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Jesuit Educational Quarterly

MARCH 1946

THE HARVARD REPORT

Two Reviews

Andrew C. Smith, S.J. Robert C. Pollock, Ph.D.

MORE STUDENT GUIDANCE IN HIGH SCHOOLS Felix P. Biestek, S. J.

A RETURN TO HUMANISM Matthew J. O'Connell, S. J.

GRADUATE STUDIES IN THE AMERICAN ASSISTANCY 1945-1946

VOL. VIII, No. 4

(FOR PRIVATE CIRCULATION)

Contributors

In presenting the studies on the Harvard Report the editors of the QUARTERLY had two aims: first, to give a general view of the report and to stimulate the interest of Jesuit educators in it; second, to give an analysis of the theory underlying the report from the sociohistorical viewpoint. The QUARTERLY is indebted to FATHER ANDREW C. SMITH, whose study fulfills the first aim, and to DR. ROBERT C. POLLOCK, whose study fulfills the second aim. Father Smith, who received his doctorate in English from the University of Chicago, is now General Prefect of Studies of the New Orleans Province and dean of Spring Hill College, Mobile, Alabama. Dr. Pollock, associate professor of philosophy in the Graduate School of Fordham University, received his B. A. and M. A. from Harvard, and his Ph. D. from the University of Toronto. Dr. Pollock is at present engaged in preparing, in collaboration with Don Luigi Sturzo and others, a work dealing with man and the sociohistorical process.

FATHER FELIX P. BIESTEK, who is completing his theological studies at West Baden College, makes a plea for more student guidance in high schools and shows how a large public school endeavored to offer such guidance.

College administrators are busily engaged in revamping postwar curricula. FATHER PATRICK A. SULLIVAN'S question, "Why the Fathers?" may give pause to Catholic educators who have too long neglected an area of the Christian heritage that is thoroughly classical and thoroughly Catholic. Father Sullivan will complete his theology this year at Weston College.

MR. MATTHEW J. O'CONNELL in his "A Return to Humanism" suggests some cogent reasons why students of the humanities do not profit more by their courses in the classics. Mr. O'Connell, of the New York Province, is studying philosophy at St. Louis University.

MR. G. GORDON HENDERSON, a Maryland Province theologian studying at Weston, offers a strong argument for partial homogeneous grouping of high-school students.

Book reviewers in this issue are Father John J. Wellmuth, professor of philosophy at Loyola University, Chicago; Father James F. Moynihan, director of educational guidance at Boston College and consultor of the Veterans' Administration Center; and Father Edward J. Farren, theologian at Woodstock College.

The editors of the QUARTERLY present the annual statistical report on the "Status of Graduate Studies in the American Assistancy, 1945-1946."

Jesuit Educational Quarterly March 1946

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The JESUIT EDUCATIONAL QUARTERLY, published in June, October, January, and March by the Jesuit Educational Association, represents the Jesuit secondary schools, colleges, seminaries, and universities of the United States, and those conducted by American Jesuits in foreign lands.

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The Harvard Report: A Review

ANDREW C. SMITH, S. J.

Every Jesuit engaged in educational work should read with interest and sympathy the Harvard Report on general education.¹ When the oldest and richest of our American universities dedicates some twelve of its most distinguished teachers to a more than two-year study and gives them an expense budget of \$60,000 to work with, the outcome should merit our careful study, even if it did no more than recommend certain changes at Harvard itself. As a matter of fact the present report does that and much more. It offers indeed a definite plan for revamping the Harvard curriculum so as to insure for all its future graduates a more markedly general education, without at the same time sacrificing any of the real values of the specialism for which the institution is noted. But it goes further, proposing as an answer to a well-proved need, a similar liberalizing of the secondary schools of the nation.

It is, of course, this broader and much more developed section of the report that gives the volume its public justification, as it will occasion the widest discussion and criticism. What Harvard University proposes to do in its own confines is largely its own business (though inevitably it will evoke widespread imitation). But what it proposes to do for the nation's schools is everybody's business. Everybody, more than likely, will have something to say about it in the course of the coming year, which will see the revival of educational conventions. It is even possible that the very moderation of the authors in attempting in a scholarly way to strike a via media between traditionalism and functionalism in education may have succeeded only in antagonizing all parties by failing to go far enough for any. Whatever the other groups may do, it is this reader's opinion that the traditionalists called Jesuits will approve the general tenor of the recommendations, both for colleges and high schools. While regretting the lacunae, particularly in the field of religious and moral education, we will recognize that they are in large part consistent with that neutral and secular philosophy on which the writers, whatever their convictions, felt obliged to base their planning for the American schools.

GENERAL EDUCATION AT THE COLLEGE LEVEL
Certainly the recommendations for Harvard itself should, if adopted,

¹ General Education in a Free Society. Report of the Harvard Committee. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1945. pp. xix, 267. \$2.00.

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bring that institution into closer harmony with the traditional curriculum in our Jesuit colleges. Indicated by implication stands the once-vaunted free elective system, even as modified by the concentration and distribution arrangements of more recent years. Unity of purpose and community of knowledge have been sacrificed, it is now recognized, to overspecialization, affecting alike the outlook of the Harvard student himself and the character of the courses which he takes outside his field merely to satisfy distribution requirements. The end result is that students of differing departments fail to have a common outlook. To a great extent they fail to speak the same language—at least on intellectual levels—and in this way they are inferior to the cultured group of "Christian gentlemen" that Harvard turned out in its pre-Eliot days. With specialism in the ascendancy, education may be successful in producing learned specialists for the graduate schools, but it is sadly neglectful of the terminal needs of the many young men who after graduation from college are expected to be civic leaders in a democratic community.

Definite provision for a solid core of general education, commensurate in prestige and in content with those of any single department, is the general aim of the new Harvard Plan. Thus stated it may sound at first like another echo of the Chicago Plan, particularly when the areas of general education are again listed as the humanities, the physical sciences, and the social sciences. In reality the Harvard proposals contain some important original features. To begin with, the new required courses are not surveys; they have a logically integrated content and are much more concerned with developing attitudes than accumulating facts. Moreover, they are not limited, as at Chicago and its many followers, to the lower division of the college, coinciding completely with the first half of the four-year course (or the whole four-year cycle as now given to the youthful prodigies at Chicago). At Harvard the plan is rather to spread them, along with some specialization, over the whole course, thus recognizing that neither general nor special education is restricted to any period of a student's career but should ideally permeate his whole course, and indeed his whole life.

Practically, the new plan will require that the Harvard student who will continue to concentrate six of his sixteen units of study in a particular specialty, must in the future carry six units in general education. Half of these are to be taken in the first two years; viz., one each in the humanities, in the physical sciences, and in the social sciences. The other three, to be taken in the last two years, may be selected, with the approval of the newly constituted Committee on General Education, from fifteen or more courses concerned with the same three general areas. To forestall any cleavage between the specialized departments and the new quasi

Department of General Education, all the teachers of the general courses shall belong to specific departments, even though for two or three years their major, though not their only, work will be that of the general courses.

Obviously the success of this plan will depend in greatest measure—the qualifications of the teacher being presumed—on the specific content of the courses approved as satisfying the requirements of general education. For this reason the report goes into much detail on the organization of such ideal courses. Experiment is allowed for, and experience is exploited. Thus in treating of philosophy (included under the humanities), after suggesting three alternative approaches—viz., the study of six or seven masters; the canvassing of several great philosophical problems, like causality, free will, truth; and the analysis of several great systems, like realism, idealism, pragmatism—the report continues:

We would propose still another way, altogether different from these mentioned, for future consideration in connection with the development of philosophical courses in general education. This method has already been tried at Harvard with an increasing measure of success among beginning students. Such a course would have as its objective the study of the heritage of philosophy in our civilization. Western culture may be compared to a lake fed by the streams of Hellenism, Christianity, science, and democracy. A philosophical course based upon the study of these contributions might offer an extremely valuable way of considering the conceptions of a life of reason, the principle of an ordered and intelligible world, the ideas of faith, of a personal God, of the absolute value of the human individual, the method of observation and experiment, and the conception of the empirical laws, as well as the doctrines of equality and of the brotherhood of man (p. 211).

The subject of this extended quotation should not imply that philosophy, under the Harvard Plan, is regarded as a necessary part of the curriculum. The report is explicit to the contrary:

We think that it would be serving no good purpose to require every student to take a course in philosophy. Such a rule would result in a watered-down course suitable neither for the philosophically dull nor for the philosophically curious and adept. . . . We do believe it important to recognize that there are many students who will profit from work in philosophy provided their study of that subject comes relatively late . . . (pp. 209-10).

Yet even with this limitation it is clear that philosophy would occupy a prominent place in the Harvard scheme of general education. In fact, as a whole, the new provisions would parallel in great part the usual Jesuit college's requirement of courses in literature, science, history (as social science), and philosophy. It is true that religion, as previously noted, is a glaring omission from the list of the humanities. In this the Harvard professors are less clear-sighted than Professor Theodore M. Greene in his famous report on the humanities. The discipline of the foreign languages

is also slighted, being regarded either as a part of literature for the better students or a tool subject for the specialists. Mathematics receives similar treatment. For the average student its values are supposed to have been exploited to the maximum of the average student's capability in high school; as for the rest, those who have need of higher mathematics for work in the sciences, the problem belongs to the realm of special education.

However much we must deplore the omission of this or that subject from a common core of general education at the college level, we cannot but admire the scrupulous care with which the Harvard Committee insists that the courses required in the name of the values of general education be really on the general side, and not merely introductory courses designed primarily for future specialists. What is said about the science courses in the following excerpt may be applied *mutatis mutandis* to similar courses in other areas:

From the viewpoint of general education the principal criticism to be leveled at much present college instructions in science is that it consists of courses in special fields, directed toward training the future specialist and making few concessions to the general student. Most of the time in such courses is devoted to developing a technical vocabulary and technical skills and to a systematic presentation of the accumulated fact and theory which the science has inherited from the past. Comparatively little serious attention is given to the examination of basic concepts, the nature of the scientific enterprise, the historical development of the subject, its great literature, or its interrelationship with other areas of interest and activity. What such courses frequently supply are only the bricks of the scientific structure. The student who goes on into more advanced work can build something from them. The general student is more likely to be left simply with bricks. . . . It is necessary, therefore, to provide science courses at the introductory level which have general rather than specialistic education as their primary aim (pp. 220-21).

Without stating it so explicitly, many Jesuit educators have felt this same need for a more truly liberal content in our various courses required for their cultural contribution to the "whole man." The Harvard Report will have done us all a valuable service if it stimulates Jesuit administrators and teachers to a similar reorientation of many of our courses away from the special or vocational to the liberal or general type.

GENERAL EDUCATION IN THE SCHOOLS

The same compelling reasons which move the Harvard Committee to propose a common core of general education for the colleges—or at least for Harvard—call likewise for an important revision of the secondary-school program. Indeed this wider field, affecting as it does some four times as many millions, and plagued as it is by an even more bewildering variety, is even more in need of some integrating program capable of

transmitting to as many of our youth as possible the common heritage of American traditions and ideals. Needless to say, for the careful scholars who wrote the present study such a purpose demands more than a single required unit in United States history or the American way of life. It means rather a grounding, as thorough as the ability and interests of each pupil will permit, in the essential elements of the three great areas of general knowledge mentioned above: the physical sciences, looking to proper relations with our physical environment; the social sciences, tending to adjustment of the individual to society; and the humanities, enabling one to understand "his own nature, aspirations and ideals." For the high-school student these three areas are to form "a continuing core for all, taking up at least half the student's time."

Lest this requirement should be interpreted too rigidly the report goes on:

This does not mean that all should have exactly the same courses. . . . The ideal of commonness must show itself chiefly in a common requirement rather than in a common way of carrying it out. There must be courses of different difficulty and different method in each of the three spheres of general education, and the criterion for membership in these should be neither a student's intentions in life nor his background nor the kind of diploma for which he is aiming, but simply whether or not a given course is the best for him—which is to say, a criterion of ability (pp. 99-100).

Such generous allowance for individual differences will merit the theoretical approval of all modern educators; and even the proponents of a rigidly common curriculum—as we Jesuits sometimes fondly mistake ourselves to be-will be pleased to find that the requirement is common, though the achievement of it is perforce differentiated for different talents. What will strike us as more of a surprise is that the proportion of required courses in the three general areas is greater for that large body of students who are ending their formal education with high school, occupying in their cases as much as two thirds of the time. Yet the reason given seems eminently just: the college-bound students will have ample opportunity later on to plumb the great areas, and at a deeper philosophical level, whereas the others are having in high school their last chance to acquire at least a taste for their great heritage. In each case the program leaves full opportunity for special and, where the need is indicated, for vocational education. The unity of the whole scheme is thus graphically summed up in a neat figure:

General education at high school is like the palm of a hand, the five fingers of which are as many kinds of special interest—mathematics and science, literature and language, society and social studies, the arts, the vocations. These fingers would stretch for all beyond the common core, and all would

follow one or more than one. If, as urged earlier, actual work comes to take its place, for some, as part of high school, that would be, illogically, yet a sixth finger. All, then, whatever their future intentions, would have the binding experience of the common core; and all would follow some field of special interest (p. 102).

In spite of this insistence on "a common core," the authors, believing, as they state, "in the need for variation," refuse to state in detail exactly what high schools should teach as general education. Instead they put together, in what they aptly call "railroad train order, car hitched after car," their various ideas on the importance of different studies in the three great areas together with much incidental comment on alternative methods of exploiting their possibilities for general education. The resultant chapter, if at times disconcerting, is also frequently suggestive. One can hardly refrain from conjecturing that it is in this part of the work especially that are contained what the Letter of Transmittal alludes to as "some unresolved differences of opinion." Certainly, the average Jesuit reader's reaction will be one of alternating approval and disagreement. Thus a strong plea for the revival of the art of reading aloud is balanced in the section on English by a sweeping deprecation of the study of formal grammar. Or again, while Latin teachers may welcome the suggestion that this study be begun early, say in the seventh grade, teachers of mathematics may resent the insinuation that their subject except in its simplest form, arithmetic, is beyond the grasp of at least 50 per cent of high-school students. But before taking issue on any of these points we should do well to recall that the writers are dealing with the masses of students in our public school system, and not with the supposedly select groups by whom our experience and ideals are conditioned.

