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CONTENTS

THE BALTIMORE CONFERENCE—BEFORE AND AFTER

Edward B. Rooney, S. J. 153

BOSTON LATIN SCHOOL: AN EDUCATIONAL SURVIVAL

William H. Marnell, Ph. D. 163

THE CLASSICS AND CATHOLIC TRADITION

John P. Rock, S. J. 168

THE STUDY OF LITERATURE

Edward J. Drummond, S. J. 176

PRESIDENT HUTCHINS AND THE MODERN PROBLEM OF EDUCATION

Robert Pollock, Ph. D. 182

BROADENING HORIZONS 193

The Functions of Philosophy in Jesuit Colleges

William L. Wade, S. J. 193

Objectives in Teaching Philosophy to Undergraduates

Joseph F. Beglan, S. J. 206

"I Teach Tommy Grammar . . ."

William J. McGucken, S. J. 213

PROGRAM, ANNUAL MEETING, J. E. A. 218



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The Baltimore Conference—Before and After

EDWARD B. ROONEY, S. J.

Saturday and Sunday, January 3-4, 1942, saw in Baltimore, Maryland the largest gathering of college presidents and administrators that has ever been held in this country. The occasion was the National Conference of College and University Presidents on Higher Education and the War, sponsored by the Committee on Military Affairs of the National Committee on Education and Defense and the United States Office of Education. At the general sessions, held on Saturday and Sunday mornings, representatives of government agencies outlined the problems facing the government and the ways and means by which organized education would be expected to cooperate in the war effort. Among the governmental agencies represented were the Federal Security Agency, the War Department, the Navy Department, the Selective Service Agency, the United States Office of Education, the Civil Service Commission, the Treasury Department, the Department of Agriculture, the Civil Aeronautics Authority, and the Office of Civilian Defense.¹

Following the general session on Saturday, January 3, the conference divided into ten sectional meetings representing publicly and privately controlled universities, large and small coeducational colleges, publicly and privately controlled junior colleges, colleges for men and colleges for women, teachers colleges, and technical and professional institutions. To give form and direction to the open discussions at these sectional meetings the delegates were supplied with a tentative draft of resolutions and recommendations prepared by the National Commission on Education and Defense and the Divisional Committee on Higher Education of the United States Office of Education Wartime Commission. After lengthy discussion by the various sectional meetings the resolutions were assigned for revision and editing to a Resolutions Committee composed of the chairmen of the sectional meetings under the general chairmanship of Edward C. Elliott, President of Purdue University. At the final general session held on Sunday afternoon, January 4, the resolutions and recommendations were unanimously adopted.

¹ As this issue goes to press, the American Council on Education has distributed *Higher Education and the War—The Report of the National Conference of College and University Presidents, Baltimore, Maryland, January 3-4, 1942* (xii-184pp). American Council on Education, 744 Jackson Place, Washington, D. C.

SUMMARY OF THE RESOLUTIONS

A preamble to the Resolutions pledges to the President of the United States, Commander-in-Chief of the nation, the total strength of the colleges and universities of the country. There followed a series of sixteen resolutions and recommendations whose general aim was the immediate and more effective prosecution of the tasks imposed on colleges and universities for the service of the nation.

Resolutions one to four deal with the necessity of extending to the field of man power the planning that had already been done for the use of physical resources. Governmental cooperation, it was stated, in such planning for education's man power will be best secured by a presidential statement on national policy depreciating competitive bidding for students and faculty members by government and industry. The United States Office of Education was requested to study the problems of shortage of teachers, workers in community programs, rural life leaders, county agents, and the like.

Acceleration of college programs is treated in resolutions five to nine. Institutions are asked to give consideration to ways and means of accelerating the college course without, however, lowering established academic standards. The National Committee on Education and Defense and the United States Office of Education were requested to study this same program as it relates to secondary education and likewise to explore the need for federal financial assistance to the schools in implementing the accelerated program.

Resolutions nine to eleven deal with exchange of information on educational practices during the war, on uniformity of practice in granting academic credit for military service, and on health and physical fitness programs in the colleges.

The last group of resolutions, twelve to sixteen, deals with military service. In these resolutions the conference recommends the general application of selective service as being more farsighted than voluntary enlistment. The Selective Service System is again asked, in the interest of conservation of man power, to make adequate provision for the deferment of premedical, pre dental, and pretheological students as well as of selected individuals pursuing graduate studies.

These, in brief, are the recommendations agreed upon by the eight hundred to a thousand delegates of American colleges assembled in Baltimore shortly after the declaration of war by the United States. This National Conference is now being referred to as the Baltimore Conference, in much the same manner as theologians refer to a council of the Church. It may well be that in years to come we shall look back on the Baltimore Conference as a turning point in American education. It undoubtedly

marks a step in the growth of federal influence in the direction of education. For this reason it would be helpful to look back a few years to see what led to the Baltimore Conference. Such a glance may also serve to enlighten those (and I fear their number is many) to whom the various committees and commissions already referred to present much of a maze.

THE UNITED STATES OFFICE OF EDUCATION

In 1867 a federal department of education was established with a commissioner of education in control. The budget assigned to the department that year was \$9,400. It should be noted that the department was established as a fact-finding agency to gather statistics on the condition of education in the United States. It was also expected to distribute such information on organization and management of schools, and on methods of teaching, as might assist the United States in maintaining an efficient school system. In 1869 the Department of Education became a bureau in the Department of the Interior and remained there until 1939 when it became the Office of Education of the newly established Federal Security Agency. The executive head of the Office of Education is commissioner of education. The office is now held by John W. Studebaker.²

An indication of the growth of the activity of the Office of Education may be seen by comparing the \$9,400 budget of the year 1867 with the \$28,000,000 operating budget of 1940. From an agency devoted originally to research and information it has constantly expanded its activities, one of its chief functions being—and this is significant—the administration of federal grants-in-aid to education. At a meeting of educational representatives held in Washington, December 23, 1941, the commissioner of education (John W. Studebaker) stated that the regular Office programs of vocational education involved the expenditure of about 65 million dollars, more than one-third of which is supplied by the federal government. He also informed these representatives that this year the Office of Education, in cooperation with the Office of Production Management and the Federal Security Agency, managed the expenditure of more than 116 million dollars of special federal appropriations. Any impressiveness these figures may have will be utterly dwarfed by the amounts that will be administered by the Office of Education this coming year. The days when the United States Office of Education was a fact-finding, statistical bureau are gone, and maybe forever.

THE AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION

In the early days of World War I, the United States Office of Education did not have the high-powered organization that it had at the end

² *American Colleges and Universities*, 1940 ed., p. 655.

of 1941. In fact it did not have such an organization in September 1939. In 1917 there was no organization to coordinate and direct educational effort and to act as a liaison between government agencies and educational organizations and institutions. "Instead there were endless confusion, overlapping of responsibilities, and even conflict of orders in the utilization of the schools and colleges by the various departments and agencies of government,—War, Treasury, Bureau (now Office) of Education, and the numerous war-created Committees and Commissions."³ To correct this evil various commissions were formed but all were inadequate. Finally, on January 12, 1918, a meeting was called in Washington of representatives of the Association of American Colleges, the Association of American Universities, the Catholic Education Association, and the National Association of State Universities. This meeting led to a further conference later in the same month, of eleven national educational associations, and of it was born the "Emergency Council on Education." The object of this council was, "to place the resources of the educational institutions of our country more completely at the disposal of the National Government and its departments, to the end that through an understanding cooperation, their patriotic services may be augmented; a continuous supply of educated men may be maintained; and preparation for the great responsibilities of the reconstruction period after the war may be anticipated."⁴

So successful was the Emergency Council on Education in its early efforts to coordinate educational activity on a national scope that before peace came in November 1918 it was seen that there was a definite place in American education for a permanent organization of its kind. The name was changed to the American Council on Education.

It should be noted that the American Council on Education owes its origin to the activity of voluntary educational associations. Of the eleven original associations not one represented the government. Coordinating educational effort with the activity of government agencies during World War I was the work of voluntary associations.

For well over twenty years the American Council on Education has continued its function as a national, non-governmental, coordinating organization of educational associations and institutions. It now numbers 81 national and regional associations, 414 colleges and universities, private schools, public school systems, and state departments of education. A fair representation of American education, it will be admitted.

Some of the most important educational studies of recent years have been made by or under the sponsorship of the American Council. The

³ "Education and National Defence," American Council on Education, January 1940, p. 9.

⁴ "The History and Activities of the American Council on Education," American Council on Education, October 1941.

efficiency and prestige of the Council have enabled it to raise vast sums of money to conduct its investigations. To mention a few which perhaps are more familiar to the readers of the QUARTERLY, the Cooperative Study of Secondary School Standards was originally a project of the American Council as was the American Youth Commission, whose final report was made a short time ago. Other commissions have made, or are making, significant studies on Teacher Education, Motion Pictures in Education, Financial Advisory Service, Measurement and Guidance, and Rural Social Studies. These will serve to indicate the character of projects the Council has been sponsoring. And all the time, from its coign of vantage in Washington, it has kept a close eye on every movement that could in any way affect American education.

On September 1, 1939, World War II broke out in Europe. One week later the President of the United States declared the existence of a "*limited* emergency." It was clear that American interests were involved in the European conflict and as the limits of the emergency widened, education would have to do its part to prevent the crass mistakes of the last war. Immediately the American Council began to operate in an effort to protect educational interests. A series of regional conferences were called by Dr. George F. Zook, President of the Council. General plans were outlined, aimed at preventing the absurdities of war hysteria and at the same time enabling education to offer a maximum of efficiency in aiding national defense.

By the time of the May 1940 meeting of the American Council, an active Committee on Military Affairs was in operation. In June a statement was issued on "Education and National Defense" that was a model of sanity and good planning. To preclude the errors of 1917 the statement called for the establishment, by the President, of a joint committee of educational and governmental leaders. The plan appealed to the President and such a committee was set up. It was clear that the American Council on Education was again functioning as a liaison body between education and government.

NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND DEFENSE

But here something happened. Was the American Council looming too large in the educational picture? Was it overshadowing other national organizations? Perhaps it is better to leave the interpretation of facts to the reader. The facts are these. The National Education Association met in Milwaukee in June 1940. Complaints soon began to reach Jackson Place in Washington, headquarters of the American Council, of lack of adequate representation, lack of voice in planning for education and national defense. Just how strong the complaints or how high they reached

is impossible to say. This much is true. The American Council is a national coordination organization, professing to represent all the important areas of education. It must therefore see that all have adequate representation in its deliberations and activities. Dr. Zook, besides being scrupulously careful of the rights of all, is a peace-loving man. Possibly years of work in Washington have taught him that this policy accomplishes more in the long run.

These facts are necessary to understand the next move. On July 27, 1940, a letter was sent to some sixty national educational organizations, inviting them to send a representative to Washington on August 5, 1940, to serve on a National Committee on Education and Defense. Practically every phase of American education was represented on this Committee. Dr. Zook and Dr. Givens were elected co-chairmen and were asked to appoint an Executive Committee to function in the interim between meetings. Four objectives were determined upon:⁵ (1) Immediate and continuous representation of organized education for effective cooperation with governmental agencies; (2) Coordination of educational efforts in the interests of national defense; (3) Dissemination of information useful to education; (4) Maintenance and improvement of educational opportunities for a long-range program.

Six sub-committees were appointed to facilitate the attainment of these general objectives. The sub-committees were to deal with teaching materials on the defense of democracy, pre-service education, vocational training, women in college and in national defense, inter-American educational activities, and finally military affairs.

By far the most active of these sub-committees and that whose influence has been most tangible, is the Committee on Military Affairs. Isaiah Bowman, President of Johns Hopkins University, the first chairman of the Committee, was succeeded last summer by Harry W. Chase, Chancellor of New York University. The secretary of this Committee is the indefatigable worker, Dr. Francis J. Brown, formerly of New York University, now of the American Council. The advice and assistance of this Committee were sought both in the drawing up of selective service legislation and in the interpretation of the legislation by state and local draft officials. It should be recorded that no committee or organization has done more to protect the sound, permanent interests of education and educational institutions than this Committee on Military Affairs. Besides maintaining contact with military authorities and exercising constant vigilance over military legislation, the Committee has made four important studies: on the

⁵ "National Commission on Education and Defense," a paper read by C. S. Marsh, Vice President, American Council, at the meeting of the American Association of School Administrators, San Francisco, February 23, 1942.

experiences of colleges and universities with local draft boards; on shortages of elementary, secondary, and college teachers; on college men students who dropped out during the first semester of this pre-war year and of those who did not return to school last autumn; and on faculty members of colleges and universities who have gone into government service.

A bulletin, "Higher Education and National Defense," has served as the Committee's medium of communication with higher education. By means of the twenty-one issues of this bulletin (6,500 copies of which are printed) colleges have been accurately informed on interpretations of selective service legislation.

Some further remarks on this Committee on Military Affairs are in place. The Committee was originally a functioning committee of the American Council on Education. Secondly, the Committee had been functioning actively long before the declaration of war. Its efficiency was recognized by military authorities, and by the selective service system and other governmental agencies. Thirdly, as a committee of the American Council and later as the sub-committee of the National Committee on Education and Defense, it was an organ of voluntary educational associations.

THE U. S. OFFICE OF EDUCATION WARTIME COMMISSION

In the midst of this activity of voluntary educational associations, which seemed to be meeting the situation created by the war to the apparent satisfaction of most educational institutions, the United States Office of Education enters the picture. This Office had, no doubt, been doing an excellent job on the many problems peculiarly its own, some of which were indicated earlier in this article. But national coordination and direction of educational effort had not been a governmental function. Was it to become one?

In December 1941 plans were already in progress for a national conference of educational leaders. On December 23, 1941, a group of educational representatives was called to Washington by John W. Studebaker, United States Commissioner of Education. After outlining the war services in which the United States Office of Education had been engaged and emphasizing the point that during the emergency the relationship of the federal government to education was "going to be more direct than at any previous time,"⁶ Dr. Studebaker informed the representatives that, at the request of Paul V. McNutt, Administrator of the Federal Security Agency, he was establishing the United States Office of Education Wartime Commission. The purpose of the Wartime Commission was to enable

⁶ Statement presented by John W. Studebaker, U. S. Commissioner of Education at a meeting of educational representatives, Washington, D. C., December 23, 1941.

the Office of Education "to be of the largest possible service to the Government in general, to a number of agencies of the Government in particular, and to organized education throughout the Nation."⁷

Administrator McNutt's request, as explained by himself before the same gathering, was that the United States Commissioner should effect "such an organization in connection with his Office as will make possible the most direct and workable contacts both with Government agencies on the one hand and educational institutions and organizations on the other. . . . The object," Mr. McNutt went on to say, "is (1) to facilitate the adjustment of educational agencies to war needs, and (2) to inform the Government agencies directly responsible for the war effort concerning the services schools and colleges can render, and (3) to determine the possible effects upon schools and colleges of proposed policies and programs of these Government agencies."⁸ When the proposed organization was in operation he would receive from it, through the Commissioner, the definite proposals for government action. "I shall assist" he concluded, "in the development of those proposals which seem to me to be feasible by assuring their proper consideration by the appropriate Government officials, including the President."

The Wartime Commission is composed of thirty-three members with three additional staff members from the United States Office of Education. Dr. Studebaker is chairman of the Commission, with Fred J. Kelly and John Lund, both of the Office of Education, acting as executive director and assistant executive director. Two divisional committees, one on state and local school administration, the other on higher education, will operate within the general framework of the Commission. The chairmen of these two committees are Willard E. Givens and George F. Zook. The personnel of the divisional committees is made up of members of the Commission, together with eighteen additional persons not members of the Wartime Commission but engaged in the actual operation of educational institutions or programs.

The Wartime Commission was established on December 23, 1941. The Baltimore Conference was held on January 3, 4, 1942. Just how much the Office of Education had to do with calling the Conference, I am not able to say. Actually the Conference was held under the sponsorship of the Committee on Military Affairs of the National Committee on Education and Defense and of the United States Office of Education. In the Baltimore Conference the Office of Education was very articulate and it is mentioned by name in several of the resolutions finally adopted by the Conference.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ Statement presented by Administrator Paul McNutt before the United States Office of Education Wartime Commission, Washington, D. C., December 23, 1941.

Since the Baltimore Conference the Office of Education has been especially active and has impressed educators and organizations with its influence. An index of this could be seen in various sessions of the meeting of the American Association of School Administrators held in San Francisco in February of this year. Federal aid for education was strongly urged in several meetings. It was openly stated that organizational pressure should be brought to bear on members of Congress to pass such legislation and it was repeatedly mentioned that the United States Office of Education should be the agency to administer this federal aid. One of the resolutions passed at the convention deals with coordination of federal programs. It recommends that "in order to avoid waste and inefficiency and to insure the maintenance of well articulated educational services . . . in all federal legislation and administrative action the United States Office of Education be recognized as the agency for the promotion and coordination of all educational programs."⁹

What conclusions, if any, may be drawn from this long story of the preliminaries to the Baltimore Conference? It will be clear to all, that the federal government, through the United States Office of Education, is much more active in the educational field than it ever has been. Its position is particularly strong today. Primary and secondary education are in need of help; badly in need of it in some states. Colleges and universities are feeling the strain of war on their enrollment and resources. All education will be looking for help; and it will look particularly to the federal government. The danger is that education may sell its birthright of freedom and independence for a mess of federal pottage.

The federal government's commanding position in the field of education is supposedly a wartime measure. Will the strong organization that is being set up in the United States Office of Education today disintegrate at the end of the war? Will it not rather become more deeply entrenched? Now is the time for serious thought on the ultimate effect of the growing influence of government in education.

And what will be the position of voluntary educational associations? In announcing the formation of the Wartime Commission of the Office of Education, Dr. Studebaker stated that the Commission would "in no way impede but rather facilitate the continuing operation of existing educational organizations and committees." The reader will have noted, of course, that the objectives set for the Commission differ little if any from those of the National Committee on Education and Defense which had already been functioning. There is however this difference—an essential

⁹ It seems that this was aimed at the administration of the NYA and CCC educational programs.

one—that the ultimate authority and direction rests with a government office, under the Federal Security Agency.

