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JESUIT EDUCATIONAL QUARTERLY
Notes Toward the Idea of a Catholic University

W. Seavey Joyce, S.J.

The contemporary university is subject to many pressures. I suppose I was aware that the President of the University acted as a center of these multiple pressures. But the past nine months have brought this knowledge home to me with particular point.

I am convinced that the demands being made upon the university and upon me personally witness a new phenomenon, a new departure in the life of universities: one that heralds a new era of creativity for the university and for the University called Boston College.

The university used to be thought of primarily as a reservoir of accumulated knowledge and a haven for wise and reflective men. It stood apart. Its function was precisely to survey the passing event, to assign the contemporary world its proper location in a system of understood truths.

The older buildings on our own campus were obviously built with that image in mind. Those shaped Lindens and Gothic structures speak of a day that valued both elegance and detachment and wished to provide for the faculty and students of the University a setting that fostered such qualities of mind.

Today, all this is changed. The hard, pragmatic contours of our recent construction are echoed everywhere. New expectations which ask to be fulfilled by hard, pragmatic action seem to have become the order of the day in university life.

The insistent voices of students calling for relevance and immediacy, for new knowledge in new forms that respond to their sense of the needs of the day, are, in the popular press, taken to be the central symbol of the changing university. But, significant as the student voice has become, it is by no means an isolated voice.

For, demands are proceeding from every structure of society: from local, municipal, and national government, from the church, from educational institutions, from people with problems that range from the international scene to the marriage chamber.

When I say all this is new, I am not denying that there is a history to it. The expectations of American Society have always, in a major way, been pragmatic and immediate; and this has affected the American attitude toward the American university almost from its beginnings.

Other nations have called upon technical and vocational schools
to train the majority of their labor force whenever they found ancient apprentice systems inadequate. But Americans, since at least the establishment of the land-grant universities in 1862, have increasingly chosen to prepare their teachers, merchants, engineers, and even craftsmen and artists by giving them over for four years to the tutelage of professors.

I doubt that this has been done in the light of a very developed theory. Perhaps it responded to a naive respect for knowledge, characteristic of a young and unsophisticated people. The instinct which prompted the American system of higher education may indeed have been untutored. But, it was shrewd and it was sound. Out of this decision came the possibility of national coherence where so many forces—the size of the country, the variety of people (most of them initially confined to ghettos), and the bounding acceleration of the nation's growth—operated to fragment and divide America.

There is a position that says it would be wrong to change the ancient university ideal of reflective detachment. Jacques Barzun's *The American University: How It Runs, Where It Is Going*, a charming and urbane book, sets forth this position. And the plea which Father Hesburgh recently made for a period of contemplative calm in which the university should be allowed to settle its own problems by its own tried and true procedures is entirely understandable. But I think it a touch impractical. Society is not about to give the university peace. Instead, society calls for a new university. Once again, it asks the university to meet a need—a new need.

Technology, though it is a truism to say so, has equipped mankind with a host of new competencies. The resistant universe of matter has been rendered at once protean and subservient. We can make nearly anything we want. Indeed, the most recent social and biological research indicates that we may soon be able to control man himself from his genetic structure to his mature behavior. By conscious decision we can shape the lovely commonwealth of which philosophers have long dreamed. We seem to be poised to engineer the world to our will.

The single-minded pursuit of knowledge has provided us with marvelous tools to make even the most fanciful of human decisions effective. In consequence of this we are faced less and less with questions concerning the "how" of things. Increasingly we must confront questions that ask "why." But we fear our own technology. We shrink from our own power to transform. Men are asking
Notes Toward the Idea of a Catholic University

again those questions the university has not asked since the En-
lightenment: What is truly desirable? What ought we to do? What
is the good?

These are the real questions to which the University must address
itself again. For the needs of the day call for a response to ques-
tions of value. American society, as always, through the multiple
means available to it—government grants and student protest, alike
—is demanding answers where it has always sought them, from the
university. But, over the past 200 years or more, American uni-
versities have become ill-equipped to deal with questions of value.
Their goal has become knowledge alone.

Knowledge, pure and simple, should be sought for its own sake,
with no contaminating considerations of hierarchy, competition, or
relative worth, interfering to deflect this single-minded search. The
ideal of pure science—knowledge for its own sake—was the germinal
notion behind John Henry Newman's *Idea of a University*. It served
as the philosophy which enabled him to reject the narrow moralism
of those Irish bishops who were the sponsors of the Catholic uni-
versity he was laboring to establish when he wrote that marvel-
ously illuminating book.

Nor should the ideal of pure research be dismissed. Jacob Bron-
nowski, in his book, *Science and Human Values*, has demonstrated
with almost final eloquence how decisively disinterested investiga-
tion can shape both social and personal character towards admir-
able ends.

And in my proposal of a new university, newly directed and
freshly conceived, there would be no dismissal of the old university
ideal. Knowledge must never cease to be the center of the uni-
versity's task and function. A totally unhindered effort to extend
the bounds of human knowledge remains the university's most im-
portant task. But, knowledge will no longer constitute the uni-
versity's ultimate purpose.

For our new world we need a new objective for the university.
Let me replace the usual proposal of "knowledge" with the category
of "learning." The word learning calls attention to the situation in
which the contemporary American university finds itself: pressured
and distraught by change and the consequences of change.

When pure knowledge is proposed as the purpose of the uni-
versity, even in the most flexible understanding of the term, it can
too readily be heard as proposing a series or an accumulation of
disparate, self-contained acts of understanding, I wish to propose
a process of understanding: an open-ended inquiry that expects no surcease because it sees itself continuously responding to changes in conditions. Learning, then, is changing knowledge, as it is also knowledge for change.

All of this may not seem very startling. Process, as a shape for reality and the mind, is by no means a novel insight. Nevertheless, I am persuaded that much as process has been talked about, it needs constantly to be rediscovered and reasserted.

Dr. Clark Kerr's proposal of the "Multiversity," for example, seems to have been formed out of an image of scatteration of the many research projects simultaneously conducted on the campus. It seems to consider them an unrelated series: one act of understanding, self-contained and completed, succeeded by the next. In the term "Multiversity" one hears a despair of coherence.

It is the learners, the men and women of the university, students, faculty, and administrators alike, who can provide the continuity we need. It is their dedication to the university's task which makes for coherence.

Learning implies the people who know and seek knowledge. It points to that vital coherence which is located within the learners themselves; and the university, as an institution, offers those procedures of order through which the separate investigations of the many learners on campus can meet each other, inter-change and change.

Finally, and, again, because learning implies learners, learning points to that crucial element which characterizes the university's immediate and pressing task: the search for value.

The new university is summoned to play a role in social change. It must assist society to employ its vast technological complex for the benefit of man. It must search for means to humanize organization and bureaucracy without disrupting efficiency. It must find ways to understand the world-wide network of economic and political conglomerates in order to discover ways whereby these will no longer ignore or injure the people they affect.

This is, of course, a summons to greater power for the university. American society seems ready to renew its immense act of faith in the American university. And the prospect is exhilarating. But the power, if it is to come to the university, will only be bought by a prior admission of weakness.

To propose learning and the ceaseless process of learning as the heart of the new university ideal, is to abandon something of the
assurance and serenity contained in the old university's ideal of secured knowledge. To do this throws emphasis on the fallibility of the learner, who must keep correcting his insights as he progresses.

The total commitment to rationality, which the old university ideal proposed in a pursuit of pure knowledge, sought to eliminate the necessary confession of limitation and weakness in the man who adopts a value position which is not universally acceptable. It was thought that patient research into phenomena could make values emerge as compelling matters of fact. Whatever is to be thought of the totally rational ideal as theory, it has clearly proved inadequate to our immediate situation.

We are possessed of much knowledge. Knowledge has given rise to technology, and technology forces us to choose right now among alternatives, and to choose without the certainty of fact. To use the language of the totally rational and scientific theorists, we have not been able to control all the variables of choice. But we must choose.

The M.I.T. faculty and students who have entered so vigorously into the campaign to stop the production of the anti-ballistic missile cannot argue their position with the dispassion and cogency of pure scientists. They may well wish to. But at this point in history they cannot.

They are arguing a question of value; and they are beyond the bounds of universally accepted evidence. They have, in the spirit of the new university I am calling for, declared themselves learners rather than knowers. They are men who are consciously confronting what can be called the mystery of action.

Values are not neutral. They are not achieved as the result of neutral inquiry. But we desperately need them. Can universities provide the discussions that clarify values? Some say no.

The Reisman and Jenks study, The Academic Revolution, considers that the explicitly value-oriented university needed by society today is probably beyond the capacity of the larger, more successful institutions of higher learning in America. The goal of omniscience implied in the ideal of pure science has perhaps been pursued too long for redirections to become genuinely possible.

S. M. Miller, in his telling Ford Foundation pamphlet, Breaking the Credential Barriers, has given some of the reasons why established universities, so firmly identified with the expectations of society, are finding it difficult to respond to changing conditions.
The sterility and rancor of several recent student disruptions reported in the press, seem to indicate that fully established universities do indeed have problems of reform.

I am by no means suggesting that a value-oriented school such as ours is not only experiencing similar problems. But I am suggesting that a University which emblazons its commitment in capital letters, to quote an earlier phrase of my own, can be in a better position to respond to the needs of the day than another, more traditionally designed university. We can become, if we have the will to do it, an instance of the new university I have been attempting to describe.

It is in the context, therefore, of a fresh understanding of the importance of value questions to society that, in my opinion, it makes sense to speak of a Catholic university and of a Jesuit university.

The Christian lives by the conviction that our history is marked by God's activity; and this conviction imparts a fundamental cast to the values he brings to any discussion.

The Christian is less afraid of the unknown than some men, less impatient with the mystery of action, less confident of reason than others. He knows of no abstractions, no simple intellectual talk that can give an adequate account of the endlessly fertile mystery which the life of Jesus, and therefore the life of man, holds for him. Before the mysteries which are the object of his belief he can never be a knower. He remains perpetually a learner.

We are far from certain these days about what should define the Catholic university as an institution. I think myself that institutionally, that is to say in academic structure and procedure, no useful specific differences between the Catholic and the secular university can be found.

Our own university, unlike, for example, many Protestant church-related schools, owes nothing of its financial support and nothing of its direction to established church bodies. Although I am on record as being deeply concerned for excellence in theological studies, I am not convinced that the mere fact that theology is taught on campus should be considered the distinguishing note of the Catholic University.

Theology contributes in a special way to a general concern for value questions, but it is by no means the solitary department to make such contributions.

Certainly, an exclusive Catholic faculty or student body is no
proper definition and no proper aim of the Catholic university. May I quote my Laetare Sunday statement in support of what is patent fact:

We shall welcome to our faculty those of the Catholic faith, and indeed those of other persuasions who, in the spirit of sincerity and deep human concern, will join us in the high pursuit and the generous imparting of knowledge and wisdom.

In this statement I adumbrate what I feel should define the Catholic university. For the question is not properly by what fixed standard of Catholicity should the Catholic university be judged; but rather what is the “high pursuit” it undertakes. What do Catholics hope to achieve in the University?

In this question I think we can find some helpful insights. For the motive of every explicitly Christian undertaking, such as Boston College, is the furtherance of that union of God with Man announced in the words and in the life of Christ. In briefest statement, the divinization of a mankind, united and free, is the hope that animates the Catholic and Jesuit university. It is toward that great end that the Catholic and Jesuit university labors.

Again, this is not a labor which only Catholics and Jesuits perform within the Catholic university. Others may not use Christian terminology. But similar hopes, under other rubrics of understanding, animate them as well. We work with all large-minded men in our high pursuit.