AIMS OF GENERAL EDUCATION

Perhaps the greatest assurance that the report as a whole is definitely on the side of sanity will be derived—apart from the opposition it will arouse among extremists of all kinds—from its magnificent effort to define and appraise general education less in terms of prescribed courses than in the broader nomenclature of the mental traits desirable, if indeed not necessary, for the future citizens of our free society. While by no means novel—else how would we recognize them as true—those characteristics are stated in fresh, clear terms, a fact which will doubtless insure their quotation by many a commencement speaker and their inclusion in school catalogues. Education, we are told, "is not merely the imparting of knowledge but the cultivation of certain aptitudes and attitudes in the mind of the young" (p. 64). It is the residual value of these acquired habits or intellectual virtues, to use the scholastic rather than the Harvard

terms, that justify the process of education which consists in forgetting more than we learn.

Specifically, there are four characteristic traits which, in the view of the Harvard Committee, education aims to produce; viz., "to think effectively, to communicate thought, to make relevant judgments, to discriminate among values." Once the second of these, communication, is set aside as the habit of adequate expression (or what St. Thomas calls the "habit of grammar"), the rest of the traits may be reasonably equated with the three great intellectual virtues enumerated by St. Thomas as "science, understanding, and wisdom" (Summa Theologia I, IIae, q. 57, art. 2). These are indeed noble objectives for any educational system, and no better yardstick for measuring the value of any curricula could be devised. But there is in the Thomistic explanation an ascending hierarchy among them. The greatest of these is wisdom, which "discriminates and orders all truths." Unfortunately, it is precisely here, in the realm of discriminating values, that the Harvard program is weakest. It touches lightly on the values of "good taste and the appreciation of beauty . . . the love of truth and the respect for the intellectual enterprise," but of the higher values of right and wrong, it can only bemoan that the problem of "moral values and character is more complex," and bid the school put its trust "in the Socratic dictum that the knowledge of the good will lead to a commitment to the good." The unexpressed realization of how futile this is gives poignancy to the frequent, half-reluctant admission that "religion is not now for most colleges a practical source of intellectual unity."

But we should not be too hard on the professors. Given their secularistic presuppositions, perhaps their stand is inevitable. Writing of the virtue of wisdom in 1938, an American commentator on St. Thomas, pessimistically declared its absence from American educational thought:

It [Wisdom] is not satisfied with the immediate truth, as is knowledge; it wants the last truth, the last explanation. It is not satisfied to take a truth from some other science, it must go back to the very last and very first principle. . . . It furnishes the answers to the fundamental questions of human life—why, whence and where—of the universe and even of God. It should be the prime object of education. The skeleton of it is given to the Catholic child in the catechism class; . . . and it is one intellectual virtue which is a stranger to the American educational system (Walter Farrell, O. P., Companion to the Summa, Vol. II, p. 186).

While, happily, none of the intellectual virtues or the moral virtues either for that matter, are excluded a priori from our educational objectives, the reading of the Harvard Report will be for all of us a salutary experience if it persuades us to check our professions with our practice, to reexamine our curricula and their administration in the light of their maximum contribution to the distinctive traits of general education, with special stress on the discrimination of values.

The Harvard Report: Its Theory of Education

ROBERT C. POLLOCK, PH. D.

No theory of education can be considered satisfactory which fails to take into account man in his full concrete existence. Indeed even a philosophical analysis of man, as fundamental and imperative as it is, must never lose touch with the concrete in its complex factors and their actual synthesis. Nothing is more wholesome for thought than to remember what experience never fails to exhibit, that the aspects we have distinguished by conceptual analysis are interrelated and interdependent in actual fact. To separate concepts and principles from concrete reality is to deprive them of their deeper meaning and significance and to render them less effective in their applicability to real problems. And what is true of philosophy is most certainly true of educational theory, since it is the living man with whom such theory is concerned not the concept of man. Educational theory cannot dispense with the guiding principles which philosophy alone provides, but neither can it dispense with an account of concrete reality in its being and action nor with a thorough scrutiny of all those factors of the concrete that are especially relevant to its subject matter.

We shall see better what is meant by the foregoing as we proceed to examine those sections of the Harvard Committee's Report on General Education in a Free Society, that are taken up with educational theory.1 It should be said at the start that the committee's formulations are vague and fluctuating in their philosophical content. It is almost as though there was fear of making any definite commitments, lest in so doing the committee should lose what it apparently wishes to preserve at all costs, a certain comprehensiveness which it appears to think is absent from prevailing formulations. That the report does have a certain comprehensiveness and balance, which contrasts favorably with much that is written on education, is clear beyond a doubt. And it is likewise clear that its achievement is the result of a healthy respect for fact and a desire of the committee to bring its views to the test of a broad experience. This fidelity to the concrete is in itself admirable, and it may well be that what the committee has done is so substantially sound on the empirical side that were it amplified beyond its present sketchy condition, it would point to a rounded

¹ Chapter II. Theory of General Education. pp. 42 sq.

theory of education, well able to escape the irrealism of those current theories which are so deeply infected either with rationalism or positivism. And I do not hesitate to add that it might even call for a religious orientation in education, something, unfortunately, the committee deems impracticable.

EDUCATION AND THE CONCRETE MAN

First I would consider the insistence, so widespread in recent times, that education concern itself with the human being in his wholeness, since personality "cannot be broken up into distinct parts or traits" (p. 74). After all, it is futile to speak of training the mind if we fail to realize that mind is always found in the human synthesis and cannot be reached except within that synthesis. "The aim of liberal education" therefore "is the development of the whole man" since human nature is made up of instincts and sentiments, emotions, drives, and will, as well as intellect. Obviously man is not a contemplative being alone. But if one asks why then is education centered on the training of the intellect, when in fact "human nature is so complex," the answer lies in this, that intelligence is also "a way in which all human powers may function. Intelligence is that leaven of awareness and reflection which, operating upon the native powers of men, raises them from the animal level and makes them truly human" (p. 75).

It is of the utmost importance to recognize that through the intelligence the instincts, passions, and sensibilities realize their potentialities so that man is raised to a higher plane. To emphasize man's wholeness in education is to recognize his unity in diversity, and to perceive that for man to be intensively one, he must be deeply and intensively many. Such a view is poles apart from any dictatorship of the intelligence which suppresses rather than brings to completion all of man's powers. Because man craves true wholeness, it is only when the life of the intelligence helps him to achieve this that it asserts its power over him. Hence theory and practice cannot be separated, and when one or the other is stressed as an exclusive end, "wholeness is lost" as the committee avers, and both inevitably suffer. It cannot be forgotten without serious consequences that thought and action are so intimately united that if one prevails, this is merely the result of an emphasis and direction given by the individual himself. And because all knowledge, even the most abstract, is always ordered to practical ends, it becomes plain why general education must be so vitally concerned not with mere "manipulation of concepts," but with "effective thinking, communication, the making of revelant judgments and the discrimination of values."

CONCRETE MAN AND SOCIETY

But the report has much more to say about wholeness. "Just as it is wrong" it asserts "to split the human person into separate parts, so would it be wrong to split the individual from society" (p. 76). We are thus beyond eighteenth-century liberalism which "thought of humanity in pluralistic terms (like matter in Newtonian physics) as an aggregate of independent particles" (p. 76). While the individual as a free moral subject is unfailingly emphasized, there is nevertheless an insistence upon "fraternity and cooperation for the common good."

One can only praise this high sense of ethical and social organicity. Yet one must confess to a feeling of disappointment over the failure to give us a clearer and more definitive conception of the individual's relation to society. Thus we have the curious statement that when "union is stressed to the exclusion of freedom we fall into totalitarianism," as though the perfect society, which would be essentially a communion of love, could possibly lack true freedom. Actually one finds a fluctuation between two views, that in which society seems to be a merely external fact and that in which it enters deeply into the individual's formation, as something internal.

Educational theory is urgently in need of an account of the relation of the individual to society which not only brings to clearer light the individual's irreducibility as a free rational being, but also does full justice to the dynamic role which society plays in the life of each of us. Unfortunately, the general situation is this, where one school of thought emphasizes the individual's irreducibility and his essential human nature, the other puts all its weight on society as a perennial and constitutive factor in individuality, while yet falling far short of a true conception of the human person.

Cultural development and our social evolution have given us a profound awareness of the social nature of man. In recent times there have been important studies throwing light on the extent to which social reality influences the individual through his every pore by means of language, tradition, institutions, et cetera. It is this better understanding of the social fact that makes us realize how much more complex is a full realism concerning man than is generally understood. Unfortunately the implications of the social fact for education have been largely the concern of educators whose point of view is determined by a sociology narrowed down to positivistic dimensions.

It has been shown that the social fact can be more deeply penetrated and encompassed by recognizing that it is the individual who is the truly active element of society; that is, the individual taken in his intellectual

and spiritual nature.2 And we must further recognize that we do not apprehend the concrete individual fully until we see that society is his necessary aspect. Indeed so true is this, that personal life and the life of society are not to be taken as two lives, but a single individual-social life. Only too often we speak as though the individual were somehow the inner and the social the outer side, whereas in the concrete, even the inner is social. Man's individuality and sociality have their single root in his full human nature, and together they constitute the concrete individual. Man cannot find himself, he cannot become aware of his individual-social nature nor can his consciousness develop except in a social life. Society aids and complements him in every aspect of his life, whether sensitive, intellectual, or ethical. But if society is the medium of his growth, it is not such as something extra-individual, since society is made up of individuals in their coexistence and inter-activity. As with soul and body, so with individuality and society, we do not experience them as a simple coexistence but as an intimate and profound interpenetration.

THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY IN ITS PROCESS

But we can go farther in showing the extreme importance to education of a recognition that the full concrete man is not only soul and body, but at once individual and social. Man's consciousness and his very thought always exhibit him in his double characteristic as individual and social. Thus it is necessary to distinguish in the individual not only that aspect of his consciousness, which is sensory and psychological, but also that aspect which is at once psychological, ethical, and historical. For the concrete individual is inconceivable without the projection of his consciousness into the social milieu comprising family, city, nation, people, church, et cetera. And because of the continuity of historical life based on the social bond that unites successive generations, what is cumulative and historical, conditions us as individuals and becomes part of our psychic content. It is only in the logical order that individual consciousness in its personal aspect comes first. In the temporal order the personal and social are always together. If there were any priority at all, it would be rather of social and historical consciousness, since tradition and our milieu are our points of departure for finding and realizing ourselves through our own personal and self-reflective consciousness.

When we say that society is not an exterior but an interior fact, we mean that man lives, thinks, and acts socially, although he resolves all sociality as actuated into himself as a person. In the report we read that "Thinking is a solitary process, and in so far as education cultivates in-

² I refer to the sociohistorical writings of Don Luigi Sturzo to which I am deeply indebted for a better understanding of the sociohistorical aspect of philosophy.

tellectual skills it is producing individualists." Thinking is indeed something conducted in solitude, but not a solitude that separates. As we grow in our understanding of our true nature, we must come to see that our thought would hardly be worth the effort if it remained outside the sociohistorical reality. Such thinking would have but little vitality nor could it influence and mold the future to any significant degree. If in cultivating intellectual skills education makes us individualists, it simply means we are not truly conscious of what we are really doing when we think and master the various disciplines. It is time we recognized that man's thinking manifests a vital relation with reality only when that relation exhibits man's individuality and sociality in their fecund and intimate relationship. Consider man's indigence outside society. His formation would be less human, for his consciousness would be detached from the historical past and therefore from the accumulated experiences of mankind. He would have no share in its moral and material conquests, and he would be deprived of those orientations of mind, of those aspirations towards great ideals which have imprinted themselves within the souls of countless individuals from generation to generation, and which as common consciousness, have shaped history.

There are two important aspects of concrete society that are of prime importance for education, and both of them the committee recognizes in a general way, as we shall see. First, there is the fact of organic continuity in the life of a society and there is also the fact that each age has its peculiar rhythm, dynamism, unifying tendencies, its own peculiar orientations according to its interests, beliefs, customs, circumstances, development of institutions and culture, the genius of its people, et cetera. While the fact of continuity is of major significance we must also give our full attention to the age's uniqueness. This uniqueness stands out when we see the difficulty each age finds in imitating the works of another, in which so many were once able to produce and with such ease, it seems. Considering this uniqueness, we can better appreciate, for example, the problem that confronted medieval men who had to assimilate the elements of another culture into their own world, ruled by its own vital rhythm, and its own urgencies, and enlightened by different principles, and by a more complex experience. For too long we have looked upon this assimilation as though it were something abstract and logical only, and not also organic and according to a concrete complexus of sociohistorical life. We have been too apt to regard this assimilation as part of a long drawn-out dialectic of self-moving ideas, without realizing the rationalistic and even idealistic implications of such a view.

Clearly then, educational theory must take cognizance of the actual world in which men carry on their lives. We must avoid that oversimplifi-

cation that arises out of a failure to consider the sociohistorical aspects that enter into the problem. Perhaps we are in a better position to understand that while there has been continuity in educational theory and practice, it is still true that the schools have been deeply influenced by social change. "Education," writes the committee, "like all society's prime needs, changes as society changes." But today we are becoming more conscious of this fact, and instead of being at its mercy, we can master and utilize it.

THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE MODERN WORLD

The question arises as to what the actual character of our modern world has to teach the educator, especially when he is determined to maintain and preserve all certain and absolute values. Modern society, we know, has been undergoing rapid and far-reaching changes in every field. But there is one important aspect of the modern world which should be brought to focus. Despite the presence in our world of powerful countertendencies, there has been a growing concern for personality. Let us not be sidetracked by the faulty and even harmful formulations of philosophers and others. These will suffer the erosions of time and may give place to better ones. But underlying these formulations is the solid fact of a great historical tendency manifesting itself in a development of social consciousness, as is evident in our democratic political expansion and in the various domains of social life.

This decisive emergence of the individual person is the outcome of a long process whose principle source is Christianity. Personality, it is recognized, is the peculiar achievement of the Christian era. For it was Christianity that revolutionized society by putting human personality in the place formerly taken by the family, caste, clan, et cetera. Christianity not only affirmed the centrality of the person in social life, but it gave to the person the consciousness and power with which to emerge from the group and to establish himself in his own personal life. But here is the important fact for the present discussion: a freer and more vigorous interplay between the individual and society became possible, since personal values could more effectively flow over into social life, just as in turn sociality, as actuated, could make a direct return to the person, as resolvent terms. Thus was created a life-giving cycle between the person and the collective life which accounts in large measure for the mounting crescendo of social and cultural life, bringing forth renaissance after renaissance, creating masterpieces of thought and art, deepening human consciousness, and revealing new facets and aspects of personality.

In modern times social life has become more dynamic, relationships have undergone considerable broadening, and the benefits of society have reached larger numbers. As a result, society is more deeply rooted in the individual than perhaps at any other time in the past. Hence the cycle between individual and society, and society and individual has reached an intensity which must make itself felt in the classroom and which educational theory and practice dare not ignore. Today it is so impossible to shut sociohistorical reality out of the school, that to attempt to do so, would empty the school of its occupants.