The fact is that voluntary associations, as the American Council on Education and the Association of American Colleges, are being pushed into the background. They will have to fight for their lives. As I see it, there never was more reason for their existence than now; there never was more reason for insisting on states rights in education. If the federal government, through the Office of Education, is to be prevented from assuming control, now is the time to exercise the franchise of voluntary associations. This may be the cry of an alarmist. Let us hope it is not the raucous voice of Cassandra.

Boston Latin School: An Educational Survival

WILLIAM H. MARNELL, PH. D.

The fact that boys of an age look about alike, think much alike, and act about alike tends to obscure the fact that in scholastic background their differences may be very great indeed. This is not to stress the basic differences which separate, let us say, the Theodore Roosevelt Technical High School, the Woodrow Wilson Classical High School, and the Horace Mann Commercial High School—which may divide, by Caesarean precept, the field of human knowledge in the American city of 200,000 people.

Since there is historic justification for putting the Jesuit high school into the same genus as the publicly operated classical high school, however distinctive the species have become one from the other, this brief and nostalgic plea for an older day in education will restrict itself to one field of human enterprise, that is known as "college preparatory work."

One of the distinctive differences between the Jesuit school and the city school has been the introduction into the latter of an educational universal joint called "promotion by subject." This device permits the youngster to round the curves on the road to success with the off-wheel, civics, spinning with exhilarating rapidity while the near-wheel, algebra, moves with dignified slowness. It permits the youngster to attain the grandeur of senior history and English, the respectability of junior geometry, but still to wallow in the ignominious morass of sophomore Latin. Promotion by subject enables the student to graduate more rapidly than in the old, inexorable days when he progressed from freshman to sophomore to junior to senior. This fact delights the taxpayer, who is aware that each student costs \$140 a year to educate; it delights the professional educator who, beneath his professional mantle, is very conscious of the taxpayer's desires. There are fewer casualties among the student body, and the fact that educational coherency is a casualty bothers no one, since that is an abstract ideal not to be measured in dollars and cents.

One of the advantages of educational incoherency is the great flexibility thereby made possible. If the student does not like Latin, he drops it for art (the genial appreciation of art, not the austere creation). Civics is a green oasis for one lost in the stony wastes of geometry. All this is possible since admission to college is based, not on the satisfactory completion of an integrated course of study, but on the compiling of an established minimum of scholastic "points."

Thus the city's classical high school has moved far away from the Renaissance ideal of an integrated education which is as truly its lineal ancestor as it is the progenitor of Jesuit high school. It is very difficult for one who believes firmly in public education and in integrated education to reconcile his beliefs. It is our present purpose to show that this reconciliation is not entirely impossible and to demonstrate that in one public secondary school, at least, it is achieved quite as truly as in a Jesuit school.

For the past fifteen years the writer has taught Latin and Greek at Public Latin School in Boston. The history of American education starts with this institution, which was founded on April 23, 1635 by the Reverend John Cotton. Its model was the Free Grammar School of Boston, England.

Its first thirty-five years were checkered. Its existence was threatened in 1636 when the schoolmaster, Philemon Pormort, was forced to take refuge in the friendly fastnesses of New Hampshire because of his theological heterodoxy. In 1670 its future was assured by the appointment of Ezekiel Cheever as headmaster. To him, in an unwonted burst of enthusiasm which is proudly recorded in a plaque on the school wall, Cotton Mather ascribed "all the learning in New England."

The Revolution found the old school concerned with problems of current life with an intensity that would warm the cockles of a modernist's heart. At one end of the schoolroom the headmaster, John Lovell, expounded the Tory viewpoint; while at the other end the usher, his son James, preached the patriots' doctrine. The students' viewpoint was expressed in an incident that is one of the school's most cherished memories. The first class bearded General Gage in his headquarters and established the immemorial right of Boston schoolboys to coast on Boston Common.

The nineteenth century was a rather fallow period in the school's life, although some vitality was instilled during the decades when Benjamin Apthorp Gould, Epes Sargent Dixwell, and Henry Gardner ruled the front office. During the last forty years the school has flourished under the successive headmasterships of Henry Pennypacker, later chairman of the committee on admissions at Harvard College, Patrick T. Campbell, later superintendent of schools in Boston, and the present headmaster, Joseph L. Powers. Today the school has almost 1,900 students, representing an increase in enrollment of 100 per cent over twenty years ago, but a decrease of 600 students from the peak enrollment in 1935. This decrease is part of a general decrease in Boston's school population.

The basic course at Latin School is of six year's duration. Boys are admitted by certification or examination from the sixth grade of the lo-

cal elementary schools. During the first two years they study English, Latin, mathematics, history, geography, and general science. The history of the United States is studied the first year and the history of England the second. During these two years the elements of Latin are to be mastered as a preparation for the study of Caesar's *Commentaries* in the third year.

In the third year the course consists of English, Latin, French, algebra, and ancient history. In the fourth year ancient history is dropped, geometry takes its place beside algebra, and an elective choice between Greek and German is offered. About three-quarters of the boys elect German, although the ratio electing Greek has increased steadily though not spectacularly during the past decade. In Latin, selections from Cicero, Pliny, and Ovid are read, with Sallust's *Life of Catiline*. The same subjects are studied in the fifth year, the classical subjects comprising four books of Xenophon's *Anabasis* and seven orations of Cicero, with selections from his letters.

In the sixth year a fairly wide range of subjects, by Latin School standards, is offered. All students study English, American history, and physics. An elective choice is offered among Greek, German, French, chemistry, economics, and trigonometry. Latin is required of all students except those planning to enter certain scientific schools; they must take chemistry and trigonometry.

In addition to the basic six-year course, there is a four-year curriculum closer in organization to the conventional high-school course. The subject matter is the same as in the last four years of the six-year course, save that the elements of Latin are taught the first year and the *Commentaries* read the second year.

Promotion is by class and instruction is by class, as in the Jesuit secondary schools. Instruction is organized on a departmental basis, each field of instruction constituting a department, save the classics and the sciences which are each combined in a single department. Such devices of modernism as "promotional points" and "graduation points" are genially disregarded except when the requirements of the city-system authorities or the preferences of college-admission authorities make necessary the translation of school practice into modernized terminology. Recognition is taken, however, of individual differences by a device called "promotion on trial." Thus a youngster whose work in sophomore year (class three, in the centuries-old phraseology of the school) is of passing grade in all subjects save Latin is permitted to pass into class two on trial, in the hope, frequently realized, that Cicero holds fewer terrors than Caesar. Excepting this modification, promotion is entirely on the basis of class to class.

While the school has adhered to a fairly rigid traditionalism in methods and content of instruction, an extracurricular program of substantial extent is promoted. Boys interested in art, aviation, chess, debating, dramatics, highway safety, literature, music, philately, photography, as well as boys with particular interests in the various academic subjects, are organized in clubs under the direction of faculty members. Boys paint pictures, sing songs, make model airplanes, write one-act plays, publish their magazine, and trade stamps with all the enthusiasm of youngsters in the general high schools. Interscholastic contests are played in football, baseball, hockey, and track; and basketball will soon be reintroduced.

For three centuries Harvard College has been the objective of the largest single group of Latin School graduates. Not infrequently more than one hundred of a class of two hundred have crossed the Charles on graduation and today, when Latin School boys have a wider range of objectives than formerly, sixty or seventy members of a given class become Cantabrigians. Boston College and Massachusetts Institute of Technology compete for second place, while substantial groups go to Dartmouth, Holy Cross, Boston University, Tufts, West Point, and Annapolis. Last year's class indicated forty different institutions of higher learning as their objectives. Substantially more than 90 per cent of the school's graduates attend college.

One of the most interesting and significant developments of recent years is the increasing interest in scientific studies by graduates of the school. Latin School graduates are going to Massachusetts Institute of Technology in ever-increasing numbers and last year they had the best record of achievement of any group at the Institute. In the light of the severely classical tradition of the school and the fact that the only concession made to scientific preparation is the permission to substitute chemistry for Latin in the senior year when a technical college is the boy's objective, a feather of no insignificant size has been inserted in the classical cap. Cicero and Xenophon would appear, on the surface, to be unrealistic training grounds for future mechanical and electrical engineers, but in some mysterious and illogical way they seem to do the job. Technology takes appreciative recognition of the fact by welcoming Latin School graduates.

Thus there is in Boston a college-preparatory school supported by general taxation and maintaining high academic standards, with the assistance of widespread public approval, that goes on its serene path year after year little affected by the storms that churn the waters of contemporary education. It perpetuates, even as the Jesuit schools do, the Renaissance educational tradition; its curriculum is entirely familiar to anyone versed in the Jesuit tradition of education. It does the same job that the

local Jesuit high school does, and the comparative success of the two institutions is a hotly debated point among junior partisans.

As a public school, it necessarily lacks that explicit moral training which is part of the Jesuit system. There is, however, an implicit moral training in adherence to the ideals of high academic achievement, intellectual honesty, and rigid standards. This sort of moral training Public Latin School has in abundance.

As a public school, it is a more accurate mirror of the community as a whole than a school run under religious auspices can be. Boys of Irish Catholic and Jewish parentage attend in about equal numbers and constitute 80 per cent of the school. The remaining 20 per cent is representative of a large, cosmopolitan, seaboard city. Its graduates very likely go farther afield for collegiate work than do the graduates of any other American college-preparatory school. The New England private schools are explicitly preparatory to a half dozen private colleges in the East; the same is true of private schools in the Middle Atlantic states. Jesuit high-school graduates tend to enter Jesuit colleges. Public Latin School graduates go everywhere.

Consequently the school and its system are tested everywhere. That they should meet the test in colleges of a liberal arts tradition is only natural, granting the proper instruction and proper standards in the school itself. That they meet the test with equal success in scientific schools is a justification on a higher plane for the broadly classical tradition.

Between Public Latin School and the local Jesuit institution, Boston College High School, there is the closest bond of friendship spiced with the warmest rivalry. It is entirely proper that a close feeling of kinship should exist between these two institutions, the one stemming from the fourth part of the Jesuit *Constitutions*, the *Ratio Studiorum*, and the other from the humanistic secondary school tradition of the Reformation. Divergent and opposed as these sources were in the sixteenth century, both stemmed ultimately from a Renaissance ideal. Expressed in a nutshell, this ideal is that true education is a harmonious, integrated development of the intellectual and moral faculties and that the intensive study of the classics constitutes the surest road to that ideal. The success of Public Latin School in the field of secular education, like the success of the Jesuit schools in the field of religious education, testifies to the abiding validity of that ideal.

The Classics and Catholic Tradition*

JOHN P. ROCK, S. J.

In a recent issue of the QUARTERLY, a pedagogue posed the question, "Is Latin worth fighting for?" Oddly enough that question is as old as Christian culture. In the early centuries of the Church, it was asked, "What has Christ to do with Plato? Or the Academy with the Church? Are not the poets cesspools of impurity and the philosophers hot-beds of heresy?"¹ In the East, the answer came from the pen of St. Basil; while St. Jerome first responded for the West, but with apprehension. He was never sure whether he should be proud or ashamed of his classical learning.² It was St. Augustine, with his great integrating mind, who took the full measure of the question and definitely closed the debate.

The contrast between the circumstances of the debate in the fourth century and those today is both significant and humiliating. The question then was asked because men were so spiritual—the objections against the classics sprang from either morals or dogma; today the question is asked because men are so materialistic and pragmatic—the objections can all be reduced to dollars and cents. The few suggestions of concern for the spiritual aspects of the problem lack perspective and finality. On the other hand, there is more than one point of similarity between the debilitated, half-converted culture which Jerome knew and the youthfully effete mind of America.

Theology and Scripture were constant points of reference for the Fathers in their evaluation of the classics.³ They might figure much more prominently in our discussions today, had not a queer sort of naturalism equivalently divorced the word "Christian" from humanism and made of Scripture and theology arcana for the cloister and the chancel.⁴ We may feel sure that the classics could not find today a more exacting Christian tribunal than they did in the studies of Augustine, Jerome, and Basil, and yet, these Fathers found in them a triad of transcendental values practi-

* This paper was prepared as an answer to the question proposed in the September QUARTERLY "Is Latin Worth Fighting For?" The December issue of the QUARTERLY contained two replies to the same provocative question.

¹ Boissier, G., *La Fin Du Paganisme* (5th ed.; Paris: Hachette and Co., 1907), vol. I, p. 328 ff.

² Ep. LXX. 6 (P. L. Migne, t. XXII, c. 668).

³ DeLabriolle, P., *History and Literature of Christianity* (trans. Herbert Wilson; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1924), p. 27.

⁴ In October 1939 the National Catholic Alumni Federation proposed that faculties of theology be established in our colleges and universities as an antidote to modern secularism.

cally indispensable to the formation of a Christian culture. They saw in them a heritage of truth, goodness, and beauty which prepared the world for the coming of Christ and was to be the perennial foundation of Christian humanism.

Basil was preoccupied with forming the Christian mind to truth and with confirming Christian teachings. Just as Moses prepared himself for divine things through the teaching of the Egyptians, and Daniel through that of the Chaldeans, so the Christian youth should "train his mind" through the study of Greek literature.⁵ He should "exercise the eye of his soul as in the mirrors and shadows," as soldiers by physical exercise prepare themselves for coming warfare. After contemplating the Sun of Truth reflected in the waters of pagan literature he should lift his eyes, thus strengthened and matured, to gaze on the full effulgence of sacred revelation.⁶ Basil tells us to compare the classics with the Scripture. "Where they are alike, the knowledge of pagan literature will help us; where they are dissimilar, the contrast will strengthen our love of Revelation." "Truth," he writes, "is the essential fruit of the soul. It becomes a joy to contemplate; when surrounded by profane learning, as by leaves, it receives from this learning the protection of shade and the embellishment of beauty."⁷

Jerome, as a "hammer of heretics," found in the classics truth of an apologetic value. When asked by Magnus, his friend, why he spattered his pages with the mudstains of pagan authors, Jerome cites the precedent of Moses, of Solomon, and especially of St. Paul, who did not hesitate to illustrate his teachings with quotations from Aratus and Menander.⁸ He even blames Cyprian for refuting the heathens with Scripture and not with their own writings, an authority they could not gainsay. "Like David," he tells us, "we must snatch the sword from the hand of our enemy and with his own blade cut off the head of the arrogant Goliath."⁹ "Read all the books of the philosophers," he writes, "you cannot help finding in them some part of the vessels of God."¹⁰

Augustine saw in the classics truth that was the legitimate property of Christians. "Let every good and true Christian understand that wherever truth may be found, it belongs to his Master."¹¹ In the *De Ordine*, his first formal treatise on education, the liberal arts are advocated as disciplines to develop the powers of mind to reason, to evaluate, and to integrate all that one has learned, and to cure the wounds of false doctrines

⁵ *On Greek Literature*, 4 (P. G. XXXI, c. 568).

⁶ *Ibid.*, 2 (P. G. XXXI, c. 566).

⁷ *Ibid.*, 3 (P. G. XXXI, c. 568).

⁸ Ep. LXX. 1, 2 (P. L. XXII, c. 665).

⁹ *Ibid.*, 5, 2 (P. L. XXII, c. 666).

¹⁰ *In Daniel*, p. 624 (P. L. XXV, c. 495).

¹¹ *De Doctrina Christiana*, II. 28 (P. L. XXXIV, c. 50).

which daily intercourse inflicts upon one.¹² "Liberal Studies make us love truth more keenly, pursue it more constantly, seek it more ardently and cling to it more gladly."¹³ They will orient the mind to the things of God. "Direct your liberal studies toward truth," says St. Augustine, "and you will not only believe divine things, you will contemplate them, understand them, and dwell on them."¹⁴ "The Liberal Arts are, in fact, the *sine qua non* of a Christian saint."¹⁵ It is true that in the *Retractationes*, an appendix of *corrigenda* to his voluminous writings, Augustine confesses that his enthusiasm had gone too far; he had known many scholars who were not saints and many saints who were not classical scholars.¹⁶ Nevertheless, he does not impugn the essential values of the classics. He emphatically restates them and gives them a new finality in his last treatise on education, *De Doctrina Christiana*. The arts and authors are recommended and directed toward the fuller understanding of sacred revelation.¹⁷ The liberal arts will not only mature the mind, but through grammar and erudition they also afford the student an *integritas locutionis*, that is, an objective standard by which the Christian can measure the text of Holy Scripture.¹⁸ In a scriptural simile the great Bishop states his principle of integration: just as the Israelites plundered the Egyptians, not of their superstitious idols, but of their valuable vessels of gold and silver, so too Christians should take from the ancient writers, not their false and superstitious fancies, but rather all the truth they have written in harmony with the Faith.¹⁹ In confirmation of this principle, Augustine quotes the precedent of Moses, Paul, Cyprian, and a host of others, who used pagan truth in defense of Christ.²⁰ The principle is put into practice in the *De Civitate Dei*, a masterpiece of integration, where Plato and Cicero are coupled with St. Paul, Virgil with Jeremias, Lucan with Tobias, Sallust with David, and Plotinus even with our Lord.²¹ Why not? This ancient heritage of truth for him is "the gold and silver which God in His Providence has buried in the veins of the earth. The Pagans did not create these metals; they discovered and mined them for us."²²

The early Fathers were hardly less concerned than we ourselves with the practical formation of the youth, but the "practical" with them meant

¹² *De Ordine*, II. 30, 35, 38 (P. L. XXXII, cc. 1009-11, 1013).

¹³ *Ibid.*, I. 24 (P. L. XXXII, c. 988).

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, II. 44 (P. L. XXXII, c. 1015).

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, II. 26 (P. L. XXXII, c. 1007).

¹⁶ *Retract.* I. iii. 2 (P. L. XXXII, c. 588).

¹⁷ *De Doc. Christ.*, II. passim, (P. L. XXXIV, c. 35 ff.).

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, II. 16 (P. L. XXXIV, c. 42).

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, II. 60 (P. L. XXXIV, c. 63).

