitled Loyola: or Jesuitism in its Rudiments. More intelligent and objective than most of the anti-Jesuit books in this Age of No Popery, Taylor’s piece outlined the works and writings of the order as he understood them. He contended that the Jesuits

3 Andrew Steinmetz, A Year Among the English Jesuits (New York: Harper and Bros., 1846), p. 5.
were secret conspirators in a plan to capture men's minds; in developing this thesis he placed little emphasis on their supposed political machinations, viewing the order mainly as a spiritual movement.⁴

Lecturers and textbooks

Of the numerous anti-Jesuit lecturers who toured the land, only one deserves comment here. He was Joseph F. Berg, who lectured with success in the Eastern cities during the early 1850's. His best known address, given in Philadelphia in 1852, outlined the "subversive" and "cruel" history of the Jesuits. He characterized them as men with "a will strong as iron, and a heart as cold as marble and as hard."⁵ The speaker drew enthusiastic applause when he noted that Ignatius Loyola's broken leg "remained crooked; an apt representation and emblem of the crooked ways of his followers, from that day to the present."⁶

Even the textbooks of the period showed a strong anti-Jesuit bias. One of the most popular history manuals of the time, Charles A. Goodrich's *Outlines of History*, said that the Popes were using the Jesuits to persecute Protestants, capture Asia and South America, and eventually gain control of the whole world.⁷ It is interesting to note, however, that all the contemporary history texts, even those most hostile to Catholicism, had good things to say about the Paraguay Reductions.

Certainly the most famous and effective anti-Jesuit polemicist of the times was Samuel F. B. Morse, the inventor of the telegraph. A native of New England and raised in an atmosphere of anti-Catholicism, Morse nevertheless seems to have taken no notice of the No Popery movement until he became the victim of an unfortunate incident in Rome. In the Jubilee Year of 1850 Morse happened to be in Rome while making the traditional "grand tour" of the Continent. One day, while watching a papal procession, his

hat was rudely knocked off his head by an arrogant Papal soldier who cursed and taunted him insultingly. Enraged, Morse vowed never to relent in his attacks on Romanism. His special target was the Jesuits, whom he castigated in the second most widely read anti-Catholic work of the period, *Foreign Conspiracy Against the Liberties of the United States*. Echoing the widespread fear of foreign domination so strong at that time, he contended that the Holy Alliance, led by Catholic Austria, was using the Jesuits to undermine American liberty:

She has her Jesuit missionaries traveling through the land; she has supplied them with money, and has furnished a fountain for a regular supply. [Austria's agents were the Jesuits:] They are an ecclesiastical order, proverbial through the world for cunning, duplicity, and total want to moral principles; an order so skilled in all the arts of deception that even in Catholic countries . . . it became intolerable, and the people required its suppression.8

The Jesuits, stated Morse, planned to gain control of the nation by cleverly manipulating the votes of the millions of Catholic immigrants then flooding the Eastern cities. In this plan, the Irish Catholics, of course, would be especially useful. What made the Jesuits especially dangerous in Morse's eyes was their opposition to freedom. For the present they found it useful to hide their tyrannical views, he said, but when they came to power, they would quickly destroy all human freedom. Morse was also suspicious of the methods he felt the Jesuits were using, methods involving the use of physical brutality, mob action, and "priest police." The author "proved" all his contentions by citing a number of remarkable letters supposedly written by Jesuits themselves.9 These letters showed how the Jesuits opposed freedom, plotted the overthrow of the government, and cynically took advantage of the generosity, liberality, and hospitality of the American people.

Morse's work was exceptionally well received, and was followed by a second opus, *Imminent Danger to the Free Institutions of the United States Through Foreign Immigration*. Strongly anti-Jesuit throughout, it failed to achieve the popularity of *Foreign Conspiracy*, probably because it repeated so much of the material con-

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9 Ibid., pp. 73-76.
tained in that earlier work. The temper of the book, however, was even more severe than its predecessor. For example:

They [the Jesuits] have already sent their chains, and oh! to our shame be it spoken, you are fastening them upon a sleeping victim. Americans, you are marked for their prey, not by foreign bayonets, but by weapons surer of effecting the conquest of liberty, than all the munitions of physical combat in the military or naval storehouses of Europe. Will you not awake to the apprehension of the reality and extent of your danger? Will you be longer deceived by the pensioned Jesuits, who having surrounded your press, are now using it all over the country to stifle the cries of danger, and lull your fears by attributing your alarm to a false cause? Up! Up! I beseech you. Awake! To your posts! Let the tocsin sound from Maine to Louisiana. Fly to protect the vulnerable places of your Constitution and laws. Place your guards; you will need them; and quickly too—And first, shut your gates.”

The middle 1840's witnessed a new form of anti-Jesuitism: the fear that the Jesuits were taking over the West. To understand this fear, one must keep in mind that the nation was rapidly expanding westward, and Americans of that day placed the highest hopes on the newly settled western lands. Any threat to the development of that area was clearly a threat to the good of the entire nation. When the Jesuits began a rapid expansion of their schools in the Mississippi Valley, many Protestants viewed the action as a menace to the nation's safety. A group called the “Society for the Promotion of Collegiate and Theological Education in the West,” formed in Boston in 1843, devoted much of its time to stemming the westward advance of Jesuitism. One clergyman told his congregation that the country’s greatest battle with the Jesuits would be waged in the West. To counter them, “We must build College against College... All experience has confirmed our anticipation, that America is a field on which the open, manly, Christian discipline of a Protestant College must annihilate the rival system of Jesuitical education.”

The leading religious newspaper of the day, The American Protestant Vindicator, warned its readers that Jesuits in the West often travelled in subtle disguise:

12 Loc. cit.
It is an ascertained fact that Jesuits are prowling about all parts of the United States in every possible disguise, expressly to ascertain the advantageous situations and modes to disseminate Popery. A minister of the Gospel from Ohio has informed us, that he discovered one carrying on his devices in his congregation; and he says that the western country swarms with them under the names of puppet show men, dancing masters, music teachers, peddlers of images and ornaments, barrel organ players, and similar practitioners.\(^\text{13}\)

The Jesuit threat was not confined to the West, however. Wherever freedom loving Americans established their domiciles, the Jesuits could be surely found, waiting to take away their constitutional rights. Even the halls of Congress were considered unsafe from the Jesuit threat; Representative Lewis C. Levin, speaking in the House on March 2, 1848, objected to a measure designed to establish an American Embassy in Rome, saying that he had been a frequent victim of “the paid agents of Jesuits who hang around this Hall and who swarm over the land.” When the members of the House expressed astonishment, Levin countered by insisting that the Jesuits held the doctrine that Protestant governments which did not have the sacred confirmation of the Pope were illegal, a tale which, whether true or not, failed to prove his preceding contention. After repeating the now familiar story that the Jesuits were using the immigrants to gain ultimate control of the new states in the West, he ended with the ringing words, “How many Jesuit Senators shall we have in the course of the next twenty years!”\(^\text{14}\)

Maria Monk

_Uncle Tom’s Cabin_ was the most popular book of the pre-Civil War period, but _The Awful Disclosures of Maria Monk_, first printed in 1836, ran a close second. The 300,000 copies it sold before the Civil War brought the cries of No Popery to their highest pitch. Maria Monk, so the book said, was an “ex-nun” who fled her convent in Montreal. Immediately after her “escape” (who can tell what really happened in this fantastic story—the versions, including her own, are so contradictory), Maria wrote down her recollections, under the persistent prodding of a group of anti-Catholics. She wrote that her Mother Superior told her she must “obey the priests in all things,” meaning that she was to “live in the practice of

\(^{13}\) _American Protestant Vindicator_, December 25, 1834.

\(^{14}\) Myers, _op. cit._, pp. 182-83.
criminal intercourse with them,” a fate which she tells us filled “her with utter astonishment and horror.” The children whom the hapless nuns subsequently bore were immediately baptized and strangled, because, as the Mother Superior sweetly explained, “This secured their everlasting happiness, for the baptism purified them from all sinfulness . . . How happy . . . are those who secure immortal happiness in such little beings! Their little souls would thank those who kill their bodies, if they had it in their power!”

Maria’s book enjoyed instant success, making Maria herself a celebrity. Her fame began to decline, however, when she gave birth to a fatherless child and then another a year later. At this stage, the Jesuits entered the story. The American Protestant Vindicator, coming to Maria’s defense, stated that her second pregnancy had been arranged by the Jesuits to discredit her, although it failed to enlarge upon the “arrangements.” Shortly afterwards a group of impartial Protestant clergymen examined Maria’s convent in Montreal and concluded that her whole story was a hoax. The publishers of the Awful Disclosures, afraid of losing a lucrative item, insisted that the clergymen were nothing but Jesuits in disguise. Charges and countercharges flew until Maria’s mother gave her own version of the story, one that differed considerably from Maria’s. The mother said that her daughter had never been in a convent in Montreal, and that the whole story was the product of a brain which had been injured in infancy, when Maria had run a pencil into her head! As a result of her wild behavior, so the mother’s story went, Maria had been put into a Catholic asylum in Montreal, from which she escaped with the help of a former lover who was also, by the way, the father of her first child. A mere two years after the first publication of the Awful Disclosures, Maria’s once brilliant star was fast fading away. In 1849 she was arrested in a brothel for picking the pockets of her male companion. She died in prison shortly thereafter.

With the Maria Monk affair ended, “No Popery” and “No Jesuits” declined until the 1850’s, when the Know-Nothing party appeared on the scene. The “Know-Nothings,” so called because they claimed to “know nothing” about their anti-Catholic activities, waged a

16 American Protestant Vindicator, April 28, 1941.
systematic campaign to destroy the power of the Jesuits in America.

The secret rituals of the party were not known until 1856, when suddenly they appeared in print, causing great embarrassment to the members. Not surprisingly, the Jesuits figured prominently in these ceremonials. For example, the President of the local council was admonished to address the newly-initiated members as follows:

It has no doubt been long apparent to you, brothers, that foreign influence and Roman Catholicism have been making steady and alarming progress in our country . . . A sense of danger has struck the great heart of the nation. In every city, town, and hamlet the danger has been seen and the alarm sounded. And hence, true men devised this order as a means of . . . checking the strides of the foreigner or alien or thwarting the machinations and subverting the deadly plans of the Papist and Jesuit. 17

The aroused leaders of the party, certain that the Jesuits had published the rituals, warned their followers:

The aroused malice of the sleepless disciples of Loyola, the foes of God, of man and of liberty, has been directed against us. Every means, however atrocious, will be adopted, and the spirit which has enchained the world and washed its fetters in gore, will be on the alert to discover your secrets, to thwart your action, and to destroy your fortune, your reputation (and, it may be done in cowardly security), your life. 18

The Know-Nothings produced a host of anti-Jesuit novels, in most of which a Protestant “hero” and a Catholic “villain” (often a Jesuit) debated the evils and dangers of Rome. The Protestant always won decisively. The Harper publishing company, for instance, produced a book by Reverend M. Hobart Seymour entitled Mornings Among the Jesuits at Home: Being Notes with Certain Jesuits on the Subject of Religion in the City of Rome. Selling for seventy-five cents, the book described its author as one “thoroughly acquainted with those unscrupulous controversialists, the disciples of Loyola.” 19 In the year 1851, a novel was published entitled, The Female Jesuit; or, the Spy in the Family, by John C. Pitrot, a

19 Giacinto Achilli, Dealing with the Inquisition, or Papal Rome, Her Priests, and her Jesuits, with Important Disclosures (New York: Harper and Bros., 1851), back cover.
prolific anti-Catholic polemicist. The book told the story of a woman known only as "Marie" who belonged to a mysterious organization known as the "Order of Female Jesuits." A faithful and zealous member of the group, she took part in numerous Jesuitical deeds until she left the convent, for reasons made none too clear by the author. After her departure she refused to tell anything about her former life, thus casting suspicion on her actions. Pitrot followed his successful work with another on the same theme entitled Sequel to the Female Jesuit. It too enjoyed success as did his final effort on the subject, Carlington Castle; a Tale of the Jesuits.