The Protestant Christian, as well as the Catholic, seeks the culmination of all things in Christ. The non-Christian theist knows his learning stands under the judgment of a God who desires the betterment of mankind.

The secular thinker often enough speaks of the human adventure; and his heart is stirred at least by the courage of humanity. Indeed, the total pessimist has a place in our common attempt. There is enough of the Demonic in the Christian understanding of sin, the fall, and the crucifixion to give his insights legitimate voice in the Catholic university forum.

The aim of our high pursuit is, again, learning, the same aim I have proposed as the purpose of the new university our present American society calls for. The meaning of Christianity for the Christian is not something he can pretend to have inherited in neat formulas. It is something that always has to be learned over and over.
The present is always a point of intersection where knowledge of the past and hope for the future meet. And so the full meaning of our tradition is something that must always be learned anew. We have no intention of abandoning our Catholic identity, much less our Catholic Heritage and tradition. But the question for us is: what does this mean for the future?

We are certainly not going to accept the narrowly apologetic and catechetical role in which some have cast the Catholic university. We see the Catholic University, instead, as the place where we develop, in conjunction with persons who have similar high hopes for mankind, those distinctive values which the Christian tradition can generate when it is in contact with the real problems and with the real questions of contemporary experience.

In conclusion, let me state once again that the bewildering changes we are witnessing call for a new university, one that consciously seeks to respond to these changes with answers that are not abstract speculations or conceptualizations, but rather answers that point to the achievement of those human values which, in turn, are the answers to man's deepest needs.

In one of his Godkin lectures, at Harvard last month, John Gardner, former Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, emphasized that we will not accomplish the exceedingly difficult tasks of redesigning our society "... without a combination of commitment and cool intellect."

"Intellect alone won't generate the courage and determination necessary to cut through the obstacles." Mr. Gardner said, "But the contemporary fashion of ardor without intellect is even more inadequate."

Commitment and cool intellect are a useful definition of the learning I am proposing for the pursuit of the new university ideal.

In the pursuit of such an ideal for the university, I am convinced that Boston College is ready to make a major contribution. We are a university committed to the search for human values, since we are moved to that pursuit by the highest and most compelling motivation that can effect an institution.

By our dedication to the mystery of a transcendent God, intricately present in the complexities of time, we are necessarily a University committed to that endless process of understanding which I have called learning, with all that implies of flexibility, immediacy, and concern in confronting the problems of society in our era of desperately needed change and renewal.
Commitment in a World of Change: 
The Philosophy and Focus of 
the JEA Denver Workshop

EUGENE E. GROLLMES, S.J.

There is a scene in *Alice in Wonderland*, we all recall, where the Cat is confronted by Alice. "'Chesire-Puss,' she began, rather timidly . . . 'could you tell me please, which way I ought to go from here?' 'That depends a good deal on where you want to go,' said the Cat. 'I don't much care where—' said Alice. 'Then it doesn't matter which way you go,' said the Cat." The JEA Workshop on "Jesuit Universities and Colleges: Their Commitment in a World of Change," to be held in Denver, August 6th-14th, has for its purpose to clarify what is the goal of Jesuit higher education in the twentieth century. What is the nature and substance of its commitment in a world of rapid change? Where is it that we want to go? Until this question has an answer, it is difficult to determine what policies should be adopted in our universities and colleges. Policies should be means to an end. If the end is confused, then more than likely so will be choice of means. In such circumstances there seems to be a strong inclination to imitate the policies of other institutions that may be pursuing a goal quite unacceptable or inadequate, in the last analysis, for Catholic institutions of higher learning.

Fundamental to the goal of the coming JEA Workshop is the conviction expressed by Very Rev. Paul C. Reinert, S.J., at the National Catholic Educational Association in 1964. "The preservation and development of Catholic higher education," Fr. Reinert said, "is based on the assumption that we have something unique to offer for the benefit of American society." Hence, if Catholic universities and colleges are not different from their secular counterparts, there seems insufficient reason for the enormous expenditure of blood, sweat, and tears yearly poured out to keep these institutions in existence. There is little reason to hope that Catholic universities and colleges will ever surpass secular institutions at being secular. Nor is there any reason to suppose they should strive to do so. Rather than be content with imitation of others, therefore,

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it seems necessary that Catholic universities and colleges derive their purpose from hopefully an existential fact, namely, that of being true to themselves.

If we are true to Christ to whom we as Catholic educators, as well as our institutions are dedicated, then it would seem the unique aspect of our educational institutions can be derived from this very dedication. No less an educator than Harvard President Nathan M. Pusey concurs in this opinion. He writes:

Individuals have been swept along in the advance of secularism, and have become fascinated if also perplexed, by it. In the confusing, promising, but problem-ridden world it has created, a tragic result has been, as Sir Walter Moberly has said, ‘some think God exists, some think not, some think it is impossible to tell, and the impression grows that it does not matter.’

The chief point I should like to emphasize is simply that in my opinion it does matter, hard as it is in our present situation to say this or to have it understood.2

Certainly the commitment to Christ that characterizes the Catholic educator and its consequences for higher education will be a primary focus of attention in the JEA Workshop. In fact, it will be the core of discussion in the very first session. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine the uniqueness of Jesuit higher learning being clarified, at any time, without reference to Christ.

Another major focus of attention will be the concern of Catholic higher education for the person as well as the mind of the student. In a recent article entitled “The Great American Frustration,” Archibald MacLeish points out the importance and present need for this concern. MacLeish writes:

Education, particularly higher education, has altered its relation to the idea of man in fundamental ways. . . . From the time when Harvard President Charles Eliot introduced the elective system there—from the time, that is to say, of the renunciation by the university of an intention to produce a certain kind of man, a man shaped by certain models, certain texts—the university's concern with “man” as such has grown less and less and its concern with what it calls “subjects” has become greater and greater. The important thing has become the academic “offering”

(revealing word): the range of subjects from which the student, with his eye on his career, may choose. And the ultimate consequence, only too evident in the time we live in, has been the vocationalization of higher schools. The college no longer exists to produce men qua men, men prepared for life in a society of men, but men as specialized experts, men prepared for employment in an industry or a profession.\(^3\)

In accord with its concern for man qua man, the JEA Workshop will view today's student sociologically, psychologically, pastorally. It will examine whether or not a secular fundamentalism has restricted modern man's vision almost as much as a religious fundamentalism restricted the vision of many of his predecessors. Regarding the existence of a secular fundamentalism, Nathan M. Pusey says:

There was a time not so long ago when religious fundamentalism worked to prevent a free play of mind and spirit—was restrictive, unenlightened, fearful, limiting. Unfortunately there are those who honestly believe, in spite it seems to me of a vast amount of contrary evidence in music, art, and personal behavior, that religion's influence must always be of this nature. But with the advance of secularization there has come into being a new kind of fundamentalism, a secular variety. And whereas the old kind, at least in academic circles, has long since been unmasked and put to flight, the new kind, which would forcibly eschew all attention to religion, unfortunately has scarcely as yet been identified, with the result that its noxious influence—noxious I believe to spirit, imagination, and so also, in the long run, to mind—works among us almost unopposed, and at times indeed with approval.\(^4\)

Underlying both the concern for man qua man and the concern for the student being introduced to the fullness of reality and not just a segment of it, there is and will be a search for timeliness in the JEA Workshop. In its search for timeliness, the Workshop will be in keeping with a long-standing Jesuit tradition. Rev. George Ganss, S.J., goes so far as to attribute the historical success of the Jesuits in education to this quality.\(^5\) Because what they were teach-


\(^4\) Pusey, op. cit., p. 100.

ing was timely, the Jesuits and also their students became capable, admired, and influential. Such circumstances, logically enough, brought the teachers success and the consequent enthusiasm which feeds upon it.

This brings us to the third major focus of the Workshop, namely, a rekindling of the spirit. If those involved in Jesuit higher education are going to be true to themselves, they must possess a quiet but firm and stirring belief in themselves, a belief that brings out the best that is in them. Much involved in all this is how Jesuit and lay administrators and faculty should relate to and work with one another and how they with the students should form on campus a truly Christian community. Fundamental to the formation of community on campus, and certainly fundamental to the rekindling of the spirit at the Workshop, will be the liturgy, which in regard to the Workshop has been in preparation since February.

Stemming from the timeliness of the teaching and the community that those on campus have with one another, there should come an enthusiasm for what they have and for what they can bring to society. As Fr. Ganss has pointed out, "... the early Jesuits were enthusiastic."6

In a word, the time has come for those involved in Jesuit higher education to start believing in themselves again. The team that is undefeated is usually a team that refuses to be beaten. Unless we can recapture the spirit that gave the term Jesuit education a place of importance and prestige in the history of education, whatever else the JEA Workshop may achieve will probably be insufficient and inadequate to have us conquer the future.

6 Ibid.
The Freedom of the Theologian
in the Catholic College

ROBERT I. BRADLEY, S.J.

Fr. Scott's article, "Freedom in Theological Research," in the March issue of the J.E.Q. is a fair resume of the thesis that has been circulating generally in the Assistancy since the J.E.A. meeting in San Francisco a year ago (see J.E.Q., June 1968, pp. 12-22, for Fr. Orsy's and Fr. McCauley's papers delivered on that occasion). The following brief exposition is intended as a challenge to that thesis. I propose it as being at once more in line with traditional orthodoxy and more attuned to the realities of the contemporary situation.

I. The Freedom of the Theologian *qua Academician*

Although in the purview of the present discussion this aspect of the theologian's freedom is definitely secondary to that of his freedom *qua Christian*, it should be treated first. For it situates the question of freedom within the institutional framework most generically appropriate to the topic of the Catholic college. Schematically stated, this first point contains three propositions:

1. Academic freedom, particularly the freedom to teach, is necessarily limited.
2. The Catholic college enjoys *de facto* this freedom as much as any college, if indeed not more so.
3. The theology faculty in the Catholic college enjoys *de facto* this freedom as much as any faculty, if indeed not more so.

1. That no faculty or college has complete academic freedom should be evident. Pressures both from within and from without the institution itself effectively limit the range of faculty freedom, whether of the individual or of the group. These pressures are so commonplace and inevitable that the very existence of teachers' associations is the best evidence of the felt need to exert a counter-pressure. The result is a kind of equilibrium in tension: the individual faculty member is subject to the control of his professional peers; and the group itself is subject to *its* peers: the various constituents—professional, governmental, consumer—of our democratic, pluralistic society. That an academic *elite* should be responsible to no one but itself is at least an intolerable—and impractical—in this
century as was the essentially similar position of the *noblesse* on the Continent two centuries ago.

It should be noted that the freedom here in question applies primarily to the academician’s function as *teacher* and only derivatively to his function as *researcher*. For the latter function, viz., the inquiring into new data and values, freedom is simply necessary (*ad esse*). No one can, nor does, reasonably deny this necessity. For the former, however, viz., the custodianship and transmission of accepted data and values, freedom as here understood is not strictly necessary but highly desirable (*ad bene esse*). It is not by accident, therefore, that the real efforts of the academic profession, corporate and individual, are particularly directed to secure this freedom of teaching.

2. It can be asserted with practical certainty that the freedom thus described is enjoyed by the faculty of the Catholic college to a degree comparable to that which obtains on secular campuses. In fact, it is probable that its freedom is greater, for at least three reasons. 1) There is the obvious immunity from the directly political involvement incurred by all tax-supported institutions. 2) The relatively small numbers in Catholic colleges promote more personal relationships on both faculty and administrative levels, which should in turn promote the elusive but vital milieu necessary for real freedom. And 3) the homogeneity of views that should be at least implicit in the antecedent acceptance of the definite institutional commitment of the Catholic college should be conducive to a definitely felt freedom, viz., the *de facto* academic freedom we are speaking of.