²⁰ *Ibid.*, II. 61 (P. L. XXXIV, c. 63).

²¹ *De Civitate Dei*, VIII. 10; V. 12; X. 27; I. 12; III. 14; X. 14 (P. L. XLI, passim).

²² *De Doc. Christ.*, II. 60 (P. L. XXXIV, c. 63).

the practice of personal life through the moral virtues. It is all the more remarkable that three intellectual leaders of the Church, who have been canonized for the heroicity of their virtue, should have found so much that was admirable in the praise of virtue by the pagans. St. Basil devoted one half of his *Essay on Greek Literature* to this specific value. "Let us receive those writings of the pagans," he writes, "by which they have praised virtue and condemned vice."²³ And again, "Since it is through virtue that we must reach our eternal life, and since poets, historians, and especially philosophers have sung the praises of virtue, we must apply our minds in particular to writings of this nature." Studies of this nature are unchangeable and should, therefore, be deeply engraven on the tender minds of the young.²⁴ "Like bees, we are to extract the honey from the flowers of literature and leave the poison behind."²⁵ Homer, Hesiod, Theognis, Solon, and Chios, all wrote from this moral point of view.²⁶ Through their works, we are to learn virtue. Lest the reader still remain skeptical of the moral worth of the classics, Basil ends his discourse with a prelection, showing how we can learn from the pagans the superior excellence of the soul, the moderate use of riches, and the contempt of vain-glory.²⁷

Jerome, who could satirize the deficiencies of the clergy of his day in a manner to extend the very sinews of charity, was even more emphatic than Basil in finding moral values in the classics. Crates the Theban, Antisthenes, and others had contemned riches;²⁸ Plato and Pythagoras preferred virtue to pleasure;²⁹ Virgil and Varro taught the excellence of virginity.³⁰ Surely the Christian should be more virtuous than the pagan: "Plus debet Christi discipulus praestare quam mundi philosophus. . . ."³¹

For Augustine the classics "were filled with excellent precepts of morality."³² In fact, Cicero's *Hortensius* was at least the occasion of Augustine's conversion from vice to virtue.³³ Virtue was the *finis* of education for him, and the classics were a means to that end. In *De Ordine*, liberal studies culminate in *philosophia*, or natural virtue;³⁴ in *De Doctrina Christiana* they led to the portal of the supernatural virtue of *Sapientia*.³⁵ Through the mouth of Horace, Augustine rebukes the lust for

²³ *On Greek Lit.*, 4 (P. G. XXXI, c. 569).

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 5 (P. G. XXXI, c. 572).

²⁵ Cf. note 23.

²⁶ Cf. note 24.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 9, 10 (P. G. XXXI, c. 581 ff.).

²⁸ *Ep.* LXVI. 8 (P. L. XXII, c. 644).

²⁹ *Adv. Jovin.*, I. 4 (P. L. XXIII, c. 224).

³⁰ *Ibid.*, I. 4 (P. L. XXIII, c. 282).

³¹ Cf. note 29.

³² *De Doc. Christ.*, II. 60 (P. L. XXXIV, c. 63).

³³ *Confess.*, III. 4 (P. L. XXXII, c. 685).

³⁴ *De Ordine*, II. 52, 53, 54 (P. L. XXXII, c. 1020 ff.).

³⁵ *De Doc. Christ.*, I. 9; II. 9, 10, 11 (P. L. XXXIV, c. 19, 39, 40).

power;³⁶ in the words of Terence, he teaches universal charity.³⁷ So convinced is Augustine of the moral integrity of the classics that fifteen years before his death, in a letter to his friend Evodius, he praises the pagan writers who have even occasionally confessed the one true God. He describes them as men of moderate lives and sound morals. He recommends them as models of chastity, self-denial, patriotism, and fidelity. He even prays that they may be admitted to the eternal bliss of heaven.³⁸

That the Fathers found beauty in the classics is too obvious for comment. What we should note is their attitude towards that beauty. For them, the beauty of the classics was not an absolute; it was a means by which the student could be enkindled to love the true and the good.

Basil, as usual, expresses this principle in a simile. "Other creatures find in flowers only the enjoyment of their scent and color; but the bees draw honey from them as well. In like manner, we must not pursue literature merely for beauty and pleasure; we must also draw from Letters some profit for our soul." The same principle is stated negatively when Basil warns against the siren song of evil poets and the *ψυγαγωγία* (a term used by Aristotle and Plato to describe the power of beauty) of ungodly historians.³⁹ Beauty must not lead our souls into vice; it must stimulate them to virtue.

In the beginning Jerome had exaggerated the beauty of the classics to the proportion of an absolute. In the most famous of his letters to Eustochius he describes this excess and its marvelous cure. He was on his way to a spiritual retreat at Jerusalem. He had cut off the ties of blood; he had given up his accustomed dainty food; but he could not bring himself to forego his library. He would fast, only that he might afterward read Cicero. After tears of penance he would seize his Plautus. But when he read the Scripture, the style seemed rude and repellent. In short, the beauty of form became for Jerome a quasi-ultimate. The remedy took the shape of the famous dream, in which Jerome saw himself beaten with lashes, brought before the divine Judge, and accused of being a Ciceronian, not a Christian.⁴⁰ It worked; for, thirteen years later, Jerome is a *Ciceronian Christian* who through the beauty of the classics wants to lead men to Christ. In a letter to Magnus he sums up the true perspective in an allegorical simile: "Is it surprising that I should admire the fairness of form and the grace of eloquence in secular wisdom, that I should de-

³⁶ *De Civitate Dei*, V. 13 (Bened. ed. VII, Pars Ia, c. 210).

³⁷ *Ibid.*, XIX. 5 (Bened. ed. VII, Pars Ia, c. 885).

³⁸ *Ep.* CLXIV. 3, 4 (P. L. XXXIII, c. 710).

³⁹ *On Greek Lit.*, 4 (P. G. XXXI, c. 569).

⁴⁰ *Ep.* XXII. 30 (P. L. XXII, c. 416).

sire to make her who is my captive and handmaid a matron of true Israel . . . and beget of her servants for the Lord of Sabaoth?"⁴¹

A soul as beautiful as that of Augustine could not miss the beauty of the classics. It is from the classics that he builds his own aesthetic; it is through them that he illustrates it. Nevertheless, the beauty of the classics always remains a means. In *De Doctrina Christiana* he set down the distinction between *utenda* and *fruenda*. God alone is an end to be enjoyed; pagan literature is a means to lead us to God.⁴² We are all familiar with his ladder of the soul. He names the successive rungs in order: Vitality, Sensation, Art, Virtue, Tranquillity, Approach, Contemplation. Described in terms of beauty, they are: *pulchre de alio*, *pulchre per aliud*, *pulchre ad pulchrum*, *pulchre in pulchro*, *pulchre ad pulchritudinem*, *pulchre apud pulchritudinem*.⁴³ Literature comes in the third step of art. The soul acts beautifully toward something beautiful, in order that it may finally reach the highest step in contemplation, where it will bask in the full effulgence of Absolute Beauty.

Rarely does anyone deny the beauty of the classics. At most, men question the possibility of teaching students to appreciate that beauty. Again we can learn from St. Augustine: "A man learns the beauty of eloquence," he writes, "not by being instructed with diligent disquisitions, but rather by being enkindled with ardent reading."⁴⁴ In other words, a sense of the beautiful is like an electric current that must reside in the teacher and pass from him to the pupil. It is not demonstrated; it is communicated.

One short digression may be permitted to answer a question so frequently asked: "Why cannot all this truth and goodness and beauty be derived from translations?" The classics are art forms, expressed in the medium of Latin and Greek. No more does a beautiful translation equate the art form of Plato than a clay model the Moses of Michelangelo. A translation is the art form of the translator, not the translated. Moreover, because of the two-fold relation of the *logos*, the thought and the expression, it is only in the original that we can grasp the pattern of truth expressed in the literature. Finally, an exhortation to moral goodness that is twice removed from the author is weakened to the point of worthlessness. In the words of Castiello, "If continuity must be established and maintained, then it must rest on reality and not on its shadow."⁴⁵

In the course of fifteen centuries streamlined science and "super" con-

⁴¹ *Ep.* LXX, 2 (P. L. XXII, c. 666).

⁴² *De Doc. Christ.*, I. 4, 5 (P. L. XXXIV, c. 16).

⁴³ *De Quantitate Animae*, 79 (P. L. XXXII, c. 1079).

⁴⁴ *De Doc. Christ.*, IV. 21 (P. L. XXXIV, c. 98).

⁴⁵ Castiello, J., *Humane Psychology of Education* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1936), p. 189, note 11.

veniences may advance the cult of the physical, may render materialism a little more refined, and therefore more insidious, but they cannot change the spiritual and human nature of man. That is why the transcendental values of the classics, the humanistic truth, goodness, and beauty of Plato or Virgil, are every gram as precious in twentieth-century America as they were in fourth-century Rome or Caesarea. We too are nourishing a Catholic culture four hundred years young. Today again Christian youths must be matured; Christian minds must be refined in analysis and judgment. There are likewise neo-pagans to refute, modern humanists to convert. Atomists, Sophists, and all the old enemies are back in our secular universities in modern apparel. The ancient heritage of pagan truth offers to us, as it did to the Fathers, a solution to our problems. Can we afford to cast it lightly aside?

Nor will anyone deny that our Catholic youth would be more humane and more Christian, had he a deeper understanding of the natural foundations of supernatural life, and a more sympathetic view of the natural moral goodness of his non-Catholic contemporary. Hence our recent endeavors toward an ethical entente between Catholic, Protestant, and Jew. In the humanities the Fathers found the common grounds for mutual moral understanding between themselves and the pagans of their day. In a Latin classic St. Augustine caught his first glimpse of the noble life of virtue, thus foreshadowing and preparing for his later vistas of the supernatural.

Again, if we are to magnetize the hearts of our students through the beautiful to love the true and the good, we shall best do it, not through the psychological aberrations of a Picasso nor the psychopathic pessimism of an Ibsen, but rather through the sane and wholesome literature of Greece and Rome. A people who lived life deeply and intensely, who had a marvelous power of abstracting the human essentials from their experience, who could express these values with a consummate artistic technique, these ancients produced a literature of such simplicity and beauty that the profound lessons it teaches are as obvious as they are irresistible. In addition, should not the deepest human values, expressed in the highest literary form, develop *per se* the most refined aesthetic taste?

Surely the classics are worth-while; probably they are also necessary. Folly is at its dizziest height when any nation, especially infant America, hopes to manufacture for herself all the truth, goodness, and beauty that are to constitute her culture. We are, as Bernard of Chartres puts it, like dwarfs seated on the shoulders of giants. If we "see more things than the ancients, and things more distant, it is not because of our sharp sight of

great stature, but simply because they have lent us their own."⁴⁶ If Western civilization and Western democratic life are to grow and flourish in America, then the foundations of our education must be buried deep in the prime sources of this same Western culture. Break with the ancients, and the Catholic humanistic culture of America will have the stunted growth and petty influence of a pigmy.

Little wonder that our late Pontiff Pius XI wrote in his Encyclical on Christian Education:

Hence in accepting the new, the Christian teacher will not hastily abandon the old, which the experience of centuries has found expedient and profitable. This is particularly true in the teaching of Latin, which in our days is falling more and more into disuse, because of the unreasonable (*perperam sane*) rejection of methods so successfully used by that sane humanism, whose highest development was reached in the schools of the Church.

⁴⁶ Cited by Walter Lippmann in an address delivered December 29, 1940, before the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

The Study of Literature

EDWARD J. DRUMMOND, S. J.

As a plan calling for scholarly integration and for a reestablishment of literary values *Literary Scholarship*¹ deserves consideration. Newman viewed a university not merely as a place where all knowledge was taught but as a place where every branch of knowledge was made to bear upon, and to be integrated with, every other branch of knowledge. That is hardly the picture of the average university today. It has been broken up into such completely isolated units as the schools of medicine, of education, of law, the college of liberal arts, and the graduate college. Within these separate units the process of disintegration has gone on. In the graduate school there are the distinct faculties of philosophy, English, history, classics, foreign languages, to mention only a few of them. Some of this, of course, is necessary for the purposes of administration, but at least as far as the study of English is concerned, this process of separation has in many instances been pushed too far.

Partly because of the origins of the American graduate school, partly because of the scientific temper of the age, there has been the tendency in the graduate world to find a strictly scientific approach to every subject studied, whether that subject was capable of strict scientific treatment or not.

As a result of these two factors—the drift towards isolated specula-

¹ *Literary Scholarship: Its Aims and Methods*. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1941.

"Because of the present conflict in the realm of values, the humanities—the value subjects—have taken on a new importance. Yet for decades they have been studied much as if they were sciences. Though they are value subjects, they have been viewed largely as fact subjects. Thus, while literary scholarship abroad has sought fresh aims and methods, in America it has followed the pattern established in the 19th century.

"This is the first American book which attempts to formulate the rationale of literary scholarship as a whole. After an introductory chapter dealing broadly with the subject, the authors take up the two newer disciplines, linguistics and literary history, which were developed with great energy in the 19th century under scientific auspices. They then proceed to the two older disciplines, literary criticism and imaginative writing, which were characteristic activities of the scholar all the way back to the ancient world—so old, indeed, that when revived today they may seem to be innovations.

"While these studies of the provinces of literary learning constitute the bulk of the book, an effort is also made to envisage a plan of education in the graduate school, capable of providing both a better rounded type of scholar and experts in the special fields. By this means, the authors believe, the gap may eventually be closed which today separates and impoverishes the work of scholars, critics, and writers in our society. The collaborators in the present study are the director and four staff members of the School of Letters at the University of Iowa."—*Publisher's statement*.

tion and the emphasis on the scientific approach—the study of English has suffered. It has often concerned itself only with the establishment of texts, of biographical data, of literary influences, and with the study of linguistics. Working in this limited domain scholars have produced some excellent results. Even when such results are admitted it can be questioned: (1) whether most of such work produces anything like proportionately valuable results; (2) whether such work has not really overlooked the matter of English literature altogether and concerned itself only with matters external to literature or matters which are only preparatory to the study of literature itself. Or to put it on a somewhat more practical basis; men prepared to do research work are turned out by English departments but it may be doubted how well men are being prepared to be teachers, writers, or critics under the usual system of graduate English.

Foerster believes that, if literature is important for anything more than its recreative values, the literary scholar will have to descend from his ivory tower and that literary scholarship “will have to reclaim its lost provinces.” His program for a new discipline in letters is described as follows in the first essay in *Literary Scholarship*:

1. To encourage a *common intellectual life* among students of letters, in which the discipline of letters will be integrated with the other humanistic disciplines—history, the fine arts, philosophy, and *religion*.

2. To restore the full meaning of literary scholarship so that it shall imply not only accuracy, thoroughness, and the sense of time, but also aesthetic sensitiveness, the ability to write firmly, a concern for general ideas, and an insight into the permanent human values embodied in literature.

3. To offer a rigorous discipline in the specialized types of literary activity—the study of language, the study of literary history, the theory and practice of literary criticism, and the art of imaginative writing.

4. To restore a vital relationship between scholarship and letters by preparing scholars for careers as teachers (collegiate as well as graduate), as critics, or as writers.

This program is really a plan for a reintegration of English with other branches of knowledge and a reestablishment of the values of literature.

The other essays in this book, by various members of the English department at the University of Iowa, are concerned almost completely with the second and third points. McGalliard gives a scholarly survey of

the present stage of linguistic studies. Wellek sharply analyzes the nature of literary history and concludes that most writing in this field has been either not "*literary history*" or not "*literary history*." Warren's "*Literary Criticism*" is a careful and exact presentation of the critic's task. Schramm's "*Imaginative Writing*," which closes the book, is an effort to point out the opportunities that a university can offer the creative writer.

As developments of the program outlined by Mr. Foerster's introductory essay, some of these studies are less successful than others. Most of McGalliard's essay is spent in explaining the present state of linguistic scholarship. His exposition is clear and during the course of it he throws considerable light on linguistics as a "special discipline." But he integrates it with the general study of literature only with a few statements at the end of his essay, in which he points out the importance of the study of language for the literary critic and literary historian. Quite probably, however, the study of languages admits of no closer or more complete relationship with the study of literature.

To develop the following idea would, perhaps, have gone beyond the scope McGalliard outlined for himself in this study; nevertheless, it does appear worth noting that in the study of linguistics there is need of that broader integration with the other humanities pointed out by Foerster. The various schools of linguists—mechanist, idealistic, sociological, stylistic—are concerned with what is, in an exact view, the externals of language. There is no quarrel, of course, with the linguist marking off these externals of language as a field of study and being concerned only with that field; but he should not believe that he is studying the whole of language, language in the complete sense. The true center of language is not *speech* but the intelligence in its function of communication. The schools of linguists noted above have dealt only with the word or the relation of the word to concept; they entirely omit the relations of concept to reality. Professing to be exactly scientific, they would declare that the relation of concept cannot be studied scientifically. True, but it can be studied philosophically. Here then is a place for an integration of language with one of the other humanities, namely, philosophy.

Wellek's essay is an excellent study and closely reasoned. He is rightly critical of historians of literature who fail to write a history of literature. They have given us "social histories or histories of thought as mirrored in literature, or a series of impressions and judgments on individual works arranged in a more or less chronological order." What he wishes is "the history of literature as an art in comparative isolation from its social history, the biographies of authors, or the disjointed appreciation of individual works." He admits and analyzes the difficulties in the way of realizing such a history of literature; yet his positive approach to a

solution of the problem does not strike one as forcibly or as cogently as his negative criticism. There are difficulties in his positive theory which can be completely clarified only when such literary history as he demands is written—*probatur ambulando*. Besides the value of his speculative criticism, which different students will evaluate differently, Wellek's approach to literary history has emphasized the fact that literature must be studied as literature. That certainly is in the right direction.