The last important Know-Nothing publication dealing with the Jesuits was William Binder's Madelon Hawley; or, the Jesuit and his Victim; a Revelation of Romanism (1859). The tract told the heart-rending story of Madelon Hawley, a maiden of incomparable innocence, who was captured, kidnapped, and murdered by Fr. Heustace, a malevolent Jesuit, described graphically as one who could "rob the orphan without one remorseful pang." The scene in which Heustace murders Madelon is a classic of its genre:

Madelon had barely concluded her appeal [to be released from the Jesuit prison] when the now infuriated priest sprang towards her. Eternal Truth had pierced even his callous heart; but instead of deterring, it only urged him on to new scenes of violence. "Be that word the last you shall shriek in my ear, proud, defiant woman!" he shouted, terribly. There was a blow—a faint scream—a running of blood. The priest had stricken the girl with the heavy iron-key which opened the doors of the tunnel.

I looked on horrified, for my mind was not prepared for such a sight. For some moments I could scarcely comprehend what had occurred. At length the reality burst upon me.

With the yell of a madman I dashed into the room. The Jesuit turned and glared at me affrighted; Madelon fell quivering to the floor, her white clothes dyed with the purple stream.

"Mother—Frank—I come!" she murmured—gasped for breath—moaned, and died . . . I turned to the priest . . . "Fiend!" "Fiend!" I shouted, crazy with the scene—"behold another murder is committed—another victim is added to your long catalogue. The spirits of so many murdered are waiting to drag you down to hell. I hear their voices in the whispering air. They clamor for retribution. Come—come—come!" . . . Bounding upon him with all the

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21 William Binder, Madelon Hawley, or, the Jesuit and His Victim; A Revelation of Romanism (New York: H. Dayton, 1859), pp. 19-20.
ferocity of a madman, I—bore him to the floor, and twisted my fingers about his neck.  

Father Heustace was murdered, the narrator was later captured, but then escaped.

The Know-Nothings were elected to the state legislature and national congress, carrying their anti-Jesuit doctrine with them. Representative Bayard Clark warned his colleagues in the House of Representatives that the Jesuits were the allies of slavery, while Senator Brooks, speaking in the upper house of the New York Legislature in March, 1855, stated that the Jesuits took an oath to destroy Protestants and heretics.

In the 1850's a number of "ex-priests" of questionable credentials toured the country, giving lectures on the evils of Romanism, with special attention placed on the Jesuits. The first of these was Fr. G. G. Achilli, an ex-priest from Italy, who warned the nation in 1851 of the part played by the Jesuits in the Inquisition. They were the right hand of the Inquisition, averred Achilli, for without their aid the twelve Cardinal Inquisitors would have none of the secret information so essential to their task. His book told how he had become the friend of one of the Jesuits working on the court. This man told Achilli all of the Inquisition's secrets—its subversive methods of gathering information, its torturing of suspects, its secret undermining of legitimate governments. Two years later "Father" Alessandro Gavazzi toured the land, giving nine lectures, the burden of which was that the "Satanical Jesuits" (his term) would bring oppression to America. "The Jesuits throng to America to support and glorify the Popish system," he said in one address. The most sinister Jesuitical method was the practice of confession: "In astute hands . . . it has become a political instrument, making the priest master of the secrets, the conscience, the soul of his penitent." Gavazzi enjoyed a brief but glorious reign as the lead-

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22 Ibid., pp. 269-70.
26 Myers, op. cit., pp. 190-91.
ing ex-priest in the country. Interestingly enough, he had tried to lecture in Ireland before coming to this country; his reception there has been described as “poor.”

Another popular Know-Nothing orator was the “Angel Gabriel,” so called because he always started his prayer meetings by blowing a loud horn. He preached wherever anyone would hear him, fulminating against “the infernal Jesuit systems and accursed popery.”

Fr. Bapst

It was only in the Know-Nothing Era that anti-Jesuitism reached the point of violence. The most widely publicized incident was the tarring and feathering of Fr. John Bapst, S.J., at Ellsworth, Maine, on the night of Saturday, October 14, 1854. Fr. Bapst had been sent to the tiny community of Ellsworth in January the previous year. Maine was a center of Know-Nothing unrest, and Ellsworth was especially tense. Fr. Bapst suffered intermittent harassment all through 1853 and 1854 as riots flared up, gangs of Know-Nothing ruffians held stormy meetings, and the local Catholic Church was attacked. The situation worsened rapidly in June, 1854, when party members threw a bomb into the small Catholic school, causing extensive damage. Fr. Bapst, meanwhile, had been assigned to the parish nearby in Bangor, Maine, but when he visited Ellsworth one day he found not only a collapsing school but a resolution passed by the town meeting which said:

Resolved, That should the said Bapst be found again upon Ellsworth soil, we manifest our gratitude for his kindly interference with our fine schools, and attempt to banish the Bible therefrom, by procuring for him, and trying on an entire suit of new clothes such as cannot be found in the shops of any tailor and that when thus appalled, he be presented with a fine ticket to leave Ellsworth upon the first railroad operation that may go into effect.

Bapst ignored the resolution and came back repeatedly to Ellsworth. He returned once too often, however, for on the night of October 14 (all the contemporary accounts insist it was “wild and stormy”) Father Bapst was dragged from the house where he was staying overnight and was taken to the driveway of the Ellsworth Machine Company. There he was stripped naked, tarred, and

27 Condon, op. cit., V, 454.
feathered. The operation finished, his captors forced him astride a rail and rode him through the streets of the town, bouncing the rail violently to make the journey as painful as possible. The group was narrowly dissuaded from hanging the priest, and decided reluctantly to let him go. He was thrown unconscious to the ground. Unbelievably, Bapst said Mass the next morning. His enemies threatened to kill him if he did not leave town, but the ever-bellicose Irish armed themselves to protect him. He finally left, without duress, one day later.

The incident received national publicity, and tolerant groups even in anti-Romanist Maine were touched by the priest’s courage and endurance. The Protestant citizens of Bangor held a public meeting denouncing the Ellsworth affair and presented Father Bapst a purse of money and a gold watch. The inscription on the watch said: “Although not agreeing with you in the tenets of the faith you profess . . . we are unwilling to see any man proscribed for worshipping God according to the dictates of his own conscience.”

James J. Walsh soberly informs us that Fr. Bapst received permission from the Father General of the Jesuits to wear the watch. He was, in fact, “the only Jesuit wearer of a gold watch anywhere in the world.” Walsh hastens to add, however, that the modest Bapst never showed it off.

The Bangor Whig and Courier stated that “an outrage of the kind perpetrated at Ellsworth admits of no palliation . . . It was not only a crime—but it was a stupendous folly.” A folly it certainly was, for partly as a result of the bad publicity the Bapst incident received, Know-Nothingism in Maine would eventually decline, but not, however, until two more incidents occurred. The first was the destruction at Norridgework, Maine, of a statue com-

30 Lucey, op. cit., p. 133.
32 Lucey, op. cit., p. 133.
memorating Fr. Sebastian Ralse, a 17th century Jesuit martyr. The statue, originally paid for by both Protestants and Catholics, was not replaced, although both Protestants and Catholics gathered at his grave in 1907 to do him honor. Finally, in November, 1855, there was a second incident when the laying of the cornerstone of a new Jesuit church in Bath, Maine, was prevented by an ugly mob.

Know-Nothing sentiment was also strong in Massachusetts, though less intense than in Maine. The Jesuits at Boston College had considerable difficulty, due to Know-Nothing opposition, in buying property for their new campus. From 1853 to 1857 they sparred with the Boston Know-Nothings, meeting every kind of legal obstacle. Finally the Jesuits were forced to buy property in a completely different, and to them less desirable, part of the city. Even then, the Know-Nothings attempted to interfere with the transaction. The affair was not settled until July 22, 1857.

Jesuits in New York ran into occasional difficulty with the Know-Nothings. In Troy, New York, a Fr. Thebaud reported in 1857 that he had been prevented from visiting the town poorhouse by religious zealots running the institution. He further noted, however, that he had nothing to fear in the way of personal attack, because he "was surrounded by an army of Irishmen, mostly from Tipperary, and all the Know-Nothings of Troy combined would not have dared attack me in my fortress."

The Midwest

Know-Nothing operations in the Midwest were much less extensive than in the East. Nevertheless, St. Louis University found itself forced to give up its schools of medicine, law and divinity in 1855. The college, founded in the 1840's, had to restrict itself for a time to a small liberal arts course. A Missouri Jesuit, described only

33 Walsh, op. cit., p. 216.
34 Lucey, op. cit., p. 134.
35 David Dunigan, History of Boston College (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1947), pp. 32-33.
37 Ibid., p. 251.
as "Fr. Weninger," figured prominently in one of the most famous acts of the Know-Nothing Era, the violent reception given to Monsignor Gaetano Bedini, the papal nuncio sent from Rome to settle the trusteeism conflict. Bedini's visit was impolitic in the extreme, for his presence only added to the anti-Catholic sympathies of the Know-Nothings. The nuncio, who had angered American Protestants by taking the side of the conservatives in the European liberal revolutions of 1848, was escorted unceremoniously out of the United States, but not before he had been jeered at, insulted, fired upon, and burned many times in effigy. In one of the burnings, Fr. Weninger had the honor of being burned with the nuncio. The event was described in detail by Fr. Weninger's superior, Rev. William S. Murphy, S.J., when the latter made his annual report to the General of the Jesuits, Fr. Roothaan. At the same time a letter supposedly written by an Italian Jesuit to the King of Naples, defending the concept of absolute monarchy, was being circulated throughout the country. It created a furor wherever it was reprinted, causing difficulties especially for the Missouri Jesuits.

Surprisingly, Know-Nothingism was weakest in the South, partly because of the South's growing preoccupation with the slavery question, and partly because of the area's traditional isolation from the North. A couple of incidents, however, are worth recording. In the lower Mississippi Valley the movement enjoyed favorable reception, though most of its leaders disavowed the religious issue, concentrating on political and economic questions. Some of the local councils, in fact, listed Catholics on their rolls. In Louisiana, however, one newspaper of prominence seems to have had second thoughts about Catholics. Said this journal: "The Pope is the presiding general of the army . . . the Archbishops, priests, and curates are the subordinate officers, and that includes the whole body of Catholic Irish, [which] could be moved by a nod and made to act in any manner by a wink of the General, the Pope." One notes, however, the relatively moderate tone of this comment.

In nearby Alabama one Jesuit priest, cited only as "Father

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40 Ibid.
Nachon," was beaten by the Know-Nothings. The priest, a professor of note at Spring Hill College, was attacked by ruffians of the party while making a missionary foray near the village of Dog River. The mob beat him severely with bludgeons, leaving him for dead. Though covered with blood, he dragged himself to the Dog River Mission and managed to say Mass. When fully recovered, he resumed his trips to the Dog River Mission, experiencing no further difficulty. One wonders about the authenticity of this story, especially since the priest is supposed to have dragged himself a considerable distance, after which he said Mass in its entirety. No further sources are available, unfortunately, to check the accuracy of the narrative.

Like all third-party movements in American history, the Know-Nothing died. Their appearance on the stage of American politics was brief, brilliant, and colorful. Without question they contributed to the antagonisms of class and section becoming daily more apparent in American culture. But what is of special interest to us is the fact that they posed the most formidable threat the American Jesuits ever faced. Out of the writings of the Know-Nothings and their predecessors emerged a caricature which the Jesuits would find hard to live down. The American Jesuit was described as a formidable personage, possessed of extreme craft and cunning, highly trained in the arts of subterfuge, and unscrupulous as a matter of principle. Ever the adversary of human rights, he would take every means, assume any guise, to extend the kingdom of the Pope. Fundamentally opposed to American democracy, he would wave the flag with as much apparent conviction as the most energetic patriot, all the while plotting the overthrow of the Republic.