As for the rationale (*de jure*) of this freedom, it is limited in the same manner as the freedom of secular faculties; i.e., it is not an absolute, an end in itself, but rather a means, relative to the purpose of a larger community of which the academic community as such is but a part. In this case the larger community is the Church, and its control—official and unofficial, direct and indirect—*should* be as efficacious as the analogous control of the educational establishment exerted by the component institutions and communities of the civil society. That *de facto* this control of the Catholic colleges is less restrictive than its secular counterpart (as indicated earlier) is but a reflection of the Church’s essential character as a community of faith and love.

3. What we have said of the Catholic faculties in general can be said *a fortiori* of the theology faculties. Individually and collec-
tively, our Catholic theologians enjoy de facto a freedom—not only of research (this is simply taken for granted, as mentioned earlier) but of teaching—that is quite unparalleled, whether on the Catholic campus or on any other campus. The fact that so many of them can talk so freely on so many subjects not strictly theological, as well as the fact that so many others can pose as “theologians” nowadays, argues to an autonomy both within the discipline and in its relationship to the rest of the world that no other discipline, as far as I know, either has or desires.

This de facto freedom of the theologian qua academician is undoubtedly one of the reasons why the question of his freedom de jure has become as obscured and ambiguous as it has. This brings us to the second and main point of this discussion.

II. The Freedom of the Theologian qua Christian

The following treatment of the relationship between the theologian in his professional capacity and the teaching authority of the Catholic Church can be summarized under three headings:

1. The office of the theologian is not properly charismatic.
2. The office of the bishop, on the other hand, is essentially charismatic, and indeed essential to all other charisms.
3. The role of other institutions involved in this relationship, viz., the Catholic college and the Roman congregations, can be properly determined only by reference to that relationship.

1. The theologian, as a professional researcher and teacher of the Faith, has no more claim to a charismatic character than any other member of the Church. The diversity of gifts enumerated by St. Paul and cherished in Tradition undoubtedly include—and eminently so—the intellectual gifts pertinent to the understanding of the Faith and its transmission to others. “Teachers” and “prophets” have abounded and do abound in the Church, building up its body by their function of sustaining and developing the content of the Faith. But to equate these “prophets” and “teachers” with the holders of academic degrees and faculty positions is utterly simplistic—and naively ironic. For doctoral study and university status are “institutional”—the very thing so decried by theologians (in the institutional sense) as inimical to the true charismatic element in the Church! The true gift (charism) of teaching in the Church is hardly dependent on the paraphernalia of the academy. One might better say that the paraphernalia of the academy are not necessarily an impediment to the charism of teaching in the Church. This
may sound anti-intellectual; in reality it is not. It may be anti-institutional; indeed it may be. But only in order to safeguard the authentic charisms of spiritual insight and spiritual imparting that are alone capable of building the Body of Christ.¹

The phenomenon of the contemporary theologian, lodged in his institutional fortress, is of course nothing new in the Church. There is a kind of continuum in the sacred history whereby a perennial spirit of “purity” and “enlightenment” has regularly returned to be scandalized at the perennial scandal of the “pilgrim Church.” Conciliarist, Gnostic, Pharisee—right back to the beginning, their common denominator is a knowledge that inflates, not a charity that builds. If this indictment seems harsh, it is no harsher than the aspersions made, consciously or not, by too many theologians on the understanding of the Faith manifested by the great body of the simple Faithful of Christ.

2. The current popular thesis depicts the dychotomy between “Catholic university” and “Magisterium” as one between “charismatic theologian” and “faithful bishop.” As we have seen, the first member of this dychotomy is at best an over-statement and at worst a plain error. Likewise, the second member suffers a similar distortion of context. The impression conveyed is that the bishop’s office is simply a kind of ballast, a fly-wheel, a counter-weight to maintain equilibrium in the progress of the Church’s life. It is a useful—even necessary—function, to be sure; but the real thrust of the office as such is actually against the movement of the body as such. And from this neutralizing thrust there results a kind of balance in the movement itself, a kind of compromise effected by a “negotiation” between the two forces. The bishop does not lead—unless accidentally, i.e., by virtue of a charism of intellectuality, holiness, etc., not proper to his office as bishop. He does not judge—unless accidentally the other charismatics in the Church agree with him.

This impression is a clear distortion of the theological—and historical—reality of the bishop’s role in the Church. His role is the essential charism of leadership: not only to defend but to feed, not only to feed but to find pasture. And by the same charism he is to judge: to discern and sanction all other charisms in the Church. This role is inalienable and indefectible, the one guarantee on earth of the efficacious presence of heaven.

Moreover, what is said here of the "bishop" has real proportionality to all bishops and to each bishop. The Bishop of Rome is the only one person authentically guaranteeing the plenitude and unity of the episcopal charism. With him the body of the bishops (in General Council or in the ordinary magisterium) possess the same plenitude and unity. With him again each individual bishop represents in his proper territorial area of the Church the same plenitude and unity. To minimize or disregard, therefore, as this thesis does, the power of the individual local bishop is simply contrary to the mind of the Church— from St. Ignatius of Antioch (who spoke of nothing but individual bishops) to Vatican II (which clearly speaks of the bishop’s right and responsibility in all activities of the Church in his diocese). To say that the local bishop does not have the “final word” in questions of faith, etc., is to miss the point—is there anyone who says that he does? But to say that he does not have the “first word”—and authoritatively binding unless and until that word is superseded by a higher episcopal word, according to norms set by the episcopacy—is to deny the plenitude and unity of the Catholic Faith.

3. From the preceding discussion it should be clear that neither the Catholic college nor the Roman congregations are essential to the study and transmission of the Faith. Yet both are extremely useful for this purpose in their respective spheres: the one transmitting and the other controlling the flow of data and values relative to the Faith. Their usefulness is, after all, what explains their respective historical origins. And conversely, they will cease to exist when that same usefulness is no longer evident. As described here, they seem mutually complementary—much more so, it may be noted, than the rather unfelicitous pairing of theologian and bishop as such. This mutual relationship seems, indeed, basic to the very existence of both types of institutions as auxiliaries to the episcopacy—which in plain fact is what they essentially are.

Leaving the Roman congregations to the vigilance of the persons responsible for that charge, we in the Catholic colleges must remain constant to ours: to see that the Catholic college remains true to its position in the right order of things. If the Catholic college is accidental to the Church, the Church is not accidental to the Catholic college. Its commitment to the service of the Catholic Faith is its raison d’être. And, contrary to an assertion which is really unintelligible, this commitment is an institutional one. For what defines an institution after all but a commitment collectively
assumed by individuals? Only in terms of this commitment, then, the role—and consequently the freedom—of the theologian teaching in the Catholic college can be properly understood.

III. Some Conclusions

1. The freedom of the theologian should be no more nor less than that of any other member of the academy. The fact of his present possession of greater freedom than that enjoyed by other faculties has perhaps something to do with the curious confusions noted or implied in this essay: the confusion of research with teaching, of the graduate work proper to a university with the undergraduate work proper to a college, of autonomy vis-à-vis the accrediting agency with that vis-à-vis the bishop(s), etc.

2. Secondly, the freedom of the theologian should be no more nor less than that of any other member of the Church. His institutional status is strictly accidental to the Church—to its charismatic life and a fortiori to its authoritative direction. The bishop’s authority, on the other hand, is charismatic and strictly constitutive of the authenticity of all other charisms in the Church. He will use the talents of the theologians—as he always has—but how he will use them and how he will judge them is his business. He is in turn judged by no one outside the episcopacy itself. For the episcopacy itself is nothing other than the judgment of God on earth.

3. Finally, in this question of how the Catholic college is Catholic, there is really no middle ground. Either the Catholic college is an institution ultimately constituted by its commitment to the Catholic Faith—and with its theology faculty free on those conditions. Or it is an institution constituted by its commitment to the secular faith—and with its theology faculty free on those conditions. There is no other alternative.
The Morality of Protest

John R. Connery, S.J.

Anyone aware of history will be conscious of the dynamic role public protest has played in bringing about important social changes and removing injustices from society. Even in early Roman history we read that the plebians retreated to Mons Sacer in protest against social injustice and refused to return until they were allowed a share in the government and in the common lands. The protest was successful, and the patricians, however reluctant they might have been, were forced to accede to the plebians’ demands because of their dependence upon them to wage their wars and work their farms. In our own colonial history we are all acquainted with the famous Boston Tea Party when 342 cases of tea, worth £18,000, were dumped into the harbor to protest a tax imposed by the British Government. And in more recent times many of us have a personal memory of the important part protest in its various forms played in the labor movement of the 1920’s and 1930’s.

The current protest movement began seriously in the late 1950’s and was associated at first with a concern for racial justice, a concern that began to confront the conscience of the community at the end of World War II. During the past few years, however, the protest movement has been extended to conscientious objection to the War in Viet Nam. Initially, these two concerns were not unrelated but recently the protest against the war in Viet Nam has become a more independent movement. In speaking of on-going protest movements, too, we should not overlook the curious phenomenon we have witnessed during the past few years . . . the so-called “Hippy” movement. This colorful band of modern gypsies by their non-conformist attitudes, dress and style of life are a living protest against the whole structure of modern society with its middleclass materialism.

The present protest movement has appealed mostly to the idealistic, and sometimes rebellious, spirit of modern young people. Given this fact, I suppose it was to be expected that sooner or later it would appear on the college campus. Originally attracted by the idealistic goals of the protest movements against racism and war, these young people soon became conscious of the general utility of the protest as a tool. It should not be surprising then that the pro-
test on the college campus has become an all-purpose pressure instrument. As one writer recently put it: "The issues range from defense related research and black studies programs to tuition increases and demands for coeducational dormitories, from the appointment and dismissal of professors to industrial recruiting for jobs."

Methods of protest vary from simply speaking out and writing against alleged injustices to picketing, boycotting and mass demonstrations, from civil disobedience to throwing Molotov cocktails and sniping at firemen and police called to extinguish fires and restore order. As we all well know, the apostle of non-violent protest was the late Dr. Martin Luther King, who erected this form of protest into a genuine philosophy. To him, non-violent or passive resistance was not just a negative thing; it was motivated by Christian love. He combined Christian love with the passive resistance method of Mahatma Gandhi and organized his movement on this foundation. As he says: "Christ furnished the spirit and motivation, while Gandhi furnished the method."\(^1\)

No one can deny the effectiveness of Dr. King's non-violent methods of protest. Already in the early 1960's his protest in the South had resulted in the desegregation of more than 5000 eating places, as well as hundreds of libraries, places of recreation and Churches. It is extremely unfortunate that his untimely death eclipsed the non-violent movement. Since that time the philosophy of Martin Luther King has given way in large measure to that of Malcolm X and the threat of violence has been associated with the protest movement against racial injustice. As for the other recent protest movements, it is not so clear that a philosophy of non-violence has ever exercised much influence.

The purpose of any particular protest is to remove the injustice or bring about the social reform or change at which it is aimed. According to the analysis of one author it achieves this aim through one of three mechanisms: coercion, persuasion or conversion.\(^2\) Conversion is clearly the ideal method since it involves a change of heart on the part of the one at whom the protest is aimed regarding the issue at stake. He accepts the viewpoint of the protestors and makes it his own. Conversion, however, is not always possible, especially where there are strong opposing convictions or prejudices.

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In this event the protestor must lower his sights and be satisfied with persuasion. It is not too clear however just how persuasion differs from conversion except that the acceptance seems to be related to the protestor rather than to the objective of the protest. The person or persons at whom the protest is aimed, although retaining their own convictions, are persuaded to go along with the demands of the protestors, even though they might still continue to resist. The least satisfying mechanism is coercion, where the goal is achieved entirely against the will of the opposition. This obviously sets up an atmosphere of tension with its concomitant dangers, and as long as it continues there may be reason for concern about the durability of the reforms. It should be clear from this analysis that non-violent protest is geared more toward conversion, or at least persuasion, than coercion. Violence, on the other hand, would more likely involve coercion.