THE INDIVIDUAL IN AMERICA

Consider in particular the American situation. The committee is acutely aware of the difficulties confronting American education, when viewed in its sociohistorical framework. As they say, "the most ideally planned educational system would have found itself in conflict with the unforeseen forces set loose by the growth and development of the country" (p. 42). One wonders what such an "ideally planned educational system" could possibly be, which neglected to consider the living individual and his milieu. And here they quote a striking passage from Machiavelli's Discourses, in which, after wondering why the Roman Republic exhibited confusion during the period of its fastest growth, he sees that confusion was inevitable in such a vigorous state. "Had the Roman Commonwealth grown to be more tranquil, this inconvenience would have resulted that it must at the same time have grown weaker, since the road would have been closed to that greatness to which it came. For in removing the causes of her tumults, Rome must have interfered with the causes of her growth" (p. 42). With America too, the committee concludes, its "very growth, the source of the gravest problems to education, is at the same time the index of its strength and promise."

I think it important to point out the particular feature in American growth which is relevant to the educational problem and which throws light on a development in education which resulted in "disturbance and maladjustment undreamed of in simpler times." In America we have reached a new point in the polaric relation between individual and society. Here individuals have found greater opportunity to develop their aptitudes and their moral and intellectual qualities, just as they have found opportunity for a larger voice in communal affairs. Americans as a result have a well-developed sense of independence and even a strong antipathy to mere regimentation. On the other hand they are more intensively a part of the social life, and feel its many benefits. The entire American experience has matured the individual in a sense of his own worth, while at the same time giving him a typically American formation. Remember that for over three hundred years there has been no letup in the individual and collective conquest of the physical environment and in the establishment of new communities from one end of the continent to the other. Americans

have thus a solid core of individualism arising out of a long pioneer experience, and yet Americans are primarily society builders, thinking of themselves not as individuals who have risen out of the community as a given matrix, but rather as individuals who have a hand in shaping it.

If in modern times society has rooted itself more deeply in the individual's life, in America the process has gone much farther, accounting for our special difficulties and the gravest problems in education, and offering us at the same time as, I believe, an "index of its strength and promise."

Fully aware of the American scene, the committee is looking for an "over-all logic," a "strong not easily-broken frame within which both college and school may fulfill their at once diversifying and uniting tasks. This logic must be wide enough to embrace the actual richness and variegation of modern life. . . . It must also be strong enough to give goal and direction to this system—something much less clear at present. . . . It is evidently to be looked for in the character of American society . . . and must further embody certain intangibles of the American spirit . . ."

RECONCILING TRADITION AND THE LIVING PRESENT

Stated in the most general terms, the committee wishes somehow to do justice to the living present while at the same time providing for "goal and direction" through a recovery of our heritage. There is a profound desire to overcome "the seeming opposition . . . between traditionalism and modernism," which, "has been a tragedy for Western thought." And it is here that their apprehension of society as an organic process serves them well. For they perceive the living present in its peculiar character, while emphasizing that the present is conditioned by the past.

We are part of an organic process, which is the American, and more broadly, the Western evolution. Our standards of judgment, ways of life, and form of government all bear the marks of this evolution, which would accordingly influence us though confusedly, even if it were not understood (p. 45).

Therefore "it is not and cannot be true that all possible choices are open to us individually or collectively." For this reason the "impulse to mould students to a pattern sanctioned by the past in one form or another can never be absent from education. If it were society would become discontinuous." The past and present "are parts of the same unrolling scene and, whether you enter early or late, you see for the most part the still-unfinished progress of the same issues."

Throughout the section there is a sustained effort to see the present, not as something static, but as a dynamic reality, which is a real organic development of an earlier civilization, by which much that has been only implicit has become explicit. It is natural therefore that there should be a

deep concern to keep alive in education a sense of innovation and change. For, to follow my own line of thought, if the present is in a certain way an actualization of the past, it is also finalistically projected into the future. In every domain of life, personal and social, there is an irrepressible urge to overcome limitation and deficiency, in order to attain to a better future. Individuals and societies of necessity seek their own vital development, and to suppress this impulse one would have to suppress life itself. Man cannot rest in potency, but must act incessantly in order to achieve fulfillment. The world must be conquered morally as well as physically so that it might correspond better to his aspirations and needs. There are ideas and ideals to be brought into life, so that what were unstable and fluctuating elements may enter deeply into the logic of events, in laws, institutions, customs, habits of mind, et cetera.

Without renewal and development the values of the past would never remain operative. Hence, true conservation can never be separated from growth, which takes place through the addition of new elements and a deeper experience and reexperience of established values. Each age, each particular society transmits to individuals the need to act in determined directions, and since the quest for the truth and the good are never absent, in the midst of, and underlying, the quest for welfare of one special sort or another, there is a trend to greater rationality of action. That is why we must bring back to education a sense of vocation in its true meaning, as a call to life, a call to realize the good, and a call to master ourselves and the surrounding world. If that sense of vocation has degenerated under the impact of commercialism and a society lacking in organicity, then our task is to rehabilitate it.

Obviously one cannot ignore this need for achievement, especially in an American school. No people has had so strongly this urge for improvement and the enhancement of life as Americans. As Santayana has rightly said, Americans are filled with enthusiasm for the future, and view existence under the form of the good. Who would say that this sense of the future is not an "index of strength and promise"! At any rate we have gone a long way from the Greek intellectual, for whom reality was essentially immobile and the world fully completed. So far from being turned toward the future, he sought to free himself from time altogether so that he might better contemplate the eternal forms. The committee recognizes this too when it says that "perhaps for Greek thought, only the timeless realm had importance" (p. 48).

According to the committee,

The true task of education is therefore so to reconcile a sense of pattern and direction derived from heritage with the sense of experiment and innovation

deriving from science that they may exist fruitfully together, as in varying degrees they have never ceased to do throughout Western history.

But why do they consider "the sense of experiment and innovation" as deriving from science? In the light of the inherent finality of human personality, we must rather attribute this sense to human rationality itself. If by science is meant 'natural science,' such science has undoubtedly been an enormous factor in releasing human energies and turning man toward the creative transformation of his world. But fundamentally it is man himself, as I have indicated above, who seeks realization and perfection, and of course men in their coexistence in society. If in the course of history, man's striving for perfection has brought him into time and history, and away from a mere fixation upon the timeless essence, this is due, in no small degree, to a profound transformation of human rationality wrought by Christianity. The committee is aware of this, for they assert that "historical Christianity has been expressly and consistently concerned with the importance of this life on earth. . . . The doctrine of the Incarnation . . . declares this concern," and in contrast with the Greek, Christian thought conceives "the process of history" as "vested with absolute significance" (p. 48).

Now it seems to me that the whole approach of the committee, and much of the material they present, calls for another kind of statement of at least one major task of education. I would put it this way. Education must include a reconquest of the past. But it must utilize at every step the tremendous truth that the living present in its totality is in some sense the fruit of the past, and is therefore calling for its own clarification through that past. If it is true that society and therefore history is more deeply rooted than ever before in the individual life, then it follows that men today are in greater potency to the truths and values acquired in history. In other words the reconciliation of traditionalism and modernism is already latent within the modern soul, perhaps more so than at any time in the past. The problem is, of course, how to bring what is in potency to actualization, but at least to know where the problem lies is half the battle. But let us not forget that reconquest of the past must not only bear upon the concrete present and its experience, but must be tied in with the projection of the present into the future. So that to go more deeply into the past is to arrive at a fuller prospect of the future and its immense possibilities.

THE LESSON OF WESTERN TRADITION

The report tells us that "in this concern for heritage lies a close similarity between religious education and education in the great classic books" (p. 44). This is an interesting point, for it suggests that our heritage is

not only intellectual but religious. In another part of the report, an emphasis upon the religious part of our heritage is expressly made. In the section with which I have been dealing it states:

Classical antiquity handed on a working system of truth which relied on both reason and experience and was designed to provide a norm for civilized life. Its importance was heightened and vastly intensified by its confluence with Christianity.

But it is all important for the educator to know how it happened that religious belief had so powerful an effect upon ideas, and the answer we shall see is particularly significant within the framework of this discussion.

It is necessary to see the simple fact that our Western tradition is not merely a search for truth, but also a search for unification. It was never simply a dialectic of ideas abstractly moving in some kind of ideological vacuum, but was profoundly a quest for a synthesis which would unify man both within and without. The ancients sought perfection, and therefore a unifying principle. But they sought it in the realm of the pure idea and eternal form. Hence the search for unity meant exclusion of material reality and history. With Christianity the whole search for unity was transformed in its very foundation. Why? Because for the first time man apprehends a principle by which that unity toward which the ancients had aspired could be achieved, and not abstractly but in actual fact. For it was no longer the immobile idea but the infinite God, plenitude of existence, Who is the true source and end of all things. On the religious plane a synthesis of energies was achieved such as the world had never dreamed of. And aspiration to the divine meant a new sense of the relationship between the eternal and the temporal, the spirit and matter, soul and body, and individual and society. This is the reason there could be that fecund union of science and technology in the Middle Ages which Whitehead sees as important in the development of science. It also explains the striking fact, attested by writers on the history of technology, that it was technological advance as much as anything which marks the difference between the Christian West, even in its medieval phase, and the ancient world. If Christianity multiplied the ancient heritage a hundred fold and enabled thought to outstrip pagan philosophy, we must look for the reason in the fact that Christianity stood for a coordination of the whole of nature, from which no value was allowed to escape.

UNIFICATION TODAY

Yet the committee, while recognizing that many consider religion "the highest, most embracing sphere" has left it out in its description of "the facets of reality reflected in the different spheres of learning and together comprising what the human spirit can call truth." However, less than a

century ago American colleges held "the conviction that Christianity gives meaning and ultimate unity to all parts of the curriculum, indeed to the whole life of the college" (p. 39). Today "a supreme need of American education is for a unifying purpose and idea." But the Christian solution is no longer possible in publicly supported colleges "and is practically if not legally impossible in most others."

Still Christianity is not easily avoided. Indeed it is so impossible to avoid it, that even those who call themselves naturalists would have to separate themselves from the basic convictions and concepts that have made our civilization, in order to separate themselves from Christianity. Christianity has always been a prime factor in the dynamic life of our civilization, accelerating its movement toward truth and unification; and it is impossible to envisage a better civilization without conceiving it as a fuller actuation of the Christian spirit.

If "religion is not now for most colleges a practicable source of intellectual unity," what is to take its place? Apparently a belief in the dignity of man, and that which follows from it, a recognition of one's duty to his fellows. This "belief in the idea of man and society that we inherit, adapt, and pass on" (p. 46) is the end to which in an important sense religious education, education in the great books, and education in modern democracy work together. Moreover this belief "is the common ground between these contrasting but mutually necessary forces in our culture," by which is meant "the sense of pattern and direction deriving from heritage with the sense of experiment and innovation deriving from science" (p. 50).

To uphold such a belief and to seek to make it a central one in education is admirable. But it is to be seriously doubted that such a belief can perform the unifying function expected of it without that still larger pattern of thought and belief in which it must find its place. Clearly a belief in man cannot coexist for long with any form of relativism or naturalism. A contemporary American philosopher has recently suggested that even the followers of William James and John Dewey deny their relativism in committing themselves to democracy in some absolute sense. Always they assume "the moral certainty of good faith, integrity, humanity, and respect for human personality." When such values are merely accepted beliefs, it may be possible to hold them in a relativistic sense, but not when they are being reexperienced, as they are today, as the only basis upon which civilized life is possible. Then their deeper meaning is revealed and men are compelled, willy-nilly, to uphold them in an absolute sense. Naturalism and relativism, and in general immanentism, cannot supply the necessary foundation for an effective belief in human personality or in the human spirit, for the simple reason that the person is regarded as

nothing more than an 'epiphanic actuation' of something more intrinsic and basic. In social terms this means that individuals cannot have true being in themselves but only in their relationships, since substantiality belongs to the whole rather than to the individual. Not only is any idea of a reality above the sociohistorical process eliminated, but even that process itself is stripped of its human value. History is reduced to absurdity, the highest achievements of mankind no longer have an indestructible and eternal value, nor can there be any possibility of fulfillment in the future.

The committee observes that "the view of man as free and not as a slave, an end in himself and not a means . . . may have what many believe to be the limitations of humanism, which are those of pride and arise from making man the measure of all things. But it need not have these limitations, since it is equally compatible with a religious view of life" (p. 46). Now these lines do seem to suggest that humanism is much more compatible with a religious view. The belief in man as free and an end in himself owes its life to Christianity and cannot be sustained in its full meaning without it. The limitations are not merely such, but are rather destructive forces which would quickly dissolve humanism were there not great spiritual powers capable of counteracting pride and the thousand and one vices that flow from it unceasingly. And these powers are present in the world and are being utilized by the nonreligious humanist even if he does not know it.

We do need belief in man, and such a belief can surely be a powerful force for unification. But because Christianity alone provides the spiritual foundation for this belief, Christianity is thus again "a practicable source of intellectual unity." Upon such a foundation men can rebuild the world so that it may shine anew with the light of the human spirit, and in the rebuilding men will know once again the deeper meaning of their striving after truth and unification.

More Student Guidance in the High Schools

FELIX P. BIESTEK, S. J.

A public high school in one of the suburbs of Chicago has an enrollment of four thousand. The building looks like a factory and is operated much like one. Teachers punch time clocks as they enter. The school day, broken up into three four-hour shifts, begins at 7:30 in the morning and ends at 7:30 in the evening.

In spite of its size this educational monster does successfully what most Jesuits would scarcely dream possible: it provides every student with more personal attention, advice, and guidance than does the average Jesuit high school. The arresting fact is that this provision of personal attention is made possible by the introduction of a very simple bit of machinery, which Jesuit schools could very easily introduce—a daily fifteen-minute "spelling" period.

This quarter of an hour period, compulsory for all, is sandwiched into each of the three shifts. Despite its name, the purpose of this class is primarily student guidance and only secondarily the teaching of spelling. The teacher of a spelling class is the faculty adviser of every student assigned to that class. Each faculty member has only one such class.

The daily spelling drill is merely directed, not conducted by the teacher. Each day a student is appointed to dictate the words, while the others write them in their notebooks and later correct their own mistakes. Only at the end of the week is the teacher's time taken up with spelling. On Friday he corrects the papers and gives the students a grade. Hence, four out of the five days in the week he is free to devote the period to counseling.