Of the several studies, Warren's is the most sharply focused on a development of the program mapped out by Foerster. Partly due to the nature of criticism, partly due to his treatment of the subject, his essay has quite successfully integrated literary criticism with the whole field of literary scholarship. He has, moreover, pointed out the value of a knowledge of the fine arts for the critic and indicated the necessity for integrating literary criticism, for, "the total act of literary criticism is a total judgment, aesthetic and philosophical." Besides this integration, Warren has given an excellent outline of the whole problem of criticism. I know of no single essay that presents so clearly the complete work of the literary critic.

Foerster's plan for integration has not been just a paper program. In the Iowa School of Letters, the graduate student majoring in English has no fixed minor. Instead he is required to do work equivalent to a minor in those fields (history, philosophy, classical and foreign languages being especially recommended) which will be of special use to him and his particular program. Besides the usual requirements in French and German, a reading knowledge of Latin and Anglo-Saxon, or Greek, is required of the student.

Thus far in the department of English little has been done with linguistics or strict literary history outside of some classes by McGalliard and Wellek. But criticism, both formal (esthetic) and philosophical (ideological), is stressed in many courses. There are courses in imaginative writing and well-known authors and poets have guided the work of students. It may seem a bit radical to allow poetry, novels, or short stories to take the place of the hallowed thesis or dissertation. Still imaginative writing would seem nearer to literary scholarship than sheer fact-finding, which is two degrees removed from literature as literature.

Actually there is some strictness in the management of the program. The first doctoral degree for a book of poetry has yet to be granted and it practically requires acceptance by publishers to have fiction or biography accepted. Furthermore, whether a student is working for a degree in literary history, criticism, or creative writing, he undergoes the same examinations, qualifying and comprehensive, and passes the same linguistic standards as other students.

This, however, is not intended as a complete defense of Iowa's School of Letters or its program of creative writing (where the theory may offer a better defense than the practice). This paper intended to examine a book which is receiving some attention and briefly to indicate that there are some valuable things in it for Catholic schools.

Integration and the reestablishment of literary values are aims, it seems to me, with which Catholic educators in general, and Catholic teachers of English in particular, should be in sympathy. We hold that knowledge is one and truth is one and that man is an *unum*. The more then that particular knowledge can be integrated with other particular knowledge, the more human and real that knowledge becomes. Yet the study of literature must not be so integrated with (or rather, melted into) theology, philosophy, history, and the rest, that this study is changed into something else.

In the study of literature on the graduate level the emphasis is often placed only on biography, the influences that affected an author, the source of his ideas; necessary preparations, perhaps, but this is not the study of literature in a strict sense. Emphasis on the undergraduate level is often given only to the values of the author's ideas or to a survey in chronological order of authors and works, setting them in periods and fixing dates.

This is only a partial study of literature. Surveys are useful and evaluation of ideas is certainly necessary, but the fact can be overlooked that literature is not history or philosophy but art. So more attention might well be given to it as an art. It would make for better writing and better criticism on the part of Catholics, to note one result of such attention.

Not only can Catholics be in sympathy with integration, they are, because of their Catholic "wisdom," in a far better position to order knowledge with knowledge. Really, where can there be anything approaching complete integration except in a Catholic university? In non-sectarian and state institutions *rapprochements* can be made between professors with similar philosophies of life but it is impossible completely to integrate faculty with faculty and school with school. There is no common basis on which the most fundamental agreements can be reached. There is a parting of the ways at "What is man?" and "What is truth?"

Some of the weakness of *Literary Scholarship* as a book (the individual essays are separately better than the book as a book) may be due to this. The writers do not appear to be completely at one save in holding that literature is important and that changes must be made in literary studies if that importance is to be realized. That they are aware of the difficulties in making any complete integrations or absolute revaluations

appears in the use of such weak and neutral words as "affirmations," "values," "a philosophy," "some position."

Catholic colleges and universities are in a much stronger position potentially; they have a common "wisdom" to serve as a basis for integration and they have a scholastic theory of art (with which American Catholics are generally not sufficiently concerned) as a basis for literary evaluations. But if better teachers, writers, critics of literature are to be produced that potency must be actuated and completely so. As a stimulus towards such actuation, some pages from *Literary Scholarship*, particularly those by Foerster and Warren, may be read with good effect.

President Hutchins and the Modern Problem of Education

ROBERT POLLOCK, PH. D.

A noteworthy feature of American life is its concern with the problem of education. And precisely because education is no longer an aristocratic monopoly, a new ideal is agitating their minds. There is a growing insistence that a true cultivation of mind cannot and must not be divorced from the whole man and that education must help men to live "in the light of the world's concrete fullness."

Among the pagans and in modern times, it was an accepted fact that the educated man was not as other men were. The cultivation of mind, so far from bringing men closer to the world of common experience often cut them off from it, maiming their sense of fellowship and their human feelings. The great sin of the intellectual was first to abandon the world to its misery and suffering, and then to condemn its worship of false idols when he found himself too far removed to influence it.

Today men are revolting against the Platonic ideal of a cultured class whose passionless reason is severed from the life of desire and for whom the activity of will is due to a defect of understanding. In short they are revolting against any conception of man which reduces him simply to a mind for which the world of real things is but grist for the philosopher's mill. They are trying very hard to break with such rationalism. But what is particularly hopeful is the growing realization that rationalism is but the symptom of a deeper disease—the separation which first occurs within concrete life itself. It has often been said that man becomes first of all a rationalist and then cuts himself off from the real world. But men are beginning to know better. The conviction is growing that it is more the other way around, men first isolate themselves from actuality and then become rationalists. Only too often, alas, the occupational disease of the philosopher has consisted in an almost ineradicable inability to understand that man's growth in rational consciousness is rooted in a vital connection with God's "splendorous order" and that such vital connection is the source itself from which living thought draws its sustenance.

Now it is this impulsion towards a more realistic conception of education that is responsible for the hostile reception given to President Hutchins' proposals for educational reform by many educators. Let it be noted, however, that his critics are not unappreciative of the service he

has rendered higher education by his challenging criticism of the evils which sorely afflict it. Many of them acknowledge the lack of a coherent and integrated course of studies, and join him gladly in deploring the crude and ridiculous vocationalism that has overrun the universities like a swarm of devouring locusts. Those among his critics who are Marxists heartily agree that education is sadly lacking in a fundamental philosophical outlook.¹ Even so staunch a critic as Professor John Dewey has pointed out the shrewdness with which President Hutchins has exposed the evils that prey upon contemporary higher education.²

Nevertheless, these same critics have militantly opposed his views as contained in his volumes, *The Higher Education in America* and *No Friendly Voice*. For, in their opinion, many things he says point to a crass form of rationalism which conceives man as a static mind rotating around ideas. When a popular magazine of wide circulation informs the world in a confidential mood that President Hutchins is against "contemporaneity" in education, that about sizes up for his critics the underlying spirit of his proposals, a spirit of separatism which makes itself felt despite his desire to synthesize philosophy and science.³ This synthesis, they feel, is made at the expense of science, just as surely as his empirical tendencies are swallowed up in ideas.

I think it would be accurate to say that the opposition of some of his critics does not spring merely from the fact that he desires to bring back philosophy as a basic integrating factor in education. Neither does his insistence on the priority of intellection in university education cause an arching of the back. Nor are they put in a dither by his desire to promote a study of the great classics. Actually, as I have suggested, what makes them shy away is their fear that behind his proposals there lurks an arid rationalism, ready to convert everything it touches into universals while hastily imposing itself upon a rich world of historical *becoming* that will always be just one jump ahead.

The vagueness which infests his discussion of such a crucial matter as metaphysics is revealing, for, after all, the whole issue hangs upon the meaning of a very equivocal term. And so equivocal a term is it, that in the hands of some, it has turned out to mean what to others would be anti-metaphysics. His complacent use, too, of undefined terms like grammar, logic, and rhetoric, whose meaning today is much more restricted than it was at one time, likewise indicates a mind too easily given to pallid generalities and not sufficiently sensitive to the social and psychological implications with which words are packed from generation to generation.

¹ Theodore B. Brameld, "President Hutchins and the New Reaction," *The Educational Forum*, Vol. I, Number 3.

² *Social Frontier*, January 1937.

³ *Newsweek*, November 27, 1939.

Then again his apparent belief that a critical study of the Great Tradition will of itself serve as a kind of touchstone by which to separate the true from the false in the modern world is symptomatic of an abstractist mentality.⁴ Such naïveté is detected at once. For today men are realizing that, if in one sense it is true to say that a knowledge of the past is indispensable for a critical appraisal of the present, in another sense it is just as true to say that a knowledge of the present is indispensable for a critical appraisal of the past. The real problem of course is to combine these two points of view.

It is instructive at this point to consider a statement on *Educational Objectives*, issued by his own college faculty almost three years after a reorganization of the curriculum. The chief accent is laid upon education of the "whole person." As they put it ". . . the University, and especially that part of it which constitutes the College, has sought to deal educationally with the whole person,—with men and women as knowers and doers and appreciators." Moreover their statement lays emphasis upon the understanding and enrichment of "twentieth-century life in all its phases." A little further on occurs this significant line, "In our judgment devotion to ideas is incompatible with the cult of ideas."

In this statement there is brought into sharp relief a point of view which motivates many of President Hutchins' critics. Unfortunately, it appears from the body of the statement that its authors, like many of his critics, err by failing to present a standpoint clearly designed to rescue us from the morass of relativism and positivism. Apparently men find it very difficult to do justice at one and the same time to man's intellectual dignity and his concrete wholeness. Either they embrace a barren essentialism or fall into the abyss of exaggerated dynamism and existentialism. To so many of them, movement in the direction of universal, immutable truth and movement in the direction of decisive choice and fullness of life are seemingly incompatible.

Two significant elements stand out in the statement issued by the college faculty, first, an emphasis on the whole person as against any notion of mind taken in isolation, and secondly, a desire to relate the thinking of the concrete person to the actual world of time and space. To a Catholic educator these two elements recall at once the affirmation of concrete personality and the development of a true historical standpoint which figure prominently in western thinking only *after* the coming of our Lord, and not before. At once there comes to mind St. Augustine with his apprehension of the simple fact that man in a state of pure nature, or considered with his reason alone is but an abstraction. The whole man, not just his reason alone, must participate in the search for truth. Man moves

⁴ *Harper's*, October 1941.

either towards his spiritual integration or towards disintegration, and it is only in the movement towards spiritual integration that thinking itself can be really fruitful. No thinker has so richly deserved the proud title of Prophet of Personality conferred on him by posterity. And because the concrete man was uppermost in Augustine's thought, he tried to create an intimate synergy of intellect and will and refused to consider man's moral life except as it is bound up with a social life.

Given St. Augustine's intense awareness of the concrete man, it was inevitable that his philosophy should develop around an historical standpoint. Man's thinking is bound up with his integration into an actual order of things. Hence it would be utter folly to suppose that man can rise to the fullness of truth from an abstract sensible located at any point of time and space. It was not accident, therefore, that out of Augustinianism came a philosophy of history and a repeated insistence upon actual spiritual integration as the basis of fruitful intellectuality.

In modern times the Christian and Augustinian movement towards a focusing upon the human subject became a preoccupation that loosened the connection with the objective order, ontologically understood. Hence the excessively reflexive character of modern philosophy and its exaggerated voluntarism. Still, let us grant that this focusing upon the human subject is not in itself a bad thing. Indeed once it is properly centered within an ontological framework, together with the rich points of view and treasure of facts that go along with it, the gain will be enormous.

Happily there have been modern Catholic thinkers from Suarez to the present who can aid us in the great work of assimilation. Contemporary Catholics like Father André Bremond are insisting that intellect is the proper activity of the whole spiritual creature "who wishes to be all," and that intellectual cognition involves far more than gathering and classifying concepts. Catholics are perhaps not occupying themselves as much as they should with the problem that is necessarily linked with the problem of the concrete man, that of conceiving properly the role of actual historical *becoming* and the actual order of things in the formation of our ideas. Nevertheless, there are modern Catholics who can help us here too, Cardinal Newman for instance, who has given us rich insights not only into a psychological approach to fundamental problems, as in the *Grammar of Assent*, but also into an historical approach, as in his classic work, *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*.

Undoubtedly the whole course of western development has brought the human subject to the foreground of consciousness. Lacking however an ontological basis and separated from the Christian source, modern consciousness of the concrete individual suffers severe and almost fatal limitations. Nevertheless from a natural point of view, there have been

great and important gains which we have still to make our own. Modern philosophy has attained to profound insights into the concrete man, despite its idealist bias, and modern psychology has magnificently confirmed some of the Christian insights into personality on its dynamic side. Modern psychology has enriched our knowledge of the psychological content of the individual in its account of man's subterranean mental life, his purposiveness and his urge to self-determination and even in cases to self-negation, and his will to community, expressing itself so falsely and tragically in the vicious totalitarian practice. After all, wasn't it Hitler's cunning utilization of modern psychological knowledge which helped to make his propaganda machine and his dictatorial methods such terrible instruments of fanatical zeal.

In America, William James did much to popularize the notion of the concrete man with his doctrine of the individual conceived as thoroughly purposive and situated in a real world of people and things. American education was deeply influenced, too, by his efforts to do justice to the rich complexity of human nature and to show the place of the impulses and passions in human knowledge. In his dynamic conception of the individual, William James was not simply rediscovering, as Professor Mortimer J. Adler appears to think, a truth well known to Aristotle, that man is an animal.⁵ Of course modern biological conceptions played their part in William James' intellectual formation, but nevertheless his desire to see man in the round and concretely is much closer to the Christian than the pre-Christian tradition. To my mind, it is revealing to see Professor Adler, reputed to be President Hutchins' mentor, pounce upon a dynamic conception of man as a mere rediscovery of man's animality.

But to a Christian, *homo spiritualis*, which includes so much more than *homo sapiens*, must always be conceived dynamically. Let us not forget that there were many great Catholics like St. Bernard who taught that man is the image of God above all in his will. And to those who were thinking primarily of *homo spiritualis*, it was natural to elevate the will to the eminent position of queen of the faculties. In affirming as we should, *homo sapiens*, let us not however be lulled into a forgetfulness of *homo spiritualis*. After all we must beware of turning back the clock to a pre-Christian Aristotelianism, even when it calls itself the "Great Tradition" or "Thomism."

As I have been at pains to emphasize, one cannot enter the sphere of personality without at once encountering the problem of history. It was inevitable that in focusing their attention upon the human subject, modern philosophers should become sensitive to the role of historical experi-

⁵ *Harper's*, September 1941.

ence in thinking. Indeed the two great characteristics of modern thought are its psychological bias and its historical standpoint.

To a Catholic securely grounded in metaphysical truth, there is much that is of value in the modern emphasis upon history in regard to the formation of ideas. One cannot come away from a study of the historical standpoint among the philosophers from Vico to the present without appreciating more deeply than ever the role of historical *becoming* in rational development. One might say, for want of a better formula, that truth is not only theoretically developed but existentially unfolded. Thus, the Christian awareness of the reality of the individual as against the Greek blindness to it, must not be conceived as due simply to a further elaboration of intellectual theory. Of course rational activity played its role, but we should not forget that this awareness was an expanding force within the full Christian life. Long before men arrived at adequate concepts, ordinary unlettered Christians were discovering through their life as Christians the reality of the individual. So, too, the evolution of self-consciousness, the growth in awareness of the role of will in knowledge and life, the gradual refinement of feeling, a developing sensitivity to the ground under our feet were not just the result of theoretical construction. Intellectual activity intensified these forces immeasurably, but still they were fundamentally an unfolding of truth itself within the broad area of history, under the driving power of Christianity. It would be hard to exaggerate the extent of the revolution in Christian philosophy brought about by this existential unfolding of truth. To grasp it one has but to measure the distance between, say, Plato and St. Augustine, or Aristotle and St. Thomas.

Once we take Divine Providence seriously and look upon truth as a force which, secretly as it were, despite human aberrations, invades the whole field of historical *becoming*, we cannot but make our students more sensitive to the world in which they live. Because man is a person, he is a profoundly historical being, as the subhuman is not. Students must be brought therefore to a vivid awareness of this truth. Thought which loses touch with concrete being and the historical present loses touch with being at its most crucial point. Unless a strong bond is created between the person and what in the present world is genuinely creative and good, the search for truth is in danger of becoming a branch of archeology or a game of dialectics by nimble-witted men of a byzantine turn of mind. Hence the wisdom of Professor Whitehead's observation that to depreciate the present does deadly harm to young minds.

An historian like Toynbee has shown how the present can be a key to a better understanding of the past, in bringing to the surface elements and forces that had escaped the attention of the earlier historian precisely be-

cause in the past these elements and forces were active only beneath the surface of life. We know too how, because of certain modern philosophical developments, we are looking more deeply into the philosophy of St. Thomas for truths that are there only in germ, yet are more meaningful now than ever before.

In the light of these remarks perhaps we can better appreciate the insistence on the part of some of President Hutchins' critics that growth in consciousness cannot be divorced from integration within a real world. Professor Charner Perry in his article on Hutchins, "Education: Ideas or Knowledge,"⁶ maintains that intellectual growth cannot be seen apart from the individual's integration into a real world which comprises his locality, the nation, western civilization, and the world.

To President Hutchins, the attainment of truth seems to be a purely dialectical matter of studying "the basic theoretical questions." There is lacking in everything he writes any real and penetrating insight into the way in which "the basic theoretical questions" actually confronted human consciousness. So too there is no evidence of a living awareness of the development of truth through the interpenetration of many spheres of life, practical as well as theoretical—social, political, aesthetic, and mystical as well as intellectual.

From the manner in which he refers to our western tradition, he seems to forget that this tradition is much more than merely intellectual and that in its Catholic phase the triumphs of intellect were not merely dialectical triumphs but triumphs of the human spirit seeking to live integrally and to know integrally. In this connection it is significant to find Professor Adler stating that "the European community of culture flowered because of excellence in liberal education."⁷ The vast and spectacular drama of medieval life with its stupendous dialectic between heaven and earth, its fine balance between the abstract and the concrete, its unappeasable hunger for the universal incarnation of Christian truths, its passion for beauty, its all-dominating quest for concrete unity—all of this, we are told, was due to "excellence in liberal education." How neatly the dialectician carries the universe under his hat! Let us affirm against such a bloodless abstraction that it was out of commerce with the living God and in vital interaction with men and things that the religious mind was propelled to the attainment of an integrated and deeply human culture.