The Constitution of the United States in affirming freedom of speech, clearly protects the right to dissent or protest. It also allows for the right to organize people for dissent and protest. It generously protects the right to assemble, to picket, to stage marches and mass demonstrations. If the demonstrators are peaceable, and if they comply with reasonable regulations aimed at protecting the general public without interfering substantially with the effectiveness of the protest, the law will protect them. But if a protest is organized with the intent to cause unlawful action, e.g., a riot or an attack upon others, or to cause injury to the property of others, and if such unlawful action or injury occurs, the dissenter will not be protected by law. Similarly, if the protest is so exercised as to violate valid laws, the dissenter will not be protected by the law.

Abe Fortas illustrates the legal limitations on freedom of speech by appealing to the famous example of Justice Holmes. No one may falsely cry “Fire” in a crowded theatre and thereby cause a panic, even though he may have been outraged by the lack of proper fire regulations in public places. He may have shouted “Fire” only to dramatize the need for proper fire regulations and to secure government action in the public interest. But good motives will not excuse an action which will cause injury to others, nor will such action be protected by law . . . even after all other measures have failed.

4 Ibid. p. 12.
With this introduction I think we are in a position to discuss the morality of dissent or protest. It will be agreed, I hope, that everyone has a moral right to protest. This right certainly is not absolute, but must be exercised within the limits of justice and charity. It is with the demands of these moral limitations that we are now concerned.

1. One must be reasonably sure of the justice of the cause he is trying to promote or defend before launching a protest. Such certainty seems compatible even with a minority opinion, but in this event I would think that a very open and careful investigation of all the issues would have to be made to guarantee against possible self-deception. I would like to think also that a respect for the freedom of others would caution against carrying the protest in this situation to the point of coercion. But even a thorough investigation will not rule out all possibility of an erroneous conscience, and it may happen that a protestor will feel constrained in conscience to launch his protest and perhaps continue it even to the point of violence. Since he is following his conscience, he cannot be faulted. But this does not mean that others must forego their rights or that the public authority may not intervene to protect the community. The right to follow an erroneous conscience is not absolute but must yield where the rights of others or of the community as a whole are at stake.

2. There must be a reasonable hope of success in achieving the goal of the protest. Even though a protest may be non-violent, it is a pressure instrument and frequently runs the risk of creating violent reactions with consequent physical harm both to persons and property. It would not be right to run this risk unless one had a reasonable hope of achieving some worthwhile good. If the protest movement is an extensive one, the success, of course, does not have to be immediate. It may well be that an individual protest will not succeed, and that success will be the result of a gradual process of unfreezing the opposing position. One might argue, and with reason, that it was a miscalculation of the chances for success that led to the abortive march on Chicago's southwest side by Martin Luther King and his followers in the summer of 1967. This particular area, largely populated by a national group, was on the periphery of the black ghetto and the people were just too insecure to entertain with any kind of equanimity proposals for open housing.

3. The value of the goal of the protest must be sufficient to balance anticipated bad effects. Again, this must be a reasonable calcu-
lation made beforehand, and it may possibly be mistaken, but the leaders of the protest must be concerned for this requirement even while the protest is in progress. If at any time it becomes evident that more harm than good is resulting from the protest, the leaders should be willing to call it off. One must admit, obviously, that it is often difficult to measure the value of moral causes against physical harm, and the individuals may make different estimates. But this points up the importance of having prudent and conscientious leadership in protest movements.

4. Before a protest is launched, the party against whom it is directed should have been clearly informed of the issue and should have clearly refused to concede what is requested. It has been known in the past that those against whom a particular protest was aimed were never approached beforehand and had no idea that there were any grievances against them or their policies until the pickets appeared outside their home or place of business. It is clearly unfair, as well as unwise, to subject anyone to the embarrassment and possible damage of a public protest unnecessarily, and this is a real possibility when a protest is initiated without warning. Yet it can happen in a particular case that those who have grievances can realistically anticipate a negative response from the party responsible. They may be sure too that if he is approached beforehand, he will only abuse the warning to try to prevent the protest. If the protesters are reasonably sure that a surprise protest will not cause unnecessary harm to the other party and that he would only abuse a warning, they may legitimately forego the preliminary attempts to settle their grievances. Ordinarily, however, public protest should be preceded by less radical measures.

5. It should be clear from what has been said above that the decision to protest must not rest on a purely emotional reaction to evil or an imprudent zeal. The protest is too sophisticated an instrument to be used immaturely or prematurely. Such protest can be as damaging as it is ineffective. Individuals and groups engaged in protest must be both knowledgeable and well-trained before they can hope to use this instrument effectively. As will be shown later, only a well disciplined group can cope with the problem of violence in protest activity. Those who participate in protest, therefore, must have a sincere and abiding interest in the cause they are promoting. No protest will be benefitted by participants motivated primarily by a desire for excitement or display.
6. Before joining a protest group one should know precisely what the issues are, what interests are involved and what purpose these interests have in mind in promoting this particular protest. This requirement should be fairly obvious, yet in the past young men have joined protest groups simply as a reaction against real or imagined police brutality, and with nothing more than a superficial knowledge of the issues at stake. It is known too that young men have been used at times by protest leaders to advance their own selfish designs. The intentions of the hard core leadership, or at least of a certain segment of the group, may go far beyond the alleged purpose of the protest.

7. Methods of protest range from various forms of activity that come within the limits of the law, even to civil disobedience. From a moral standpoint the methods used should be proportioned to the values at stake. But the question of civil disobedience calls for special moral consideration, since it involves the violation of a prevailing civil law. Whatever may be said for the theory of purely penal law, it certainly does not mean that one is free to observe a law or not. One cannot appeal to this theory then in defense of civil disobedience. Moreover, many civil laws protect the rights of citizens, rights which everyone has a moral obligation to respect. The demands of civil law must be considered in any protest activity. Is any protest important enough to warrant disobedience (if this is the right word) to civil law?

First of all, this question does not concern laws which are unconstitutional or unjust. If a law has been declared unconstitutional or is unjust, there is no question of disobedience. While prudence may at times call for observance of such a law, one is often free, and sometimes even obliged, not to observe it. It was precisely this situation which prevailed in respect to the Freedom Rides to the South in 1947 and 1961. The Supreme Court had just declared segregation in interstate traveling facilities unconstitutional. In not observing segregation in the buses in which they traveled or the dining facilities they used on their stops, the Freedom Riders were not really violating valid laws. This form of protest, at least from this one standpoint, was entirely legitimate. I think that one could argue also that even if the laws had not been declared unconstitutional, or if they had violated segregation laws on an intrastate basis, they would still have been justified. No one is obliged to obey an unjust law, and in our society segregation laws are an insult to the dignity of the human person and hence clearly unjust.
Whether it would have been prudent to violate these laws on an intrastate basis is another question. The Freedom Riders themselves were very careful to keep their protest within the framework of the law.

But let us suppose that the proposed violation pertains to a just law. Is it permissible to violate a just law to call attention to a law or a situation which one considers unjust? This is a technique that has been used in recent times, particularly by selective conscientious objectors against the war in Viet Nam. Before responding directly to the question, it should be remarked that the civil courts do not condone such violations; whatever the good intentions of the violators, such violations are subject to indictment and conviction.

But what of the morality of violating just laws as a means of protesting against injustice? Human laws are clearly not absolute, but subject to exceptions. Even many precepts of the natural law allow for excusing causes. For instance, one is not obliged to restore a gun to its rightful owner if the man has suicidal or homicidal intentions. It would be difficult to argue against similar excusing causes in reference to civil laws, especially considering the limitations of the human lawmaker. If the violation of a just law were the only effective means of preventing serious damage or injustice, it would be excusable, e.g., violation of the speed limit or other traffic laws to catch a thief or get a dying person to the hospital. We are presuming here that the violation of the law is not complicated by some relevant natural law factor, e.g., speeding in the above case through a school zone and endangering the lives of the children. But there are so many legal means of protest at the disposal of the ordinary citizen, it is difficult to see how the violation of a just law can be considered the only means to serve this purpose. I think one might also seriously question the effectiveness of such means. The respect which most people have for law is such that they are just as likely, or perhaps more likely, to be alienated from a cause than attracted to it when the violation of a just law is used to achieve it, and especially if there seems to be a disregard for the rights of others in these violations. Protestors will sometimes argue that the violation of a just law has a dramatic value that legal methods usually lack. I find it difficult to accept the dramatic aspect of the illegal method as an excusing cause or a justification for its use. This approach seems to attach value to the illegal act precisely because it is illegal, since it is under this aspect that it draws greater
attention to itself. To my mind this is a very unhealthy, and hence questionable, approach to the law. I tend to agree with Dr. Sidney Hook that civil disobedience frequently ends up in uncivil disobedience and tends to generate general disrespect for law.\(^5\) I have not therefore found any satisfying justification for the violation of a just law as a method of protest.

8. We have already pointed out that the method of protest should be tailored to the needs of the situation and should not go to excess. This leads us to the question of violence. It is a very pertinent question, especially today when the philosophy of non-violence has given way to a more militant approach to protest. Can the use of violence ever be accepted as a legitimate method of protest?

The problem of violence in reference to protest can be approached from several different angles. There is the question, first of all, of planned violence as an effective means of protest. Then there is the consideration of the moral relevance of expected violent reactions even to non-violent protest. Finally, there is the issue of just self-defense against such violent reactions, even with the use of violence. All of these aspects of violence must be considered in any attempt to make a moral assessment of the subject.

In his non-violent movement Dr. King would not allow his followers any kind of violence. He was not able, of course, to prevent violent reactions to his protest actions, but he was rigid in his demands on his followers. He would not allow violence even in defense against injury. Many of his followers were beaten up rather severely, but they were not allowed to strike back. They were put through a vigorous training program before being allowed to participate in protests not only to make sure that they would not use violent methods but especially to guarantee that they would not react violently to personal insult or attack. On at least one occasion, when a protestor did react violently, he was sent home and not allowed to participate again until he had learned the self-restraint, sometimes heroic, required to keep his peace in the face of severe provocation.

Most current protests are clearly not as disciplined or controlled as those just described. Even when violence is not resorted to as a method, there may well be violent reaction to the protest, and if there is no policy of non-violence, the protestors themselves may use violence in self-defense. This, of course, tends to escalate the

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The Morality of Protest

violence, perhaps even out of control. We have already seen that the possibility of a violent reaction to protest must be taken into consideration and weighed against the importance of the protest. As for the use of violence in legitimate self-defense by the protestors . . . I do not think it can be outlawed, but if it is not ruled out beforehand by policy, the possible escalatory effect must be taken into consideration in making the general moral assessment of the protest. It may well be that the issue at stake is not important enough to warrant the risks involved.

What about the morality of planned violence? Can this ever be justified as a method of protest? Some civil rights advocates would like to distinguish between the use of violence against property and violence against persons, and although they would not resort to the latter, they are less reluctant about doing violence to property. Others do not hesitate to use violence even against persons. Let us consider first the use of violence against persons . . . can it ever be justified? I do not think that any moral theologian would condone violence directed against a person outside of a case of legitimate self-defense. Everyone has a right to his own physical integrity and this right must be respected. Outside of legitimate self-defense, then, the use of violence against another person must be considered an unjust attack.