While a student, then, conducts the spelling drill, the adviser sits in the rear of the room and has a conference with one of his advisees. The time given to each student depends, of course, upon the needs of the individual. The conference begins with a discussion of the pupil's progress in studies; for this discussion the adviser is well equipped by the school's providing him with a duplicate of the advisee's report card. Even before the first report is issued, the adviser gets to know his freshman advisee by inquiring about his courses, his plans for the future, and his extracurricular interests. As the report cards are issued, they normally become the initial subject of the conference.

Usually, however, the report card is no more than a point of departure, particularly in the case of students who most need guidance. Failure and low grades always have causes. After questioning, the adviser may discover that the student needs eyeglasses; or that his after-school job prevents him from doing his homework and even deprives him of needed sleep; or that the boy needs a good man-to-man, straight-from-the-shoulder talk, whether it be about laziness, bad companions, girls, or personal cleanliness. Frequently this conference in class is used merely to make an appointment for a longer conference after school hours, or for a meeting with the boy's parents.

Teachers have learned to use the advisory system for dealing with their problem children. A "bad boy" is sent first to his adviser, not to a prefect of discipline. The adviser, acting as advocate and judge, consults the offended teacher, talks to the boy, and recommends a solution of the problem.

In actual practice, an adviser manages to see each advisee at least twice each month in the routine conference. Some boys call for more frequent attention. In the course of four years, it is clear, the adviser gets to know his boys very well. Since he knows them well and has helped them solve small problems, many an adviser has in time become a confidante and adviser on purely personal problems not related to school or studies.

Is every teacher in this school equally successful as a student counselor? Of course not. The success of each adviser depends upon his own character and personality. The failures in this particular institution, however, are the exception rather than the rule.

In Jesuit schools usually the only formal provision for student guidance is the office of student counselor. Certainly, the counselor is a necessary, indispensable official, assigned to a work of magnificent possibilities. But counselors themselves are the first to admit the inadequacy of a system which leaves the counseling to but one or at most two men in a school.

The typical procedure in the Jesuit high school seems to be pretty much as follows: A boy, without any advance notice, is called out of class and told to go to the student counselor's room. The supposition seems to be that he needs counseling this very day, or that he has been saving up his problems and difficulties until this fateful hour. He enters the room and is made comfortable. The experienced Jesuit, knowing that it's a rare boy who will begin to talk immediately about his troubles or his spiritual life, opens with the subject of sports, makes a few remarks about studies, and finally comes to the sixty-four dollar question: "Have you any problems or difficulties you would like to talk about?" Some boys will answer that question affirmatively, and the counselor does his job.

But most boys will not loosen the clamps. Why not? Simply because they are a sample of that common human species which is slow to confide. They do not know the counselor. They know he is a Jesuit and a priest; they know that he has a reputation for keeping secrets; they know he is willing to help. They know much about him; they do not know him. They will not unravel that personal problem which they are ashamed of, which they think never occurred before in the history of mankind, to a man they know only by name and who may not even know them by name. This is no fault of the counselor. He has four hundred boys on his list, and it is physically impossible to know each of four hundred boys as both the boy and the counselor would like.

True, the Jesuit teachers, priests, and scholastics, do a certain amount of informal student guidance when a boy comes to them for help or advice. But not too many boys are forward enough thus to take the initiative. The shy, backward boy who does not stay after school hours to engage in some extracurricular activity which brings him in close contact with some member of the faculty gets very little personal attention in the way of advice and guidance, and it is not the fault of the teachers. Preparing classes, correcting papers, teaching four or five classes daily, and attending to extracurricular activities leaves little time to search out the boys who need attention.

The faculty advisory system described earlier would, it appears, remedy the major weakness in the Jesuit system, at a maximum cost of fifteen minutes added to the school day. Indeed, in some schools, a systematic use of study periods for counseling would obviate the need of even this short extension of the school day.

To repeat, the simple bit of machinery essential to the faculty advisory system would put student guidance in the Jesuit high school on a systematized basis. It would get adviser and advisee acquainted. It would make it easier for students to ask for help and advice. It would provide the adviser with a definite time and a definite number of advisees. It would eliminate the hit-and-miss character of much of the counseling now given.

More than that, it would also help to make the splendid work of our present full-time student counselors more effective. The scholastic or the layman, for instance, who in the routine of his conferences encounters a case which involves problems of conscience and calls for the knowledge and faculties of a priest, could prepare the boy for a conference with the student counselor: "Bill, why don't you see Father Student Counselor? He's a wonderful man. He will be only too glad to help you. Just knock on his door, sit down, and tell him right out just what you told me." This encouragement would make it relatively easy for the boy to approach the counselor, and would make the work of the counselor much more

efficient by giving him more time and more opportunities to do adequately the work for which he has a special talent.

But can the scholastics and laymen be entrusted with the task of advising thirty students? Well, they are not now forbidden to exercise that function privately; in fact, they are encouraged to do so. Why will they lose that ability when it is exercised systematically?

Adoption of this system may give rise, it is true, to some administrative problems: the addition of fifteen minutes, if need be, to an already full school day, the discovery of a suitable place for conferences in overcrowded classrooms, and similar difficulties peculiar to each school. But, if a public school administrator is able to overcome these details in a mammoth institution, surely Jesuit principals can do the same in much smaller schools.

Why the Fathers?

PATRICK A. SULLIVAN, S. J.

It was Belloc I think who railed against writers who set themselves up as commentators on those who in turn had been commentators on other authors. It is bad enough, for instance, to peruse the numerous books written on Shakespeare and his plays without discussing further the commentators themselves. In a sense the writer of this article must fall under the condemnation because he plans to urge the adoption of the Latin and Greek Christian writers along with the more ancient pagan classics. In other words those very scholars who drank deeply of the wine of Greece and Rome and in turn urged all others to drink with them have presented to posterity literary works that deserve careful study.

It is well known that the fathers and doctors of the Church recommended the reading of the pagan classics. St. Basil held that we should study the classics first and then gaze on the scriptures.1 St. Jerome declared that the knowledge of them was of apologetic value as Christians could then use the opponents' own weapons.2 St. Augustine believed that the classics developed the powers of the mind to reason and evaluate truths, and (almost) declared that the liberal arts are essential foundations for the development of the Christian saint.3 Most of the fathers imply that the pagan writings are a means to the end since we can be led through the beautiful to a love of the true and the good. They saw in them a heritage of truth, goodness, and beauty which prepared the world for the coming of Christ and which was to be the perennial foundation of a Christian humanism.

It is true that during the very first years of Christianity many of the bishops condemned the study of pagan literature, but in time as the Church increased its membership they permitted and then urged classical study. At all events these Christian writers read and were influenced by them to such an extent that the very style of a Cicero and a Demosthenes breaks through their writings like a ray of light. They were better stylists, more humane, and more persuasive because they read the ancients. However, it is not the aim of this article to discuss this point further except insofar as this knowledge is necessary to show why at least some of the Christian classics should be introduced into our college courses.

¹ P. G. xxxl, c566.

² P. L. xxv, c495. ³ P. L. xxxll, c1007.

Our colleges now teach the pagan classics and rightly so. But the omission of the Christian classics is a grave defect in our system. The reasons for the study of the pagans are still potent and the recommendation to turn to the fathers is by no means an attack on the classics. In fact the study of the Christian literature requires a previous course in the ancients, not only because the fathers themselves urge it but because as Professor Rand says, "We can't understand them without the Ancients." They sat at the banquets of the pagans, adopted their style and culture, and saturated themselves with the best that the pagans had to offer. They abound in classical allusions and expressions and cannot be fully comprehended by one who has not studied the ancients.

But to the pagan classics let us add the Christian. Let pagan and Christian walk hand in hand or study the pagan first and then the Christian. Teach Horace and Juvenal and Cicero and Demosthenes and Sophocles. They are superb poets and rhetoricians and dramatists, whom we cannot neglect; but there are Christian poets and rhetoricians whom we dare not overlook any longer. These latter not only have the poetic strain but they have the truth which the pagan never had. They know the real God and are members of His Church. A study of them not only develops the style, mental acumen, and appreciation of the beautiful (all of which the pagans do) but adds to this the knowledge of God and the one true faith. The young student is introduced to a new and finer appreciation of Christianity. He advances far toward the ideal that Newman painted—that of the Christian cultured gentleman. The question of the adaptation of the classics to Christ and His Church is solved because the contents of these Christian writings are Catholic.

One way to introduce these authors is rather simple. Teach a pagan author and then a Christian one. In freshman year, for instance, immediately after the odes of Horace acquaint the class with some of the superb hymns of Commodian, Prudentius, and St. Thomas. These hymns contain the most sublime poetry and at the same time are thoroughly Catholic. In sophomore year analyze and appreciate the rhetoric, style, and logic of Cicero and Demosthenes, and then select a few of the fiery speeches of Tertullian. He is a master of rhetorical devices and of oratorical development. What is more, he is a defender of the Church. Along with the satires of Juvenal and Horace consider the satirical keenness of St. Ambrose, who has caught the style of Cicero and the forceful penetration of Juvenal.

The dialogues of Cicero and Plato may be accompanied by the Octavius of Munucius Felix. His work at times surpasses in dialogue structure

⁴ E. K. Rand, Founders of the Middle Ages. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1928, p. 35.

the best of Plato. He is, of course, superior to Plato in content. Lactantius imitates Lucretius and may well be studied with him. St. Bernard, the mystic, very closely approaches the mystical language of Plato; only the one is pagan and the other is Christian. The biographies of Tacitus may well be followed by a few of the lives written by St. Jerome. Finally, the more advanced students should view the *Consolatio* of Boethius a fine student of Greek philosophy, and St. Augustine's *City of God*. After the student has read his Aristotle and his Plato and appreciated their philosophical investigations and conclusions, he can then read the Christian philosophers who solved many of the problems left unanswered by the pagans.

The burden of this article then is that our colleges should continue to teach the pagan classics, but should also introduce the Christian literature. This can be done by bringing in a similar type of Christian literature immediately after each pagan author has been studied or by finishing the pagan writers first and then by taking up the others. Perhaps it will mean that a lesser number of pagan authors will be seen in the classroom. More wisely it may mean that a smaller amount of each author will be considered; but the loss is more than balanced by the gain. At all events many secular universities in later years seem to have grasped some idea of the tremendous wealth long buried in the Christian classics. They have accordingly introduced them into their courses in Latin and Greek. Yet these writers belong to us, and it would appear to be our duty to serve them to our college students. As Catholics we cannot afford to overlook them, because of their doctrinal content. As educators we dare not omit these weapons that can arm us so well against the forces of evil. Indeed as literati we belie our name if we fail to appreciate such fine writers. Now is the opportune time to turn to them.

A Return to Humanism

MATTHEW J. O'CONNELL, S. J.

The present article is not a plan for postwar liberal education. Such plans, of every size and shape, may be found in any magazine from the journals of learned societies down to the Saturday Evening Post and Liberty. Neither is it a defense of the ancient classics. They need none. Nor is it precisely a continuance of the recent controversy in these pages on liberal education, although I think that what I say will find an assenting echo in the minds of Father McGloin and those who commented on his article. It is rather an attempt to take one branch of liberal education, viz., the classical humanities, and, in the light of the principle that the humanities are to humanize, to describe the elements that enter into a truly classical education.

The main difficulty with what I shall have to say is that many teachers of the classics will claim that they hold these very ideas. Let them, however, examine their actual classroom practice, for classical education has something wrong with it somewhere. If the difficulty is not with theory, then practice is at fault.

The first part of what I shall say is necessarily negative. Perhaps the second part will make up for it by a constructive attempt to point out what a classical education should be. In order to preclude certain objections, let me say that the classical authors to whom I shall constantly refer are to be taken as those which are at present studied in our high schools and colleges.

GRAMMAR AND LITERARY FORM

From a glance at the products of our classical education, I should feel safe in saying that forty-nine out of every fifty students in our high schools, and probably ten out of fifteen in our colleges, do not get beyond the grammatical stage in their classical training. The reasons? A few of many may be listed.

- 1. There is a lack of selectivity in regard to the student body. This is, of course, a very practical problem, but it is also one on whose solution will depend in great measure our future as humanistic educators.
- 2. Many of our teachers are unable to communicate anything more than a knowledge of grammar. Two years in a juniorate will not automatically turn out a competent classicist.
 - 3. Competent teachers have a habit of underestimating the intelligence

and interest of high-school boys and even of college students, and therefore of feeding them grammar or at best something called "form" which is quite formless in the minds of teacher, student, and textbook writer.

Whatever the reasons, it is, to say the least, doubtful whether the results of a merely grammatical classicism are worth the years spent on it. The same results can be obtained from a study of, let us say, French, which, with its array of grammatical forms and its subtlety and intricacy of idiom, taxes and trains the powers of observation and memory at least as much as does the study of either Latin or Greek grammar. Needless to say, the conciseness, the flexibility, the strength, the simplicity, and the concreteness of the Greek language, the ruggedness, sonorousness, and power of the Latin are often beyond the ken of the grammarian. For these qualities can be perceived only when language is regarded as the embodiment of great thought or emotion, when one is studying the classical literatures as cultural, artistic, or philosophical media.

Apart from the reasons given above, what is the fundamental reason, the theoretical principle, which explains the emphasis laid on grammar in the average classical course? It is the fetish of "mental training." Any of the exponents of the "mental training" idea will tell you that literature is propaedeutic to philosophy; they will quote Cardinal Newman as saying that mental power is one of the ends of a literary training.1 It is undoubtedly true that literature is a preparation for philosophy, the best there is; and Cardinal Newman's words are always to be received with respect. The only difficulty is that the mental training given by a merely, or predominantly, grammatical classicism is far from training the mind for philosophy. In fact, the grammarian will have a definite leaning toward nominalism and will show that much-caricatured, but nonetheless actual, inability to get into contact with reality, whereas it is this very contact that the good philosopher beyond all other people needs.