The anti-Jesuit crusade, a movement that ended with the Civil War, had begun in the earliest days of the colonies, though it hardly reached the proportions of an organized campaign until the 1830's, when the first anti-Jesuit tracts appeared. Chief among the early anti-Jesuit polemicists was Samuel F. B. Morse, whose caustic assaults on the order attracted a wide audience. Scarcely less troublesome to the Jesuits was that classic of anti-Romanism, The Awful

Disclosures of Maria Monk, whose pages haunted the Society until its unfortunate author was finally discredited.

The Know-Nothing movement, lasting roughly from 1850 until 1860, brought the Jesuits the greatest trials they were ever to bear in the United States. Skillfully organized, well financed, and enjoying a broad national following, the Know-Nothings deluged Catholics in general, and Jesuits in particular, with a flood of novels, scientific treatises, lectures, and newspaper articles. The crisis was reached in the mid-1850’s, when physical violence, political harassment, and economic pressures brought misery to many American Jesuits. The Civil War ended the Know-Nothing movement by calling attention away from the religious issue, but in the years to follow, especially the Ku Klux Klan eras of the 1890’s and 1920’s, the Jesuit question would be raised again, and once more, the sons of Loyola would be told that they were not welcome in America.
THE INFANCY NARRATIVES AND THE SPIRITUAL EXERCISES

a Scriptural basis for the second week

MICHAEL PETTY, S.J.

IN A 1962 ARTICLE J. Fitzmyer points out the difficulties that the recent gospel studies present when they are used in the meditations in the Spiritual Exercises.¹ As an initial solution to the problem he advises the use of a single evangelist each time for all the Exercises, emphasizing the theological focus and individual point of view of each inspired writing. This would tend to make the Exercises themselves more meaningful with more penetrating and personal insights of the Lord.

In this article I shall try to compare the intentions, central ideas or theological evaluations of Luke and Matthew in their infancy narratives, giving particular attention to the use of these passages for the Exercises themselves. Obviously a profound comparative study of the distinct theologies of Luke and Matthew considering all of their writings is necessary. But in this paper I shall limit myself exclusively to the study of the infancy narratives, because of the particular difficulty that the literary styles present and because of their use in the Exercises.²


² St. Ignatius appropriately does not begin the time of the election until the
We will basically follow the method used by R. Laurentin in his important work on this theme, that is, we shall study details selected by the evangelist and then investigate the sources used, so as to understand the intentions or theological viewpoints of the author. This paper supposes an understanding of the Haggadic midrash literary style, which is a theological reflection on certain fundamental historical facts, where these same facts have been enriched by the comparison, generally implicit, with Old Testament passages. All agree that such a style favors both terms of the comparison and that it gives a greater margin of liberty to the author so that he may clothe his fundamentally historical truth with other more or less legendary passages of profound theological meaning.

Selection of Events

The difference between the events selected by one or other evangelist is very noticeable. A comparative study of the different structures of the infancy narratives will give us an indication of the intentions of their authors.

a) In St. Luke

In Laurentin we can find an extremely competent study of the basic theme of the infancy narrative in what he calls the author’s plan or the static element of the work. In concluding his analysis, which he bases on his earlier investigations, he presents the two diptychs which we offer below:

1. Diptych of the Annunciations (1:5-56)

I. Concerning John (1:5-25) II. Concerning Jesus (1:26-38)

The parents introduced
Appearance of the Angel
Zechariah is troubled
Fear not...
Announcement of birth and mission Question: How shall I know?

The parents introduced
Entrance of Angel
Mary is troubled
Fear not...
Announcement of birth and mission Question: How shall this be?

retreatant has considered the entire Infancy Narrative and the hidden life; from this we can deduce the special value that these meditations have in the Exercises.


4 Laurentin, p. 33, slightly edited.
Answer: Angel's reprimand
Sign: You shall be dumb
Zechariah's forced silence
Zechariah leaves

III. The Visitation (1:39-56)
Complementary episode: the visitation
Conclusion: She returns home.

2. Diptych of the Births (1:57-2:52)
IVA. Birth of John
Joy concerning the birth
Scrap of canticle
IVb. Circumcision and Manifestation of John (59-80)
Circumcision on the eighth day
First manifestation of the "Prophet"
Canticle: Benedictus
Conclusion: The child grew . . . (80)

V. Birth of Jesus (2:1-20)
Joy concerning the birth
Canticle of the angels and shepherds
VI. Circumcision and Manifestation of Jesus (21-40)
Circumcision on the eighth day
First manifestation of the "Savior" to Jerusalem
Canticle: Nunc Dimittis
Supplementary episode: Hannah
Conclusion: The child grew . . . (40)

VII. Finding in the Temple (41-52)
Complementary episode: the finding
Mary treasured . . . (51)
Conclusion: Jesus grew . . . (52)

This diptych clearly reveals the intention of establishing a comparison with the person of the Baptist, and even more, at first sight it seems to underestimate a little our Lord's role, since he is compared to an ordinary man. But on the other hand we are reminded of the meditation on the Kingdom (Exercises, nn. 91-93) where the strength of the argumentation lies precisely in the impossibility of comparing a human with a divine king: because even though the human personage is depicted as having the finest of qualities, the divine being always appears superior. It can also be seen here that the narration of the infancy of the Lord always goes beyond the form or the content of the more hieratic molds in which the birth of John is presented.

If we compare the protagonists of these scenes, we observe that in relation to the part played by Jesus' mother the parents of the Baptist have a secondary role in each stage of the drama and that the aim of this comparison is to show how the Lord towers over John. Furthermore, if we compare the missions, indicated by the
angels, in announcing the births of each one of the infants, we can see that the mission of the Lord surpasses that of the Baptist in as much as an eternal mission transcends one that is merely temporal and provisional.

So it is that the dialectic of these diptychs is composed of a rhythmical movement which finds its culmination in the personality of the child Jesus, pointing out his superiority at each stage. The authors differ with respect to the greater or lesser transcendency that the figure of the Lord presented here by St. Luke may have, as may be observed in the phrases which describe him: great, Son of God, etc. But at least we cannot doubt his relative superiority: the Ignatian ideal expressed in the formula “Deus semper maior” can easily be verified.

Besides this comparison with the Baptist, the mere selection of external deeds reveals in Luke an interest for centering these diverse episodes around the area of Jerusalem and the temple. Not only the message of the angel to Zechariah, but also the presentation of the Child and his discovery at the age of twelve take place in the temple. This effort to center his gospel around the events of the temple is characteristic of Luke. Keeping in mind that the temple is the place chosen by God for his people’s worship and that for all practical purposes it was the focal point of the life of Israel, especially after the exile, Luke would logically consider it the place where the Lord was to manifest himself.

Finally, it is extremely interesting and profoundly theological to notice the contrast made between both the origin and superior nature of the Lord and the humble, poor, and hidden way in which he begins his life: the Lord is laid in a manger, the temple offering is that of the poor, his way of traveling is modest, he is adored by simple shepherds and the canticles of these chapters are all in praise of humility. This contrast forms the most profound theological nucleus of all the infancy gospels.5

b) In St. Matthew

Matthew’s difference from the third gospel is noticeable. Most authors usually agree in counting five parts to this infancy narra-

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5 Ignatius seems to have wanted to emphasize this same point in the meditation on the Nativity. Cf. Point Three: “to look and study what they do, as their journeying and toiling, all that the Lord may be born in extreme poverty ...” (Exercises, n. 116).
tive. For some this would constitute a small pentateuch, and at the same time a preview of the five parts into which the entire gospel is divided. They are:

1. The genealogy of the Lord
2. The annunciation to St. Joseph and the nativity
3. The coming of the Magi
4. The flight into Egypt
5. The massacre of the innocents and the return to Nazareth

Two stages, however, can clearly be distinguished which together form a drama of noticeable unity. From the start Matthew pictures the Lord as rooted in the people of Israel, descending from David through Joseph. It is significant that the future birth of the Child at once provokes problems and difficulties for the holy patriarch. Undoubtedly the first struggle brought about by the Lord develops in Joseph’s heart. But there is no doubt whatsoever that the two principal characters of this drama are Herod and Jesus himself, both truly historical and pictured with well drawn characteristics. The fight unto death that takes place between them begins with the birth of the Lord, and develops in the public and political sphere, for Herod announces to his people his wicked and previously well hidden intention in the slaughter of the innocents. Only a hard exile till the tyrant’s death was to save the Child’s life.

The gentle insinuation, expressed by Luke, of the people’s opposition to the Child, when Joseph could not find shelter in Bethlehem, here gives way to Herod’s intrigues, the hurried flights and the blood of the Innocents. This drama is provoked by some oriental Magi to whom the Lord manifests himself as King: the extension of the Christian message to the gentiles initiates the rejection of the chosen people. There seem to be no doubt that Matthew wishes to point out on the one hand the opposition of his people (led by Herod), and on the other hand, the favors granted the gentiles (headed by Magi) in God’s plans.

Matthew writes for Israel and he offers them his personal image of the Lord and his plans. To accomplish his purpose he retouches and rethinks the facts he has available on the infancy of the Lord and he integrates them into a history which fits his purposes. Could we not anticipate the Ignatian meditation on the Two Standards in this dramatic struggle (Exercises nn. 137-147)?
Use of the Sources

In the literary style known as midrash, there are many references which are implicitly or explicitly made to Scripture. The hymns of Luke together with the characters and even the facts are presented as a mosaic of allusions, insinuations, and meaningful terms which would be too extensive to detail. We are only going to consider the parallelisms which indicate or initiate a specific literary structure in the gospels because we believe that these may more clearly point out what the evangelist has attempted to accomplish with his work.

a) In St. Luke

According to Laurentin the two fundamental texts which are most significant in the structure of these chapters are: Dan 9, with the appearance of the angel Gabriel and the prophecy of the seventy weeks, and Mal 3 which prophesies about the future of the Baptist. The application of the seventy weeks to the time between the announcement to Zechariah and the presentation of the Child in the temple is not convincing, although it is certainly mathematically possible to calculate a period of seventy weeks during this time. Even the reference to the angel Gabriel, mentioned by the prophet Daniel, would confirm the hypothesis. But I do not think that these two references should be considered as the core ideas for the makeup of Luke 1-2. Certainly one could question the omission of the finding of the Child in the temple in the seventy weeks.

It seems, however, that the study done by Muñoz Iglesias is more valuable. In this he compares certain elements found in the narratives of the births and vocations of Old Testament heroes with the births of Jesus and John. In the births and callings of Isaac, Moses, Gideon, Samson, John, and Jesus he finds the parallel elements of the angel’s appearance, the fear of the beholder, the announcement, the objection, and the confirmation by a sign. This theory is generally accepted, since much of the dialogue pattern between the angel on the one side and the apprehension, objection and desire for a sign on the other can be clearly verified in all the passages quoted.

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On the other hand, it is interesting to note the stylistic differences between Luke 1-2 and the rest of the third gospel: his polished and elegant Hellenistic style gives place at this point to a large number of rough Hebraic phrases. We can suppose that Luke had worked over some of the earlier Jewish writings, possibly narratives of the infancies of John and Jesus which would be known to the primitive community.