Passing on to the question of violence against property, I think we would have to admit that there is a difference between violence against a person and violence against property. All things being equal, violence against a person is a much greater moral evil. Yet in the practical order this may be a matter of relative degree, since it might well happen that a shopowner would rather take a punch on the nose than have his shop burned down. It is precisely because of its relationship to a person that the violation of property takes on a moral aspect and all admit that ownership of property carries with it clear rights and that these rights must be respected precisely because of the person of the owner.

It is quite true that property rights are not absolute (no more than the right to physical integrity) and that they will yield to extreme need. In a case of such need one can legitimately appropriate, or even destroy, what belongs to another, if this is necessary to relieve the need. Apart from this case, however, property rights are considered inviolable, at least in reference to other private citizens. The legitimacy of violence against property then will depend on whether it can fit into this category of relieving extreme need.
Relating all this to recent protests, I think one might be able (at least in theory) to justify the looting of food where people are starving from hunger, but I do not see how he would justify, for instance, the destruction of a food mart. One would rather have to conclude that destructive violence would be more likely to increase than to relieve this kind of need. But I do not think the real goal of this kind of violence is the immediate relief of extreme need. It is hoped rather that the confiscation and destruction of property in protest will call attention dramatically to some existing injustice or the need for social change. The intention is that public sympathy and support for the cause will be built up to the point where enough pressure can be brought to bear on those responsible for the injustice to remedy it. This brings us then to the morality of violence against property to correct injustice.

There may be instances in which the destruction of another's property is a necessary means to self-defense in unjust aggression, and if this is the situation, moralists would certainly allow it. But outside of actual aggression, moralists will not allow violence and have always insisted on an appeal to public authorities to remedy injustice. It is true that they allow for occult compensation in cases of clear violation of commutative justice, but this extends only to taking possession of something which belongs to another; it does not extend to damaging his property. Moreover, the precise reason why occult compensation is allowed and open compensation forbidden is that the latter will involve violence. In peace-time society the function of protecting and restoring justice belongs to the public authorities. It is only in an emergency situation that the private citizen may take it upon himself. I think one must conclude, then, that apart from the exceptions mentioned above, violence to property in peacetime is not permissible to private citizens, even to remedy injustice.

A right to violence in protest against injustice, then, apart from the exceptions already mentioned, does not seem consistent with peace-time morality. Nor do I think that the present situation, whatever its injustices may be, allows for the application of war-time moral principles. Whatever one may wish to say, therefore, to justify the Boston Tea Party (if it can be justified), may not be at all pertinent to our present situation. Admittedly, there comes a time in the history of a country when it must decide whether recourse to war is justified as a remedy against injustice. This has happened in our own country on several occasions, although I think
it would have to be admitted that people are becoming increasingly disenchanted with violence as an effective means of restoring justice. But whether it is effective or not, I do not think it can be condoned (admitting the emergency exceptions allowed above) outside a situation in which the conditions of a just war would be verified.
Protest on the College Campus

Victor R. Yanitelli, S.J.

Anyone who reads Father Connery's paper will have to be impressed by its lucidity. Father Connery has capsulated the problem very skillfully and touched—at least as far as I can see—on all the relevant relationships: the right to protest, the justice of the cause, the just and unjust law, civil disobedience, and violence against persons and property.

It is perhaps my responsibility as a reactor to bring Father Connery's basic statement into specific focus on the problems that confront us as educators. I shall try to do this by specifying a four-fold context in which protest and the morality of protest is relevant to our campuses. They are: today's students, today's society, today's Church, and today's American higher education; all inextricably bound together, forming one hugely complex problem. I shall mention what I see in these briefly and then draw some conclusions.

What follows is undoubtedly an oversimplification. However, I present these facts and my views on them without judging right or wrong, and without trying to research the reasons why.

Today's Students:

I begin by declaring that for today's students, protest is an accepted way of life. This is a fact. Just as a labor movement of the '20's and '30's eventually made the strike a respected and honorable part of the democratic process, so too, students today have made the protest a part of the life around us.

It is also a fact that students have been raised on a cultural diet of permissiveness, violence and the defiance of authority. It is almost a component part of the air they breathe.

Today's Society:

The fact that American society is not one but two, with liberty, equality and opportunity meaning one thing for whites and an entirely different thing for blacks,—"some are more equal than others"—has given the concept of protest a context of morality and of justice that perhaps no other issue in man's history, except slavery, could have given it.

Add to this problem of civil rights, the problem of Viet Nam,—whereby grading papers takes on the magnitude of a decision to send a man to war,—and the causes for protest multiply. They
multiply in terms of draft resistance and conscientious objection and are expressed in terms of hatred for ROTC, the Dow Chemical Company and the CIA.

**Today’s Church:**

Our Catholic students today find themselves in a period wherein the Church has changed more in the last seven years than it had in the last 700 or even 1700 for that matter. They find theologians and religious in disagreement and what is perhaps worse, they see the older generation torn apart by the uncertainty of the Church’s process of transition in bringing itself to the modern world.

Thus, to the general search of youth for its own identity, there has been added the religious insecurity of a Church in transition. (I cannot refrain from adding here a wish that all theologians who publicly teach the “do it yourself” method of forming one’s conscience vis-à-vis Sunday Mass and the sacraments, would also consult a psychologist about the possible effects of their teaching on the uncertain, unformed and groping young who are neither entirely out of their adolescence nor entirely in their adulthood. I do not judge the motives of these teachers who may be immaculate in conscience. However, I do judge dereliction of duty on the part of any teacher who neglects to assess the effect of his teaching on the taught.)

In any case, my point here is that protest is part of the temporal, historical process in the evolution of today’s Church.

**Today’s American Higher Education:**

Protest has flourished on the American campus because the college and the university are conceived as the citadels of freedom. The college and the university must stand as the critics of society, of politics, government and even of the Church. Nor can the university surrender this task—as the University of Frankfort surrendered to Hitler—without yielding itself up to tyranny or to dogmatism. Therefore, in today’s world, protest may well have become part of the search for truth.

**Some Conclusions:**

I have given off these oversimplifications—these clichés if you will—only to pave the way to the conclusions which I offer tentatively as my personal convictions, not as the final solution to the problem.

1. It would be a mistake—I believe—to play the numbers game and say that the percentage of protesters is so small that it will eventually dissipate itself. This I think is to play the ostrich. The
history of campus protest, as far as we know it to date, has shown that the longer the protest goes on, the more followers it picks up. Above all, the history of campus protest has also shown that the longer students sit-in, the longer a violation of other people's rights is permitted, the longer violence is tolerated, the longer and bloodier it becomes to stop it. This might sound like an appeal to repressive force. It is not—because I do not think repressive force is the answer to anything.

Joseph Schwab (College Curriculum and Student Protest, University of Chicago Press, 1969) has amply made the point that “occasional” protesters become regulars when they find in the protest movement a sense of community denied them on the average campus. And he adds: “the current of dissatisfaction and uneasiness about college curriculum runs deep and well beyond the borders of the highly audible protest groups.”

The conclusions I draw from this and from all that I said about youth, society and the Church, are twofold: First, the college and the university must take a stand—dissent, Yes! disruption, No!—based on clearly defined grounds which are made known to the community and secondly, the stand must be accompanied by a constant, unremitting effort to open up the decision-making processes to students and faculty.

2. The growing importance of education to our national and social life makes it imperative that the college and university become instruments of social change. There is, of course, the fact that thanks to the knowledge explosion, the American economy needs more and more brain power poured into it. Therefore, we cannot afford the luxury of even one dropout. Beyond that though, lies the fact that the only lasting solution to the racial problem and to the problem of the culturally and economically disadvantaged, is going to come out of education. Welfare programs and antipoverty programs, even the guaranteed annual income, may all be fine for managing the problem. They will never solve it. Only education which enables a man to stand on his own two feet with dignity and to compete on the basis of knowledge and skill, will ever provide anything like a lasting solution.

It therefore behooves us, as educators, to become ever more involved in the process of helping the disadvantaged to educate themselves. We must do this without losing sight of the college's and university's academic mission and of course, within the limits of each institution's academic and financial resources.
My second conclusion then, really refers to our need to take a stand on this question and to deal with the problems that arise from that stand in terms of our educational mission, rather than in terms of welfare, the war against poverty, or any other good cause which is not primarily academic.

3. I think we can agree that we are living in “revolutionary times.” For two or three percent of college students, the phrase is more than a metaphor. Certainly, SDS is committed to the destruction of society as we know it, and therefore, to the destruction of the college and university as we know it. Our gravest mistake could well be to believe that they are not really “playing for all the marbles.” The hard-core SDS is serious. The hard-core SDS is determined that the only way to correct this immoral, hypocritical and sick society, is to destroy it. Protest has taught them one great fact which they are passing on to all the other students, namely, that a small, well organized, determined group,—no matter how unreasonable their claims, no matter how small their support,—can disrupt the functions of the college and university and even paralyze their machinery. Students have found, as have protesters everywhere, that direct action works. And direct action will always work when the college or university has not taken a clear stand. Direct action works especially when the president allows himself or any one of his subordinates to by-pass faculty and existing procedures for the handling of grievances.

Up-date the machinery by all means. Change it. Do what you have to do from within. Anything else will result in nothing less than an ever-present threat of blackmail on the campus or to negotiating with a gun at your head.

So my final conclusion comes down to this. We have a choice between real revolution and reform from within. Michael Novak has put it in these terms of two ideologies. The issue is not educationally procedural but socially substantive. And by the last, I take him to mean that the radicalization of youth (however small a percentage) has confronted higher education with an either/or decision.

To me it is a choice of life or death for higher education as we know it. The pursuit of truth inevitably creates debate on the value of ideas. Once the ideas become a cause and the cause is labeled moral, then two things happen: anyone who disagrees with the idea is labelled immoral and anything done, any action taken for the moral cause becomes itself automatically moral. The end justifies the means—all over again.
Protest at the High School Level

RICHARD L. BAILEY, S.J.

My reaction to Fr. Connery's paper will make sense only if interpreted in the framework of a high school situation. Even then, I realize that there will be objections to my posture. It is virtually impossible these days to formulate a statement suitable for all of our many different high schools. Last fall, one of our Jesuit high schools opened its doors for the 1968-1969 term to admit a group of seniors haphazardly trained in typical S.D.S. tactics, prepared and determined to promote dissension and confusion in a very negative way.

Last month, the president of one of our high schools was criticized in the school newspaper for being uncommunicative and indecisive—the implication being, in my perhaps exaggerated interpretation, that he was like a ship's captain opting to keep his boat in foggy waters so that he could not see where he was going.

Last week, in a Jesuit high school, several classes of sophomores threatened to boycott one teacher's classes, because he graded too low in the third quarter.

I have given three examples of student unrest on the high school level, varying in degrees of seriousness.

Most of our Jesuit high schools indicated in Fr. Joseph Shea's survey that they have not as yet experienced "noteworthy incidents of student unrest." To be exact, only 12% of the respondents have had such experiences; and so, at the most, six schools would be involved. However, if the current trend is like most trends, all of our high schools can expect problems in a reasonably short time.

Before beginning my personal reaction, I would like to go on record as admitting that in most instances of student unrest there are many good and educationally defensible elements. I prefer, however, not to enter into this consideration.

Fr. Connery has very clearly and convincingly discussed the morality of protest. I feel very strongly that, in the high school situation, the administrative or total faculty treatment of student unrest should not be handled in the light of what is morally permissible or legally defensible. Our students could attend school without shirts, they could lounge on classroom floors sucking lollipops, they could put up soap-boxes in front of the school and preach to passers-by about the foibles of public education. These
are all morally permissible and legally defensible. But would we tolerate them?

I feel that we should consider the treatment and handling of student unrest in the light of three areas: 1) the student and his needs, 2) our responsibility as educators, 3) our total objective.