The distinction between such mental development as is gained from grammatical studies alone, and that to which Cardinal Newman referred, is the same as the distinction drawn by Father Edward Leen, C. S. Sp., in his book What Is Education?, between the effects of a scientific and of a literary training. For grammar is a science as much as physics or chemistry. Father Leen says:

It is hardly needful to remark that a scientist may have an outlook on life, and a good one. But his science, in spite of the marvellousness of its discoveries and the great utility of its acquisitions, does not yield any knowledge of the why and wherefore of things. He handles the actual; he has no

¹ No reference is here intended to Father John E. Wise, S. J., who made use of such a quotation in his article, "The Uses of the Liberal Arts," JESUIT EDUCATIONAL QUARTERLY 8:9-15, June 1945.

dealings with the real. What is more significant still, the mental power he develops, and the mental habits he acquires through his devotion to scientific procedure, rather handicap than aid him in any attempt he might make to wrest the real from the swift movement of phenomena. The inferential processes of scientific procedure invigorate the faculty of reason; they do not affect robustness of intelligence. Science sharpens the power of observation; it does not impart insight. The scientific mind is acute, discursive, quick to see analogies, subtle, and served by brilliant fancy rather than by powerful imagination; it is not, however, gifted with the power of penetration. It does not get to the heart of things, for it knows nothing of the heart of things. In this lies the great danger of mental training with a predominantly scientific bias. The scientist, from his constant preoccupation with what can be weighed, measured, and tested, runs risk of coming to identify all reality with the measurable.2

The student who gets only grammar from his study of Latin and Greek certainly comes under the same indictment, at least in its main outlines.

What is said of the study of grammar as the end of classical training, is also applicable to the study of literary form in the abstract. The formalism present in our classical training, however, is not due, as Father Yates claimed,3 to the categories of poetry and rhetoric. These are natural divisions, for poetry is the earliest form of written expression, at least among the Greeks and Romans, and is a liberal art; whereas oratory, the subject matter of rhetoric, is literature not in its own right but by reason of its style, for its primary purpose is utilitarian. The difficulty lies rather in the fact that the capital sin of separating content and expression is repeatedly committed. In theory, no one would claim that you can study expression without reference to thought, but in practice it is done. The literary vices of the Roman rhetorical schools of the Empire are being repeated in our own high schools and colleges.

THE CLASSICS AS TRUE HUMANITIES

There is also a formalistic taint in the educational system worked out by the Jesuits—a system in all respects so ingenious and in some respects so admirable. The Greek and especially the Latin classics are taught in such a way as to become literary playthings rather than the basis for a philosophy of life; a humanism is thus encouraged which is external and rhetorical rather than vital.4

In quoting with approval these words I am presupposing two things. First, they are wrong who adopt what they think was the attitude of the

² Edward Leen, What Is Education? New York: Sheed and Ward, 1944, pp. 136-37.

³ Gerard F. Yates, S. J., "Commentary on 'Revitalizing Liberal Education,"

JESUIT EDUCATIONAL QUARTERLY 7:142-43, January 1945.

⁴ Irving Babbitt, Rousseau and Romanticism. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,

^{1919,} p. 118.

early church fathers and so condemn the paganism of the classics. They do not realize that the prohibitions against reading the classical authors were due, for the most part, to the fact that the early Christians, newly converted from pagan religions, were not sufficiently strong in the faith to be able to read those authors with profit. With two thousand years of Christianity behind us, however, anyone who condemns as a basis for a philosophy of life, those classical writings whose wisdom and insight are undeniable and unsurpassed, is in truth condemning either himself for inability to teach literature properly or the moral education given to the student. He is not condemning the authors. I said above, "What they think was the attitude of the early church fathers." For, actually, they are wrong. In the middle of the last century, there appeared a book called Paganism in Education, written by one Abbé Gaume, who claimed that all the evils of his day were due to the pagan influence of the classics. From its very first printing, however, the book carried a preface by an anonymous "Theologian of Malines," which began thus:

We feel that we cannot offer this work of the Abbé Gaume to the public without making some reservation, which we will partly express in the following propositions.

First proposition:—From the time of the Apostles to Gregory the Great, the ancient authors were studied as they are at present; that is, for the sake of their beauty of form, and the good maxims and examples of moral virtues, both political and private, which they contained.⁵

Can this last statement be made of classical education today?

The second presupposition is this, that to be a humanist is a desirable thing. It is true that a man can save his soul without being a humanist. It is true, too, that many of the saints—though not the majority of those considered the greatest, I think—were not humanists. On the other hand, it is clear that the man who develops all sides of his nature (always, of course, with regard for moral character) is better than the one who through neglect or lack of opportunity has not so developed himself; that the man who develops those talents which have an aesthetic bearing will be a better man than the one whose whole outlook is utilitarian; finally that he who cultivates a love of beauty in its manifold forms and can therefore make truth and goodness lovable for himself, will at least have a much happier and more joyful life than he who knows nothing of all these things.

It would perhaps be in order at this point to describe that philosophy of life called humanism, to which Mr. Babbitt refers in the words quoted above and which he attempts to set forth in many of his writings. First

⁵ Abbé Gaume, *Paganism in Education*. Baltimore: John Murphy and Company, 1852, p. ix.

of all, however, I doubt whether many Jesuits would listen very readily to what Mr. Babbitt has to say on so vital a point as a philosophy of life. And secondly, a Christian already has his philosophy of life—his goal and the manner in which to attain it—mapped out for him. But does this mean therefore that the ethical aspects of classical humanism, which are what Mr. Babbitt expounds and which are implicit in the teaching of the Gospels, are to be passed over in the teaching of the classics? Certainly not, and this is precisely the point at issue.

It is precisely in teaching humanism that the classics become humanities, humanizing influences—in teaching content as opposed to barren grammar and meaningless form. Grammar alone never humanized anybody. Form alone is truly formless. We are accustomed to speak of expression and content as "form and matter," respectively. This is misleading, for, actually, words or colors are but the raw materials in the hands of the artist. It is his thought which is the true form, that inner form which gives birth to and vitalizes "that form which exists in the outer structure of line and melody or within the verse in its logic of emotion and event."6 This external form acquires value only when, under the creative inspiration of the artist, it becomes the inseparable embodiment of great thought or emotion. In that mysterious and awe-inspiring fusion beauty is born, and thenceforward the external form partakes of that beauty. If, then, a student considers merely external form, he catches but a shadow of the beauty of the whole. There may be pleasure given to the sensual ear by the sound of music or words, or to the eye by color, but to stop at such pleasure is to admire the cover of a casket without ever comprehending the riches within. Yet many teachers make this mistake. (Incidentally, why are poetry and rhetoric so hard to teach? For this very reason, that they are considered as literary forms which may be divorced from the thought they embody.)

By teaching the content of a work, I do not mean merely explaining the particular thought that is expressed in so many words by the author. This is the very least that must be taught, for only in relation to such thought do grammar and form begin to acquire meaning and value. But at this stage classical education is only beginning. If the Greek and Latin literature are to be truly humanities, we must go several steps higher: we must enable the student to get in contact with the philosophy of the ancients, not merely philosophy ex professo in the writings of Aristotle and Plato, but also those general principles, that philosophy of life, which governed the life and outlook and therefore influenced the work of men like Sophocles and Virgil. Thus contact may be established with the per-

⁶ George E. Woodberry, Vergil. New York: The Authors Club, 1930, p. 11.

sonalities of these men, who were among the world's greatest humanists—possessors of a humanism, be it noted, which is far more noble than much of the Renaissance humanism. For while that of the ancients was incomplete, inasmuch as they did not have divine revelation, it was usually joined to religion and its followers were men of a religious cast of mind; many in the Renaissance, however, refused a practical belief in the divine revelation which they did possess, so that their humanism was not merely incomplete but positively vitiated.

After contact with these personalities, the final step is to study the ancient literatures in their historical setting, to study the Latin and Greek cultures as a whole. This means, as far as literature is concerned, a study of those great and fundamental ideas on life and its meaning, on man, his nature and destiny, which arose among the Greeks before Homer, found expression in writing from his time down through the older poets to fifth-century Athens, fused with Roman ideas, and gradually degenerated under Oriental influences. These ideas to which I refer are the cardinal principles of ancient humanism; and it is only these principles, I should like to insist, that can humanize.

Here let me revert to the matter of mental training and preparation for philosophy. What does this mental training embrace?

Real culture is, above everything, love of truth and beauty, thoroughness, modesty, hate of bombast and hollow rhetoric; realism, accuracy and command of detail, without, however, losing sight of the whole.⁷

Such culture requires the development of the whole man, and only art provides such a development. For art-and literature conceived, as it should be, as thought and emotion forcing itself into expression, as the embodiment of the thought and culture of a people, is an art-brings into play the intellect and will, the imagination and emotions fed by the senses. Such a mental training, then, takes in the development of the higher powers of reason and judgment; the acquisition of standards, aesthetic, literary, social, and even political; and an understanding of human nature in its universal aspects. Obviously, it is only in the higher stages of classical education that the mind is thus trained. A man develops reason and judgment only by reasoning and judging; and reasoning and judging take place only when there is thought to understand and evaluate. The acquisition of standards, of ideals as opposed to mere factual knowledge, involves appraisal and understanding; it implies that one attempts to get at meaning, and thus unify his own mind. An understanding of the meaning of man requires that the student be put in contact with men, and in

⁷ Jaime Castiello, A Humane Psychology of Education. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1936, p. 141.

the classics he can meet some of the greatest men the world has known. Furthermore, throughout all this study of literature in its higher stages, there enters in that inexplicable thing called beauty.

Because literature deals with the whole of life, with the past and the present, with nature as well as man, it provides us with a real arsenal of ideal values in all fields of knowledge. The specific utility of these ideals is that they participate in all the attributes of beauty. Because they are expressed in concrete, plastic, sensuous forms, they appeal to the eye and the ear. They are easy to grasp. Because they are soaked in the emotional life of the artist, they also appeal to the emotional life of youth. Because they are beautiful, they attract, captivate and bind to themselves, as only beauty can, whose privilege it is to make things lovable for their own sakes. Thus it is that the content of a literary work, whether an ethical principle, or a scientific truth, or a philosophical thesis, when it has been endowed with the strange power of the beautiful, penetrates the totality of man, his senses and his imagination, his emotions and his intellect; and above all awakens his love.8

Secondly, when do the classics become a good preparation for philosophy? Clearly, only when one has penetrated beyond mere grammar and beyond expression for its own sake. Father Castiello says of the ancient writers:

It would not be difficult to show that a personal contact with the thought of such men would arouse a more or less conscious desire to be, as far as possible, as they were: that is, intensely inquisitive and curious about all the things of this world; intensely hungry for knowledge; conscious of a certain inward poverty, which only a patient and protracted study would in some way mitigate but never entirely satisfy.9

Let us remember that "all men by nature desire to know," even classical students. All philosophical thought is the fruit of minds which have been awakened to the mystery of the universe and conceived an intense desire to pierce the veil of sensible phenomena and penetrate to ultimate realities. Without hoping to produce another Plato or Aristotle, let us remember too that there is nothing more curious than the mind of a high-school or college boy and that it is our great privilege to stimulate and inspire such minds. The instrument is at hand, the classics.

DIFFICULTIES AND TEACHER REQUIREMENTS

To many, such an ideal of classical education will seem visionary in the extreme. There are undoubtedly many difficulties in the way of its realization. First of all, a boy has to learn Latin and Greek grammar before he is able to read the authors with any depth of vision. But it should not take four years of Latin and three of Greek to get that reading ability.

⁸ Ibid., p. 143.

⁹ Ibid., p. 177.

The presence of this very difficulty therefore indicates either that we must apply the principle of selectivity to our student bodies or else that we are no longer capable of teaching even the mechanics of language in high school. Perhaps, too, excessive emphasis has been given to the acquirement of a complete system of grammar before attempting to read. The plan for teaching Greek,10 expounded recently in these pages by Mr. Raymond V. Schoder, S. J., is a step in the right direction of having the student read as soon as possible.

A second difficulty is this: often, when a student has conquered the barriers of grammar, the teacher may not be prepared to take him any further in the field of classical education. By way of handling this difficulty, I shall attempt to lay down what I believe to be the qualifications of a good teacher of the classics.

1. He must have a love of his subject, for only then will he become an inspiration to the student, and inspiration is the greatest of all qualities in a teacher.

The efficient causes of learning are on the one hand reality, on the other hand, thought. The teacher is and must remain the instrument. It is his job to create the mental situation, and to stimulate the immanent activity of the student. It is the part of the student to abstract personally from that concrete situation the meaning or soul of the thing. The teacher, therefore, is the go-between, the "mid-wife," the stimulator who quickens the inborn urges of the mind. That is the reason why inspiration is the highest qualification of any teacher. Inspiration is the most active of all stimulants.11

The educational value of the classics (and of any other subject matter as well) depends to a very great extent on the personality which is teaching them. If the teacher can feel, love and communicate to others the spirit of his subject and the inherent methods and attitudes which can be derived from this spirit, then he will form and train. Otherwise, whether he teach theology or bacteriology, his teaching will be barren.12

2. The teacher must have a love of literature as such. The sign of this is a love, not merely of the ancient classics, but of all other literatures as well, especially, of course, for us, the English. A liking that is confined to Latin and Greek and has no room for the other tongues is a pedantic one. It does not find in literature an expression of the human heart, a dwelling place of beauty, an experience that is second in intensity only to direct contact with reality. Instead, literature becomes a field for philological dissertation and an exaggerated worship of anything that is archaic and antique.

^{10 &}quot;Starting Them Off with Homer," JESUIT EDUCATIONAL QUARTERLY 7:210-21, March 1945; 8:25-37, June 1945.

¹¹ Castiello, *op. cit.*, p. 44. ¹² *Ibid.*, p. 188.

- 3. The teacher must have a feeling for language, the ability to perceive those qualities of language which often lie, as I have already said, beyond the ken of the grammarian and antiquary. This feeling for language, as well as a sense of style, which would be the next step and is more or less in the same sphere, is a gift. It cannot strictly be acquired, for it is not a question of mental ability alone—brilliant men are often without it—but of what we usually call a "literary" turn of mind. Often, it does not even require a teacher to develop it, but is simply actuated in the process of reading. However, the teacher who possesses this gift and, with it as a basis, has learned to read well aloud, can awaken the student to a realization of the beauty of language and to a desire of developing the gift in himself.
- 4. Thus far, we have only reached the threshold of classical education. If a teacher of the classical literatures, as indeed of any literature, has not at least these first three qualifications, he is unworthy of the name. We come now to the higher stages, previously mentioned, wherein the classics become truly humanities: a knowledge of ancient philosophy, not merely the systems, as I have said, but also the "philosophy of life" that characterizes the work of each author; sympathetic contact with the personalities of these writers as human beings; and finally a knowledge of the ancient cultures as a whole, of the genius of the Greeks and Romans as expressed in their literatures. This is not as simple as it may sound. The following words of R. W. Livingstone are significant:

What is the nature of this Greek genius . . . ? What qualities made it great and give it permanence? . . . What view of life, if any, does Greece represent? . . . These are obvious questions which we might naturally expect every student of Greece to have answered, in some sort, by the time he leaves his public school: they are so obvious indeed, that if he has no answer to them he may reasonably be said to have hitherto studied in his sleep. Yet many persons survive to a far later stage than their schooldays, and gain a real acquaintance with Greek literature, and receive in examinations the official stamp of success, and yet remain in a comfortable ignorance about both the questions and the answers to them. 18

If all this is expected of the student, how much more is it expected of the teacher? And how can the student attain to this knowledge unless the teacher shows him the way? It is not a knowledge that is acquired overnight, for it is not expressed in so many words in the pages of the ancients. It takes long and sympathetic reading aided by a study of the many excellent books on the subject.