Besides these midrashic references which establish the basic structure of Luke 1-2, one can find many Old Testament echoes related with isolated passages of the gospel. Below we mention some of the more important ones which are less controversial:

Lk 1:32-33 ... (the mission of the Lord) 2 Sam 7:12-16
Lk 1:26-33 ... (the message of the angel) Soph 3:14-17
Joel 2:21
Zech 2:14; 9:9

Lk 1:35 ... (the power of the most high) Ex 40:35
Lk 1:42 ... (Blessed are you among women) Jud 13:18-19
Lk 1:48 ... (He has regarded the low estate of his handmaid) Gn 29:32; I Sam 1:11
Lk 2:14; 4-9 ... (the birth in Bethlehem) Mich 5:1-5

One cannot deduce from these parallelisms any general structure nor any underlying dynamic element of importance in the infancy narrative. We can only affirm that they enrich our understanding of the particular mystery to which they refer.

b) In St. Matthew

The study of Muñoz Iglesias on the infancy narrative of Matthew presents the different motives pointed out earlier and their scriptural foundation. In the first place he indicates that the apologetic intention of the genealogy is quite clear: Jesus is the son of David and his ascendency remains intact through Joseph, his legal father. The birth in Bethlehem can be considered as certainly prophesied earlier and can be found in legends and myths of the period. The warnings in dreams are no novelty in scripture (for example, the

7 Muñoz Iglesias, p. 253.
cases of Jacob and Joseph); and the murder of the innocents, besides being found in other cultures, bears a strong resemblance to the birth of Moses. The star theme can be found in a legend that seems to be dated after the Lord's birth that concerns the birth of Abraham, and also in Balaam's prophecy (Num 24:17). But in this case, as in later Judaic literature, the star appears as representing a person and not as an astronomic sign of an extraordinary event.

The adoration of the Magi attracted by the light of the star is related with Is 60:1-3, 5-6, and with Ps 62:10. Bruns⁹ sees here an allusion to the Queen of Sheba and to all the wisdom literature, even though she had come from the south and the Magi from the east. The flight to Egypt has its parallelism according to Iglesias in the flight of Moses to Midian. On the other hand, according to Bourke,¹⁰ it resembles the journey of Jacob-Israel to Egypt. On the basis of a paschal Haggadah, Laban would be the figure corresponding to Herod; it was from Laban that Jacob-Israel and his followers fled in view of an imminent massacre of innocents. In this context Jesus would resemble Jacob, or rather Israel and the chosen people. And so it is that we can better understand the quoting of Rachel, the patriarch's wife, in the prophecy of Jeremiah. That the same quoting should be in a prophetic context would establish a connection with the Babylonian exile. The return from Egypt would have a parallel in the Exodus, which confirms the quote on Hosea 11:1: "out of Egypt I called my son," which refers to Israel and not to Moses.

There is no doubt that the parallelism Jesus-Israel unifies to a large extent this entire infancy narrative and, what is more important, accentuates the opposition between Jesus and Herod with that of Jacob and Laban, the central point of the account. Nonetheless, it is difficult to decide in favor of either one of the two comparisons, as the first one, with Moses (as proposed by M. Iglesias) and the second with Jacob (Bourke) can both be viewed as serious arguments.

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⁸ Ibid., p. 259.
INFANCY

Conclusion

In concluding this brief study of the structures and midrashic significances of the two infancy narratives, we can point out certain similarities as well as very noticeable differences in the accounts.

a) Differences

In the external configuration of their styles, Luke is more discreet in his way of quoting; Matthew is more explicit, but without fundamentally changing the literary style. Although in both narratives the historical facts prevent or make difficult any close bond to the literary structure employed, it is clear that Luke is bound to an earlier basic structure but can proceed freely in presenting the facts of his story, while Matthew, freer in his use of structures set up by others, seems to tie himself down to small formalities and quotations.

Luke attempts to write a meditation about the mystery of the origins of Christ, while Matthew’s intent is more markedly apologetic: he wants to show that this character rejected by his people and accepted by the gentiles, is the promised Messiah.

Considering the theological content of both narrations, Luke is noted for his comparison between John and Jesus, taking into account their persons, messages, missions, parents and circumstances of their birth. The goal of this comparison is to point out the superiority of the Lord who mysteriously wanted to surround himself with poverty, obscurity, and sacrifice and thereby bring to the forefront even in his infancy a synthesis of his salvific work. Matthew on the other hand presents Jesus in the culminating moment of Israel’s history.

The entire historic trend of the life of Israel finds its meaning, its goal and we could even say its completion, in the life of Jesus. He is the corner stone of his people’s history, which is also verified in him. He is rejected by his own nation and proclaimed to the gentiles. Let us recall that Matthew’s entire gospel ends with the mission to preach the gospel to the gentile world.

Luke on the other hand, does not go beyond the framework of Israel in those two chapters. The Lord’s manifestation is not made to the gentiles but in the temple: it is the son of man who offers himself to God in the place destined by God himself for his worship.
b) Likenesses

Both narratives are distinct from the rest of the gospel, not only because of the difference of literary style, but also because of the absence of miracles as such. They are characterized by the intervention of the supernatural and the spectacular: Zechariah, Mary, Joseph, the Magi, and the shepherds come in contact with the world of the supernatural through heavenly messengers whose appearances and messages cannot be properly considered as miracles. The common everyday events, in Matthew as well as in Luke, are directed in extraordinary ways by angels and dreams, the carriers of heavenly messages.

Matthew and Luke, each in their own way, attribute great importance to the people of God. In Luke, Christ takes part in the life, norms and customs of his people and manifests himself in the very center of them all. In Matthew it is Jesus himself who somehow personifies this very people.

Both coincide in insisting on the beginning of an eschatological period rather than merely accounting for familiar or picturesque facts. It is also interesting to notice the sobriety of both evangelists in describing persons. In Luke they are almost symbolic, while Matthew, aside from the color and dramatic suspense of the narrative itself is not attracted by picturesque or typical scenes. Matthew prefers clear ideas and lapidary formulas.

Use in the Exercises

Fessard points out\(^{11}\) that the infancy meditations have the dialectical purpose of bringing the retreatant down to reality, after the possibly lyric experiences in the meditation on the Kingdom.

But the infancy meditation is far more important: it not only introduces one to the life of the Lord and to a way of contemplating his life,\(^{12}\) but it also presents a remarkably synthetic view of Christ's complete message,\(^{13}\) before going into the election. Moreover, on the third day of the second week, St. Ignatius considers the medita-


\(^{12}\) *Exercises*, n. 162.

\(^{13}\) *Exercises*, n. 116. The mention of the cross in this meditation reflects the intention of achieving a synthesis.
tions of Jesus in Nazareth and the finding in the temple, above all else as models of the different states of life from which the retreatant may choose. At this point he prescinds from the order of the narration and first considers Christ's state of obedience to his parents and secondly the state of evangelical perfection or the finding in the temple.

The Ignatian synthesis is fundamentally based on Luke: the Incarnation and Nativity meditations follow his structure, and these are the basic meditations. Nevertheless, this does not close the possibility of taking the fundamental meditations from Matthew (note the meditations on the Magi and the flight into Egypt, *Exercises*, nn. 267 and 269).

Saint Ignatius omits every reference to the Baptist in the Incarnation and Nativity. But from what we have already seen it would not be contrary to his way of thinking to consider him as a point of reference in order to emphasize more the person of the Lord. Ignatius also omits the genealogies and the revelation of the Incarnation in the visions to Saint Joseph.

Finally, taking into account the need to transmit to the retreatant the "real meaning of the history," it seems important that the director of the *Exercises* enter into the very spirit of each evangelist, recalling what was said by Kempis: "all of holy scripture should be read in the spirit in which it was written," and so insist on the essential aspect of each account. Considering the retreatants, it might be more helpful to use one evangelist rather than another, depending on whether one wishes to stress more the meditation on the Kingdom or the Two Standards.

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14 *Exercises*, n. 135.
15 *Exercises*, n. 134.
16 *Exercises*, n. 2; cf. Fitzmyer, pp. 257-58.
THE CONCEPT OF AUTHORITY

further reflections

WILLIAM W. MEISSNER, S.J.

Undertaking a consideration of this nature, since it deals with a concept which has been so thoroughly considered on the theological and philosophical levels, may require some justification. I suppose my concern with the concept of authority stems from the overriding impression that many of the problems which confront the contemporary Church and religious organizations in particular are rooted, conceptually and emotionally, in difficulties related to the concept of authority. Not only the Church, but society in general, is agitated by what might be called a crisis of authority. What I propose to undertake, then, is an examination of the multiple aspects of the understanding and exercise of authority. In so doing, I am not at all concerned with the philosophical or theological implications of the concept of authority. I am concerned with the psychological and sociological implications. That is not to say that the theological and philosophical considerations of authority are not in themselves significant, or that they are not in many ways related to the primary focus of our present concern. They simply represent different approaches. It has been my impression that in many ways the "crisis of authority" is not really a crisis of authority at all, but rather a crisis in the usage of authority. While the concept of authority itself has been well worked out, little attention has been paid to its less conceptual aspects. Therefore we can concern ourselves in this present paper with some of the less traditional significances of the concept of authority.
The traditional notion of authority

The more traditional notion of authority had focused primarily on the definitional aspect of authority and on the moral or ethical justification for the use of authority either in the political organization, the state, or in the ecclesiastical organization, the Church. Thus Vatican II, for example, speaks of the pope’s authority in the following words: “Hence by divine institution he enjoys supreme, full, immediate and universal authority over the care of souls. Since he is pastor of all the faithful, his mission is to provide for the common good of the universal church and for the good of the individual churches. He holds, therefore, a primacy of ordinary power over all the Churches.”¹ The fundamental notion here is of a divinely instituted power, vested in the pope by reason of his office, which gives him authority to rule, guide, and teach the universal Church. A similar notion of authority, applied to the political realm, can be found in the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World. Speaking of the goals of the political community, the decree reads:

Individuals, families, and various groups which compose the civic community are aware of their own insufficiency in the matter of establishing a fully human condition of life. They see the need for that wider community in which each would daily contribute his energies toward the ever better attainment of the common good. It is for this reason that they set up the political community in its manifold expression.

Many different people go to make up the political community, and these can lawfully incline toward diverse ways of doing things. Now, if the political community is not to be torn to pieces as each man follows his own viewpoint, authority is needed. This authority must dispose the energies of the whole citizenry toward the common good, not mechanically or despotically, but primarily as a moral force which depends on freedom and the conscientious discharge of the burdens of any office which has been undertaken.²

The concept of authority employed here regards it specifically as a property of the group. Moreover authority in this context has a specifically paternal function. As Simon indicates in Philosophy of Democratic Government, the paternal function of authority is only one function among what must be regarded as a diversity of functions of authority. Thus authority is regarded as aiming at the

² Ibid. pp. 283-84.
proper good of the governed. It is needed for the survival and
development of immature and inadequate persons. Consequently
authority is made necessary, in this sense, by the deficiency of the
governed. It presumes the inability or the incapacity of the governed
to organize and direct their own activities toward their own proper
good. The proper good here, of course, is not always the individual
good, as distinct from the common good. The common good toward
which authority directs the common efforts of the governed may
indeed be equivalent to the proper good of individual members
of the community. It is plain, however, that paternal authority has
an essentially pedagogical aim. It seeks the attainment or maturation
of the capacities of the governed to enable them to govern them-
selves effectively. Properly considered, then, paternal authority
should really be aiming at its own disappearance, and, therefore,
commits a fundamental abuse whenever it outlives its necessity.

Authority, however, also has the function of bringing unity into
the action of the community. But unity of action requires unity of
judgment. When the action or the means of action are unique and
determined, authority is required only, insofar as the members of
the community can be considered inadequate, either because of
the weakness or perversity of their wills or the ignorance or in-
capacity of their intellects, to perceive and agree upon the unique
means. When the means are multiple, and this is the usual case,
unity of action requires a determination among the multiple means
in order that the community can direct its efforts to a common
action. This requires authority which is empowered to decide one of
many courses of action. Thus, it is completely arbitrary whether cars
drive on the left or the right side of the street, but it is essential
to the community welfare that cars drive on the same side of the
street. Thus, as Simon is quick to point out, while the paternal func-
tion of authority diminishes as the deficiencies of the governed are
made up, the unifying function of authority becomes more signifi-
cant. The more capable and understanding the members of the com-
munity, the more diverse and variable will be the courses of possible
proposed action. Thus, the unifying function of authority does not
originate in the deficiencies of the members, but really in the nature
of society as such, and must, therefore, be regarded as an essential
function of societal organization.
Simon also points to a third function of authority, namely achieving the volition of the common good in the community. Thus authority is necessary, first of all, for the direction of private individual members of the community toward the common good of the community. Secondly, authority is required for the direction of the variety of functional processes, each of which regards some particular aspect of the common good, toward the whole of the common good. Thus, the exercise of political authority has a variety of functions: it has paternal, unifying, and volitional aspects. Moreover, it would seem that among these various functions of authority, the paternal function has traditionally been more or less emphasized in the functioning of religious groups. This is valid not only in terms of the organization of the Church itself, but, by way of analogy to the Church as a divinely instituted organization, has application also to lesser religious groupings.