When President Hutchins' critics suspect him of seeking to establish a cult of mind taken in separation from life, there is truth on their side. This is revealed in his scornful references to the modern trend towards emphasis of the whole man in education. Speaking of the phrase "whole

⁶ *International Journal of Ethics*, April 1937.

⁷ *Harper's*, September 1941.

man" he declares that "Of all the meaningless phrases in educational discussions this is the prize."⁸ It is true he is reacting to the sentimentalism and vagueness often associated with the phrase. Nevertheless, if he but glimpsed the problem, his criticism would be positive and not blindly destructive and his language itself would be different. He would not simply assert that "the three worst words in education are 'character,' 'personality' and 'facts.'"⁹ Neither would he be content with mere derision, as when he says "We have nothing to offer as a substitute for a sound curriculum except talk of personality, 'character' and great teachers, slogans of educational futilitarianism."¹⁰

Actually, there are educators who go far beyond vapid sentimentality in their consideration of the place of the whole man in education. And modern psychologists like Spearman have not been engaging in a futilitarian pastime in laboring to show the interpenetration of intelligence and other elements of personality. We should remember, too, that education has felt the influence of brilliant philosophers who have taken personality seriously and have tried to understand how it is related to rational activity.

When both President Hutchins and Professor Adler speak a kind word for progressive education, I wonder if they realize that its contribution arises precisely from its endeavor to take the whole child seriously. Both of them give the impression of viewing this contribution as arising from an appreciation of the mind's activity, not from a consideration of the whole concrete individual.¹¹ Somehow their fixation on mind and ideas has so contracted their field of vision that everything that lies beyond has but a vague and shadowy existence. It is interesting to find a better appreciation of the real nature of progressive education's contribution in Sister J. M. Rabey's careful study. Fully aware of the serious limitations of the New Education, she nevertheless singles out its conception of the whole child as "worthy of integration into Christian education."¹² Actually this consideration of the "whole man" applies with even greater force to higher education since older students are farther along on the way to self-conscious personality.

President Hutchins, I think, betrays his separatist point of view even more glaringly when he declares that "in men, reason and mind are the

⁸ Quoted by the Rev. B. Schwinn, O. S. B., "Hutchins, Cowley and Pope Pius XI," *The Catholic World*, October 1941.

⁹ *No Friendly Voice*, p. 30.

¹⁰ *Commonweal*, May 31, 1940.

¹¹ *No Friendly Voice*, p. 128; M. J. Adler, "The Order of Learning," *The Catholic School Journal*, December 1941.

¹² *A Critical Study of the New Education*, Washington, Catholic Education Press, 1932, p. 84.

chief end towards which nature strives."¹³ If he had scrutinized more closely the Great Tradition he would have found a rising affirmation not of mind alone but of personality. St. Thomas, let us recall, exalts, not simply mind, but personality above all else in nature. For him the word "person" signifies that which in all nature is most perfect. One cannot help thinking that President Hutchins is merely reverting to a pre-Christian Aristotelianism where mind hovers above the human and the terrestrial and is not intrinsically and firmly integrated with them. Hence his critics are not impressed when he protests his awareness of the empirical and when he declares that education is for intelligent action.

Again he writes that in general education "we are interested in the attributes of the race, not the accidents of individuals."¹⁴ Now as we know, the Greeks were almost blind to the value of the individual as such. Their interest lay with the universal or that which was common to many members of a class. For Aristotle, the multiplication of individuals is a mere substitution for the unity of the species. Of Plato it might be said that he confuses the type with the individual, as when he appears to identify eugenics with education. He apparently does not see that the end of breeding is the production of a perfect specimen of a type but that of education the production of individual excellence.

With Christianity of course all this is changed. Christ did not die for universals or essences. He died for living men and women. One could go on to say that our Lord emphasized the importance of the individual by promulgating the rule and greatness of small, simply lowly things. Men were thus induced to turn their eyes from the splendor of the universal to the humblest of God's creatures, the ordinary little things that the proud Greek spurned in his quest for the abstract.

Given President Hutchins' one-sided view of mind and ideas, it is but natural that his reaction against emphasis upon the whole man should take the form it does. His reaction to vocationalism is of a similar character. When Professor Whitehead points out in *The Atlantic Monthly* the need for creating a closer relationship between education and practical affairs, the president of the University of Chicago objects that such a proposal is untimely because of the vocationalism that is rife at the present time.¹⁵ Now no one has emphasized more strongly than Professor Whitehead the conviction that the university must be dominated by a "spirit of generalization." Yet he is well aware that there exists an intimate connection between the highest intellectuality and practical interests. Indeed

¹³ *The Higher Learning in America*, p. 67.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

¹⁵ Professor Whitehead's article in *The Atlantic Monthly*, September 1936; President Hutchins' Reply in *The Atlantic Monthly*, November 1936.

he feels that science owes much to the Benedictines for bringing science and technology together. There is no doubt that the great triumphs of Catholic thought in medieval times are due in large measure to the wonderful conjunction of speculative thinking and an intense practicality which Christianity fostered. Consider too how the extraordinary modern advances in mathematical abstraction have been applied to practical problems.

Before we discuss the problem of vocationalism, let us not forget that in times gone by there existed an intimate connection between the life of mind and vocation. Education was the privilege of the class of rulers, of those, in other words, who from the beginning had a vocation. Their vocation as future rulers was stamped in the fiber of their being. Hence education was motivated and dynamized by inflexible purpose. Academic thinking was rooted in men whose urge to rulership was given free scope. In the medieval world, education likewise was meant for those who had a part to play in society. There too, those who labored to know were, in the main, those who had a vocation, understood now in a spiritual as well as temporal meaning. The vocational and practical atmosphere of education is one of the most obvious and singular features of medieval society. Even when men were engrossed in the most abstract speculation they were keenly aware of their practical aims and knew fairly well how they as individuals were to play their part in a very organic society. The same is true of the great English universities. The men who pursued the liberal arts with admirable detachment breathed an atmosphere which was permeated through and through with the directive aims of a very practical ruling gentry. For them too, the cultivation of mind fitted concretely into a much larger scheme of things and reason and purpose were intimately allied.

The conclusion is inescapable. It is urgently necessary to resolder the nexus between thinking and purposive personal growth. In other words real and fundamental changes must be made in line with Professor Whitehead's suggestion, if we are to reduplicate the situation of the Greek thinker, the medieval theologian, or the English gentleman. President Hutchins is quite right in his attack upon the kind of vocationalism that flourishes so rankly in our midst. But again his reaction is the reaction of one whose study of the Great Tradition has not helped him to grasp the problem of our time—how consciously and deliberately to fashion a system of education that will integrate mind into the reality of dynamic man and the objective order, temporally as well as ontologically understood.

What must be disquieting to a Catholic educator is the identification by critics of President Hutchins' views with a Catholic position. His appeal to the "Great Tradition" has enabled him to dress his cause to ad-

vantage and has permitted him too easy a finality in laying down his principles. To many of our contemporaries he is supposed to be speaking as one very close to the Catholic standpoint. Hence it is commonly believed that what they call his Essentialism finds in scholastic philosophy its strongest defense. While Essentialism is taken to mean a stress upon essentials, it also means to these critics the doctrine which reduces the contingent, the world of real happenings, to a rather secondary and unimportant place, and which makes individuality accidental and relatively unimportant.¹⁶ If this were authentic Catholic doctrine, it would indeed be a bitter brew to drink. Happily it is but a parody of full rich Catholic teaching. Nevertheless, it is unfortunate that educators should take President Hutchins' "Great Tradition" for the real thing. To a Catholic, the name "Essentialism" must be utterly offensive, insofar as it implies a non-existential point of view, a point of view divorced from a real world of historical *becoming*, a point of view which comes dangerously close to suspending the world not from a living God but from an axiom. Can we for a moment forget that if Catholic thinkers marched so far ahead of the Greeks, it was precisely in looking at reality from the point of view of existence as well as from the point of view of essence.

I think it is true to say that Catholic educators are strategically placed to make a splendid contribution to modern education, if we turn with all our force and energy to a solution of the problem as it is being debated today. As heirs of a great spiritual, cultural, and intellectual tradition, we have the resources to create a synthesis which will correct at once the deformed conception of personality held by many educators and the static, one-sided intellectualism of President Hutchins. The issue which is agitating the minds of educators today should be evidence enough that the times are propitious for a new unfolding of the Christian humanistic spirit. We must address ourselves to the educational problem as it is developing before our eyes. There is no other way, if we are to infuse new strength into the mind of youth and if we are to save it not only from the positivism and subjectivism of the New Education but also from the fusty unrealities of the Higher Rationalism.

¹⁶ Cf. John S. Brubacher, *Modern Philosophies of Education*, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1939. Chapter XIV.

BROADENING HORIZONS

The Function of Philosophy in Jesuit Colleges*

WILLIAM L. WADE, S. J.

Like all beginning teachers of philosophy, I had occasion at one time or another to ask myself and others certain questions about my job: What is the status of philosophy in the college curriculum? How much philosophy can the ordinary student learn? What is the purpose of teaching philosophy to all students? What do the students think of the courses in philosophy? Do the students actually learn philosophy?

I inquired of professors and students the answers to these questions. From the professors I received various answers. All admitted that according to our Jesuit tradition we should demand that all our students take philosophy, since philosophy is the backbone of our system of education. Every student was obliged to take fifteen semester hours of philosophy because philosophy is the queen of the sciences and without philosophy one cannot truly be considered an educated Catholic today. But the professors differed as to how much philosophy should be given in the various courses; what subjects should be required of all students; and many were sincerely pessimistic about the ability of the students to learn the essence of scholastic philosophy—metaphysics. From the students I learned that, in their opinion, philosophy was the easiest major for an A. B. degree, and that those who were not majoring in philosophy considered the fifteen required semester hours quite an unnecessary burden, because for them philosophy was neither inspiring nor profitable. Most of the students would admit that it was good to take a practical course in ethics, but metaphysics, they thought, was useless and a waste of time. On further inquiry I found that they read neither St. Thomas, nor Aristotle, nor the modern scholastic writers. They did not think philosophically, they did not read philosophical classics, but, as far as I was able to discover, they merely learned so many theses, memorized definitions, proofs, and answers to the difficulties so that they could give back *verbatim* to the professor what he had given in class. Worst of all, when the student had completed his full course in philosophy he was not prepared to read and understand even the modern popular writers in philosophy.

* At the seventh annual meeting of the Jesuit Philosophical Association, Philadelphia, December 28, 1941, the main topic for discussion was the primary function of undergraduate philosophy teaching in Jesuit colleges. Father Wade prepared this paper at the request of the Secretary of the Association "to serve as a background for discussion." Father Joseph F. Beglan led the discussion and his comments follow this article.

Yet everyone continued to maintain that philosophy was the queen of the sciences, the crown of Jesuit education, the most important subject in the curriculum. I do not generalize, I do not pass judgment—this may not be true of any other undergraduate school in the United States, it may not even be true of St. Louis University, but it is the only conclusion at which I could arrive after such investigation as I was able to make.

I knew what philosophy was for Aristotle, for St. Thomas Aquinas; I knew what men like Dr. Hutchins of Chicago said that metaphysics should accomplish in a liberal education; I could not see that philosophy was actually fulfilling this function in Jesuit education, judging by the results in the minds of the students. I concluded that philosophy seemed to have lost its rightful place in the curriculum because a deadly formalism and self-complacency had settled over the teaching of philosophy. It seemed to me that philosophy had ceased to be philosophy and had become primarily a form of apologetics; i. e., the primary purpose of philosophy was to protect the faith of the students against the errors of the day. The subject matter in philosophy did not seem to be determined by the nature of philosophy itself, but by the immediately practical needs of the students. Metaphysics, the essence of scholastic philosophy, had been replaced by epistemological, psychological, and ethical discussions. Philosophy was required of all students, not because they needed a philosophical education, but because they needed to know certain things to protect their faith. The students were trained not to think philosophically, not to acquaint themselves with the great philosophical writings of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, but to learn certain theses and arguments exclusively from textbooks and convince themselves that scholastic philosophy had all the answers to all the questions. This was, as anyone will admit, a discouraging conclusion, and I set myself to examine my philosophical conscience. Was this situation satisfactory, was it inevitable, and why had such a state of affairs come about? Was it possible to do anything to remedy this situation? This forced me to ask myself three questions: What is the function of philosophy in Jesuit education? How can this purpose be accomplished? What is the criterion of success in the teaching of philosophy? In this paper I will present the study I made and the conclusions at which I arrived.

The authoritative pronouncements of the Society of Jesus on education are to be found in the *Constitutions* and the *Ratio Studiorum*. Hence I turned to these documents to find out what the Society had officially formulated in the various centuries as the answers to my questions. Let me note in the beginning that the *Ratio Studiorum*, which was the application of the principles of the *Constitutions* to actual conditions, appeared in four forms: the preliminary *Ratio* of 1586, the provisional *Ratio* of 1591,

the final and official *Ratio* of 1599, and the revised *Ratio* of 1832. Of these four forms of the *Ratio*, only (I stress this fact) the *Ratio* of 1599 ever secured the formal and official approval of the Society of Jesus. We must note that the *Ratio* of 1832 was never officially approved by the Society and therefore is not what is meant when one speaks of the *Ratio Studiorum* and the traditional method of Jesuit education. The sources from which I have gathered my information concerning philosophy and Jesuit education in the Society in its primitive tradition are mainly: Pachtler, *Ratio Studiorum et Institutiones Scholasticae Societatis Jesu* for the theory, and Rochemonteix, *Le College Henri IV* for the practice in the Society before the suppression.

THE PURPOSE OF PHILOSOPHY IN JESUIT EDUCATION

According to the *Ratio* the course in philosophy was given after the course in humanities and rhetoric. Regulations both for the teaching of Ours and of externs were definitely determined. It seems that the majority of students were obliged to complete a two-year course in philosophy, since philosophy was considered the crowning point of the college course for extern students, and for the Jesuits it was considered an essential preparation for the study of theology. The *Ratio*, however, definitely made provisions for those who were not qualified for the full course in philosophy.

As the *Ratio* of 1586 states, the purpose of all education in the Society of Jesus was:

“Duo plane sunt Societatis nostrae praesidia ac firmamenta, ardens pietatis studium et praestans rerum scientia. In haec duo capita omnis Constitutionum nostrarum vertitur cardo, eo quod pietas, si doctrinae luce orbata sit, singulis quidem privatim prosit non parum: at in Ecclesiae proximorumque utilitatem operam pene nullam conferre possit in concionibus . . . in sacramentis administrandis, in juventute erudienda, in disputationibus cum fidei adversariis, in consiliis, responsisque de dubiis rebus, et caeteris nostrorum hominum muneribus et functionibus: quae doctrinam, non vulgarem illam, sed excellentem quandam desiderant.”—Pachtler, II, p. 27.

It is taken for granted that philosophy is a necessary part of a complete education and no special purpose is assigned for its study. The purpose of education in the Society had already been determined in the fourth part of the *Constitutions* in the Preamble with the Explanation A. The criterion of which subjects should be studied had been determined in Part IV, chapter 5, of the *Constitutions*:

“Since the aim of the doctrine which is studied in this Society is

with the aid of Divine Grace to further the interests of their own souls and the souls of their neighbors, this, therefore, shall be the measure in general and for particular persons. From this measure therefore let it be decided what studies Ours shall devote themselves to and how far they shall go in them."

In Part IV, chapter 12, no. 3, the place of philosophy is clearly designated according to this criterion:

"So, since the arts and natural sciences dispose the mind for theology and serve to perfect its knowledge and application, and of themselves help toward the same end, let them be treated with whatever diligence is proper and by learned professors, seeking in all things sincerely the honor and glory of God." To this is added Explanation C: "There shall be treated logic, physics, metaphysics, moral science and even mathematics in so far as it helps toward attaining the proposed end."

The *Ratio* of 1599, in the rules for the professor of philosophy, specifies more exactly the place of philosophy in the curriculum:

"Since the arts and the natural sciences prepare the mind for theology and help to a perfect knowledge and use of it, and of themselves aid in reaching this end, the instructor, seeking in all things sincerely the honor and glory of God, shall so treat them as to prepare his hearers and especially Ours for theology and stir them up greatly to a knowledge of their Creator."—Pachtler, II, p. 168.

Thus according to the *Constitutions* and the *Ratio* of 1599, the course in philosophy has a twofold purpose: to prepare the students for theology and to stir up in them a love of their Creator. It is interesting to note here a point to which I will return later. Neither Aristotle nor St. Thomas would say that the purpose of the study of philosophy is to prepare the student for theology.

After the restoration of the Society of Jesus a committee was appointed to adapt the *Ratio* of 1599 to the changed conditions of the nineteenth century. The result of their work was the *Ratio* of 1832. A new purpose for the study of philosophy is explicitly introduced. After the words "and to prepare his hearers for theology" is added: "contra novatorum errores armis veritatis muniat." Philosophy as understood by the Jesuits in 1832 had a definite apologetic turn. They were much more interested in the refutation of errors that were dangerous to the faith than in the study of philosophy as philosophy. The Catholic faith in the learned world was on the defensive, there was not within the Church sufficient mental reserve to take the offensive. Above all was this true in philosophy, where

one would have sought in vain for an outstanding Aristotelian or Thomistic philosopher. In the various memoranda found in Pachtler, this defensive and apologetic attitude of mind is clearly manifested. Father Godinot had written in 1821 in reply to the various quaesita sent out:

"In Philosophicis videtur primo—in logica et metaphysica, ut missis quaestionibus de rebus inscrutabilibus et abstractioribus, solidissime formentur in ratiocinii regulis et methodo ac veritatis criteriis . . . horum dein ope utendum ad solidam de Deo et de homine, prout haec *religioni subservit*, cognitionem tradendam. . . . In his autem omnibus maxime praemuniendi juvenes contra Scepticismum, Ideologismum, Materialismum, Fatalismum ac Liberalismum; item solidis societatis humanae in Religione fundatis principiis imbuendi, et ita quidem profunde, ut vanis speculationibus nullum sit tempus reliquum."—Pachtler, IV, p. 363.