All that has been said, however, should not be taken to mean that the

¹³ R. W. Livingstone, The Greek Genius and Its Meaning to Us. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1912, p. 13.

classics, any more than any other educational medium, will increase the inborn talents of the student. The classics have been called an "aristocratic" study. They are in the sense that, on their higher levels at least, they require more than just intelligence. There are those who will never be more than superficially affected by classical thought, literature, and art. And there are those whose lives are subtly influenced in countless ways by contact with the personalities of the ancients; who have found irradicable ideals and lifelong pleasure in the contemplation of classical poetry and art. And no paganism is this. For it is such men as these who can most readily learn to find in all created things the shadow of the Divine Beauty, and who, in striving to become most human, also become most susceptible to the grace and attractive charm of the God Man.

Homogeneous Grouping for a High-School Honors Course

G. GORDON HENDERSON, S. J.

Father Thurston Davis' proposal for a small postwar college of the liberal arts was received with enthusiasm.¹ Such enthusiasm was a declaration of faith in the Jesuit system of education as well as an implicit admission of the presence of factors in the present order which tend to prevent a full realization of the aims of a humanistic college course. The course as described by Father Davis for an intensive liberal arts college demands the better-type college student if it is to succeed. Such a college, however, must naturally—as must all other colleges—draw upon the high school for its students. Just what sort of student is the modern, Jesuit high school sending on to college? If high-school graduates are not prepared to follow such an intensive course as the one proposed, much time will be lost and, perhaps, even the success of such an undertaking will be jeopardized.

At the present time, Jesuit high-school graduates are, for the most part, supposed to be trained in the classics with little or no knowledge of science. Those students who take a scientific course in Jesuit high schools are frequently students who have proved poor students in classical language studies. In most cases, and most Jesuit high-school teachers will agree, there is no real mastery of Latin and Greek even on the part of the better students; certainly there is no deep appreciation of the classic literatures. In very many of the high schools of the Assistancy Greek has been either dropped entirely or the course appreciably shortened.² In some schools even the study of Latin has been curtailed for some of the students.³

One of the aims of Jesuit high schools has been to give a classical college-preparatory course. (This article will prescind from the consideration of the present high-school course as a terminal one.) It does seem, in the light of the foregoing, that there are indications that the classics

¹ Thurston Davis, "Blueprint for a College," JESUIT EDUCATIONAL QUARTERLY 6:74-82, October 1943.

² Only one school in the Assistancy, Boston College High, makes a Greek course obligatory upon all students; only eight schools in the Assistancy offer a three-year elective course.

³ St. John's, Shreveport, and Jesuit High, New Orleans, require but two years of Latin. (All the above according to 1944-1945 catalogues.)

are either proving themselves a poor instrument for preparing the American boy for college, or that we are proving ourselves poor teachers of the classics on the high-school level. It cannot be maintained, surely, that these students, without a real mastery of the mechanics of Latin and Greek and with a minimum or no preparation in modern science are fit subjects for such an intensive college training.

It is, at least, debatable whether or not the classics have failed. Certainly, to foist an old-fashioned subject upon students simply because it has always been offered is to fail as educators just as seriously as if a tried and proved instrument were to be dropped for some passing novelty. Has it ever been proved, however, that the classics have failed or that they are educationally "old fashioned"? Is it certain that teachers and administrators have not rather failed because of a growing lack of personal conviction of the value of the classics?

Every Jesuit teacher, from the first-year regent to the father grown gray in the classroom, knows the difficulty of teaching a class which has a few members who insist on "dragging their feet" and slowing down the progress of the entire class. Many an hour has been spent in after school sessions with these slower students. If they are gotten successfully through the year and through the examinations, the general sentiment is that much has been accomplished. Perhaps something has been accomplished, but it is to be questioned whether or not the time could not have been more wisely spent with the better student. What was done specifically to increase his knowledge and appreciation of the classics? He, perhaps, was the only one in the class who could ever hope to attain real mastery of them. He never achieves this mastery, however, because the teacher cannot afford to teach at his level in the class and he cannot give such students extra time after class because of the time and attention he is required to give the poorer students. In the "normal" class, instruction must be aimed at the middle of the class and extra help must be given the duller ones outside of class hours if they are, in many cases, but to pass. This is a doubtful good for the dull student and a positive evil for the good student. This neglect of the top of the educational "pyramid," which Father Castiello speaks of, is a serious defect.4

For too many years our high schools have spent their energies at a low rate of efficiency because we have failed to deal resolutely with the problems of standards and modification of the curriculum to suit the needs and abilities of the student body. Shall we devote our first care to the competent students who must be prepared effectively for higher studies, or shall we strike an average and let the bright as well as the dull get what they can? There are

⁴ Jaime Castiello, A Humane Psychology of Education. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1936, p. 184.

even those who believe that the lowest ability group should have most of our attention because, it is thought, they need it most. The result has been, and is, that none of our students are getting their due. Bright students are bored and become idlers, dullards are discouraged and mediocrity sets the standard and pace of achievement. Even the faculty and administration have become contaminated with the self complacency of mediocrity and we console ourselves with the fiction that we are at least developing character when in reality we are breaking down the moral fiber by making duty optional for the best, impossible for the poorest, and largely a matter of indifference for the rest.⁵

The objection will be offered that the teacher cannot act other than he does under the present conditions. Why not change the present conditions? It is quite true that the students of any given class will vary in ability. This fact cannot be changed. Still, boys of similar ability can be grouped in the same class and thus the individual differences of the class can be reduced to the extent of a much smaller standard deviation in the class' IQ's. If classes were to be grouped homogeneously, much good would be done not only for the better students but for the duller ones as well. Then, perhaps, one could judge more accurately the success or failure of the classical, college-preparatory course.

Once classes have been grouped, it would be a great mistake to think that the situation has been remedied. There is still a great deal to be done. Will the better class, i. e., the class of superior students, follow the same syllabus as the regular classes? Will this class have the same examinations? The practice of uniform provincial examinations, or their equivalent, may perhaps be one reason for such mediocrity in the high school as may exist. Too much is left to chance. Present examinations must be gauged for an average student. The result: there is no great stimulus for the better student since a definite minimum of subject matter is, and must be, set. If a class is capable of doing more than this necessary minimum—and a class of better than average students can do more—what more will such a class do? In this extra matter neither the teacher nor the student need fear any deadline, and examination. The result, again: no stimulus, and worse, perhaps, no organization of subject matter. The choice of such subject matter in a given situation is the teacher's own; it may be good, it may be bad.

Why not offer this class, selected especially because of better than average ability, a better than average course? Why not introduce a high-school "honors course"? A syllabus could be drawn up for such a class, carefully designed to give a more intensive and extensive high-school

⁵ Lewis Richard, "Adaptation of High School Curriculum and Standards to Varying Mental Abilities," Catholic Educational Review 40:100, February 1942.

course; special examinations could be devised; and, at graduation a diploma, suitably designated as "honors-course" diploma, could be awarded.6 Such an arrangement would serve as a stimulus to the better student and take the sting from the relegation of the other students to second place.

The course offered to this honors class should admit of no compromise. It should strive to attain the following four objectives:

- 1. Meet general college requirements for college honors work.
- 2. Achieve a mastery of the mechanics of Latin and Greek grammar, as well as some grounding in classical literature.
 - 3. Give a satisfactorily complete course in mathematics.
 - 4. Give some knowledge of the elements of modern science.

Not much need be added with regard to the first aim. With regard to the second, this may be said in general: the course in the classics must be complete if we are to hope for a liberal education. There must be no "missing links." This means Greek as well as Latin, and it means a full three-year course in Greek. The classicist who does not know Greece is no classicist at all. Although it is not proposed to give an apologia for the classics here, it may add meaning to the discussion to recall their traditional function in a liberal education.

The fundamental reason why the classics have held a place of honor for so many generations in western European education, and still hold a place of honor in both European and American education at the present day, is the conviction that their full and thorough study affords the best kind of liberal education. This liberal education implies such an even and harmonious training of man's mind and sympathetic interest in whatever is ennobling and abiding in human life and action. Such culture possesses its strongest argument and its highest reward in its own intrinsic worth.7

There is not, generally, any complaint with the mathematics course. The importance of this subject has always been recognized in our schools. Practically all of the catalogues of the American Jesuit high schools show a four-year course in algebra, geometry, and trigonometry. The one difficulty which must be solved for an honors course is that in some schools, one must choose in senior year between Greek and mathematics.8

In the matter of the natural sciences, we are apt to be a bit remiss. An honors course should prepare the high-school boy for later work in these

ratings (for more work) than a student taking the regular course.

⁷ Francis A. Preuss, "A Liberal Education through the Classics," Classical Bul-

⁶ Such a diploma may be of more importance than would seem at first glance. The marks of an honors-course student will be much more meaningful if it is known that he did take such a course. A student will not complain that he is getting lower

letin 3:59, June 1927.

8 Cf. St. Joseph's Preparatory School (Philadelphia) Catalogue, p. 30, to cite but one example.

fields in college. Frequently Jesuit high-school boys are apt to disdain the sciences if they have been Greek students. This is, of course, a great mistake and is quite as bad as a snubbing of literary studies by science students. The following quotation of a scientist is rather interesting on this point:

The circle of human nature is not complete without the arc of feeling and emotion. And here the dead languages, which are sure to be beaten by science in a purely intellectual fight, have an irresistable charm. They supplement the work of mathematics, by exalting and refining the aesthetic faculty, and must be cherished by all who desire to see human nature complete.

To omit one is to leave man half-educated. To cram into a man a certain amount of knowledge concerning the manipulation of certain symbols is not to educate him at all. . . . 9

Such words have a particular force coming as they do from a scientist. There is no doubt that the modern world is a world of science. High-school students should have enough science to interest them in it. The course would not be more than a broad descriptive one for it is felt that serious study of the natural sciences should be reserved for the student's more mature consideration in college.

A final word about homogeneous grouping. It is not desirable, perhaps, that homogeneous grouping be universal for all the classes in the high school. There are difficulties in the way of this from both an instructional as well as administrative point of view. What is desired, however, is to group together the students who are more often neglected: the better students. If these can be grouped together and carefully guided in a well-rounded high-school course, they will become, it is hoped, precisely the student the small, intensive, liberal arts college desires. It is foolish to hope that boys of eighteen or nineteen will become scholars overnight when they enter college. It does seem that an intensified high-school honors course for the more capable boys, boys who have been carefully selected and homogeneously grouped, with special curricula and examinations, would make the ideal of a humanistic college, as proposed by Father Davis, not an ideal merely, but a successful fact.

⁹ V. E. Johnson, The Uses and Triumphs of Mathematics. London: Griffith Farran and Company, p. 34.

BOOKS

Personality Factors in Counseling. By Charles A. Curran, Ph. D. New York: Grune and Stratton, 1945. pp. vii, 287. \$4.00.

It is becoming increasingly evident that we are reaching a crucial period in the development of the nature and concept of guidance. While in many respects the recent growth of the field may be attributed to the importance attached to guidance and personnel work in military circles, there has been a healthy broadening of the concept of guidance which has been going on for some time. This has been due in large measure to the overlapping of guidance with other fields, notably the fields of psychiatry and clinical psychology. The result has been a healthy frame of reference and a broadening of the function of guidance to include all aspects of the human personality. Basic problems are now arising which bid well to modify both the philosophy of guidance and the training of counselors. One of these problems hinges upon the nature of the human personality that is being counseled. With its insistence on the total personality, guidance is now beginning to realize that it must not overlook the uniqueness of each individual. This is a pitfall that guidance must avoid in studies that are based on statistical averages. There are deeper problems of the philosophy of personality which must be faced lest in the emphasis on the development of techniques we lose sight of the woods because of the trees. This is the approach of Father Curran in this excellent piece of research.

The interview has been called the heart of the counseling process and it is by an analysis of a series of twenty interviews that Father Curran studies the human personality in the process of passing from a state of maladjustment to adjustment. A single case is taken and an exhaustive study is made of a counseling process which terminated in the client's successful adjustment. An accurate transcription of the interview material permitted a detailed analysis of the personality factors revealed in the process. Three judges analyzed the material under three main headings—interview content analysis, problem-solving analysis, and insight evaluation—both for the general trend during the twenty interviews and for the same process as revealed in each individual interview. The result is a scientific treatment of the personality factors at work in the process of therapy, a careful analysis of the nature of maladjustment, and a thorough evaluation of the importance of release of emotional tension, growth of insight, and independent choice in the process of adjustment.

Since the type of counseling used was "non-directive," a technique developed by Carl Rogers, the process of adjustment was client-centered and for this reason was considered by the author as best suited for re-

vealing the process of self-organization. While different functions came into play no one of which was alone sufficient for therapy, there was revealed in the process of adjustment a unity of experience which in turn points to the unity of the personality.

Dr. Curran brings out the value of the initial release of negative emotions and the importance of structuring the early interviews in order to obtain this. This technique plays an important part in non-directive counseling in as much as it appears to foster insight. One recalls here that St. Thomas also pointed out the value of unburdening our problems to another both for release value and a crystalization of the problem. However, it is the rational factor of insight into and the relating of the problems that is emphasized in the process of adjustment and the treatment is excellent.

Since it was the type used, the non-directive technique of counseling is given ample treatment. It is a type of counseling that is particularly apt for psychotherapeutic work. Its practicality for counselors who are dealing with educational and vocational problems in schools and guidance centers may well be questioned. In addition to the time element, it calls for training and qualifications which are not found in the general run of modern counselors.

Students of guidance will find this book an invaluable addition to their libraries. It is scholarly, objective, and penetrating. Others who may hope to find in it a text which will serve as a short cut to the field of guidance should look elsewhere. Father Curran has made a notable contribution and he brings to the field a Catholic approach which is to be encouraged. This is the time for Catholics trained in the field to make their contribution to the basic problems that are now arising. As guidance links itself with philosophy it is vital that the philosophy be sound. Much harm can thus be avoided.

JAMES F. MOYNIHAN, S. J.

The Ease Era. By Paul Mallon. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1945. pp. 119. \$1.50.