Social aspects of authority

In the context of social actions and interaction the concept of authority is very closely related to that of power. Power is essentially the capacity to influence the behavior of other members of the group. Authority is not just any kind of power, since it depends upon the recognition by the subordinate members of the group that the one possessing authority may legitimately prescribe patterns of behavior for the group to follow. Social power, in general, rests on more than one basis. In fact, French and Raven distinguish several bases: (1) reward power is based on the member's perception that others in the group have the ability to reward his behavior; (2) coercive power is based on the perception that others can punish his behavior; (3) legitimate power is based on the perception that others have a legitimate right to direct his behavior; (4) referent power is based on the member's identification with others; and (5) expert power is based on the recognition of a special knowledge or expertise in the other. Authority, then, as a form of social power is directly related to the exercise of legitimate power, but it is important to appreciate that the authority relationship can be contaminated by other forms of power.

French and Raven have proposed several hypotheses about the bases of social power. For all types of social power, it holds that the stronger the power basis, the greater the power will be. The basis of power rests on the perception of the group or of any of the members of the group that the one in authority has this or that quality. It is not enough, for example, that an individual possess expert knowledge in order to exercise power; the group must also recognize him as possessing that knowledge and, therefore, accept him in the role of expert. It is important to appreciate that the range of activities within which any particular type of power can be exercised will vary considerably. Referent power, generally, will have the broadest range, i.e., the range of activities that can be affected or changed by reason of the individual member's identification with the superior or with the group itself is broader than that of any other basis of power. This basis of social motivation is probably most often applicable in religious groups.

Any attempt to utilize social power beyond its range will tend to reduce the effectiveness of that power. Thus, when the superior exerts power on the group beyond the range of that power, he is reducing by an equivalent amount the basis of his capacity to influence the group. Expert power, of course, is an obvious case of this: if the expert tries to use his special power to influence the group in an area where he exceeds his competence, he induces an attitude in the group which tends to disregard his special competence even in the area proper to it. Even in the exercise of legitimate power, the superior can exceed the range of his legitimate authority. The range of authority is established by the formal structure of the group, but it is important to remember that informal group norms of legitimacy are also effective. In general, in addition to the formal, established norms of the distribution of authority, the group itself evolves its own operating standard of what the superior can or cannot legitimately demand. When the superior exceeds the limit established by the group's informal consensus, he exceeds the range of his effective legitimate power and, thereby, reduces the power itself. It is important to realize in understanding the exercise of legitimate authority that the informal group consensus has nothing to do with the formal organization of authority in the group and takes place independently of it.
With regard to the exercise of reward or coercive power, any new state of the group’s system produced by their influence will be highly dependent on the agent exercising the power. Moreover, the more observable the conformity of the members, the more dependent the new alignment will be. If a superior tries to reinforce external conformity by a system of rewards and/or punishments, external conformity will depend on his continued exercise of this type of power. Influence of the superior in virtue of his legitimate power would not be subject to this limitation. Thus, when a system of rewards and punishments, which often can be very subtle, has been introduced to reinforce external conformity, conformity is achieved at the sacrifice of more stabilized and internalized bases of group cooperation. The exercise of coercion results in diminished attraction of the member to the superior and a high degree of resistance to the superior. Reward, however, results in increased attraction and low resistance. Interestingly enough, the more legitimate the coercion, the less it will produce resistance and decreased attraction. Thus, when legitimate power is joined to coercive power, it mitigates the effect of the latter.

Bases of authority

Classic treatment of legitimate authority was that of Max Weber who defined “imperative coordination,” as the probability that certain specific commands from a given source would be obeyed by a given group of persons. Obedience to commands can rest on a variety of considerations from simple habituation to a purely rational calculation of advantage. But there is always a minimum of voluntary submission based on an interest in obedience. Obedience to the superior can be based on custom, affectual ties, or on a purely material complex of interest, or by what Weber called ideal (wertrational) motives. These purely material interests result in a relatively unstable situation, and must therefore be supplemented by other elements, both affectual and ideal. But even this complex of motives does not form a sufficiently reliable basis for a system of imperative cooperation, so that there must be added another important element, the belief in legitimacy.

Weber distinguished three types of legitimate authority. (1) Rational-pragmatic authority bases its claims to legitimacy on a belief in “legality of patterns of normative rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands (legal authority).” In such authority, obedience is owed to a legally established impersonal order. The persons who exercise authority of office within this order are shown obedience only by virtue of the formal legality of their commands and only within the scope of authority of their office. (2) Mimetic-traditional authority bases its claims to legitimacy on “an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of the status of those exercising authority under them (traditional authority).” Obedience in this case is owed to the person of the superior who occupies the traditionally sanctioned position of authority and is, therefore, bound by the terms of that tradition. The obligation of obedience is not a matter of acceptance of the legality of an impersonal order, but rather as a matter of personal loyalty. (3) Charismatic authority bases its claims to legitimacy on “devotion to the specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism, or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him (charismatic authority).” The charismatic leader is obeyed by virtue of personal trust in him and in his revelation, or in his exemplary qualities as influenced by the individual’s beliefs in the charisma.

It is immediately apparent, of course, that the Weberian categories of authority have a limited usefulness. They are, as he himself insisted, “pure” types of legitimate authority. They are most useful in the analysis of more bureaucratic types of social organization, and probably would find their primary application to such organizations as the army, business organizations, or bureaucracies organized along totalitarian lines. It is also evident that religious groups do not fall neatly into any one of these categories but in some sense participate in all of them. The religious subject obeys the religious superior on rational grounds insofar as he recognizes the superior as the representative of a properly constituted legal authority; on traditional grounds, insofar as he recognizes the traditional status of the superior; and on charismatic grounds insofar as the charisma of the superior can be interpreted in terms of the
grace of office or the guidance of the Holy Spirit. While this is not a personal charisma of the superior, it is also clear that on informal terms the superior may well exercise a personal charisma in relation to his subjects by reason of his own personal gifts and the measure of respect and trust which he can engender in them.

Weber’s categories have also been criticized from the point of view of their cultural embeddedness and their applicability to more authoritarian types of organization. Thus Harrison has pointed out, that the organization of voluntary groups, particularly in the United States, tends to be structured along quite different lines. The ideology of such groups tends to be highly anti-authoritarian. They distrust centralization and resist further structuring of the organization in terms of authority relations. On the other hand, some degree of bureaucratic organization is necessary for the attainment of group goals. The inherent conflict heightens social tensions and makes problems in authority and power quite acute. Thus, Harrison concludes, the modes for legitimation of authority are significantly different in this kind of organization than those suggested by Weber’s analysis of authoritarian systems. This raises the interesting question, of course, as to the influence of the democratic emphasis in our own culture in considering problems of authority and the exercise of power. It is important to realize that the exercise of authority, whatever its legitimacy and whatever its formal characteristics within the structure of the organization, is not exercised in a cultural vacuum. Culturally generated and derived attitudes towards the exercise of authority have important implications for the implementation and uses of authority within any formally organized structure. Thus, whatever the conception of authority one attributes to the religious organization, i.e., whatever the degree of one’s commitment to the authoritarian ideal of religious authority and obedience, it must still be recognized that religious subjects who are born and raised in a democratic society and whose value orientation incorporate democratic ideals, carry within them conscious and unconscious attitudes which must inevitably influence the pattern of the exercise and response to authority within the religious group.

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Authority as power

Power is an essentially social phenomenon insofar as it refers to the influence of one individual over another or over a group. It is a kind of latent force. Authority, then, is really a form of institutionalized power. Social power, as constituted within the formally organized group, is expressed in and through authority.\(^6\)

The concept of social power often carries within it an implicit treatment as being attributed to a person or a group. The most usual formulation of authority in religious groups, for example, suggests that the superior has the power to command, i.e., that the power of commanding obedience is somehow attributed to him by reason of his office. There is a tendency among social scientists, however, to view power as a particular type of social relationship in which one person adjusts his behavior to conform with a pattern of behavior communicated to him by another person.\(^7\) This is an interesting formulation of the power concept, since it implies the concept of power as a property of social relations which involves ties of mutual dependence among the members of the group. Thus, the power or the exercise of power resides implicitly in the dependency of other members of the group. As Emerson points out, the dependency relation of A on B is, first of all, directly proportional to A’s motivational investment in goals which are mediated by B, and, secondly, dependence is inversely proportional to the availability of these same goals to A exclusive of any relationship to B.\(^8\) The power relation is really the converse of this, so that the power which B exercises over A can be measured by the amount of resistance of A which can be potentially overcome by B. In these terms, the reciprocal interaction of power and dependence within the group produces tensions which throw into operation balancing


procedures which are calculated to reduce the tension. The characteristic balancing operations, as Emerson delineates them, are motivational withdrawal, by which the dependent person equivalently decreases his motivational investment in the goals mediated by the other person and thereby diminishes the other's power.

The group tension can also be decreased by increasing the extension of the power network or by the equivalent diffusion of dependency within the group. This would tend to dilute the power-dependency polarity and thus reduce tension. Another means of tension reduction is the formation of coalitions of two or more of the weaker dependent members of the group against the stronger power-wielding members of the group. In a sense, coalition can be regarded as a characteristic of all organized group functioning. One can conceive of authority as a power of the group itself exercised through an authorized person whose position is a function of group coalition. Thus, the legitimate power of authority is equivalently a directed power which can be employed only in those channels which have been defined by the norms set up by the group.

The last, and very interesting, means of tension reduction in the group is the emergence of status. By reason of status, with its correlative ego enhancing implications, the motivational investment in the group situation in the more powerful member is increased. The more powerful person's motivational investment in goals mediated by the rest of the group is increased and, therefore, his dependence on the group is increased. By reason of the reciprocal relationship of power-dependency this increases the capacity or power of the weaker member to control the more powerful members.

The emphasis on relational aspects of power, while it may not serve the purposes of philosophical definition of authority, does serve the objectives of bringing into clearer relief the multiple aspects which must be brought into focus if we are to achieve any substantial understanding of the practicalities of the exercise of authority. It also emphasizes the fact that authority, narrowly defined in terms of legitimate social power, is made more complex, in reality, by the interaction of other forms of power which in fact have a wider distribution within the structure of the group. There is an interesting parallel here in the study of leadership. For a long
time thinking about leadership was dominated by the so called trait approach which tried to delineate those characteristics which both identified leaders and made them capable of functioning as leaders. It was soon found, however, that the bases of leadership were multiple, and that in varying situations different members of the groups showed leadership potentialities. Consequently, students of leadership began to focus their attention not on the traits of the individuals involved, but rather on the interaction between group members and on the kinds of situations in which different kinds of interaction gave rise to different forms of leadership. It is quite obvious, parenthetically, that the concept of the “superior” in religious setting is still operating in terms of a fundamentally trait approach.