Concerning the student, his age is from 13 to 18. Therefore, he is not mature and cannot be as responsible as an adult. Consequently, he needs our direction; he needs the proper atmosphere to become mature and responsible. His high school years are very impressionable and very formative. With this in mind, we must be very careful: 1) not to be overly permissive, thus possibly sending annually into our present day social zoo 7000 Jesuit-bred species, 2) not to be overly strict and unsympathetic, thus possibly stifling the maturation process normal for our students today. We must necessarily channel young zeal and idealism in the proper direction.

Concerning our responsibility, we have some obligations to parents. The old term "in loco parentis" is, to me at least, a fuzzy term, with need of a lot of interpretation. However, despite the problems of this term, we do have responsibilities to the parents of our students. And I feel certain that parents do not want irresponsible activities, demonstrating student unrest, on the high school level. We have, and this is more important, responsibilities to our students. In view of the nature of our students, briefly described a few moments ago, we have an obligation to do the right thing for their proper maturation. Irresponsible student unrest does not seem to me to be suitable for proper maturation. Finally, we have responsibilities to the Society of Jesus, the Catholic Church, and our country. These responsibilities are great and almost horrifying. Consequently, we cannot treat lightly improper student unrest.

Finally, the third and last area which should determine our posture in treating student unrest is our objectives. In general, Jesuit high schools strive to graduate mature, responsible Christian citizens. On the one hand, we want in our students: a growth in maturity, a growth in responsibility, an awareness of all evil around, and a desire to rectify that evil. On the other hand, we want in our students: an appreciation of tradition and our heritage, a respect for law and authority, and a deep love (to use the "in" terminology) for all other people and their respective rights.

Briefly, I have considered the nature of our students, our responsibilities as educators, and our objectives. There are other factors, but I feel that these are the important determinants of a policy on
Fr. Connery states that “everyone has the right to protest.” Initially I stated that basically the high school problem is not one of what is legally or morally permissible, but one pertaining to our educative responsibilities and objectives. Therefore, I propose that Jesuit high schools cannot tolerate: 1) a breakdown in authority, 2) bad student dissension, 3) infringement on the rights of others, 4) a negative school atmosphere. And I propose that we can best handle student unrest by preventing it through: 1) open channels of communication, 2) providing opportunities for growth in responsibility and maturity, 3) teaching an ethics which respects law and the rights of others and which expresses the proper meaning of the freedoms.

We are living in the twentieth century; we do not want a nineteenth century school; not even a 1960 school. People change. Educational methods change. But to paraphrase Gertrude Stein: A high school is a high school, is a high school. Or: A boy is a boy, is a boy, is a boy—not a man.
Dissent in the Scholasticate

HARRY T. CORCORAN, S.J.

I think the notion of dissent and protest must be considered not only as it concerns racial justice, war, and the college campus, but in the whole context of law-and-order and dissent, and this applies to the notion of law-and-order in the Church, and dissent in the Church. My comments will be along this line, with what knowledge and experience I have had from being in a scholasticate for some years.

I. On the notion of dissent:

1) By dissent, I understand a disagreement with a precept or way of acting of one in authority and by protest, a visible manifestation of this dissent.

2) Justified, reasonable dissent is based on the principle of the dignity and the freedom of the dissenter, i.e., on the dignity and freedom of man. This dignity and freedom has been affirmed and emphasized in Vatican II. It is also based on man's conscience, i.e., on his judgment of the goodness or sinfulness of an action he contemplates performing. The dignity of conscience has also been affirmed by Vatican II (n 16: The Church and the Modern World; Documents of Vatican II: Abbott p. 213). Further, justified dissent is based on man's obligation to be involved and concerned with the problems of contemporary man.

3) Justified, reasonable dissent must be responsible. The evils that result from the dissent must not outweigh the good that is hoped for.

I recall a Town Hall we had at Alma some two years ago on the academic curriculum. It was shortly after we had a Carl Rogers' Workshop and many were prone to express their feelings. It was a time when we were working to improve our curriculum but the changes were not fast enough or were not as successful as hoped for. Most of those who spoke were extremely critical. Many of the faculty were very discouraged and I thought there was danger that a number of those who were striving to make changes for the better would say, "What's the use?". Progress can be a painful process, and dissent can be part of that painful process, but it must not break the spirit of those who are trying to make progress. It turned out that the next day some came to me to say that most of those
who had spoken had been too negative and did not represent their thinking. But they had failed publicly to express their dissent to the dissenters.

II. On the problem of the dissent of the individual religious:

Has a Jesuit the right to speak publicly in his capacity as a private citizen, as an individual, rather than in his capacity as a member of the Society? The Second California Province Conference, January 19-21, 1968, wanted this clearly affirmed and the public duly informed. Its Recommendation #6 was as follows:

a) That the provincial issue a clear statement strongly encouraging Jesuits to involve themselves responsibly in issues of peace, civil rights, poverty, social change, etc.

b) That the Province Conference publicly encourage all Jesuits to recognize that the individual's role as professor and citizen does not necessarily imply Jesuit community identification with his particular stand.

c) That the Conference affirm the principle that a man has a right to speak in his capacity as a private citizen or professional person or concerned Christian; and that this right is not lost by entering religious life, nor is the responsible exercise of this right a basis for dismissal from religious life.

d) That the Conference request the provincial to set up guidelines for the responsible exercise of this right according to the principles of the 31st General Congregation.

e) That the Conference request the provincial to set up guidelines according to which superiors may publicly dissociate themselves and their communities from statements made by Jesuits in their capacity as private citizens, professional persons, or concerned Christians.

f) That such province policy clearly be made known to the general public and especially to friends of the Society.

Father General on March 31, 1968, made the following observation on that recommendation:

"I am more than ever convinced that a study in depth must be undertaken to determine whether or not a Jesuit has the right to speak publicly in the capacity of a private citizen, in contradiction to that of a member of the Society . . ."

The California Province Advisory Committee on March 7-9, 1969, urged that a Province Institute be held to explore the problem of free speech, and to compose a position paper to be sent to Father General.
Concerning the possibility of dissent to the teaching of those in authority in the Church, there is a special delicacy because of the special reverence we have for that authority.

Twelve of the faculty of Alma College underwent this painful experience last August when we attempted to answer the question: "What is the relation of the individual Catholic conscience to official papal pronouncements?", and since it is evident that there must be full assent when there is an infallible pronouncement, more specifically: "What is the appropriate response of the faithful to a non-infallible pronouncement?".

Our conclusion (America, September 7, 1968, pp. 162-164) which does leave the way open to possible dissent to non-infallible authentic teaching, was that the response of the faithful must always be a reverential attention and consideration of the teaching, with presumption in favor of the teaching. This response ordinarily leads to general acceptance, and this constitutes an important indication of the truth of a proposed teaching. For the Holy Spirit operates everywhere in the Church leading believers to an understanding and acceptance of truth. However, we concluded, that no fallible exercise of authority can legitimately demand internal assent, for if the teaching is fallible, it is possibly erroneous.

2) Dissent is not disloyalty.

Responsible, conscientious dissent is compatible with loyalty, reverence, and affection for those in authority—for the Holy Father, Father General, it is compatible with obedience.

Bishop Charles Buswell, Bishop of Pueblo, Colorado, in an article in Commonweal, November 15, 1968, "Dissent is not Disloyalty" emphasizes this in defense of his priests "who are trying to obey their consciences and the dictates of their priestly ministry." (pp. 238-9)

Concerning St. Ignatius' Rules on Thinking with the Church "to praise all precepts of the Church keeping the mind prompt to find reasons in their defense and in no manner against them," I would say as loyal sons this is the tendency we should have. But a greater good may require in specified cases that there be dissent, and that this dissent be expressed, humbly, sincerely, honestly. Besides loyalty to the Holy Father there is also loyalty to the whole Church, the People of God. Dissent can be expressed without attacking the Holy Father, or questioning his right to declare his teaching. The crisis of conscience of many of the People of God may require this.
Unity without Uniformity

JOHN F. SULLIVAN, S.J.

This presentation will have two parts. In the first part, it will try to describe the nature of unity among Jesuit high schools in the past. In the second part, it will outline the form which that unity may take in the future.

Every school in the Assistancy, whether it be Bellarmine of San Jose or St. Francis Xavier of New York, was initiated as a corporate apostolate of all Jesuits in the province in which it was established. Hence, the province had the duty of staffing the school with Jesuits as long as that school remained a corporate commitment of the province. However, since every duty has a corresponding right, the province also had the right to supervise the operation of the school to see that it was religiously effective, financially viable, and academically sound. In some respects, the rector and the principal were looked upon as delegates of the provincial. There are some who would say that the provinces forfeited that right of supervision when they allowed the schools to incorporate as educational institutions according to the laws of the various states in which they were located. Whatever the theory in the case may be, it is an undeniable fact that the province, through its provincial, continued to exercise supervision and even jurisdiction over the schools for many, many years after the institutions were incorporated.

As the schools multiplied and enrollments grew, it became obvious that the provincial could not personally exercise the desired supervision. This situation led to the establishment in all provinces of the office of the Province Prefect. As a matter of fact, the office of province prefect of studies in the American Assistancy was officially established by Father General Ledochowski in an Instructio which was promulgated on August 15, 1934. That document contained the fundamental forms determining the functions of the office of Province Prefect. However, on May 13, 1954, the provincials of the American Assistancy issued a booklet on “The Duties and Functions of the Province Prefects of Studies” which outlined the responsibilities of that office in greater detail. According to this booklet the province prefect is (1) educational assistant to the provincial, (2) supervisor of schools, and (3) director of special studies.

In his capacity as consultor to the provincial the province prefect
assists the provincial in determining province educational policy, keeps him informed of major educational problems, assists him with placement of men in the various schools, etc. In order to do this the province prefect himself has to keep abreast of various educational developments by reading, attending meetings, etc. He also participates in the meetings of the province consultors when the matter to be discussed is concerned with educational policy or practice.

As supervisor of schools, the province prefect has two chief functions. In the first place, he annually visits each school in the province, observes classes, consults with administrators, and generally evaluates the academic and religious effectiveness of the institution. After his visitation, he submits a report to the provincial and also sends copies of the report to the administrators of the school. This form of supervision had special value in former days when the requirements of state agencies and accrediting organizations were not very demanding. Another function which is concerned with the improvement of the academic effectiveness of the schools is the organization of periodic meetings for administrators and teachers. The JEA Constitution, as revised in 1964, specifically stipulates that the prefect should organize such meetings in his own province and should cooperate with other prefects in organizing regional meetings.

In addition to these two main functions, other duties were specified in the booklet promulgated by the provincials of the American Assistanstasy in 1954. Thus: "He shall see that adequate provision is made for the preparation of course syllabi and for the approval of suitable textbooks." And again: "He shall direct and be responsible for the preparation, issuance, and correction of the province examinations." Therefore, the province prefects for many years were responsible for the selection of textbooks and the preparation of common syllabi and examinations. The result of this was considerable uniformity in practically all aspects of our schools.

There were some definite advantages in that uniformity. It should not be forgotten that, before World War II, our schools were relatively small. At the time, our administrators had little concept of, and less experience in departmental organization of instruction. In a given school there could be three or four instructors of mathematics and history and perhaps six of English. Generally, they were not organized, had little experience in composing syllabi and drawing up valid objective examinations, and had little time to examine
a multitude of textbooks for the purpose of selecting the proper ones for the school. The thinking at this period was that it was better to select a province or inter-province committee of four or five experienced and capable men in a definite field and give them the task of drawing up syllabi and examinations which would be obligatory for all of the schools of the province. The same group, or another one, was designated to examine and to select the proper textbooks. It was thought that this pooling of the talent of the entire province would be more effective and efficient than to leave the selection of textbooks and preparation of syllabi and examinations to the few on the local level. Moreover, the published results of the scores on the common examinations provided each school with some kind of objective norms for evaluating its own educational effectiveness in the various fields of instruction.