The Ease Era is an educational book by a man who is professedly not an educator but a newspaper man. Mr. Paul Mallon, one of the better-known Washington correspondents, has brought together into book form twenty-two of his columns, which were widely syndicated and more widely discussed and criticized. All of the columns or chapters deal, either directly or indirectly, with the topic of progressive education. And all are scathing denunciations and factual accusations of the "panty-waist Progressives" (as he calls them on page 37).

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The book is refreshing in its nontechnical language and its straight-from-the-shoulder condemnations of a false philosophy and a false practice in education. In bringing all these columns together and showing the thread of unity in an explanatory preface the author has shown clearly what a tremendous influence he had in restoring sanity to educational theory and practice in this country. Yet, he claims no honor for himself, but merely acknowledges that he took up the criticisms of progressivism that already existed and made them vocal. In his writings, which are printed in newspapers with a combined circulation of over ten million, he hammered at the lack of common sense and clearly stated what he thought were its shortcomings. The response to the first few articles was so overwhelming and so confirmatory of his views that he continued his crusade for discipline in the home and in the schools and in the churches to combat juvenile delinquency.

In response to the basic argument of the progressives he flatly states that they know neither the nature of the human mind nor human nature itself. To the dictum of "learn by doing," he insists that we must learn "by thinking and doing." The success of his campaign may be gauged by the opposition that it aroused from the progressive camp, which even went so far as to have his column suppressed in some of the large metropolitan dailies.

There is nothing especially new for the Jesuit educator in this book, unless it be to see how far education had strayed under the powerful influence of the "primrose pathers" and to realize how telling can be the influence of one columnist, either for good or evil. In all of his principles he but restates what we would accept as fundamentals. Yet it is done with a clarity and a determination that is well worth the time spent in reading The Ease Era.

EDWARD J. FARREN, S. J.

Philosophy in American Education: Its Tasks and Opportunities. By Brand Blanshard, Curt J. Ducasse, Charles W. Hendel, Arthur E. Murphy, Max C. Otto. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1945. pp. 306. \$3.00.

The five authors of this book were members of a Commission on the Function of Philosophy in Liberal Education, appointed in 1943 by the board of officers of the American Philosophical Association from among a list of nominees submitted by the members of that association. The function of this commission was threefold: first, to obtain a factual survey of the contemporary situation in philosophy and American education; second, to attempt the formulation of a clear and consistent theory about

"the function of philosophy in liberal education and in the development of a free and reflective life in the community" (p. vii); third, to study practical ways and means by which the true functions of philosophy might be more adequately fulfilled in the teaching and other activities of the philosophical profession.

The book is accordingly divided into three parts. Chapters I and II form Part I, The Contemporary Situation. Part II, The Task of Philosophy, covers Chapters III to VII. In Part III, The Teachings of Philosophy—Things That Can Be Done, Chapters VIII to XI deal with the formal teaching of philosophy to undergraduates and graduate students, and Chapter XII concerns Philosophy in the Community. Since the writing of the various chapters was divided among the members of the commission, the author of each chapter or section assumes final responsibility for the views expressed therein. But each chapter was rewritten in the light of criticisms and suggestions from all the other members of the commission, and the opinions expressed in Part III are said to "represent a consensus of the five authors on all major issues discussed" (p. 201).

In Chapter I Brand Blanshard describes the method used by the commission in its survey of the present situation and sets down the major complaints against philosophy under the head of four demands that are made on this subject: the demand for integration, the demand for community of mind, the demand for a reinterpretation of philosophy, the demand for a philosophy of life. He remarks the fundamental differences of opinion about the nature of philosophy between "those for whom philosophy is contemplation" and the instrumentalists (Dewey and others) "for whom it is a preface to action" (p. 21). This leads to a similar cleavage about the social function of the philosopher. Notice is also taken of the antimetaphysical position of the positivists, who hold that philosophy has no special subject matter, but must devote itself to "the analyzing and clarifying of the propositions of science" (p. 26) or else confine itself to talking nonsense. The most frequent criticisms directed against philosophers are "the ivory-tower reproach" (p. 30), the charge that philosophers cannot agree, that they have only negative and destructive comments to make, that they are altogether too ignorant of related fields, and that their writings are needlessly obscure. An evaluation of these criticisms and of the philosopher's opportunity to meet the demands made upon him is presented by the same author in Chapter IV, after two intervening chapters in which Arthur Murphy gives a brief historical account of the development of American philosophy and outlines the functions of the professional philosopher.

The scope of education in general, the meaning of liberal education, and the precise function of philosophy in liberal education are studied

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by Curt Ducasse in Chapter V, and a concrete application of these principles is made by him in Chapter VIII, Philosophy in General Education. Max Otto, after outlining in Chapter VI the relationship which should exist between professional philosophy and the public, brings forward evidence in Chapter XII of the success which has attended various attempts to put philosophy within reach of the community as a whole. One of the most pressing tasks of philosophy, which is emphasized by Charles Hendel in Chapter VII, is to lay the bases of our future social and political order, seeing that social and political theories of the past have always relied on philosophy for their foundations. The social implications of philosophy are once more dwelt upon in Chapter XI, where Hendel summarizes the findings of the commission about what is required for the training of a teacher of philosophy and what can be done to improve the graduate school in which such training is carried on. The problem of integration and cooperation between philosophy and the other disciplines of the curriculum is presented by Arthur Murphy in Chapter X, and some practical suggestions are made in Chapter IX by Hendel, Blanshard, and Ducasse concerning the basic course in philosophy: i. e. history of philosophy, ethics, logic, and metaphysics.

This brief account of the book's contents gives some idea of the serious and thorough way in which the members of the commission have carried out the task entrusted to them. The representative nature of their findings may be gauged from the references scattered throughout the chapters, especially in Chapter I and in Part III, and from the sixty pages of excerpts from letters received by the commission which are to be found in the May 1945 number of The Philosophical Review (54:197-259). Specifically Catholic opinion finds expression in only two or three citations: a letter from "a Catholic teacher" (Edward I. Fenlon) is quoted to the effect that so-called nonsectarian education has destroyed the faith of our youth (The Philosophical Review, loc. cit., p. 207); another, from Father J. A. McWilliams, S. J., is cited in evidence of the central position maintained by philosophy in Jesuit schools (ibid., p. 210); and the single reference in the book itself to the Catholic Church (p. 73) suggests that anyone who is identified with the "faith and philosophy of the Catholic Church" is in no position to "estimate the philosophical claims of competing gospels philosophically" (p. 74).

The importance of this book, not only for Catholic teachers of philos-

The importance of this book, not only for Catholic teachers of philosophy but for Catholic educators generally, consists principally in the reliable picture it presents of the attitude toward philosophy adopted by our immediate contemporaries in the field in this country. A critical analysis of this attitude will reveal considerable ground for pessimism about the future. Perhaps the most disconcerting features to be noticed are the

failure of philosophers to realize that faith in the supernatural is not a hindrance to philosophic thinking, and the contemporary conviction that philosophy is constantly baffled in its search for truth. On the other hand, it is more than a little encouraging to find evidences of a real confidence in the ability of philosophy to fulfill its traditional aims, and to answer the demands made upon it by the present situation. It is quite clear, for instance, that the current disparagement of Aristotelian logic has by no means become so general as might have been expected, and that the antimetaphysical stand of the logical positivists has made little impression on American philosophers as a group. Many of the practical suggestions about the teaching of philosophy in the liberal arts college and in the graduate school may advantageously be studied by Catholic teachers and school administrators. Even if none of the plans suggested commend themselves for adoption or adaptation, they serve as concrete indications of the current trend among teachers of philosophy in America.

JOHN J. WELLMUTH, S. J.

Status of Graduate Studies in the Assistancy, 1945-1946

One of the primary concerns of the Instructio on Studies sent by the late Father General, Very Reverend Wladimir Ledochowski, to the American Assistancy in 1934 (and soon, we hope, to be published in revised form) was with the preparation of Jesuit teachers. A happy result of the Instructio was the impetus it gave to the program of graduate studies in each of the provinces. Such an expanded program was expected to meet, and did meet, with great difficulties, chiefly those arising from manpower shortages and depleted finances. But the difficulties were met; and there was real progress.

Then came World War II. Its tragic effects were felt in the field of special studies. The call for chaplains, the loss of lay teachers to the military services, and the burdens consequent upon accelerated programs brought about a sharp decline in the numbers of priests and scholastics assigned to graduate studies. With the coming of peace the program, as the report will show, has taken on new life. The increases are encouraging. But they must be still greater if the ideal envisioned by the Instructio is to be reached.

The survey of special studies in the Assistancy for 1945-1946 shows that there are one hundred and forty-one Jesuits doing full-time graduate work in twenty-nine different graduate schools and in thirty-two major fields. Of the total number of full-time graduate students one hundred and eighteen are priests and twenty-three are scholastics. A comparative study of the last two years indicates an increase under all headings. The most noticeable increase over a five-year period is in the number of priest-graduate students and in the number of candidates for the doctorate. Comparative statistics for the past five years are given.

I. Comparative Statistics 1941-1946

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	1941-42	1942-43	1943-44	1944-45	1945-46
Full-time graduate students	127	90	76	93	141
Priest graduate students	75	63	60	78	118
Scholastic graduate students	. 52	27	16	15	23
Candidates for the Ph. D	. 60	47	58	63	93
Candidates for the M. A	. 39	14	8	14	18
Candidates for the M.S	. 10	13	6	7	13
Candidates for other degrees	. 10	6	4	9	19
Special studies, but no degree	. 8	10	0	2	3

		Totals	1 Ph. D.	1 Ph. D.	1 Ph. D.	2 Ph. D.	5 Ph. D.	1 M.S.	2 J.C.D.	3 Ph. D.	4 M.S.	5 Ph. D.	4 M.A.	7 S. T. D.	6 Ph. D.	4 Ph. D.	2 M.A.	2 D. Sc.	1 Ph. D.	9 Ph. D.	4 M. A.	2 Ph. D.	10 Ph. D.	2 Ph. D.
	Oreg.	Prov.			N	(3, ···· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	1 Ph. D.			2		1 Ph. D.				1 Ph. D.		1 Ph. D.		1 Ph. D.	1 M.A.	***************************************	1 Ph. D.	
	N. York	Prov.	1 Ph. D.		1 Ph. D.	F	1 Ph. D.	1 M.S.		3 M.S.		3 M.A.		2 S. T. D.	2 Ph. D.					1 Ph. D.	1 M. A.	2 Ph. D.	No. of the state of	1 Ph. D.
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			American Civilization .	American Econ. History	Anthropology	Archeology	Biology		Canon Law	Chemistry		Classics		Dogmatic Theology	Economics	Education		Engineering		English		Experimental Psych	History	History of Philosophy .

Totale	M. A.	B.S.	2 Ph. D.	M.S.	M.A.	M.D.	S.T.D.	Ph. D.	S. T. D.	5 Ph. D.	M.A.	Ph. D.	M.S.	M.S.	Ph. D.	M. A.	Ph. D.	M. A.	Ph. D.	Ph. D.	Ph. D.	M. A.	Ph. D.
Oreg.	,		1 M.A. 2		2	1				2 Ph. D. 1		1 M.S. 4	5		3 Ph. D. 5		3		1		2 Ph. D. 7		M. A.
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	Labor Economics	Library Science	Mathematics			Medicine	Moral Theology	Oriental Language	Patrology	Philosophy		Physics		Political Economy	Political Science		Psychology		Social Economics	Social History	Sociology		Speech
	Labor	Librar	Mathe			Medic	Moral	Orient	Patrole	Philos		Physic		Politic	Politic		Psycho	MI I	Social	Social	Sociole		Speech

III. SCHOOLS1

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Canisius							2	1150	2
Catholic University	1	1		2	3		2	2	11
Chicago		1			2		100		3
Columbia		1	1	PA	-	1	5	1	8
Fordham	2	4			6	2	9	3	26
Georgetown		1	- 2		11.			2	5
Harvard	2	3	2		5	1	3	14.8	16
L'Immaculée, Montreal		2		74.5	15. 5			3.0	2
Johns Hopkins		3.					1	2.5	1
Loyola, Chicago	347	2							2
M. I. T		2	1	30.00	1				4
Michigan		1.00		1		1	- bu	10.50	2
Minnesota		1					-	1	2
North Carolina		1					- 19		1
Northwestern				1				1	2
Pennsylvania	316	0.15			F 7 (#			1	1
Princeton			1					Bit	1
Santa Clara		300		1.00				1	1
St. Louis University	3			11		1	1	2	18
St. Louis I. S. S	3		1		1	200			5
Stanford	2							1	3
Toronto	4	1		3	1 2			2.2	8
U. C. L. A	2	1						-1, 1	2
Washington	•			•			196	2	2
Woodstock	2	2					2		6
Yale	1	1	100	1				1	3

American Civilization at Columbia; American Economic History at Chicago; Anthropology at Harvard; Archeology at Chicago (2); Biology at Fordham (5), Yale; Canon Law at Catholic University (3); Chemistry at Boston College, Canisius, Columbia, Fordham, Minnesota, St. Louis University; Classics at Fordham (3), Harvard (2), Princeton, St. Louis University, Stanford, Toronto; Dogmatic Theology at L'Immaculée, Montreal, Woodstock (6); Economics at California, Columbia (2), Harvard, St. Louis University, St. Louis I. S. S.; Education at Fordham (3), St. Louis University, U. C. L. A., Washington; Engineering at Harvard (2), Minnesota; English at Columbia, Fordham (3), Harvard, Michigan, North Carolina, St. Louis University, Stanford, U. C. L. A., Washington, Yale (2); Experimental Psychology at Catholic University, Fordham; History at Columbia, Georgetown, Harvard, Pennsylvania, St. Louis University (5), Toronto; History of Philosophy at Harvard (2); Labor Economics at St. Louis I. S. S.; Library Science at Catholic University (2), Columbia; Mathematics at Georgetown, Harvard (2), Michigan, Santa Clara, St. Louis University; Medicine at Loyola, Chicago; Moral Theology at L'Immaculée, Montreal; Oriental Language at Johns Hopkins; Pathology at Catholic University; Philosophy at Fordham (5), Georgetown (3), Harvard, St. Louis University, Toronto (6); Physics at Boston College, Cal. Tech., Fordham (2),

IV. DEGREES SOUGHT

	Calif. Prov.	Chic. Prov.	Maryld. Prov.	Miss. Prov.	N. Eng. Prov.	N. Orls. Prov.	N. York Prov.	Oreg. Prov.
Ph. D., new		9	3	9	5	2	6	2
Ph. D., cont		8	2	8	4	3	7	11
M. A., new	3	0	0	1	5	2	4	2
M. A., cont	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
M. S., new	1	0	3	0	2	0	3	0
M. S., cont	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Others, new	22	22, 3	0	0	45, 6	0	32, 5	0
Others, cont	12	42, 4	0	0	0	0	12	0
		State 16	-	10-000	Distance of		1 130	2
Totals	23	23	8	18	20	7	25	17

Catholic University, Fordham (3), St. Louis University, St. Louis I. S. S.; Political Science at Catholic University, Fordham (3), St. Louis University, St. Louis I. S. S.; Psychology at Catholic University, Columbia, Harvard, Loyola, Chicago; Social Economics at St. Louis I. S. S.; Social History at St. Louis University; Sociology at Catholic University (2), Harvard (2), St. Louis University (3); Speech at Northwestern (2).