Again we find this reply:

"In philosophicis postulatur primo—Logica et Metaphysica, quae subtilioribus et antiquatis disputationibus eliminatis, *omnino ac tota* confutando Ideologismo, Scepticismo ac Materialismo et omnibus modernis erroribus sit accommodata."—*Ibid.*, p. 360.

The report of the Commission itself adopted this apologetic turn for philosophy:

"Ceterum in conflictu opinionum undique emergentium regulam ac normam constituimus, quam omnes sequi debent, ut Philosophicis disputationibus facem praeferat Theologia."—*Ibid.*, p. 471.

From the various replies which were forwarded to the Committee, one is led to believe that the Fathers considered philosophy primarily as a means of refuting the errors that opposed the faith of their students, and that by subtleties and abstract and inscrutable questions, they understood anything which was not necessary to defend the faith.

THE CONTENT OF THE PHILOSOPHY COURSES

We get a better idea of the purpose of the study of philosophy as they actually understood it, if we consider the content of their philosophy courses. "In Logic and natural philosophy, the doctrine of Aristotle is to be followed" (*Const.* Part IV, ch. 14, no. 3). The entire course in philosophy was mainly a study of the writings of Aristotle. The *Ratio* of 1586 says:

"Huic Constitutioni vix potest satisfieri, nisi Nostri strenue conentur Aristotelem bene interpretari: qua in re non optime audimus,

quod Aristotelis contextu posthabito, in cogitationibus et inventis nostris pene evanescimus. Quodsi plus operae in textu enarrando poneretur, esset Nostrorum philosophia majoris apud externos auctoritatis et tutior in publicis disputationibus, et solidior, cum magna pars argumentorum ex textu depromatur . . . Eam ad rem conferat non parum, si Professores et Scholastici ipsum Aristotelis textum ferant in scholam."—Pachtler, II, p. 130.

Realizing the necessity of understanding the text of Aristotle in order to take their place in the educated world as scholars, the Fathers worked out a system of explaining the text of Aristotle to their students. Pachtler outlines the six steps in their method of introducing their students to Aristotle. Only in Logic was a textbook to be used in place of the text of Aristotle and here they advised the use of the *Summulae Logicae* of Father Fonseca or of Father Toletus. They took for granted that the students must actually read the works of Aristotle and their only subject of dispute was exactly how much of Aristotle should be studied in each year. In the *Monumenta Paedagogica Societatis Jesu* we find the various plans which were proposed. The result of their experience was formulated in the rules for the professor of philosophy in the *Ratio* of 1599:

"In rebus alicujus momenti ab Aristotele non recedat, nisi quid incidat a doctrina, quam Academiae ubique probant, alienum" (Rule 2).

"Let him especially endeavor to interpret well the text of Aristotle, and let him give no less effort to this interpretation than to the questions themselves. Let him also persuade his students that their philosophy will be but very partial and mutilated unless they highly esteem this study of the text" (Rule 12).

From Rochemonteix we find that the course in philosophy comprised a thorough study of the major portions of Aristotle together with questions which would enable the students to adapt the principles of Aristotle to the questions of the day. Their attitude toward the study of Aristotle was exactly the same as their attitude toward St. Thomas in theology:

"Frequentem S. Thomae lectionem auditoribus suis Professores commendent, et ipsi praeceant exemplo; nec in accumulandis questionibus suis, ita sint profusi, ut S. Thomae exponendo vix locus aliquis reliquus fiat. Dubitandum est enim, ne paulatim excidat nobis e manibus St. Thomas, cujus doctrinam tanti facit Ecclesia, quemque nostrae Constitutiones legendum praescribunt, cum S. Thomas probe intellectus praebeat fundamenta ad tuendas omnes Catholicas veritates."—Pachtler, II, p. 81—The *Ratio* of 1586.

When I read these passages, I often think that we have realized in fact in the twentieth century what the Fathers feared would happen in the seventeenth century—we have lost our standing as scholars because we do not know the texts of Aristotle and we have let St. Thomas escape gradually from our grasp.

After the restoration of the Society the Fathers not only revised the purpose of the course in philosophy, but they also revised the content of the course, and adopted a new method of teaching philosophy. Aristotle was, to say the least, not popular in their day; we could almost say (*salvo meliore iudicio*) that few if any of the men who formulated the *Ratio* of 1832 had a philosophical appreciation of Aristotle and St. Thomas. The study of Aristotle did not seem suited in their eyes to accomplish the purpose they had set themselves, i. e., to refute skepticism, etc. Hence they formulated a course in philosophy that would satisfy the demands of the *Constitutions* to follow Aristotle, without the actual study of Aristotle. In the deliberations of the Fathers, again and again appear such phrases as:

“Hodie *omnino* omittendus est Aristoteles in eumque commentaria.”

“In philosophia, praeter Aristotelem expungendum . . .”—Pachtler, IV, pp. 414, 417.

Father Godinot, in his report on the proposed revision of the *Ratio*, summarizes the attitude of the Fathers:

“In illis regulis, quaecumque de Aristotelis doctrina commendatur, nullibi, quantum constat, nostris temporibus docentur, sed potius, quaecumque in eo optima sunt, jam pridem selecta in variis philosophiae tractatibus sub alia forma reperiuntur . . . Itaque, licet Aristotelis auctoritas non sit cum contemptu rejicienda aut parvipendenda, ejus tamen philosophia, aevo nostro non amplius satis accommodata, non videtur in nostras scholas, cum exulaverit ex aliis, introduci debet.”—Pachtler, IV, p. 477.

They adopted the principle that whatever was good in Aristotle could readily be found in other sources and that it was sufficient to satisfy the demands of the *Constitutions* if they did not condemn Aristotle. Thus wherever Aristotle's name appeared in the *Ratio* of 1599, it was to be deleted. There is no mention made of the necessity of following Aristotle and the content of the courses was not to be based on Aristotle. The new division of philosophy that had become popular in Germany, the Wolffian division into ontology, cosmology, etc., a rationalistic attitude toward philosophy that could never be made to square with the logic, metaphysics,

and philosophy of nature of Aristotle and St. Thomas, was adopted. New textbooks that were suited to the times were to be written and each Province was to choose its own textbooks. In theology they performed the same operation on St. Thomas, with this exception: the authority of St. Thomas was too great both in the Catholic Church and in the *Constitutions* to be disregarded altogether. Yet in practice they adopted the same principles—a logical necessity, since St. Thomas is unintelligible without Aristotle and is as much behind the times if philosophy is not a perennial and unchanging wisdom, as is Aristotle. Whatever is good in St. Thomas will be found better expressed in the textbooks that we will write so that it will not be necessary to read St. Thomas.

It is interesting to speculate on the mental attitude, or rather the philosophical attitude, of men who formulated such a program in philosophy. Here I am not fully convinced of my conclusions nor of their historical justification. I am speculating, but I cannot resist the temptation to summarize certain conclusions for which I have partial evidence. In the nineteenth century the Church was on the defensive, the philosophical tradition of Aristotelian-Thomism had been lost; learning in the Church was at a very low ebb. The men who had sacrificed and labored to restore the Society of Jesus were not intellectual giants, they were apostolic men in the practical sense of that term. They were not great philosophers, nor great theologians, nor great educators. The educational tradition of the Society, except for the written documents of the *Constitutions* and the *Ratio* had been lost. These men were children of their age and were influenced by the Catholic world around them. As a result of these circumstances, the *Ratio* of 1832 (which was not officially approved by the Society of Jesus) is not a great educational document. There was a work to be done, they were obliged to protect the faith of their students and they did it. But in their educational theory they attempted a compromise, especially in the teaching of philosophy, a compromise that was fatal for the teaching of philosophy. They reduced philosophy to a rational defense of the preambles of religion. Philosophy for them was not a wisdom, an architectonic science, an autonomous metaphysics within the hierarchy of learning, but a practical science. Philosophy as Aristotle and St. Thomas understood philosophy was impractical in their eyes. I do not judge these men, they did a great work, a necessary work, but the mistake was to call it philosophy. I am convinced that they arrived at the only conclusion that was morally possible considering the circumstances. But I wonder what the result would have been if they had had the knowledge and foresight to posit as their ideal in 1832 what Leo XIII demanded in the encyclical *Aeterni Patris* fifty years later. If they had had the courage to accept the *Ratio* of 1599 in philosophy and theology, we might be today

the leaders in the new development in philosophy that is gaining for scholasticism a hearing before the world. As Durer says, they lost the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition and condemned themselves to a mediocre teaching of philosophy. They dealt a death blow to philosophy in our colleges from which we cannot recover until we return to the *Ratio* of 1599.

One other point I would like to mention here. Since the revival of scholastic philosophy in the last century, the "thesis method" of teaching philosophy with its rigid schematic presentation of a doctrine under the form of "status quaestionis," definitions, adversaries, arguments, and objections, has become almost synonymous with the scholastic method. What was the origin of this method of teaching philosophy? It does not seem to have been originated by the Jesuits. It certainly was not the method of the *Ratio* of 1599. The *Ratio* of 1599 employed the method of analyzing a text, then applying the principles learned by the problem and question method—a truly Aristotelian method of learning philosophy. It would be interesting to know what is the exact historical origin of the thesis method. It is not a natural method of presenting truth, certainly not of seeking truth for its own sake. I am inclined to think that it is a method of refuting adversaries and ensuring uniformity of doctrine. The thesis method of presenting a truth is a method that the Catholic Church has used for centuries to refute error and to ensure uniformity in matters of faith and morals. Whenever the Church condemns a doctrine the condemned propositions are usually stated in the form of theses. It seems that the philosophers who revived scholastic philosophy in the last century found this method suitable to their purpose of refuting error and protecting the philosophic faith of their students. Add to this the fact that the a priori rationalism of eighteenth and nineteenth centuries found this method well adapted to their mathematical approach to philosophy and I think we can explain the origin of this method. It is certainly a marvelous method to indoctrinate students with a block doctrine of truth that can be defended. I am not convinced from the short study I have been able to make of the subject what the exact origin of the method was, but it seems certain that these factors must be taken into consideration. Of this however I am certain, it is not the natural method of presenting philosophical thought, it does not encourage philosophical thinking, and it was not the method of Aristotle and St. Thomas, nor the method of the *Ratio* of 1599.

CONTEMPORARY JESUIT TEACHING OF PHILOSOPHY

After this historical survey of the question, what should we say of our present-day teaching of philosophy? Do we seek to introduce our students to the great philosophical works of the past and thereby make of them philosophers according to their ability, or have we another purpose

in view? I am inclined to think that we do not seek to make of our students philosophers, to arouse in them an appreciation of philosophy for its own sake as the highest natural intellectual acquisition of man—philosophy as Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas understood it—but we have primarily in mind something of an apologetic. Not that we do not teach philosophy, but we view it as a defense of the preambles of religion. At least this seems to be the conclusion at which many of our students arrive. Philosophy is certainly not taught as a *wisdom*, an architectonic science, but as a bulwark for the faith. It seems to me that we have followed the tradition that was inaugurated by the *Ratio* of 1832 and have not followed the tradition of the *Ratio* of 1599.

The content of our courses in philosophy has been based on the *Ratio* of 1832. We have accepted their division of philosophy, the Wolffian arrangement, and we have attempted to arrange the content to refute the errors of the day. We are inclined to class as abstract subtleties and inscrutable problems any philosophical dispute that is not necessary for some practical purpose, despite its theoretical importance for philosophy. I think that this could be demonstrated by a consideration of the content of the various courses. One fact will suffice to show what I mean—the emphasis on ethics and the relative unimportance of metaphysics in the college curriculum. Even in ethics itself the importance placed on the refutation of certain immoral practices of our day to the almost complete exclusion of a consideration of the virtues is another fact that seems to demonstrate my meaning. This much is certain, we have not considered it essential in our colleges to introduce our students to Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, but have adopted the principle that whatever is good in Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas can be found in a more suitable form in other works. It is undoubtedly true that one can be a philosopher without reading Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, but it is also true that one cannot become a great scholastic philosopher, that one does not begin to appreciate the beauty and power of scholastic philosophy until one has read Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. The Fathers who wrote the *Ratio* of 1599 could not see how one could satisfy the demands of the *Constitutions* to follow the doctrine of Aristotle, unless one introduced his students to the works of Aristotle. They foresaw the danger of substituting some other author for the great masters themselves. They knew that the revival of philosophy in the Middle Ages was owing in great part to the study of the actual texts of Aristotle. I believe that our philosophy course would be greatly improved if we adopted as our proximate purpose in philosophy to introduce our students to the writings of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, in as far as they are able to understand these great masters. To make our course in philosophy an actual study of the text of Aristotle and St.

Thomas might not be practicable, but at least this study should be held up to them as an ideal, an ideal that the better students will attain. Certainly our purpose and our method should not be to refute error, because that is the most deadly form of intellectual training and is not philosophy in any sense of the word. Undoubtedly we need textbooks in philosophy, but they should be so constructed that the student is encouraged to go further, to realize that he will never appreciate the depth and beauty of scholastic philosophy unless he can follow it to its sources. Then we would teach our philosophy as a quest for wisdom, as truth for its own sake, as it was understood by Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas.

We have seen in our day a revival of scholastic philosophy; we have seen scholastic philosophy welcomed at every great philosophical congress. I think that the cause of this revival has been twofold; certain scholastic philosophers have realized that scholastic philosophy is not a block doctrine to be memorized and repeated, but a wisdom to be sought, and they have returned to a study of the great masters of scholastic philosophy. No one will ever come to an appreciation of the beauty of Scripture from reading Bible history, nor will one become a great dramatist from reading Lamb's *Tales from Shakespeare*. In order to appreciate the Scripture you must read the Bible itself, and in order to appreciate Shakespeare you must read the great dramas themselves. I am afraid that we have attempted to teach philosophy from someone's tales of Aristotle and St. Thomas. I think that we can say today what the authors of the *Ratio* of 1599 said in their day: our students will not be able to take their place in the educated world as men who have studied scholastic philosophy unless they know and appreciate the works of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas.

The content of our college courses in philosophy should be so arranged that the student will be introduced to the problems of philosophy according to the *method* of philosophy. By the method of philosophy, I do not mean the thesis method, but the method of Aristotle, the problem method of studying philosophy. Philosophy is not a matter of refuting adversaries, it is a quest for the truth. Philosophy, as Aristotle says in the first book of the *Metaphysics*, must have its origin in wonder and intellectual curiosity. I think that the true method of presenting philosophy has been outlined by St. Thomas in his commentary on the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle (cf. In. *Metaph.* III. Lect. 1).

The best method of teaching philosophy is to arouse in the students that wonder about reality and that desire of knowledge which Aristotle and St. Thomas knew could only be aroused by a presentation of a problem with its difficulties. Philosophy cannot be injected into the student's mind by the question and answer method, nor by any form of catechetics. If the student is to profit from the study of philosophy, he must be

aroused to philosophize for himself under the direction of the professor. St. Thomas again and again compares the teacher to a doctor. A doctor cannot give his patient health, he can only induce the patient to cure himself by aiding nature. A teacher cannot give his student knowledge, he can only induce the student by his stimulation and direction to acquire knowledge for himself by his own endeavor. The natural manner of acquiring truth is first the appreciation of a problem, then a consideration of the various answers that have been given to this problem and finally the reason for choosing one solution of a problem in preference to another. If one studies carefully the writings of St. Thomas I think that he will find that this is the method which he always employed. The manner in which this method can be adapted to our present-day teaching of philosophy has been well explained in *The Modern Schoolman*, March 1940, in an article by Father McCormick, S. J., entitled "The Student and Philosophy." Father McCormick has employed this method in his own teaching of philosophy with exceptional success. It is indeed a difficult method and makes many demands on the professor, but it produces students who appreciate philosophy.

CONCLUSION

Thus it was that I found an answer to the questions I proposed to myself. The purpose of philosophy in the college curriculum is to give the students an introduction to Catholic wisdom, to give them an appreciation of philosophy as an architectonic science, to induce them to think philosophically and to appreciate the depth and beauty of scholastic philosophy in comparison with other forms of philosophy. The best means to accomplish this purpose is to show the students what the problems of philosophy are, the difficulties of the problems, the various solutions that have been given to these problems and to show them how Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas solved these problems. In order to do this it is necessary for the students to read philosophical books, especially the modern works that have been written to introduce students to Aristotle and St. Thomas, then to proceed to the actual study of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. The criterion of success in teaching philosophy is the ability of the student to read and appreciate the writings of these great masters. More than this I am convinced a teacher cannot do for his students, less than this is not to teach them philosophy.

How can such a program be put into practice? Is it possible for our students to attain this purpose in the undergraduate course in philosophy? It may not be possible for all the students of philosophy to rise to these levels, but it should be held up before them as the ideal. Philosophy cannot be brought down to the level of mediocre students without destroying philosophy; rather the students must be raised to the level of

philosophy. At least those who are majoring in philosophy should be required to attain this purpose. It seems to me that this was the ideal of the *Ratio* of 1599 and I would not admit that our students are not capable of attaining what the students of the seventeenth century were asked to accomplish. In practice, what changes would be required in our teaching of philosophy? In some cases it might require that we revise our textbooks from the viewpoint of refuting errors, in whatever form they might appear, to a positive method of teaching philosophy. Above all it would mean that we require of our students extensive reading in philosophy and that we convince them that the textbook is not the final word in philosophical thought, but merely an introduction to philosophy. The best means of attaining this purpose would be to require of the students that once they have been introduced to a problem in philosophy they must then proceed to a study of this self-same problem in Aristotle and St. Thomas. At first this could be done with only a few problems, but the students should be expected to study a complete work of Aristotle or of Thomas Aquinas.