Authority as communication

Another significant approach to the problem of authority puts it in terms of communication. Thus Barnard defines authority as “the character of a communication (order) in formal organization by virtue of which it is accepted by a contributor to” or “member of the organization as governing the action he contributes.”9 The definition involves a subjective aspect, that is, the accepting of the communication as authoritative, and an objective aspect, the character in the communication by virtue of which it is accepted. Barnard goes on to say that if a directive communication is accepted by a member of the group, its authority is thus confirmed by him. Acceptance admits the communication as the basis of action, while disobedience is equivalently a denial of its authority. Thus the decision as to whether an order has authority or not lies with the inferior rather than with the superior. This conception of authority is a decided turnabout from more traditional notions. But it emphasizes the notion that even in the most absolute form of social organization, authority rests in some sense upon the acceptance of the consent of the individuals.

The essential point in this formulation is that the necessity of assent is required in order to establish authority for the individual. Acceptance of the communication as authoritative depends upon

four conditions: (1) The individual can and does understand the communication. A communication that cannot be understood can have no authority. Given a willingness to comply, the individual who receives a meaningless communication must either disregard the communication or follow his own course of action. (2) At the time of his decision he believes that the substance of the communication is not inconsistent with the purpose of the group. Equivalently, then, the group ideals and purposes serve to limit the range of authority. Communication of an order at cross purposes to the group purposes would necessarily create a situation of conflict. The intelligent person can be expected to resolve the conflict by denying the authority of the order which contradicts the purpose of the group effort as he understands it. (3) At the time of his decision, he believes it to be compatible with his personal interest as whole. The acceptance of the communication is involved in the complicated relationships between personal goals and personal interest and group goals and group interest. In general, the congruence of personal and group goals increases the motivation of the individual member to participate in and contribute to the group effort. Communication of an order which is against personal interest will necessarily reduce the net inducement of the individual to contribute to the group. (4) The subject is mentally and physically capable of complying with the order. Thus, any order to do that which is impossible, even though it be only a little impossible, is regarded as exceeding the range of its proper authority. Despite the emphasis on the acceptance of the individual in the exercise of authority, the proper functioning of authority is insured by the normal compliance of orders given in any effective organization with these conditions, and by what Barnard calls a "zone of indifference" in individuals by which orders are regarded as acceptable without conscious questioning of their authority. The presumption of legitimacy operates in favor of the authority structure. The zone of indifference is characteristically wider or narrower for different individuals and would seem to be related to their personal tendencies toward conformity or deviance within the group. Moreover, group involvement and group participation generally create an active personal interest in the maintenance of authority within the group. Thus, a more or less implicit attitude is generated by the
informal organization of the group which makes individuals loath to question authority as it functions within or near the zone of indifference. Barnard suggests that the formal statement that authority comes down from above, from the general to the particular as it were, confirms the presumption among individuals in favor of the acceptability of orders and enables them to avoid challenging such orders without at the same time incurring a sense of personal subserviency or a loss of personal status.

The more objective aspect of the communication has to do with the reasons or characteristics of the communication which induce its acceptance. In the structure of formal organizations, the authority has to do fundamentally with the potentiality of assent of those to whom the communications are sent. The authority imputed to communications from superiors is based either on position (authority of position) independently of his personal qualifications and abilities, or it may be based on superior ability and competence (authority of leadership). When the authority of leadership is combined with the authority of position, the degree of acceptance of the communication is greatly increased. The maintenance of objective authority requires commensurate capacities in those who hold high positions of authority. High position, not supported by the abilities of those who hold them, have weak authority as do highly competent men in minor positions. Authority thus depends on a cooperative personal attitude of individual members and on a system of communication in the organization. Communication, therefore, must be effective and relatively efficient, not only for the effectiveness of group adaptation and the normal functioning of the group process, but also for the maintenance and effective exercise of authority within the group.10

Authority as relationship

We have already noted the traditional emphasis in the concept of authority on the power dimension. The relationship between authority and power has been a dominant motif in almost all approaches to the concept of authority whether philosophical, theological, or social. A gradual shift has been taking place from the notion of

authority as power to the notion of authority as a relationship. Authority would thus consist in the relationship between two or more persons by which one party lays claim to the cooperation or subservience of the other party, and the other party accepts this claim. Obviously the relationship involves power, but the shift in emphasis also involves a shift in the concept of power from that of being a capacity resident in the power bearing person to the concept of power as a relational phenomenon. Thus, both the bearer of authority and the recipient of authority emerge as important contributors to the functioning of authority. There is a mutuality and reciprocal responsiveness which is inherent in the authority relationship. The relationship is dynamic and reciprocal, so that one cannot presume compliance with authority on the grounds that the bearer of authority possesses a certain amount of power or that he holds a particular office. Authority must, therefore, be regarded as a function of a particular concrete human situation. It should be pointed out that the communication view of authority as proposed by Barnard, is not really essentially different from the relational view. The former emphasizes the mechanism by which the relationship is implemented, the latter brings into focus the implicit relational aspects of communication as such.

It is my impression, however, that the relational point of view must be credited with adopting a broader and more flexible approach to the problems of authority. The approach in terms of power and power relationships has a tendency to emphasize the role of the superior in the power relation. This lends itself to an over-emphasis on the exercise of authority in terms of the formal, hierarchical structure of the group as well as in isolation from the dynamic processes going on concurrently within the group, which must inevitably modify and channel the influence of authority within the group. The communications view, and other such radically situational approaches to the problem of authority, form a sort of polar position, in which the more formal and structural aspects of authority tend to be dissolved. Thus, conceived on the communication model, authority tends to be thought of as derived from or constituted by the acceptance of the individual member. It seems rather more accurate to say that the effectiveness of the exercise of authority depends upon individual acceptance rather than that authority is derived from such acceptance.
The relational view, then, enables us to bring both of these polarities into a more balanced perspective. It enables us to respect the demands of formal hierarchically structured organization, as well as to bring into clear focus the dynamic processes, at both the conscious and unconscious levels, which are at work in determining the response of individual members to the authoritative directives of the power structure. Authority, then, can be defined as a dynamic and reciprocal relationship between two or more persons in which one claims to be a bearer of authority and at least one accepts the claim of the bearer to be authoritative in some area of his own existence.

The emphasis on relation makes it possible to consider authority as involving more than a relationship of power. From the point of view of the subject, the acceptance of authority rests on more than the inherent dependency of the power relationship. The subject may accept or reject the authority of the superior, even in the face of the threat of coercion. The acceptance of authority must be based on a broader more comprehensive view of the subject's motivation to obey. To return for a moment to Simon's consideration of the diversity of function of authority, the conception of authority as based only on power is adequate really only for considering the paternal or unifying functions of authority. There is also a volitional or motivational aspect of the function of authority which is not adequately explained on the basis of power. Moreover, if authority does stem from the nature of society, as we often claim, and if society is an outgrowth of the fundamental nature of man, it would seem reasonable to conceive of authority as being based not only on the human capacities for obedience (generous though they may be) but also in other basic human needs and capacities. In other words, the acceptance of authority cannot be ascribed merely to the power-dependence dimension but there must also be another dimension or dimensions which we can denominate diversely as gratification, or self-fulfillment, or self-enhancement. I am not so much concerned with the terms here as I am with the concept that the participation of the member of the group in the activities which are structured in terms of authority must ultimately be understood and must ultimately depend on a spectrum of motivations which make it psychologically rewarding and in some sense a fulfilling
for him to participate in the group action. Thus, the exercise of authority and the reciprocal response to authority are determined and conditioned by complex human motivations. I would suggest that it is these fundamental, often unconscious motivations, which are at work in disturbing and disrupting the function of authority and that we cannot adequately understand the operations that relate to the authority relation unless we bring these fundamental forces into view.

Personal interest

If we bunch these basic motivations under the rubric of personal interest, we can suggest that as a general rule personal interest is an essential component of the normal development to maturity of the individual. The successful execution of authority, therefore, must respect the demands of personal interest. It should be clear from the start that personal interest is not equivalent to personal wishes, for personal interest may not in fact have anything to do with personal wishes. Putting it another way, the exercise of authority must always respect individual freedom, but individual freedom does not imply license and must be understood in reference to personal responsibility as well as cooperate obligation. Moreover, the successful exercise of authority must not only respect personal interest but it must fulfill the demands and obligations of the exercise of power. Plainly the balance is a delicate and complex one, but the overemphasis or the underemphasis of either dimension that of power or of personal interest, will result in a distortion of the authority relationship. An overemphasis on the power dimension without concern for the personal interest and needs of the individual member may well result in rebellion. An overemphasis on personal interest to the sacrifice of the directive exigencies of power will result in the frustration of group goals and objectives.

We have tried to thread our way in this discussion through a multiplicity of approaches all dealing with a very complex concept. Our objective has been not so much to define as to bring into better focus for purposes of further discussion the multiple aspects and dimensions and implications of the concept of authority. We have tried to show that the trait-oriented, power-based concept of authority which has dominated so much of our traditional thinking
on the subject, while secure in its own right, has nonetheless deprived us of the opportunity of exploring the more human and more motivationally oriented aspects of the problem. The shift in emphasis really represents a shift from a question of what is authority to the question of how or why does authority work or not work as the case may be. Neither, of course, are easy questions. I suspect the problems that are involved in the “crisis of authority” are not really problems in definition so much as they are reflections of an operative model of the operation of authority which may have evolved in relative isolation from the understanding of the factors and conditions of that operation. We can humbly hope that the present discussion and the further extensions of it may help to correct that deficiency.
RELIGION AND THE WORLD


When Harvey Cox, in The Secular City, accepted Dietrich Bonhoeffer's challenge to speak of God in secular fashion, he constructed an anthropology that demonstrated all too clearly the pitfalls involved in understanding the young Lutheran martyr too narrowly. Cox's hymn to secularization and his praise of man as pragmatic and profane were, for all their provocative ingenuity, inadequate as attempts to interpret modern man to himself. In order to appreciate Cox's limitations one does not have to read Hans Urs von Balthasar's latest book, but it helps. A Theological Anthropology rejects the twin extremes of the already discredited sacral society and the secularized Christianity that has lately attempted to supply a vision for man-come-of-age, and essays a synthesis of patristic writings, Scripture, and Greek and modern philosophy to provide a middle way. The result is a book that is always difficult, sometimes dogmatic, and often maddeningly obscure, but which yields occasional rich dividends to the reader who perseveres unto the end.

Von Balthasar is not trying to turn the clock back to an other-worldly, pre-Teilhardian vision of man, but he insists at the outset that Man, as the epitome of the world, would be perfectible only if the world fulfilled itself with him and in him. But inasmuch as he transcends the world as spirit and is open to being in general, the fulfillment of the world is not enough to bring about his perfection. Man is personal, transcending the world and its being.

In effect, he accepts the dictum of Hegel that man is a "sick animal," not content to be what he is. To be sure, Cox's secular man shows no symptoms of the disease, since he professes to be content with an exclusively terrestrial view. But this is exposed as one more variation of a later integralism that seeks to resolve the riddle of man by ignoring
the “fragmentariness of existence in time.” The author chides the sacralizers for seeking the real by denying time, and the secularizers for seeking it in an affirmation of time to the exclusion of an openness to the transtemporal. He then enlists the aid of Augustine in a difficult and involved reflection on the nature of time, the theology of history, and the relation between secular and sacred history. The Incarnation is, of course, the key:

Christ, living in time, is able to state his christological present: “Before Abraham was, I am” . . . His present is not only the abstract existence of eternity in time, but also eternity won from time: the planting of eternity through elective love in the heart of futile time running towards death.

If time is uninformed by eternity in the Incarnation, it remains man’s mortal enemy because it is allied with death. Death mocks man’s pretensions to wholeness and confronts him with absurdity. Other attempts to wriggle out of the net—a dualism of “body” and “soul,” a refusal to grant the question relevance by branding it “impractical”—are doomed to failure. The only valid solution is the victory of Christ in the resurrection of the dead.