In the past five or ten years however there has been a great change in the situation. The schools are now much larger in enrollment and in faculty and, as a result, the departments in the various fields of instruction are larger and frequently more competent and better organized. At the same time, there arose a strong movement for de-centralization, subsidiarity, and local autonomy. The growth of the lay faculty and their positions as chairmen of departments made "dictation from the outside" highly undesirable. Moreover, prescribed textbooks, syllabi, and examinations were found to be "stifling" by experienced teachers. Province syllabi, it was said, did not take into consideration variable local circumstances. Finally, it was felt that the province examinations were too restrictive since they compelled a teacher to teach matter of whose value he was frequently not convinced and to omit other material which he considered important. Then, of course, there was always the objection that the publication of the test results sometimes "pilloried a teacher" in the eyes of the entire province when his class did not rate high.

As a result of these changes in situations and attitudes, we have the present situation in which there are no common syllabi, textbooks, or examinations. The province prefect continues to visit the schools, submit reports, and to organize meetings. However, he frequently feels that his visitations and his reports are taken much more lightly by the schools than the visitations and reports of state groups and accrediting agencies. Moreover, there is a definite movement among the high schools to follow the colleges in separate incorporation of the Jesuit community and in having laymen on the
board of trustees. If, and when, this is done, the evolution from being a part of a “system,” part of a corporate apostolate, to being an autonomous institution will have been completed.

Some deplore this growing independence of the schools as a fragmentation of traditional Jesuit unity. Others applaud it as a necessary and desirable development which frees the school from the shackles of uniformity and allows scope for initiative and innovation. It would seem, however, that these two positions are not contradictory. It is possible to have unity without uniformity and to have mutual cooperation without universal conformity. Certainly the Jesuit schools of a given province or region are much more similar to each other than they are different. They have Jesuit personnel who share the same religious and educational ideals; they have common traditions and common problems; they are all college preparatory schools which enroll students of similar aspirations although of divergent social and economic backgrounds. Among our schools, then, there is a basis for unity and a desire for unity. The question is: How can that unity be achieved without uniformity? The answer would seem to be found in a new interpretation of the office of the Province Director of Education. In this new interpretation this function would be less of administration and more of service. His office would be the source of communication, stimulation, information, and cooperation among the schools of a province or a region. Thus, he would serve as a bond of unity without imposing uniformity.

It would be well here briefly to examine how he could fulfill these functions.

A. Communication: Although syllabi and examinations are now being drawn up and textbooks selected on the local level, it is no secret that in the different schools these things, which are so important for a successful instructional program, are being done with varying degrees of competency and success. Everything depends upon the ability and interest of the individual instructional departments. Since the principal has neither the time nor the ability to be proficient in all fields, he must rely on his departmental chairmen. He has no external norms of excellence. However, the province director can help to provide him with those by providing for an exchange of syllabi, examinations, and lists of textbooks between the schools of the province or also of other provinces. If this is done on an annual basis, it can be an excellent service to the schools and a form of cooperation which will help to promote the instructional
program of all of them.

B. Stimulation: The annual visit of a province director to a school should be more a matter of stimulation than examination. He has the opportunity of visiting many schools where different techniques are employed and different innovations are experimented with. If he tactfully calls these to the attention of the administrators and teachers of the school which he is visiting, he can readily stimulate them to similar efforts. It also helps if his report contains at least as much commendation as condemnation. Finally, the province director can serve as a source of stimulation by initiating province-wide contests in various fields. For forty-one years there has been an Interscholastic Latin Contest among the schools of the midwestern provinces. No doubt, it served to stimulate interest in Latin on the part of both students and teachers for many years although it is now losing its efficacy due to the decline in enrollment in that subject. However, the fields of modern languages, mathematics, science, and English could profit by province or regional competition. The competition would be especially helpful if the contest was drawn up along the lines of the College Entrance Board examinations. The contest would then not only elicit interest in the field, but also provide preparation for the college board examinations.

C. Cooperation: Meetings of administrators and teachers on a province, or regional, basis are excellent means for securing an exchange of ideas and cooperative action. It has been the traditional duty of the Province Director to sponsor and organize such meetings. In the Central Region of the JEA it has long been a custom to hold annual meetings of principals and assistant principals. In the past four or five years these have become meetings of high school administrators so that the presidents have been invited and have attended with great profit. In recent years it has also been the policy of the Central Region to hold triennial weekend meeting of the chairmen of the various instructional departments from the schools. These people have found the meetings informative and stimulating.

D. Information: A school can tend to become a self-contained island. Concerned with its own pressing affairs, it can be unaware of what is going on in other institutions. On the other hand, the province director should consider it his duty to keep informed about developments in the field of education by regular reading of educational periodicals. Moreover, since he frequently has access
to the newsletters of practically all of the provinces in the assist-
anc-y, he has an opportunity to know what is going on in Jesuit
schools throughout the United States. It is not an impossible burden
for him to cull interesting and informative items from these various
publications and circulate them among the schools of his province
in the form of a relatively brief and rather regular bulletin. Finally,
a very helpful service could be rendered by the province director
if he were to make and circulate some profitable studies which per-
tain to the schools of his province. For instance, he can, and should,
make a projection of the probable available manpower for the
coming four or five years. Moreover, he receives a copy of the
report which the schools make annually for the JEA. A study of
the features and trends which are reflected in those reports could
be helpful for the individual schools.

These are just a few of the services which the province director
can render the schools. Undoubtedly there are many other areas
of communication, stimulation, cooperation, and information. It
would seem that this is the direction which our efforts should take
if our schools are to have the advantages of Jesuit unity without
the disadvantages of imposed uniformity.
Freedom and Local Initiative

John F. Keating, S.J.

The transition from strong central control to substantial self-determination by the schools of the Maryland Province was at first imperceptible, later gradual, and only in the past year or two rapid. During the period 1924-1962 the curriculum and textbooks were under the complete control of Father Provincial with the province director acting as his agent. All Jesuit teacher appointments were made by Father Provincial and no changes were allowed without his permission. All students were required to take common province examinations in all subjects. In fact, as late as 1962 the Maryland Province high schools had probably the most highly centralized controls in the American Assistancy.

From 1962-1966 the province director still exercised general supervision of curriculum, although a growing degree of variation and innovation was permitted. Syllabi and textbooks were chosen by the province committees in the various academic disciplines.

In 1967 the shift towards greater freedom for the individual schools accelerated notably. This impetus was given particularly by the leadership of Bernard J. Dooley, S.J., the province director of secondary education. Teacher appointments were now made by the president of the school and the headmaster, working with the faculty, was given more latitude in planning curriculum revision.

During the fall of 1967 the question of local responsibility was offered to the schools as a subject for consideration and judgment by the school faculties. The immediate issue was the competency of the individual school to determine its own core curriculum and elective courses, to choose its own textbooks, and to construct its own syllabi and examinations. The underlying concern was the question of whether or not each school should be free, apart from administrative control on the province level, to assume fuller responsibility for its own affairs and its own destiny as an academic institution.

A paper was submitted to the school faculties as a proposed new Ordinationes Scholarum for the province. This paper outlined in some detail the roles of teacher, various administrators, province committees, and the province director of education. It was considered by the individual school faculties and later at a three day meeting by the high school administrators. The paper was admired
but not accepted as normative for the role identifications and structuring in all schools. In the course of discussing the paper, however, consensus did emerge on two points: 1) that the faculty members of each school must continue to share more fully and creatively in their own governance and structural development, and 2) that the specific means of continuing each school's individual growth would have to be more largely determined by each school in the light of those particular characteristics which differentiate it from its sister institutions in the Province. These points were emphasized in the report of this meeting which was sent to all schools.

After further consideration of the issues involved, all of the schools responded affirmatively to the proposal for greater local autonomy. The tenor of the schools' approvals ranged from tepid and tentative to highly enthusiastic.

Father Provincial replied to the proposal by granting the immediate request for freedom in the areas of curriculum, syllabi, and examinations. He urged that changes be made with prudence, with care for preserving the good already achieved, and only with the total involvement of the entire faculty. Finally, Fr. Provincial's letter stressed that greater local autonomy does not signify abdication of Jesuit control of our institutions; that it means, rather, an attempt to situate Jesuit control where it can be most effectively exercised, namely, with the Board of Trustees and with the personnel of the schools.

Since the fall of 1967 the real control of the schools has been at the local level. Several of the schools in the province have activated their Boards of Trustees to a significant extent. The process of policy and other decision making and the administration-faculty relationship has developed somewhat differently in the various schools.

Father Provincial is no longer perceived as the ultimate authority in the school as an academic institution. He is seen as the major religious superior of the Jesuit community which serves the needs of the school. One large function that he has vis-à-vis the school is the disposition of Jesuit manpower. Through this means, as well as by his prestige as religious superior, the provincial can indirectly bring influence to bear on the academic institution.

The role of the province director is in the process of reformulation. He is no longer involved in "calling the shots". His new role appears to have two main facets: educational service and personnel development. As a service person he must have knowledge of edu-
cational trends and opportunities through which he can encourage, goad and otherwise assist the schools. He is involved with province curriculum committees, with the arrangement of workshops and seminars, with relationships with dioceses, with possibilities for financial assistance through government and trusts, with organizing visitations to the various schools, and with preserving the elusive, but important bond that our schools bear to one another as sister schools in the Jesuit tradition.

His role in personnel development centers around the need to identify and to assist in the development of Jesuit candidates for positions in our high schools. The Province Director will have some responsibility in assisting individual Jesuits in locating themselves at the schools where their talents and temperaments will have the best chance for successful employment. This function will become increasingly vital as the schools begin to exhibit greater differences in clientele, curriculum, facilities, and educational attitude and goals. It is very likely that more than one person will be needed to carry on the complex duties that seem to await our province directors.

The fact of growing freedom at the local level places the opportunity for initiative in the hands of the local Board of Trustees and administrators. Since their duty no longer involves receiving the word from the province and passing it on to the school, the local administrators must reevaluate their own position in the hierarchy of authority.

The ideal of greater local freedom is, as mentioned above, that all the members of the school community have a greater involvement in the choices that touch upon issues vital to it. This is the kind of diffusion of responsibility that has been envisioned. But there remains the possibility that control may be more tightly centralized than previously and that the institution may be more oppressively controlled by on-the-spot administrators.

The school administrators, confronted by the fact that the provincial and his staff have had sufficient confidence in them to invest greater power in the schools, must ask, “To what extent do we wish to share with our colleagues this enlarged authority, freedom, and responsibility?”

The degree of shared responsibility varies greatly from school to school in the province. In those schools where faculty are becoming more significantly involved in the concerns of the whole school, administrators and teachers are searching for the structures through
which the involvement of the community may be organized, systematic and effective. While reference here is primarily to the community in terms of faculty and administrators, it seems clear that sooner rather than later students, parents, and alumni should have a voice in those affairs of the school which vitally affect them.

Although the freedom of administrators, teachers, and other members of the school community to create policy is significantly increased, it, nevertheless, remains relative to the prerogatives and obligations of the Board of Trustees. The Board, the school's legally responsible body, must see to it that the school is pursuing the stated purpose of its existence according to the norms of its charter, constitution, by-laws, and other significant documents and traditions. The development of adequate communication between the Board and the school community is clearly necessary. It is necessary for the Board if it is to be attuned to the school whose interest it promotes; it is necessary for the community whose decisions must reflect an understanding of the Board’s attitudes and responsibilities. Only through frequent communication can that trust develop which will move the Board to recognize the competence of the school people for decision making in most issues and which will enable the school people to accept the need for review of certain types of decisions by the Board.