I am convinced that this method of teaching philosophy will restore philosophy to its rightful place in the curriculum and revive an interest in philosophy that we desire in all our students. I say this because of the experience we have had in St. Louis University in the past year. We set ourselves to revise the course in philosophy according to the above ideas and drew up our curriculum accordingly. The purpose we had in view and the means which we adopted to attain this purpose have been outlined by Father John J. O'Brien in *The Modern Schoolman*, January 1941 in an article entitled "On the Pursuit of Catholic Wisdom." The reaction of the students was better than we had expected and the enthusiasm for the study of philosophy has increased by leaps and bounds, far beyond our highest expectations. The students rose to the challenge and asked why this had not been done years ago. Undoubtedly the curriculum was too difficult for many of the students, but they were not deluded into thinking they knew philosophy when they did not. The interest that has been aroused in reading Thomas Aquinas and modern works on scholastic philosophy is truly inspiring to a teacher. We know that there are many lacunae in the program, but we know that just now it is impossible to go farther. In order to test the knowledge of our students in philosophy, we will demand of the students this year a comprehensive examination in philosophy which will test their ability to think philosophically and to appreciate scholastic philosophy. The examination will be arranged to test their ability to use the knowledge which they have acquired in their various courses. It will consist of two three-hour written examinations and a half-hour oral examination. We hope that the students who can pass this

examination will have a true appreciation of philosophy and an introduction to scholastic philosophy in its great masters. If they can do this, we think that we have accomplished the purpose of teaching philosophy in a Jesuit college. At least it will be an endeavor to restore the spirit of the *Ratio* of 1599.

Objectives in Teaching Philosophy to Undergraduates

[*Discussion of the preceding paper*]

JOSEPH F. BEGLAN, S. J.

Father Wade has given us an excellent historical study of the objectives in teaching philosophy in the Jesuit curriculum, as these aims were envisioned by the Fathers of the Society, first in the *Ratio Studiorum* of 1599 and afterwards in that of 1832. His analysis claims that a change took place over the period of time elapsing between these two dates in the Jesuit concept of philosophy, so that the contemporary Jesuits, the philosophical heirs of the authors of the 1832 *Ratio*, have been teaching philosophy not as philosophy but as a kind of apologetics.

Here, I think, is the crux of the whole question: What is philosophy as such, what is its intrinsic concept, and is this concept compatible with, or a contradiction of, the concept of "fortifying our students with the arms of truth against modern errors"?

It seems to me that no adequate answer can be given to the question "what are the objectives of teaching philosophy to the undergraduates in our Jesuit colleges?" until we determine satisfactorily three related points: first, what is the intrinsic purpose of philosophy as such?—the *finis qui*; secondly, what is the purpose of the Jesuits in teaching philosophy to their students?—the *finis operantis*; thirdly, what is character of the students to be taught in the department of philosophy in our colleges?—the *finis cui*. These three are intimately related. The first might be discussed without the other two by students of philosophy who are not teachers. The *finis operantis* may change according to the character of the teacher, but obviously no teacher of philosophy can wrest his subject to a purpose alien to it and still lay claim to teaching that subject. The *finis operantis* in the mind of the teacher of philosophy must accord with the *finis operis* of philosophy itself. Finally, no teacher can ignore the caliber of his students, who are expected to learn from his teaching. He must bring his subject to their minds, while at the same time he tries to bring them up to something approaching the level of his own.

What then is the *finis qui* of philosophy as such? I am well aware that to attempt an answer to this question in the present instance may well be carrying coals to Newcastle, but, since this is the matter under discussion, I can do no better than give my own view. I maintain that the intrinsic purpose of all and any philosophy is to investigate and discover the ultimate real causes of the universe on the grounds of reason. The philosopher is primarily a student who uses his native reason to find out the truth of things. He can do so by the very fact that he is rational. Many philosophers before our time have done so, at least in some measure. We know well enough that in our own day no philosopher has to study reality solely by his own efforts, but that he enters upon a rich inheritance of philosophic thought handed down through the centuries from his philosophical forefathers. Yet among the thinkers of the past many also have failed, at least in part, in their search for truth, whatever be the psychological reasons for their failure. Instead of truth they offer to the student of today a welter of erroneous opinions without basis in reality. Hence the student of philosophy must, secondarily but in very fact, be a critic to sift out the truth from the errors in this deposit of philosophical thought. Nor can he be content to discern what the errors are, but, for his own guidance and that of others, he must investigate the source of these errors. It is reality itself when mentally assimilated by the human mind that is objective truth, which alone is a perfective good for man. Erroneous opinion, however coherent or cleverly attained, is a mental disease that needs to be expurgated by educational therapy to achieve the "mens sana" that nature demands.

Let me hasten to say that I have the greatest reverence for the philosophic thought of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas. These are the classics, or the chief classics, in all philosophy. As such, it behooves our teachers and students of philosophy, the latter as far as they can, to familiarize themselves with the treasury of their wisdom. Yet I do not think that it is the primary purpose of any student of philosophy as philosophy to read and accept either Aristotelian or Thomistic thought without measuring it critically with reality as manifest to his own reason. It may seem presumptuous for the ordinary man to set himself up as a critic of the masters, to decide by the light of his own reason what he will and what he will not accept of their thought as evident to him. It would indeed be presumptuous if he regarded his own thought as the sole measure of truth. But the real philosopher does not do this. He has sufficient humility of mind to realize his own limitations, to understand that where he and the masters differ, there he and not they may be in error. Yet he has courage enough to measure his own thought and theirs by the one real criterion of philosophic truth, objective evidence. I know no other way for him to

learn philosophy except by analytic reflection either upon reality itself manifested by his personal experience or by assimilating and making his own the thought of others, critically sifted until it becomes objectively evident to him.

If our primary purpose in philosophizing is to become Thomists or Aristotelian-Thomists, to accept the thought of the masters uncritically because they are masters, then we are building up a false authoritarianism, which both of these eminent philosophers would be the first to reject as unphilosophical. Read them, yes, read them both for their content and their method, but read them as critically as we do Plato, Descartes, Suarez, or any other philosopher who has lived and thought before us. I do not mean to put the others on a par with Aristotle or Thomas. My present purpose is in no way connected with an historical evaluation of any body of philosophical thought. But I would insist that the philosopher is in his primary capacity a realist, in search for the thing-in-itself. It is true he too may fail in this purpose, as better men have failed before him. He will do so, almost inevitably, because of his personal limitations as well as of his inheritance of original sin, unless he has another source of guidance, the infallible word of revealed truth. This brings us to another point, the relation between reason and revelation, with which we are all familiar. The positive basis of philosophic thought is the objective evidence of reality made manifest by reason. But because of the unitary nature of all truth and because of the defectibility of human reason, the truths of divine revelation serve as a negative norm of philosophy.

This primary purpose of the philosopher and of philosophy as such to investigate the truth of things necessarily implies the avoidance of erroneous opinions, whether these affect his religious belief or not. If he is a teacher of truth he cannot remain indifferent or allow his students to remain indifferent to error. He will expound errors certainly and probe for their roots, pointing out the falsity of their premises or the incorrectness of the reasoning upon which they are based, but he will teach and defend only the truth. In this sense every teacher is an apologete, a defender of the truth. In particular the religious teacher is an apologete of all truth as one organic whole. How he will do so is a question of method and not of objectives, which may be discussed later.

The second question mentioned above, that is, the purpose of the Jesuit educator in teaching philosophy to our college undergraduates, seems to me to be a question of the *finis operantis* and not the *finis operis*. Are we to say that it is to prepare our students for the study of theology? This can hardly be the case when only a small percentage of our collegiate student body go on to such a study. Times have changed greatly since 1599 and even since 1832. Yet as Catholic priests we are using edu-

cation as an instrument for the welfare of souls. This ultimate objective of all our work is attained through the attainment of our intermediate objective, that is, teaching reality. Pope Pius XI in his encyclical on the "Christian Education of Youth" says:

"The proper and immediate end of Christian education is to cooperate with divine grace in forming the true and perfect Christian, that is, to form Christ Himself in those regenerated by baptism" (p. 32).

I submit, then, that the *finis operantis* of all our educational work, including the teaching of philosophy, is to present as a unified whole what we may call an objective and coherent body of Catholic wisdom regarding the cosmic realities, God, the world of matter, and man. Philosophy is a science in its own right, to be identified neither with the sciences of apologetics nor supernatural theology, though it is allied to both. We are engaged in the same apostolic work in the educational field as our Fathers in 1599 and in 1832. We cannot be indifferent to the many errors of skepticism, positivism, materialism and idealism, pantheism, determinism, utilitarianism, and a host of others that confront us in the history of philosophic thought from Descartes to Dewey. The teaching of truth necessarily implies a defense against error, for truth and error are contraries that cannot stand together. To say that this attitude is not philosophical because it savors of apologetics does not seem to me to be substantiated by any fact or principle. Aristotle saw fit to examine critically, in his first book of the treatise "On the Soul," the various erroneous opinions of some of his predecessors and to point out their errors. St. Thomas wrote one of his most important philosophical works "Contra Gentiles." Catholic education may be called an apologetic work in this sense that it is a defense of organic truth. The Catholic teacher uses education as an instrument, not the only possible one, but still an apt one, to present the unified yet distinct truths of reason and revelation to his students. It is obvious that not every Catholic teacher in every subject he presents is a teacher of positive religious doctrine. He may teach science or literature or history or philosophy, but he is there to point out error, wherever he finds it in his own field, whether it touches religious thought or not, and to stamp it for what it is. If he teaches philosophy, he in no way distorts it by allying it with religion, since man himself actually exists in the supernatural order, and therefore must view the real universe with the mind of a Christian as well as with that of a rational being. The way of the philosopher and the way of the Christian are parallel and not antagonistic ways of human thought and action.

The third question—namely, what is the mental caliber and the gen-

eral attitude of the undergraduate student of 1941 to the study of philosophy?—must be considered. It is in itself of no small importance, since, if his teaching is to be effective, the teacher must make contact with these students' minds. Every teacher knows when he enters the classroom that he does not do his work effectively by mere exposition of philosophic truth, however learned or eloquent, unless the evidence of that truth is presented clearly and cogently to the minds of his students. The student of 1941 is not the student of 1599. While the latter was busied only with his classics, some small amount of natural science, and his philosophy, the present college curriculum is much more complex with its various subdivisions and specialized fields of study leading to many different degrees. The content of the present science curriculum has increased greatly over the modicum of scientific thought called "natural philosophy" in the earlier *Ratio*. The content of philosophical thought has also grown into many different systems or near-systems during the last three hundred and fifty years, all of which necessitate more time and attention for the teacher of philosophy. Finally, the complex life of the twentieth century, with its numberless distracting influences, most of which were lacking in the seventeenth, does much to destroy the spirit of study and calm reasoning so necessary for the philosopher. The present undergraduate has two main interests that affect his attitude to the study of philosophy. He is looking forward either to getting a job or to entering a professional school when his college days are done, for neither of which is philosophy a prerequisite. I do not mean to say he has little or no interest in philosophy as such. I think that, if our students had more leisure for academic pursuits and less need to meet the demands of their economic status, the better type among them could be brought to a fairly high level of philosophical thinking. But as conditions are today, the average undergraduate has neither the leisure nor the ability to read with much profit the works of Aristotle, St. Thomas, or Suarez. He has not the leisure for his attention is too much divided among other things of more pressing moment, at least in his own eyes, inside and outside the classroom. He has not the ability, because his mind is not properly conditioned by his previous training to metaphysical thinking. From what I have seen in four of our Eastern colleges, I would judge that not more than 15 or 20 per cent are fit for a comprehensive study of philosophy.

Yet this undergraduate has very real need of learning the important truths of philosophy that affect his whole view of the universe, as well as of learning to meet the difficulties of the modern thinkers against both his reason and his faith. In the East we have been trying during the past several years within my experience to give a fairly complete course of thirty-four to thirty-six semester hours in scholastic philosophy to each and

all of our college students. In so doing, it seems to me that we have been trying to teach too much philosophy to too many people. Only a few can really assimilate what we have been offering to the many. I think we should separate these two groups. Let the few equipped to philosophize read and discuss the masters, Aristotle and St. Thomas, and make this the major work of their senior and junior years in college. But give the average "many," in separate classes under separate professors, a "short course" in philosophy, say of sixteen semester hours, comparable to that now given in some of our colleges. The "few" majoring in philosophy would constitute the members of the "honors course" in philosophy, the "many" would still have the Catholic's ready answer to some of the fundamental problems of life, not merely on the grounds of revelation but on those of reason as well. I am not concerned whether this latter be called apologetics or not; but I am deeply interested that all our students be taught the truth about the ultimate realities of the universe.

How shall this be done? What method shall we use to reach the undergraduate minds? It seems to me that our method must be particularly adapted to approach the student mind. We are familiar enough with both the methods discussed by Father Wade, the problem method and the thesis method. He advocates the former and rejects the latter. For myself, I see no reason why the two cannot be joined together. I believe, with Father Wade, that the initial approach to any philosophical truth should be the Thomistic manner of presenting a problem; v. g., "whether the soul is a body?" This is not merely in keeping with the Aristotelian principle that "wonder" is the proper attitude of man regarding the realities of the universe, but it is the natural inquisitiveness of man into the unknown. Aristotle has merely enunciated what is objectively evident.

But merely raising the problem is not enough. An analysis of its elements, the difficulties involved in any solution, and the relation of the problem to human life are necessary to make it intelligible and interesting to the students. Perhaps one reason why our teaching in some cases may seem dull and uninteresting to our students is that it may lack vitality; part of its content at least, notably in general metaphysics and logic, seems unrelated to anything else in their lives, to their other subjects in the curriculum, or to human thought and conduct generally. I believe that the teacher of philosophy must continually exercise himself and his students in analysis and synthesis if he is to be effective in his work. A short history of the various solutions offered by different philosophers, past and present, may be given next, together with the principal arguments of each.

The teacher then begins the approach to the problem by considering the facts in the case. These are either immediately evident from common

experience or from preceding problems already solved on the joint basis of experience and reason. By applying the analytical principles of philosophy to these facts, the real solution of the problem is reached, if the problem is solved with certainty, and, correlatively, the erroneous opinions are excluded. If the solution is only probable, the contrary opinions are not certainly excluded but these less probable solutions should be shown to be such. During the exposition of the facts, and the application of the principles, the teacher proceeds by analysis to develop his definitions, which in the light of these facts and principles are now seen to be not merely verbal or conceptual but to be actually based on reality.

Here I beg the indulgence of my audience if I have seemed to be belaboring the obvious, but I have done so merely to show that the problem method and the thesis method are not mutually antagonistic but are really complementary to each other.

The conclusion, then, regarding the solution of the problem, constitutes the thesis or theses, in proportion as the problem is relatively simple or complex. If the importance of adverse opinions warrants, other theses may be set down in opposition to these opinions, but, as I have indicated, only after these opinions with their supporting arguments have been thoroughly discussed.

The practice of so many of our textbooks of putting the thesis first, followed by definitions without any apparent basis in reality, which therefore, appear to the student merely verbal or conceptual, probably leads so many of our critics to think that our philosophy is a sort of mental gymnastics, entirely unreal. Many of our students in their own minds seem equally suspicious, when, if they are asked whence these definitions are derived, have only one answer, "from the book." As we know, real definitions are nothing more than the concise expressions of universal truths and are derived by intellectual analysis of really existing things. I deprecate with Father Wade this common practice of teaching philosophy merely as a succession of theses, definitions, adversaries, arguments, and difficulties. Perhaps it is this arbitrary order of procedure that has given color to the charge that our teaching of philosophy makes it seem a kind of apologetics. But I believe that the method I have outlined is nothing new and has been substantially followed by many of our present teachers of philosophy. Hence I say, approach the truths of philosophy as particular problems, give them, as time allows, an historical setting, but set down the conclusions as definite propositions or theses to mark off evident truth from error. This is what St. Thomas does. At the conclusion of his discussion of the problem mentioned above, "Whether the soul is a body," he has: "Therefore the soul, which is the first principle of life, is not a body but the act of a body. . . ." Finally the contrary arguments

against the doctrine of the thesis, which were advanced in the beginning, are answered so that the truth may prevail.

Some of our modern philosophers seem loathe to formulate their definitions at least explicitly, leaving the reader or the student to do so for himself. If the teacher of our undergraduates follows their example, I fear that he will find not a little obscurity remaining in the minds of his students. They may be led by his direction to attempt to formulate these definitions for themselves, as they may be led by skillful questioning to do much of the philosophical argumentation for themselves, but in the last analysis they cannot be left in doubt regarding the true solution of the problem as opposed to the erroneous one. Hence I think it sound pedagogy to emphasize this truth, and I know no better way of doing this than by formulating this truth in thesis form.

“I Teach Tommy Grammar...”¹

WILLIAM J. MCGUCKEN, S. J.

Boys in Jesuit schools are continually annoying their parents and older brothers and sisters with questions about ablative absolutes, verbs that govern the dative and other similar things. These weird questionings are no novelties to families who have boys at Jesuit schools, for they early learn that one of the ogres that torment the soul of Thomas Sylvanus Baxter (aged 13 or thereabouts) is the terrible, insatiable ogre of Latin grammar. More recently fathers and mothers may have heard their offspring mutter, as they bent over their homework and paged feverishly through their Latin grammar and exercise book, “This darn old Henle!” Parents may have conjured up a picture of a stately old gentleman, something like Browning’s grammarian, absent-minded, with a singularly Victorian air of detachment, who had written a grammar to plague modern American youth. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Robert J. Henle, the author of a series of Latin texts for high schools, is a priest of the Missouri Province, a very young priest; in fact he has not yet finished the long period of training required of Jesuits.

Before examining into the reasons why Father Henle wrote this series of Latin texts used in Jesuit high schools in America, we might examine into the question why there should be all this emphasis on grammar in Jesuit high schools. It may seem an anachronism to some in this age where “learning by doing” is the educational slogan of the hour, where grammar, from time immemorial the guardian of the tower of learning,

¹ This article appeared in *The Jesuit Bulletin* (Missouri Province), February 1942, and is reprinted here as an interesting account of Father Henle’s Latin series—one of the outstanding achievements in Jesuit education in this country.

has been thrown into the dustheap of forgotten things, and a dreadful caricature of the real article—"functional grammar," if you please—has taken its place. Are the Jesuits deliberately obscurantist in clinging thus to a discipline that is no longer necessary? American Jesuits are not the only ones to insist on grammar. Wherever you go—England, France, Italy, Germany (alas, there are no longer Jesuit schools in that unhappy land), Australia, Ireland, South America—you will find the same insistence upon Latin grammar. It has always been so. From the time of the establishment of their far-flung line of schools, the Jesuits have at least been consistent; they believed that the liberal education which they attempted to impart must be based on grammar. Indeed they named their classes *Infima Grammatica*, *Media Grammatica*, *Suprema Grammatica*.