Eliade has shown us how primitive homo religiosus attempted to escape the terror of time and the threat of meaninglessness that it posed, by recourse to myth. Modern man, deprived of his myths, living in a world desacralized and alien to his psychic needs, attempts to resolve the problem by refusing to ask the question. For the take-over generation in the secular city, l’angoisse est gauche. The Christian follows a third way:

Now at last the aspirations of mysticism and of myth can be fulfilled by there being a true “appearance” of God as the salvation for man. As he pursues the way of salvation, he makes the world transparent for the divine to “appear” through it. This appearing is now no longer a turning away from bleak historical reality—as mystic negation of finitude or as its mythical translation into images of the imagination—no, reality is the place and the material within which the living God appears.

One of the most important issues raised by this book is found in von Balthasar’s treatment of what may be called the scandal of particularity—the historic claim of Christianity to proclaim a singular event by a single person at a particular time and place—an event that cannot be subsumed under any relativizing or syncretistic wisdom. He sees the present thrust toward unity among men, the gradual blurring of lines of demarcation that is the hallmark of a certain kind of cultural and religious ecumenism, as a threat to the authentic proclamation of the Gospel. Like Daniélou, he fears such openness as a prelude to the kind of absorption that would in effect be a betrayal of the uniqueness of Christ.
He asserts, paradoxically, that the more unified the world becomes, the more difficult it is to be a Christian. And this is so because reason is a tolerant relativizer that always expects Christianity to understand itself in similarly relative terms.

And so, like Daniélou, von Balthasar is wary of Teilhard de Chardin's incarnationalism as perhaps proving too much. Does such integralism leave room for the scandal of the cross? Does it try to make Christ's kingdom too much of this world?

Do not misunderstand. This is not a reactionary diatribe against the great movements of ecumenism and Christian humanism; far from it. But it expresses an arresting *caveat emptor* for Christians who are trying to take seriously Bonhoeffer's challenge and speak intelligibly to modern, secularized man. A *Theological Anthropology* will not carry much conviction to the uncritical devotees of secularized Christianity. These will be unable to take seriously arguments based on Augustine and classical oriental philosophy; and the author frankly acknowledges this at the outset. But the book is valuable for the serious thinker who wishes to borrow from secular humanism with discrimination, and who does not resent challenges to an incarnationalist synthesis that is being accepted uncritically in some quarters. Von Balthasar is suspicious of what he calls a new Christian progressivism "which takes technological means of power and the so-called 'reflection of the noosphere', which those means made possible, and seeks to interpret and exploit them in a christological way." Can the cross, he asks, be reduced to an energy factor for the evolution of the world? Is Cox the only anthropologist who has proved too much?

The jacket warns that this is not a book for the intellectual dilettante. That is an understatement. But dilettantes are not the only ones who may be discouraged by its labyrinthine ways. At any rate, if you are a student of theology who wishes to steer a course between the Scylla of reactionary clericalism and the Charybdis of secular reductionism, this may be your meat.

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*two famous Americans* have in recent times expressed concern over the loss of religious values in this country. One of them, Senator Everett Dirksen, has largely stayed on the periphery of the question, finding ominous linkages between no prayer in the schools and no peace in the streets. The other, the late Malcolm X, has penetrated to the heart of
the problem. Christianity has not influenced American culture very deeply. True Islam, he suggested in his Autobiography, might be the answer for the sinful divisions of modern America: “if white Americans could accept the Oneness of God, then perhaps, too, they could accept in reality the Oneness of Man.” Fr. Daniélou’s recent (1965) study of the civilizational importance of religion would serve to corroborate Malcolm X’s negative evaluation of Christianity as practiced in the so-called Christian West. The trouble with Christian civilizations as they have historically evolved “is not that Christians have tried to penetrate civilization with the spirit of the Gospel, but that they have not done it sufficiently” (p. 48).

The basic thesis of Daniélou’s newest little book may be summarized by saying that the world is not radically secular, religionless and all the other exciting things the theologians of Christian secularity crack it up to be, nor should it aim for such a distinction. But Daniélou goes further than this negative stance. He maintains that without a positive openness to religious values, real civilization is impossible. “Unless we relate all things to God,” he writes, “neither man nor city can survive. . . . It is natural man who is directed towards God by the very fact of his nature” (p. 111).

Americans may find Daniélou’s study of the interrelatedness of religion and civilization a bit puzzling at times. Daniélou directs many of his observations not at the classical American situation of the separation of Church and State (peaceful, for the most part, except when educational finances come into question) but at a type of European laicism less common on this side of the Atlantic. His intriguing title attempts to focus attention on prayer not as self-consciousness or as Christian act but as the interior aspect of all religions and as a fundamental element in all humanistic civilization. Civilization comes under his investigation for the most part as the emerging political problematic of today’s technological culture.

But in Daniélou’s first chapter, “The Church of the Poor,” he does not immediately face up to the challenges of technological civilization for man’s religious interiority. Without naming names, Daniélou launches into a rather intemperate attack on such theologians as Karl Rahner, J. B. Metz and Edward Schillebeeckkx for their common tendency to extol the secularization of formerly sacral societies, the death of sociological Christianity and the growth of a purified, “diaspora” adherence to Christ in faith. Daniélou asks whether there will be any poor people in this purified Church of the secularized future, people who need the support of law, custom, art-forms and even superstition in order to be able to make some Christian commitment. In the concrete
Daniélou's version of God's poor turns out to be "this Christian people which exists today in Brittany and Alsace, Italy and Spain, Ireland and Portugal, Brazil and Colombia. It is this people which feels itself betrayed by those groups of Catholics, clerical and lay, whom it sees more concerned with dialogue with Marxists than with work for its defence and growth" (p. 12).

Peasant Catholicisms

Daniélou seems most retrogressive when he rhapsodizes about these peasant Catholicisms. The fact is that all these populations are either declining or will undoubtedly explode in revolution as their poverty and numbers increase. Daniélou envisions the pious poor by their hearthsides, rejoicing in the liturgical wonders of the Rogation Days and the sanctoral cycle. It is more likely that they have long since departed for a dingy flat in the big city and find their religion at the movies, where new gods and goddesses have replaced the heavenly court.

Fortunately Daniélou does not stick too closely to this theme. Recognizing with Teilhard that a new terrestrial civilization is building up, the unifying element of which is technology, he asks how this civilization may be formed in such a way that there is room for an interior life. The new city of man must be a place, to quote LaPira, "in which men have their homes and God also has his" (p. 26). Daniélou, far from calling for a new sacral state, opts for a socialist state open to all truly human religions. Art and prayer will both have to be provided for by the future omnicompetent state. "Without art, the sacred cannot reach out to the mass of men. Without the sacred, art is swallowed up by technology. Together, they can give a reply to the cry put up by the world of technology when it asks for a vision that shall lead to a communion, a unity of spirit, a civilization" (pp. 80-81).

After examining the political necessity of prayer, especially in technological civilization, Daniélou branches out into the relationship between Christian faith and the higher religions. Once again he is dealing in controversial terms without naming his adversaries, who would seem to be Barthian missiologists like Hendrik Kraemer and secularization missiologists like Arend van Leeuwen. Daniélou rejects the Barthian notion of Christian faith as the abolition of purely human religiousness and the secularizationists' vision of technological development and scientific modernization as the only valid *praeparatio evangelica* among the cultures shaped by the higher religions. For Daniélou paganism is a human virtue which is baptized in Christ. The Christianity we are familiar with around the north Atlantic today is only the development of Greek, Roman, Gallic, Teutonic and Celtic paganism,—in something of a historical blend. Now we can look forward, in the modern perspec-
tive of universal history, to other unique forms of Christian faith. "It was the semitic way of paganism that was first to be saved, in Abraham. It was the turn of western paganism when Plato and Virgil were, in a sense, baptized. In the twentieth century it will be the turn of African paganism; in the twenty-first, of Indian paganism" (p. 87).

Danie-lou is perhaps too optimistic about the work being done by missionaries. Journalists never cease to make much of the adaptations of Christian ritual and symbol that seem to flourish in Francophone Africa. They tend to play down the huge flocks of half-educated Catholics in Anglophone Africa who have lost their traditional culture and have gotten in exchange bankrupt Irish Jansenism. Both French- and English-speaking intellectuals in Africa also seem to become more and more like their educated non-African peers: secularistic. Only time will tell whether some of the pioneering experiments in liturgy and catechesis in Africa today will come to eventual fruition in a distinctly African variety of Christianity. Danie-lou is very sanguine about this possibility, but the advances of Coca Cola and the electricity lines may prove more influential factors yet in the shaping of any future African culture.

Despite some overly enthusiastic effusions by the author, and some egregiously inelegant renderings by the translator, Danie-lou's book as a whole is a most stimulating essay. Once again the price asked by the Sheeds and the Wards is a bit prohibitive, given the fewness of pages and the size of the print. Readers with poor eyesight will find this a joy.

PATRICK J. RYAN, S.J.

POETRY AND PRAYER


In his most recent book, Fr. Noon tackles the slippery problem of being clear about the theory and practice of poetry and prayer. Others before him have made the same effort, many of them landing empty-handed in the mud. Noon, with years of preparation and a distinguished literary career behind him, with knowledge of the bruises and fractures that often result, challenges this dangerous foe with vigor and considerable confidence. I will make an effort to chart his procedure and to evaluate his success.

His book has ten chapters which conveniently divide into three parts: three theoretical chapters, five practical applications to modern poets (he considers Hopkins a modern), and two practical discussions of prayer in relation to literature. The first of the theoretical chapters,
"Introductory," indicates that he is seeking an approach that will avoid turning poetry into prayer and prayer into poetry. Each is an art, and each can be best understood, not in pat definitions, but in the light of what some poets and some men and women of prayer have said and done about the two quite different kinds of experience. In an illuminating discussion of two poets, Noon points out that Edith Sitwell, like Hopkins, seems to bring poetry close to being prayer; Whitman seems to carry poetry to the opposite pole—self-realization, not God-realization. Prayer, Noon acknowledges, may indeed lead to poetry. But poetry finds its completion only in conscious intellectual articulation, whereas prayer, finding its completion in union with another person, may transcend such articulation if it can. Both arts may indeed find images useful and even necessary. But poetry will use them as signs significant in themselves; prayer will use them as signs having significance beyond themselves—as pointers to Being, not as beings. Such symbolic articulation, however, always falls short of perfect symbolic aspiration, Noon notes. "The reality beyond remains ever inscrutable" (p. 29).

Chapter Two presents "Other Approaches." First, Bremond's notion that poetry is mysticism broken down, that a poem is an aborted prayer, receives a fatal karate chop. Bremond judged that poetry and prayer are basically the same thing, a seizure of God. Words, relatively unimportant to the poet, are in his view merely accidentally necessary. Noon well disposes of such illusion, places Bremond in his Romantic, anti-Classical context, and demonstrates that he does violence to reality in turning poetry into prayer. More active today, Noon observes, is the tendency to turn prayer into poetry. A most incisive and valuable criticism of Louis Martz's influential work demonstrates that Martz's overall argument tends to confuse prayer and poetry as modes of meditation.

Thomas Merton, to whose views I judge Noon does less than complete justice, is cited as holding, in early writings, that prayer and poetry are necessarily inimical. One can never be at all involved with the other, since they are based on the opposed achievements of reason (poetry) and intuitive vision (Merton's early notion of prayer). Merton's magnificent grasp of the question in recent writings should perhaps receive a bit more attention than Noon gives it. Maritain's view, on the other hand, sees that poetic intuition derives from reason. His position opposes not only the early Merton, but the full-blown Martz as well, in that the poetic impulse and vision might better be conceived as preceding those of prayer. Maritain does not turn the two spiritual creative experiences into one another, does not "identify the voice of poetry with the silence of prayer" (p. 51). Noon concludes that there is an intimate analogy between these two vital acts of the soul, and that, as in all
ideal unions, there can be no real divorce. Both can live best by “re-
specting the separate identity and integrity of the other” (p. 53). He
wisely observes that poetry must be known and respected as such before
anyone can find God in it.