Today the administrator in the province schools finds himself at once one of the responsible agents of the Board of Trustees and one of the official leaders of the school community. He is faced with many puzzles. The greatest of these arises from the necessity of asking himself what, in the light of a changed and changing atmosphere, will be the style of his responsible leadership. Need he see himself primarily as a decision maker or may he see himself mainly as one who inspires ideas, gathers together people and their plans, informs colleagues of possible consequences of certain courses of action, and brings to bear upon groups and individuals the perspective of the entire school?

The administrator must lead the school forward in the light of the vision and wisdom that arises from the school community. The trust that has been placed in the school must be extended to all of its members. In no other way can a school become a community of persons guided by a common vision and working toward goals and values that these persons experience as their own.
The Impact of Mass Media on Education

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Living and Learning, the Report of the Provincial Committee on Aims and Objectives of Education in the Schools of Ontario, is an excellent example of how mass media are influencing in a total way what is happening in education.¹ Singularly arresting in shape and design, with splashes of color, excellent photography, and an imaginative use of white space, it alerts the reader to a new look in education even before he begins to read the report. Nor does it deliver less than it promises. The 258 recommendations are made in the belief that we cannot build a society by looking solely to the past—to the record of what our history has shown us to be; for at any juncture in our history both past and future press equally upon us. Characteristic of our thinking today is our belief in the permanence of change . . . Like the men to make the initial landing on the moon, our children must be thoroughly prepared for a destination whose features no one knows at first hand . . . The achievements of the past are there to orient our youth; the vision, the speculation and the prediction for the future are there to challenge and excite their minds; it becomes a function of the school to provide that orientation and foster that excitement.²

Any realistic evaluation of the cultural environment would lead one to recognize, as did the Committee, the all-pervading influence of mass media on what might be called informal education. In the words of the Committee [today's child] is daily barraged, enriched and deeply affected by the wonders of the age . . . In the sophisticated society of today, the laws and language of the Industrial Revolution are as obsolete as Fulton's steam engine. The bounties and distractions of modern living have created new values and new ideas, new concepts of time and space, new freedoms and new constraints . . .

² Ibid., p. 35.
From colors to clothing, from speed to spending, he moves in an environment of constant impact upon his senses . . . He has seen the launching of astronauts, the funeral ceremonies of Kennedy and Churchill, battles in Vietnam, peace marches and race riots . . . Faced with the presence of hallucinatory drugs, wars, violence, sex, and social pressures, he often finds himself on a turbulent sea of experience for which there are no charts.3

How does the educator react to this new electronic environment? One would like to think that he sees in it great possibilities for education and is eager to capitalize on them. But the evidence hardly supports such a sanguine view. Not a few teachers consider the output of mass media as trash; they rarely listen to AM radio; they have more important things to do “than waste time in watching television;” they cannot comprehend why anyone would listen to the Beatles and other similar groups; they consider much advertising a total waste of money and a constantly irritating factor in our society; finally, the less said about comic books and magazines the better. By way of contrast, AM radio is the constant companion of the typical teenager; television claims two full years of his life by the time he is eighteen; the purchase of new records is an important item in his weekly budget; advertising more often than not presents the world to him as he would like it to be; and specialized magazines and pocket books are geared to his immediate interests and concerns. The educator may continue to believe that the school opens a wide window on the world, but for the student the window more often than not appears to be a one-way mirror, reflecting only what is taking place in a classroom carefully insulated from the real world outside.

Yet within that very classroom some educators are attempting to incorporate new approaches and methods into their teaching. The audio-visual explosion in many school systems is evidence enough of the fact. From elementary school through university, films, filmstrips, slides, overhead projectors and educational television programs are the order of the day. If young people today are at home with new media, the educator seems to say, then by all means let us use them. The emphasis seems to be on use rather than on most effective use. A teacher is delighted if he finds a film which will reinforce his own point of view, or which will replace the regular lesson; no discussion follows the screening, nor is the film shown

a second time. Yet the teacher may feel he is quite progressive! Another teacher begins each week with the same film because he personally finds it stimulating; a third teacher experiments by playing recordings before class begins; the examples go on and on. Now if audio-visuals are merely gimmicks, then one cannot quarrel with this approach. Nor can one quarrel with teachers' colleges for not incorporating serious study of media into their curricula. But if on the other hand the electronic media have ushered in totally new ways to perception, then only a response on the same level is adequate to meet the challenge. Certainly it will not be met by merely incorporating into the classroom program more audio-visual aids.

At this point it might be appropriate to ask whether the educator considers the student to be a container which is to be filled to the brim with all that the system believes worthwhile and important, or as a light bulb to be turned on. If the former, then the parcelling out of bits of information daily is the answer; if the latter then a totally different approach seems to be demanded. Few educators would agree that students are containers, but in practice many continue to act as if they were and to insist that there be no tampering with the curriculum. Just as the educator is liable to miss completely the possibilities for education that are everywhere present in the new cultural environment, so too he is liable to be completely closed to the possibility of learning experiences that are totally different from his own. Living and Learning puts it this way:

The mixed media approach, so well demonstrated at Expo 67 in the imaginative use of film techniques, raises many old and new questions for learning theorists. The simple Pavlovian Stimulus-Response formula is often found wanting as an explanatory frame of reference. In behavioristic tradition, one picture image, seen by itself, impresses one fact on the mind. But two or three picture images seen simultaneously, and often with continuously changing juxtaposition, conjure up a complexity of ideas and relations in which the whole is clearly more than the sum of the parts. Much more of learning is subliminal than we ever guessed, and such multiple ideas seem to stimulate ideas in the mind. Later, these images can be recognized and retained in varying ways, dependent upon the recipient. The real question of how to evaluate the residue of such experiences
has not as yet been answered. It has been suggested that it is primarily a sensory emotional experience, and not intellectual, which brings about changes in attitude rather than changes in philosophies... We must remain vigilantly aware of this "blitzing of the mind" approach... Father John M. Culkin, Director of the Center for Communications at Fordham University, believes that a mind blitzed is a mind burst open and alert for intellectual combat. Both he and Marshall McLuhan claim that apathy, not stupidity, has been the enemy of intellect in our time, which has led to the posture of detachment and non-involvement which modern education must overcome.4

Several ideas here might be underlined! Would it be true to say that students generally read a multi-media presentation with much greater facility than do their teachers? That they could create their own media presentations in school if given the opportunity and sufficient encouragement? Is it possible that this approach might involve them almost totally as persons in the learning process rather than as computers to store away memorized facts and data? Is it possible that television as a "cool medium" has been involving them from childhood in this total approach to perception and that as a result quite unconsciously they are seeking the same approach in education?

Constant experimentation in the past four years with university and high school students, with teachers and administrators, would lead the writer to conclude that the answers to these questions are in the affirmative. Can anything be done to close the gap between student and educator? One solution, and not the only one by any means, might be to begin "programming for discovery," to begin making much greater use of indirect rather than direct communication. Many pavilions at Expo employed the indirect method of communication with marked success, especially with the young. Basically, it provokes questions by introducing the participant to open-ended experiences. If the viewer becomes involved or "turned on," he begins to seek answers to his questions. In the classroom the teacher becomes a stimulator of curiosity and a resource person instead of being merely a dispenser of packaged information. As the student becomes involved in probing experiences with others, the teacher can direct him towards appropriate research materials. If the teacher is truly imaginative (and

4 Ibid., p. 53.
very secure!), he could suggest that the student or team of students, as the case may be, might attempt a creative presentation after the initial research was completed. At this point some may feel that this is altogether too idealistic an approach. But it has been successful with university and high school students and has resulted in superior work. Wherever “programming for discovery” has been attempted in a serious way, the total environment of the learning situation changes almost overnight. One course at Loyola has only four orientation lectures during the term; the remainder of the time is spent on individual projects and in consultation with the professor. Students find this approach difficult and unsettling. They are unable to fill their notebooks with outlines of lectures. They are lost without their “Linus Blanket.” Gradually, however, they become involved and as the involvement grows they begin to work much more seriously at the course than at any other in which they are enrolled. Similar experiments have been conducted with great success on the high school level. Surprisingly enough, students will spend hours on para-curricular projects which interest them if they are sufficiently challenged and their curiosity is aroused. One such instance centered around the film “21-87” by Arthur Lipsett of the National Film Board. As an experiment, the writer assigned two students who had never seen the film to produce an audio tape on Psalms 21 and 87, using the same inspiration as had Lipsett. After being assured that they might approach the project in any way they desired, they accepted the challenge. The result was a superb montage of sound, completely contemporary yet exactly faithful to the mood and spirit of the two Psalms. This assignment was voluntary, it was not for credit, yet the students spent more than fifty hours in researching the material and another twelve hours in producing the tape.

Films also can play an important role in “programming for discovery.” No longer chosen by the teacher as re-inforcers of his viewpoint or as substitutes for teaching, they can offer a springboard for discussion in which teacher and students together probe their experiences for new and deeper understanding. During the first screening the tendency is to project one’s opinions and biases into the film. In the ensuing discussion individual interpretations are challenged and probed, thus offering possibilities for a deeper and broader understanding of this shared experience. A second screening provides an opportunity to examine the points of view that emerged in the discussion, to compare them with one’s own
and with what the artist is attempting to communicate about man and society, and in the process to grow and become more truly human.

Obviously this approach requires careful preparation on the part of the teacher. He must discover what films are readily available, select and screen for himself the ones he thinks suitable, prepare questions which will stimulate discussion and schedule the films in the best time slots available. Many teachers concede that ideally this is the only valid approach but in practice they tend to disregard it completely because they themselves are not really convinced or because they lack the time for discussion and a second screening or finally because they see no signs of cooperation or interest on the part of principals or school boards.

Just as the mere screening of films achieves little, so too the incorporation into the curriculum of much of what passes for educational television will only lead to disappointment. Most educational television programs to date have simply dispensed information without in any way attempting to involve the viewer. But, in the words of the Hall-Dennis Report, with careful planning and creative production it is possible to prepare programs that involve the viewer in a variety of ways—by arousing his curiosity; by helping him to look more carefully at a subject; by transporting him, vicariously, in time and space to far-off events and places; by presenting for him various viewpoints on an issue; by creating situations leading to discussion or reflection; by showing him how to perform a skill; and by providing experiences which enable the viewer to form his own generalizations or conclusions. If educational television is to make its appropriate contribution to practices that emphasize inquiry, discovery, and the pursuit of individual interests, it will be essential that the planning and production of programs be based on this philosophy. Television programs for school use must support the teacher’s goal of guiding pupils through inquiry, and must not subvert or compete with this goal by merely presenting packages of information.

While it is true that few educators today exert control over the production of television programs for school use, it seems clear that this will not hold for the future. If educators actually had

5 Ibid., p. 159.
control today, would they end up by “merely presenting packages of information” or would they program for discovery? A student leader at McGill recently provided what might be the correct answer to the question when he described what is happening today:

We have a 250-year old lecture system “where the teacher writes something on the blackboard and 900 students copy it down. Even if only three people are there copying it down, it’s no more than stenography . . . Not only are teachers unwilling to change the lecture system, but they won’t allow us to make it more bearable.” So students have no control over their environment, and no real participation in the learning process.⁶

On this rather pessimistic note we might bring this paper to an end. The cultural environment, learning experiences, and informal learning programs reflect the all-pervasive influence of mass media on society. Education however and the school system seem to have been affected hardly at all, at least in ways that are relevant. Hope for the future seems to lie in enlightened reports like that of the Hall-Dennis Committee and in the television generation which will continue to press for major changes in education at every school level. Perhaps this is the only effective way to combat the “apathy which has led to the posture of detachment and non-involvement” on the part of many educators.