2 S. T. D.

3 J. C. D.

4 M. D.

⁴ M. D.

⁵ B. S. Libr. Sci.

⁶ D. Sc.

NEWS FROM THE FIELD

Expansion. So many veterans are applying for admission that Loyola University, Los Angeles, has decided to defer work on the downtown college and develop the Del Ray campus instead. Plans call for the immediate construction of two dormitories to house two hundred students, and later the completion of the gymnasium, library, and science building.

Loyola High School, Los Angeles, is conducting a drive for \$200,000, to add a wing to its present building in order to increase its capacity to one thousand students.

Cranwell Preparatory School, Lenox, Massachusetts, has plans for three new buildings: a students' dining hall with an auditorium, a dormitory-classroom building, and a gymnasium. The estimated cost of the three buildings is \$800,000.

In the one hundred thirty-two parishes of the Syracuse Diocese, a highly organized drive for the building fund of the new Le Moyne College, was conducted during the week of January 20 to 27. The drive, added to gifts previously made to the new institution, made a total of over a million and a half dollars. Construction will begin this spring on two buildings, a faculty and student residence, and an administration-classroom building.

St. John's High, Shreveport, has purchased three parcels of property directly behind and adjacent to the present school location. This property enables St. John's to increase its present playground facilities and provides a site for the gymnasium-auditorium building which is proposed.

The immediate neighborhood of St. Ignatius' High School, Chicago, is being improved by a housing project recently undertaken by the Chicago Housing Authority.

In an effort to ease its present acute shortage of classroom space, Marquette is constructing two temporary buildings. These will be wooden barracks-type structures, built by a prefabricated building company. The temporary buildings, frankly an emergency measure, will be one hundred and twenty feet long and twenty feet wide, and will provide seven new classrooms. Two months are required for construction.

A new electronics laboratory is being installed at the University of Detroit College of Engineering on a grant from the Ford Foundation.

John Carroll University, Cleveland, is installing three new fully equipped seismograph machines, designed by Father McElwane, of St. Louis University. The cost of the machines, \$5,000, is being defrayed by the Cleveland Foundation and the Beaumont Foundation. The head of the department has had to announce that the machines are not intended to cause earthquakes. He has been called on the telephone several times

when small local earthquakes occurred, and requested to stop the university's earthquake machine.

The new downtown center recently acquired by Loyola University, Chicago, as noted in the last issue, came to the university as a gift from Mr. Frank J. Lewis, Chicago industralist. Mr. Lewis purchased the building for a half million dollars and presented it to the university. In recognition of this generous gift it will be known as Lewis College of Loyola University. For the time being, Loyola will use the nine lower floors. The Illinois Club for Catholic Women, organized by Mrs. Lewis, will continue to occupy the upper eight floors. By next September the university plans to have moved into the new building all of its downtown schools.

Newest College. The New York State Board of Regents have granted a provisional charter to Le Moyne College, Syracuse, New York. This charter empowers the college to confer all the degrees usually conferred by American colleges.

Scholarship Fund. Members of the senior class at Loyola College, Baltimore, have inaugurated a scholarship fund for future students at the college. Following an unusual plan, the students have established the fund by means of life insurance policies of one thousand dollars each. At the death of each insured graduate, the premium is turned over to the college.

Labor Problems. Marquette University is conducting an employment advisory service for students of the university. Many employers are availing themselves of the service in seeking student help. In applying for employment students submit their class schedules, and work is arranged so as not to conflict with classes.

Research. A graduate school fellowship in the chemicomedical research institute of Georgetown University, has been established by the Rees Davis Co., Inc., of Meriden, Conn., for a study of hydrosulphosol for use in the treatment of burns.

For the second consecutive year, Marquette University's department of botany received the H. V. Hunkel award of \$1,000 to carry on botanical research work. The results of the research are kept confidential for two years, and then made public so that other plant growers may profit from the research.

Spanish Students. Fifteen men sent to the United States by the Spanish government to make scientific studies in American universities and technical schools arrived at Georgetown University in December for a two-month orientation course. Father Joseph F. Sobrino, S. J., professor of church history at the University of Granada, accompanied them as director of studies.

Appointments and Elections. Father William H. McCabe, rector at Rockhurst College, Kansas City, since 1940, was named rector at

Creighton University, Omaha, on Christmas Day, succeeding Father Thomas S. Bowdern. Father Bowdern remains at Creighton. Father Thomas M. Knapp, director of the Missouri Province Mission Band, succeeds Father McCabe as rector at Rockhurst College.

Father Richard Gaul, of the New Orleans Province, has been appointed superintendent of schools in the El Paso Diocese.

At the annual meeting of the Western Association of College and University Business Officers, held in San Francisco, Father John Preston, of the California Province, was elected secretary-treasurer for the fourth consecutive time.

Father Hugh Smith, formerly dean of freshmen at the University of Detroit, was recently appointed registrar of the university, succeeding Miss Florence Donahue, who died recently. Father Smith retains his position as director of adult education.

Father Eugene Shiels, of the University of Detroit, was recently appointed to a special committee of the American Council on Education, to advise delegates to the meeting of U. N. E. S. C. O. on problems of international education.

Father McElwane, of St. Louis University, was one of a group of scientists chosen by the U. S. Rubber Company as guest speakers on the nationwide Sunday afternoon New York Philharmonic radio programs.

Father Edward Shipsey, chairman of the English department at the University of Santa Clara, is president of the Bay Area Association of English teachers. The membership of the association includes professors of the University of California, Stanford, Mills, et cetera.

Father Peter M. Dunne, of the California Province, is second vicepresident of the Catholic Historical Association.

Father Higgins, dean of Rockhurst College, was delegate to the Missouri College Union meeting at St. Louis. He was elected vice-chairman of the Missouri Classical Conference. He also presided at the annual meeting of the Missouri Association of College Registrars and was elected to be delegate to the national meeting at Atlanta.

At the January 25 meeting of the Colorado section of the American Chemical Society, Father Louis T. Keenoy, of Regis College, Denver, was appointed one of the two counselors to represent the Colorado section for 1946. In his new capacity Father Keenoy will serve on the National Council of the American Chemical Society. The national organization which he will assist in directing now numbers 43,000 members. Last year Father Keenoy was chairman of the Colorado section of the A. C. S. He is also a member of the Colorado Engineering Council.

Commendation. The medical schools of Georgetown and Creighton universities received a certificate of commendation from the United States

Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery for their war-time education and training of Navy V-12 medical students.

Child Guidance. The Child Guidance Center of Loyola University, Chicago, during the year 1945, served over five hundred children and their parents. This is three times the number served during the first year the center was in operation. The center now receives some assistance from the Catholic Charities of Chicago, the Community Chest, and the Chicago Community Trust.

Meetings. The Archbishop of Boston, the Most Rev. Richard J. Cushing, and representatives of seventeen Catholic colleges attended the annual meeting of the New England Regional Unit, National Catholic Educational Association, at Boston College.

The Archdiocesan Teachers' Institute was held at the University of San Francisco, February 8 and 9. At a general meeting sponsored by the history section, Prof. Herbert E. Bolton paid a glowing tribute to the contribution the Society has made to the science of history, and also to his Jesuit "boys," his former students, all of whom are represented in the volume of essays prepared to commemorate Dr. Bolton's long association with the University of California.

New Courses. Creighton University has inaugurated the degree of B. S. in Medical Technology to prepare students to become medical laboratory technicians. The first two years will consist of basic college work, with special emphasis on the sciences of biology, chemistry, and physics. The usual general cultural subjects are included in the curriculum. A large part of the third year will be devoted to a study of the fundamental theories of proper laboratory techniques. The final year will be spent entirely in the laboratories of St. Joseph's Hospital, in an intense course in correct laboratory procedures under the guidance of a member of the faculty.

John Carroll University, Cleveland, is establishing a school of business, economics, and government. F. W. Graff, head of the business department, will be dean of the new school.

Xavier University, Cincinnati, has announced the formation of graduate courses leading to the M. A. degree, to be opened in the summer school of 1946.

The regular advanced R. O. T. C. course is to be reinstated at Santa Clara University next semester.

St. Louis University Medical School announces a program of refresher courses to run for three months, from March 15 to June 8. The refresher courses are intended chiefly for doctors returning from military service, and also for civilian doctors whose development has been hindered by the war, particularly alumni of the school.

Creighton University Law School recently held a three-day law institute for lawyer-veterans, to refresh them on procedural matters and inform them of recent developments in key branches of the law. A twelve-week refresher course for lawyer-veterans is now being given.

St. Joseph's High School, Philadelphia, is trying a new experiment with boys who fail at the end of the first term of their first year. Instead of being dropped from the school, these boys are put into special classes, with two of the best teachers on the faculty. The classes concentrate on English grammar, arithmetic, and spelling. Tests are given regularly, and an effort is made to determine whether the cause of the failure was lack of ability or lack of elementary school preparation. The school hopes that by the end of the second term it will be able to give parents a definite estimate of the boys' chances of success if they start their first-year course again next year.

In Chicago, Loyola Academy and St. Ignatius High School are cooperating with authorities of the archdiocese in the preparation of a course on Christian marriage for high-school seniors. The increasing number of applications for divorce from Catholics has convinced the archdiocesan authorities that the thing to do is to strike at the roots of the evil by a positive presentation of the exalted and sacred character of the sacrament of matrimony.

Marquette University College of Business Administration has an arrangement, known as the retail employment-scholarship plan, with two large Milwaukee department stores whereby full tuition scholarships are awarded each semester to competent juniors and seniors interested in retailing as a career. Recipients of the scholarships are given part-time work in the store to provide them with experience and opportunity to qualify for permanent work after graduation.

Comparative statistics compiled by Gonzaga University, Spokane, show that the business administration course is the most heavily populated, with electrical engineering second, premedical third, and the general course fourth.

Father Eugene Shiels, of the University of Detroit, lectured on "The Church and State in South America" at the University of Michigan to three successive groups of forty colonels and lieutenant colonels of the Army, in training there for positions as military attachés in South America.

Books. Father Henry Walsh, of the University of Santa Clara, has published a history of the Church in northern California during the days of '49, entitled Hallowed Were the Gold Dust Trails.

A London firm has contracted to publish a British edition of *The Man Nearest to Christ*, a book on St. Joseph, written by Father Francis Filas, of the Chicago Province, a fourth-year theologian at West Baden College.

Father Wideman, of the Biology Department of Loyola University, Chicago, is publishing a Complete Glossary for Vertebrate Embryology, intended primarily for medical and premedical students.

The collection of poetry entitled American Sonnets and Lyrics contains in its 1945 edition poems of Father Alexander Cody, of San Francisco University.

Souvenir. The ship's bell from the Japanese carrier Junyo was presented to Fordham University by Admiral Nimitz. At a solemn military Mass for Fordham men who died in the war, in the presence of their relatives and friends, the bell was blessed by Archbishop Spellman, and later was placed on top of the university gymnasium.

Death. Father Richard E. Gleeson, one time provincial of the California Province, and well known throughout the Assistancy, died on December 24. He was eighty-four years old and had spent sixty-nine years in the Society. Father Alexander Cody, of the California Province, has been appointed to write his biography.

Contests. Loyola High School, Los Angeles, took first place among eight hundred and seventy-one contestants in the Hearst history examination in Los Angeles.

A student from St. Ignatius High School, San Francisco, placed in the first forty of the Westinghouse Search for Scientific Talent.

In the Interscholastic Latin contest held in December in eleven Jesuit high schools of the Middle West, St. Xavier High School, Cincinnati, held the highest rating as a school, and one of its students, James M. Glassmeyer, took first place ex aequo with Raymond L. Windle, of St. Louis University High School.

In a recent one-act play contest for the Catholic high schools of Chicago, Loyola Academy won first place among the boys' high schools.

Students of Bellarmine Preparatory School, San Jose, won first place in the impromptu speaking contest and in the oratorical contest, in the oratorical-debating contest at San Francisco. Bellarmine was the only competing high school to win two first-place cups.

In an American history contest sponsored by the Hearst newspapers, a fourth-year student at Loyola School, New York, was the local winner. Five other boys from the school were among the next eight contenders. Besides the personal prize for the winner, the school library will receive one hundred dollars worth of books.

The 1945 edition of *The Hearthstone*, school annual of Fairfield College Preparatory School, won a first-place award in the Columbia Scholastic Press contest.

Anniversaries. A three-day celebration was held in New Orleans to honor the centenary of the birth of Chief Justice Edward Douglass White.

As part of the program a special convocation was held at Loyola University. Chief Justice White was a gradute of the old Immaculate Conception College, forerunner of Loyola. The principal address was given by Mr. David A. Simmons, president of the American Bar Association, who received an honorary degree of doctor of laws at the ceremony.

St. Ignatius High School, Cleveland, is preparing to celebrate the sixtieth anniversary of its foundation in 1886, in conjunction with the civic celebration of the one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the city of Cleveland in 1796 by Moses Cleveland and his party of settlers. In 1886 a group of German fathers from Buffalo, led by Father John B. Neustich, established what was then known as St. Ignatius College in Cleveland.

Alumni. Mr. Garret McErney, alumnus of the University of San Francisco, has been appointed president of the Board of Education for the city and county of San Francisco.

Chief Justice Higgins, of the Massachusetts Superior Court, and former president of the well-known and influential Catholic Alumni Sodality of Boston, was recently appointed by President Truman for the trial of Japanese accused of war crimes.

Regis College in Denver has opened a counseling and placement bureau for its college and high-school alumni at the college's downtown center in the Ferguson Building. The work is under the direction of a committee of the faculty and alumni headed by the rector of the college.

An alumnus of Marquette University, Most Rev. William P. O'Connor, at present Bishop of Superior, has been named first bishop of the newly created diocese of Madison in Wisconsin.

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