JESUITS AND THE CHRISTIAN HERITAGE

Were they wrong in this? Are they wrong today? The Jesuits are committed to a theory of liberal education that was not their own; it was once the common possession of Christendom. That theory was based on the seven liberal arts, a Christian heritage from the age of classicism. All during those long thousand years from the fall of the Roman Empire to the flowering of Christendom in the middle ages men clung to the liberal arts as the basis not merely of their education but of civilization itself. Hence, we have the picture of the Irish monks wandering up and down Europe, confronting the barbarous or semi-barbarous hordes in their *peregrinatio pro Christo*, the Gospel in one hand, the Latin grammar in the other.

When the Jesuits established their schools and universities in the sixteenth century, they believed with a singular unity of purpose that the reason for these schools was to turn out intelligent, cultured Catholic gentlemen. As a foundation for this process they took Latin grammar, not because Latin was the language of the Church, but because, first, Latin was the ordinary means of communication among educated people, and because, secondly, they believed they had to teach their students to think before they could advance to the civilizing procedure of imparting a liberal education. Latin grammar was ideal, they believed, for that purpose. It forced the boy to focus attention on the structure of language. The discipline thus imparted would enable a boy to think for himself, because he had learned to read understandingly; and contrariwise by reason of his contact with Latin literature, he would learn to express himself adequately in speech and writing. Of course, he would also be gradually brought into touch with some of the great minds in history. The first reason no longer exists; the others are still true.

With the establishment of grammar schools by the Jesuits, it was al-

most inevitable that they should write grammars for the use of their students. Alvarez, "the master of those who know"—grammar, is a potent name in Jesuit annals. Indeed, a General Congregation of the whole Society passed a solemn resolution that Father Alvarez' grammar should be used in all Jesuit schools. Fancy grammar being of sufficient importance to take up the time of an assembly of this great Society that was engaged in world-shaking contests with kings and heresiarchs!

LATIN IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Yes, grammar was important to the sixteenth-century Jesuit; it is important to his twentieth-century successor. And all through her long and glorious history there have been scholars of the Society of Jesus who have not disdained to take time out to write grammars for small boys. It may not have been exactly "Latin without Tears," for the Jesuit master believed in the salvific power of hard work, but at least it was Latin made interesting under these extraordinary men who made schoolmastering an adventure in discovery; for they successfully applied the principle that a boy retains more in his memory when he has acquired it in a mood of curiosity and imagination.

Father Robert Henle, during his teaching days as a scholastic at St. Louis University High School, dreamed of producing a set of texts for high-school Latin that would embrace the time-honored principles of the *Ratio Studiorum* with all its hallowed traditions and that would make use of all the means pedagogic, typographical, and technical likely to appeal to the American boys he was teaching. With incredible energy and marvelous skill he wrote a series of texts, a *Latin Grammar* and a Latin exercise book for each year of the high school. All of them are published by the Loyola University Press, Chicago, and are admirable examples of the publishers' craftsmanship. Already in a few short years they are being used in the high schools of five Jesuit provinces in the United States and in approximately fifty other highschools not run by Jesuits. There are something like fifty thousand American high school boys for whom Henle has become a household word, just as Alvarez became such for the schoolboys tutored by the Old Society.

"STREAMLINED" LATIN

Father Henle calls his system "streamlined" Latin. This does not mean grammarless Latin. When an automobile is streamlined, marvels of engineering skill go into the manufacture to see that nothing will interfere with its performance. It is thus with the Henle system. Linguistic training and humanistic insight are chosen as the goal of the high-school Latin course, the time-hallowed objective of Jesuit education, *eloquentia*. Everything leads to this aim. Themes, exercises, memory assignments, transla-

tion, parsing—all have this in mind. There is no time in his system for the gadgets of Latin, the making of Roman togas or the fashioning of Caesar's bridge; there is no place for that bane of classical teaching, "intelligent guessing." Father Henle attempts to teach mastery; time is precious; there is no longer the spacious leisure of the old days when the principal, almost the only, subject of the day was Latin. There must be a complete mastery of forms, of meanings, of syntax; and this must be constantly tested, first by reading intelligently and appreciatively in the great Latin authors—Caesar, Cicero, Virgil—and secondly by the ability to turn English sentences into Latin in imitation of the authors studied.

The results? Perhaps it is too early to form an opinion, but I have been watching the progress of the experiment in the Missouri Province high schools for the past five years, and I am amazed and gratified by the showing. Some of the boys in classes I have visited have an extraordinarily sure grasp of Latin for their age and for their years of training. That all of their "minds are filled with humanistic ideas and ideals as subsumed into and remade in the Catholic tradition," the desired result as stated by Father Henle, is perhaps too much to hope for. But that some have at least approximately attained to this is an extraordinary thing. After all

*A man's reach should exceed his grasp
Or what's a heaven for?*

THE NEW SERIES

The reason for the success of Father Henle's Latin series can be attributed to the fact that he has seized on the element of interest with astonishing cleverness, but at no loss to the essential elements of Latin training. Grammar, forms, and syntax boys must learn and must learn thoroughly; but that does not mean that these things, so dull of themselves to modern young America, cannot be made interesting. For example, in the *Second Year Latin*, maps, diagrams, and pictures of modern warfare make Caesar's Gallic war almost a contemporaneous affair. So too Cicero in *Third Year Latin* no longer is just another Latin task; he becomes a modern figure; the struggle he is engaged in is of paramount importance even to young American ears—the struggle between anarchy and constitutional government. The events that led up to Cicero's first speech against Catiline are not embalmed in dull academic notes; Father Henle uses the device of newspaper flashes from an imaginary news service of the day. And Seuteen listens intently for the first words of Cicero's masterly invective: *Quousque tandem abutere, Catilina.*

A word should be said about the ecclesiastical Latin in each of the four books. In the third book, for instance, is taken up the struggle between Rome and Christianity from the days of Christ and the Apostles,

through the ages of persecution down to modern times and the defiance of totalitarianism by Pope Pius XII. And all done with matchless art, leaving an astonishingly moving picture of the endless conflict between Christ and the powers of this world.

Father Henle's *Fourth Book*, the Virgil book, gathers up the threads of all that has gone before and leads the students forward at least a little on the way of Christian humanism. Cicero's superb *Pro Archia*, with its unforgettable praise of humane letters, and Virgil's *Aeneid* are edited with so expert a hand by Father Henle that in actual truth those pagan classics become genuine heralds of Christ. It is an astonishing thing, but as far as I know there has never been a Catholic edition of Virgil, that *anima naturaliter Christiana*. Father Henle has proved himself in these books a truly Christian humanist. As one looks at the sparkle and fire of these textbooks, one looks back with nostalgia to one's own school days. *Utinam noster esset*—would that he had been our schoolmaster, to lead us and guide us over the stony path of classical learning in such expert fashion.

* * *

Books by Father Henle, published by Loyola University Press, Chicago:

1. A Latin Grammar for High School.
2. First Year Latin.
3. Second Year Latin.
4. Third Year Latin.
5. Fourth Year Latin.
6. Streamlined Latin; A Statement of Basic Principles.

PROGRAM
Annual Meeting
Jesuit Educational Association

STEVENS HOTEL, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

APRIL 6, 9, 10, 1942



I. GENERAL MEETING OF ALL DELEGATES

Monday, April 6 ~ 7:30 P. M.

REPORT OF NATIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR—Reverend Edward B. Rooney, S. J. · “JESUIT EDUCATION AND THE FUTURE”: PROBLEMS—Reverend Albert H. Poetker, S. J.; SOLUTIONS—Reverend Raphael C. McCarthy, S. J. · ADDRESS TO THE DELEGATES—Very Reverend Zacheus J. Maher, S. J.

II. DINNER MEETING OF ALL DELEGATES

Thursday, April 9 ~ 6:30 P. M.

“INTER-AMERICAN RELATIONS”—Reverend John F. Bannon, S. J.
“DEVELOPING A SOCIAL SENSE IN OUR STUDENTS”—Reverend John P. Delany, S. J. · “DEVELOPING A MISSION SENSE IN OUR STUDENTS”—Reverend Calvert P. Alexander, S. J.

III. MEETING OF SECONDARY SCHOOL DELEGATES

Friday, April 10

Morning Session ~ 9:30 A. M.

REPORT OF COMMISSION ON SECONDARY SCHOOLS—Reverend Joseph C. Mulhern, S. J., *Chairman*. · “A FRESHMAN DEAN EVALUATES THE HIGH-SCHOOL PRODUCT”—Reverend Leo A. Shea, S. J.

Afternoon Session ~ 2:00 P. M.

“‘BEATING THE GUN’—THE ACCELERATION PROBLEM”—Reverend Arthur J. Evans, S. J. · “GUIDANCE IN THE JESUIT HIGH SCHOOL”—Reverend James A. King, S. J.

IV. MEETING OF UNIVERSITY AND COLLEGE DELEGATES

Friday, April 10

Morning Session ~ 9:30 A. M.

"TEACHING OF PHILOSOPHY: COMMENTS"—Reverend John A. O'Brien, S. J. · "DEVELOPING A SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY IN STUDENTS"—Reverend Francis E. Corkery, S. J. · REPORTS OF COMMISSIONS: *Commission on Professional Schools*—Reverend Samuel K. Wilson, S. J.; *Commission on Graduate Schools*—Reverend Francis J. Gerst, S. J.; *Commission on Seminaries*—Reverend Joseph C. Glose, S. J.

Afternoon Session ~ 2:00 P. M.

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON LIBERAL ARTS COLLEGES. *The mimeographed report of the Commission was distributed in March. Comments on its findings will be made by members of the Commission:* "TRAINING OF LAY FACULTY MEMBERS"—Reverend William C. Gianera, S. J. · "RELIGIOUS DISTRIBUTION OF LAY FACULTY MEMBERS"—Reverend Joseph R. N. Maxwell, S. J. · "RELIGIOUS EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUNDS OF LAY FACULTY MEMBERS"—Reverend Percy A. Roy, S. J. · "COLLEGE GRADUATES CONTINUING THEIR EDUCATION"—Reverend Allan P. Farrell, S. J. · "THE FRESHMAN TESTING PROGRAM"—Reverend Paul C. Reinert, S. J. · "SUCCESS OF COLLEGE STUDENTS WHO ENTERED PROFESSIONAL SCHOOLS"—Reverend Wilfred M. Mallon, S. J., *Chairman.*

Contributors

DR. WILLIAM H. MARNELL, A. B. Honors (Boston College), Ph. D. (Harvard), has been professor of Latin and Greek in "Boston Latin School" since 1929. His interesting description of this nationally famous classical high school will be profitable and nostalgic reading for administrators of Jesuit high schools! We hope Dr. Marnell will again favor the QUARTERLY in future issues.

MR. JOHN P. ROCK, S. J., will complete studies for a Master's degree in Latin this June at Boston College. His article is a carefully prepared contribution to the discussion on Latin in the curriculum (J. E. Q.—September, December, 1941).

FATHER EDWARD J. DRUMMOND, S. J. (Missouri Province), is engaged in doctoral studies in the School of Letters, University of Iowa. His review of *Literary Scholarship* includes a first-hand account of the notable experiment in graduate study inaugurated at Iowa by Norman Foerster.

DR. ROBERT POLLOCK (assistant professor of philosophy, Graduate School, Fordham University), continues his exposition of the fundamental principles of education ("Education and Personality," J. E. Q., December 1941), with this keen analysis of current ideas in education, especially those of Dr. Robert M. Hutchins of the University of Chicago.

The papers read at the Jesuit Philosophy Meeting, Philadelphia, December 1941, are printed, as promised, in this issue. FATHER WILLIAM L. WADE, professor of philosophy, St. Louis University, and FATHER JOSEPH F. BEGLAN, professor of philosophy, Canisius College, make a stimulating and thoughtful contribution to this very important investigation. We invite readers of the QUARTERLY to continue discussion of this topic in future issues.

No readers should miss FATHER MCGUCKEN's comments on Father Henle's Latin Series.

Jesuit Educational Quarterly

INDEX TO VOLUME IV

June 1941 to March 1942

Articles are entered under both author and subject headings. Book reviews are listed under the author of the book, with title in italics and the name of the reviewer in parenthesis. The figures refer to the initial page of the articles.

Baltimore Conference [of College and University Presidents]—Before and After, The. Edward B. Rooney.....	153
Beglan, Joseph F.: Objectives in Teaching Philosophy to Undergraduates.....	206
Boland, Joseph: Religion Institute—High Schools.....	94
Boston Latin School: An Educational Survival. William H. Marnell, Ph. D....	163
Cantillon, Joseph F.: Periodicals in a High-School Library.....	135
Castiello, Jaime: The Psychology of Intellectual and Moral Habits.....	59
Catholic Tradition, The Classics and. John P. Rock.....	168
Classics and Catholic Tradition, The. John P. Rock.....	168
Defense, National: What It May Do to the Catholic College. Samuel K. Wilson	130
Drummond, Edward J.: The Study of Literature.....	176
Education and Personality. Robert Pollock, Ph. D.....	109
Education, President Hutchins and the Modern Problem of. Robert Pollock, Ph. D.	182
English Program for an Undergraduate Professional School. John Waldron, Ph. D.	81
Enrollment Statistics in Jesuit Schools [1941-1942].....	105
Fordham University Celebrates Its Centenary.....	89
Graduate Philosophy, Programs in. [Fordham; St. Louis University].....	71
Grady, Richard F.: Premises and a Conclusion.....	125
Grammar, I Teach Tommy. William J. McGucken.....	213
Habits, The Psychology of Intellectual and Moral. Jaime Castiello.....	59
Higher Education in Trouble.....	133
Hutchins and the Modern Problem of Education, President. Robert Pollock, Ph. D.	182
Jesuit Colleges, The Function of Philosophy in. William L. Wade.....	193
Jesuit Education and Ibero-American Relations. Senor Jose Ortiz-Monasterio...	18
Jesuit Education, Self-Activity in. George V. McCabe.....	85
Jesuit Educational Association, Commissions of.....	75
Jesuit Educational Association: Jesuit Institutions Represented at the Annual Meeting [New Orleans, 1941].....	5
Jesuit Educational Association: Letter of Very Reverend Father Assistant to..	7
Jesuit Educational Association: Meeting of Secondary-School Delegates.....	24
Jesuit Educational Association: Meeting of University and College Delegates.	28
Jesuit Educational Association: Program of Annual Meeting [Chicago, 1942]	218
Jesuit Educational Association: Report of Executive Director at Annual Meeting [1941]. Edward B. Rooney.....	9
Jesuit Schools, Enrollment in [1941-1942].....	105
Jesuit Schools: A Comparison of National Statistics. Charles M. O'Hara.....	105
Latin: Is It Worth Fighting For? Pedagogus.....	77
Latin, The Question of—Replies. Hugh P. O'Neill; Richard F. Grady.....	123

Leturia, Pedro: Why the Society of Jesus Became a Teaching Order.....	31
Librarians, Opportunities of Jesuit High-School. John A. Murphy.....	137
Library, Periodicals in a High-School. Joseph F. Cantillon.....	135
Literature, The Study of. Edward J. Drummond.....	176
McCabe, George V.: Self-Activity in Jesuit Education.....	85
McGucken, William J.: "I Teach Tommy Grammar . . ."	213
McNamee, Stephen F.: Philosophy Convention—Eastern Provinces [1941]....	96
Maher, Zacheus: Letter of Very Reverend Father Assistant.....	7
Marnell, William H., Ph. D.: Boston Latin Schools: An Educational Survival.	163
Monasterio, Senor Jose Ortiz-: Jesuit Education and Ibero-American Relations.	18
Morrison, Bakewell: They Know with Their Hearts.....	116
Morrison, Bakewell: Religion Institute—Colleges.....	91
Murphy, John A.: Opportunities of Jesuit High-School Librarians.....	137
National Defense: What It May Do to the Catholic College. Samuel K. Wil- son	130
News from the Field.....	142
O'Hara, Charles M.: A Comparison of National Statistics.....	105
O'Neill, Hugh P.: Why Blame Latin?.....	123
Periodicals in a High-School Library. Joseph F. Cantillon.....	135
Personality, Education and. Robert Pollock, Ph. D.....	109
Philosophy, A Note on the Teaching of.....	120
Philosophy, Objectives in Teaching to Undergraduates. Joseph F. Beglan....	206
Philosophy, Programs in Graduate [Fordham; St. Louis University].....	71
Philosophy Convention—Eastern Provinces [1941]. Stephen F. McNamee....	96
Philosophy in Jesuit Colleges, The Function of. William L. Wade.....	193
Pollock, Robert, Ph. D.: Education and Personality.....	109
Pollock, Robert, Ph. D.: President Hutchins and the Modern Problem of Edu- cation	182
Psychology of Intellectual and Moral Habits, The. Jaime Castiello.....	59
Religion Institute—Colleges. Bakewell Morrison.....	91
Religion Institute—High Schools. Joseph Boland.....	94
Rock, John P.: The Classics and Catholic Tradition.....	168
Rooney, Edward B.: Report of the Executive Director of the Jesuit Educational Association at Annual Meeting [1941].....	9
Rooney, Edward B.: The Baltimore Conference—Before and After.....	153
Society of Jesus, Why It Became a Teaching Order. Pedro Leturia.....	31
Statistics, A Comparison of National. Charles M. O'Hara.....	105
Wade, William L.: The Function of Philosophy in Jesuit Colleges.....	193
Waldron, John, Ph. D.: English Program for an Undergraduate Professional School	81
Wilson, Samuel K.: What National Defense May Do to the Catholic College	130