In his third chapter Noon grapples with mysticism. Having stated that
both poetry and prayer are grounded in mystery, that prayer, based in
love of God, is most deeply personal and marked with reserve, Noon
discusses the numerous meanings and contexts of the term “mysticism.”
He clarifies, largely in discussion of Hopkins’ poems, the possible liter-
ary uses of the term; and, quoting many authorities, he indicates in most
useful fashion some limits for both literary and theological discussion. In
a beautiful paragraph (p. 84) on the function of sense and language in
poetry, he says, speaking of the poet, “The discernible pattern of the
world reflects itself for him in the vital kinesthetic energy of his
patterned language.” He concludes this section of the book by repeating
that poetry is not prayer. Both are mysterious, both “surmount the limits
of convention and self-centeredness” (p. 93). Some saints have re-
nounced art, some artists have renounced prayer. But the two arts need
not and should not be inimical. If only one recognizes the boundaries of
each, both, each in its own way, can map the road and light the dark.

In his second section Noon chooses five poets for examination in the
light of his theory of the relationship between poetry and prayer. In his
somewhat pedestrian examination of Hopkins, Noon judges that while
Hopkins used his response to ordinary Jesuit prayer—probably not
mystical experience—as an inspirational source for many of his poems, he
worked as every other true poet works, patterning in speech his personal
response to reality.

In a much livelier and more objective study, Noon considers the work
of Yeats, whose poetry, according to Yeats himself, is rooted in his
human rage or lust. Noon sees this work as “major,” mirroring the human
efforts of Yeats to rely on some myth that would reflect his spirit’s
operation without constricting it. Yeats, in Noon’s view, was no mystic
at all. He attempted to construct for his art a human mysticism, and
succeeded for his art, though he failed for himself—apparently Yeats’s
view too. Noon enunciates a deeply penetrating and moving conclusion.
Well aware as Noon is of Maritain’s careful (and valuable) distinction
between a love which ends in another person and the love which ends
in a work of art, Noon chooses not to depend on such Scholastic defini-
tions, but to approach the problem on the basis of the thought and
attitude of the artist he discusses. It is a difficult but rewarding attempt,
and Yeats would, I believe, have read this chapter with admiring ap-
probation.
Wallace Stevens, Noon judges, aimed at dealing with ultimate values and ultimate human aims. He thus approached the mystery where religious men find God. Whether he personally found God or not, he did find and did express in exquisite poems the human situation, the human confrontation with the physical world, and the human need for ultimate good transcending the physical. Yet his poems are not all all prayer. They concern themselves with the human, not (directly, at least) with the divine. They strain to escape human modes of knowing in reaching reality, while realizing the futility of the effort. Noon may fail somewhat in his sincere effort to sympathize with and to express the vision of a man without religious faith—he supposes Stevens to be referring to God in “Final Soliloquy,” a not altogether convincing supposition—but he succeeds amazingly well in throwing light on the vision and poetic achievement of this excellent poet.

Robert Frost, as Noon sees him, faces the harshness and apparent chaos of life and responds with seemingly simple poems which reflect that chaos but “impose a measure of aesthetic control by color, shape, or sound” upon it. He “preserves a human record of value.” Frost’s poetry, centering in the human self, never overcomes “the gravitational pull of earth.” Frost’s poems, like Stevens’, are clearly not prayers, though they are profoundly spiritual. Frost’s lover’s quarrel was with the world, Noon states, not with God. And he addressed himself directly only to humans.

The analysis in which Noon clearly takes most interest and in which his critical talents find their most original and challenging operation is that of David Jones’ Anathemata. Noon begins by stating, with a flourish of academic birch, that those who do not appreciate Jones are either old-fashioned or ignorant and lazy. An illuminating outline of the eight sections of Jones’ great poem follow, revealing its re-enactment of the history of the Mass throughout human history. Underneath these eight narrative sections lie four poetic actions: 1) the Grail legend, with Christ as Galahad (or Perceval) and Pellam as Adam; 2) liturgical symbols, based largely on the Roman Missal and on wine and water; 3) Scriptural passages, especially the Gospel of St. John, with emphasis on Calvary; 4) the Mass as sacrifice, according to de la Taille. Throughout it is suggested that “Jones’ poem resembles the evolutionary thought of Teilhard de Chardin.” Certainly Noon has here produced the most thorough and profound study of the poem that has appeared, and if Jones proves to be as great a poet as Noon proclaims him to be, this essay will tower as a pioneering critical achievement. The criticism does depend on the poem, however, and Noon sees soaring excellences there which so far escape me. But whether one can follow Noon all the way or not, it is an exciting and valuable experience in criticism.
In the final two chapters of his book, Noon stresses the consideration of prayer, first of the relation between the *Exercises* and modern literature, then of the nature of colloquy. In his ninth chapter he inquires into the influence of literature upon prayer. American indifference to religious history finds itself confronted, in Golding, in Albee, in Bolt, in Katherine Anne Porter and Flannery O'Connor and Muriel Spark, with the activity of that past in the present. Yet, Noon concludes, most modern literature cannot fit "under the already wide umbrella of Christian art."

While religion of itself cannot produce literature, literature cannot provide religious values. In five ways, however, the *Exercises* can be related to modern literature: 1) in concrete, existential quality; 2) in the appeal to the past; 3) in symbolic use of metaphor; 4) in intensely personal quality; 5) in imaginative tone and texture. Above all, "the best modern literature obliges one to share the basic human concerns of the present time," important for prayer as for literature.

In his brief final chapter dealing with colloquy in prayer, Noon suggests, by means of an extended analogy with Proust's work, that history can be bridged and the past brought into the present through memory, taken in the Augustinian sense. In such a process the symbolic action of the liturgy finds its essential function, he holds. And Ignatian spirituality, he concludes, finds one more valuable link with literature in its creative use of metaphor.

As I suppose is evident from this effort to disentangle a line of development from Noon's vast and complex tapestry, I judge that Noon the tackler (to return to my introductory image) has pinned down his opponent with impressive and relatively final thoroughness. He has clarified the murky issue, suggested valuable solutions for some of the most elusive problems, provided a generous amount of pointed and valuable literary criticism, and illuminated with brilliant insight both poetry and prayer.

That he would accomplish all this without human faults could not be expected, and it is not, to be sure, the case. There are numerous things at which malice might gnaw. Noon's style, for one thing, with its neo-Jamesian weavings, will irritate those who admire the brisk no-nonsense structures of our cybernetics-oriented age. The apparent irrelevancies, too, which start up in the midst of many paragraphs and swirl immediately off in the resumed flow of graceful logical rhetoric, will puzzle and distract some. In my own judgment, however, those who will consent to a leisurely and human relish in language dealing with all possible nuances of a complex subject, and those who enjoy the quick probings of a curious and eager mind will find both Noon's style and his occasional erratic thrusts into the void charming and illuminating.
As should be expected in those of us who have taught classes for many years, some academic crankiness takes brief charge now and then. The determined effort definitively to categorize artists as “major” and “minor,” while sometimes useful in classroom comparisons, can become faintly ludicrous if taken too seriously, and particularly so if Hopkins ends up “minor” and David Jones “major,” as they do in Noon’s text. Some of Noon’s readings are open to serious question, too, not only of a few portions of the literary texts he uses—though his balance of judgment and grasp of entire contexts is almost awesome—but of such peripheral matters as Maugham’s critical judgments or MacLeish’s meaning in “Ars Poetica.”

But such trivial opportunities for disagreement and argument rather spice up his book than disfigure it. It is a beautiful book, both physically and in content, and a worthy product of a fine critic.

ROBERT R. BOYLE, S.J.

RELIGIOUS WOMEN


Many people today are writing about fulfillment in the sisterhoods. Frs. Evoy and Christoph have again approached the topic in their latest book, a conversational-approach presentation of concepts and opinions originally formulated for a series of lectures given in the summer of 1965.

Primarily the two authors demonstrate a genuine interest in and understanding of religious women and their role in the church. They offer some rather encouraging insights into possible psychological difficulties and their related possibilities for growth. They set their comments against the background of the New Testament and find much of their material for discussion in the gospels themselves. The reader can sense a certain tradition of awareness in the two priest authors, with regard to sisters and the problems they face.

However, the book is disappointing on several counts. Perhaps it is an attitude shaped by the times, but the reader closes the book feeling that the problems and questions raised were neatly skirted in too many instances, that the fundamental issues to which the authors referred were given a once-over-lightly treatment and polished off with just a few too many generalizations. The chapters proceed with little evident awareness of the present day tensions existing in houses of religious women, tensions resulting not from personality differences among women so much
as from the searching re-evaluation of both structures and purposes. The authors strike the reader as unwilling to accept sisters as anything more than little girls who need guidance in getting along together, obeying happily, accepting the fact that religious life is a way of growing up gracefully, and doing a bit of good in the whole process.

The fact is that a revolution is taking place within religious sisterhoods, just as surely as it is taking place within the church and world society as a whole. The concerns of religious women are broader than a poverty which quietly accepts the poorer with the better, or an obedience which anticipates the desires of legitimately established superiors, or a chastity which understands the sacrifice of wifehood and physical motherhood. Sisters are facing the fact that there is a difference between a relevant and genuine life of co-suffering poverty and a comfortable, sometimes middle-class community of goods. They question the validity of a life of comfort for one who has professed poor-ness and dependence, and ask how the witness of love of God is seen and proven in a “poverty of spirit” which is protected from the guts-and-blood experience of the ghetto victim.

**A list to be done?**

Like many other authors, Frs. Evoy and Christoph admonish sisters to try to “envision our role in the apostolate to which we have committed ourselves.” But the real truth is that today’s sisters are questioning this commitment to an apostolate, to a set work, to a list of things to be done. In professing obedience sisters are not simply determined to henceforth “operate within the guidelines of what the superiors, under God, directed within the bounds of their proper authority.” The thrust of religious obedience has brought religious women to an awareness that they are, in effect, vowing an openness to needs, an obedience of availability which demands a greater creativity, a greater independence, perhaps a restructuring of the total concept of religious obedience. Teilhard says that “the effort of mankind, even in realms inaccurately called profane, must in the christian life, assume the role of a holy and unifying operation. It is the collaboration, trembling with love, which we will give to the hands of God, concerned to attire and prepare us (and the world) for the final union through sacrifice.” And this total response is the more meaningful understanding of the life in obedience.

It is no longer true that a sister needn’t really worry about what she does, so long as she does it for a genuinely good intention. The day is past when the sister can trust that her faith and good will suffice. The needs and demands of her work require a professionalism with little margin for error and incompetence. And somewhere in the process of
creatively and responsibly living her profession the religious woman encounters the situations and opportunities and individuals which make her the total person which the authors hint at throughout their book, the woman “feminine to the fingertips,” “capable of loving warmly,” a “deeply honest person.”

Throughout their book, the authors make positive suggestions which are sometimes vague, sometimes leaving the reader with the feeling that they have all been offered before. This is not so much a criticism of the present authors alone, but rather a comment on the overly simplistic attitude too many priests tend to take in speaking to and of sisters. It is no longer true that the sisters’ inferiority to the priest makes them able and willing to accept his admonition without questioning, without desiring dialog. Many religious women would echo the editorial in *America* magazine (January 13, 1967): quoting the Immaculate Heart Sisters recent general chapter, the editorial said, “Women, perhaps especially dedicated women, insist on the latitude to serve, to work, to decide according to their own lights . . . to be in the mainstream. . . .” And in conclusion the editorial suggests, “In 1968, then, let the sisters be—themselves. In a world where men have to learn again that they are brothers, let the sisters be—sisters.”

Perhaps the value of the present work by Frs. Evoy and Christoph lies in its calling to mind many of the fundamentals leading to the development of the total feminine personality within the life of consecrated virginity, poverty and obedience, and in reminding religious women of the potential that is theirs. In an age when the sisterhood is more and more coming under attack for its relevancy and meaning, it is encouraging to read and reflect on the comments of two men who very evidently believe strongly and care deeply.

**SR. SHARON FEYEN, S.D.S.**